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ABSTRACT
As the credit card evolved from simply a replacement of cash to a large industry, it
also opened opportunities for the commission of credit card fraud. Evidence of this is
the concomitant growth of the credit card industry and credit card fraud in countries
where the credit card is part of the payments system. An analysis of the payments
systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia suggests these
countries have experienced similar trends in the incidence of credit card fraud and in
efforts to address it. These are the benchmark countries for comparison with the
Indonesian case.
While the payments system in Indonesia is not as advanced as that in the United
States, United Kingdom and Australia, there are similarities between these countries
and Indonesia in the growth of the credit card industry and incidence of credit card
fraud. Therefore, Indonesia may benefit from the experiences of these countries in
managing the risk of credit card fraud in their payments systems. By means of
benchmarking, this study analyses trends in credit card fraud prevention in the
payments systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to
highlight lessons that can be applied to Indonesia from commerce and criminology
perspectives.
This study concludes that the essentials of credit card fraud prevention practice in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia comprise six key areas of resource
allocation: understanding of the real problems; fraud prevention policy; fraud
awareness; technology-based protection, identity management; and legal deterrence.
11

These six key areas are mainly supported by four pillars: user; institution; network;
and government and industry. For purposes of this study, this framework has been
dubbed the ‘Four Pillared-House of Payments Fraud Prevention Practice’.
Based on this framework, Indonesia appears to be following the footsteps of the
benchmark countries by allocating its resources to develop the six key areas
supported by the four pillars. However, credit card fraud prevention practice in
Indonesia is at lower level of robustness than those in the benchmark countries.
Comparative deficiencies between Indonesia and benchmark countries are indicated,
inter alia, by a lack of reliable fraud data collection, management and distribution
mechanisms as well as a lack of effective and efficient identity management practice.
This implies that Indonesia’s first step in improving its credit card fraud prevention
practices should be an examination of those of other countries. On the basis of this
examination, deficiencies and weaknesses in the system should be identified and
action taken to make it more consistent with credit card fraud prevention practices of
other countries. This may not only improve prevention practices but also allow
Indonesian regulators to identify vulnerable areas within the credit card fraud
prevention system and anticipate possible offence displacement from other countries.
Past experience shows that credit card fraud, as with other crimes, often moves from
places perceived by perpetrators to have strong defences against it to places with
weaker defences. For this reason, it is essential that Indonesia keeps up with the rest
of the world in terms of credit card fraud prevention.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND OF STUDY
As one of the most popular non-cash payments instruments in the world economy,
the credit card has also contributed to the existence of a particular type of crime:
credit card fraud. This crime has grown along with the growth of the credit card
industry all around the world. In the US, for example, fraud statistics from the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have often named credit card fraud as the most
common type of identity theft scheme1. In the UK, the total loss from various types
of plastic card (debit card and credit card) fraud in 2007 alone was $US1048.5
million (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 5). In Australia, total
loss from credit card and charge card fraud was $US70 million just for the year 20072
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2008b).
In Indonesia, the credit card industry has become a prosperous industry that is
expected to grow even further. For example, in 2007, 9.2 million cards were in
circulation, with a transaction value of $US8 billion, compared to 8.2 million
transactions valued at $US6 billion in 2006. This represents an 11.7 per cent increase
in the number of cards and a 13.7 per cent increase in transaction value) (Bank
Indonesia, 2008a, p. 32)3. Simultaneously, according to Bank Indonesia, in 2006
approximately 56,900 cases of card fraud (including credit card fraud) occurred, with

1

For examples, see Federal Trade Commission (2008a, p. 13; 2007b, p. 13; 2006, p. 13).
For more discussion on fraud statistics in the US, the UK and Australia, see Chapter 6.
3
For more discussion on the statistics of the Indonesian credit card industry, see Chapter 5.
2
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total losses of over $US4 million (Bank Indonesia, 2007c, p. 30)4. The high level of
fraud in Indonesia had meant that the country was, at one stage, ranked among the
worst in the world for e-commerce fraud5.
The growth of the credit card industry in Indonesia, as well as in other countries
(such as the US, UK and Australia) is mainly attributable to the need for greater
efficiency (for example, faster payment time) in the payments system6. On the other
hand, the existence of the credit card as a non-cash payment instrument and its
technology infrastructure also creates opportunities for crime. For example, card-notpresent (CNP) fraud can be perpetrated via the internet against a merchant from
different country without the presence of the card and the offender7. This means that
offenders and victims of this scheme could be anyone around the globe, which
underscores the seriousness the offence. Moreover, various ways exist for credit card
fraud to be perpetrated that range from conventional theft of cards to sophisticated
theft of card data through computer networks8. Jovan (2006, pp. 5-50) argues that in
many cases of credit card fraud, the methods used to perpetrate the offences are very
simple. This suggests that victim ignorance is also a major factor behind the growth
of credit card fraud. To add to the problem, in practice, proceeds from credit card
fraud can also be used by offenders to finance other, more serious crime, such as
terrorism. For example, one of the perpetrators of the Bali bombings, Imam Samudra,
4

Despite the common use of these figures (for example, by mass media) as a reference to current
prevalence and costs of credit card fraud in Indonesia, questions regarding their reliability remain.
This is discussed in Chapter 8.
5
For example, ClearCommerce, in its Fraud Prevention Guide ranked Indonesia as the second-worst
country in the world after Ukraine (ClearCommerce, 2002, p. 27).
6
See Chapter 5 for more discussion.
7
See Chapter 6 for more discussion.
8
For examples, see Hamadi (2004, pp. 27-149).
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during his time in prison in 2004, wrote a jailhouse manifesto which included an
explanation of how to find information on the internet about credit card fraud
techniques (Lormel, 2008, p. 14)9.
Although efforts have been made to address the problems of credit card fraud, and
high fraud losses have been experienced by countries such as Indonesia, the US, the
UK and Australia10, it remains a major problem. The impact on their economies
underlies the need for further actions to address the problem by designing and putting
in place more effective and efficient measures for fraud prevention, in addition to
improving fraud investigation and prosecution. In doing so, building sufficient
knowledge on the actual problems through intensive and extensive studies should be
among the first priorities.
Discussions on issues of credit card fraud and its prevention have been part of many
studies all around the world. Such studies analysed the issues of or related to credit
card fraud from various perspectives. Some examples of these are:
A study by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) (1998, p. 1) that analysed



various issues of identity fraud, including law enforcement, costs of fraud, the
use of the internet to support the offence and the role of credit bureaus in relation
to the management of the confidentiality of personal identifying information.
This study establishes that in addition to imposing high financial costs, identity
fraud could also result in significant human cost, such as emotional and
opportunity lost costs (United States General Accounting Office, 1998, p. 4). It
9

For more discussion on terrorist financing by means of credit card fraud, see Chapter 3.
For more discussion on fraud statistics, see Chapter 5.
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also suggests that the threat of identity fraud has increased, partly facilitated by
the development of computer technology, particularly the internet (United States
General Accounting Office, 1998, pp. 50-51).


The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has conducted studies in addition to
the periodical publications of the fraud statistics on identity theft within which
credit card fraud is categorised. The 2003 Identity Theft Survey Report (Federal
Trade Commission, 2003) and the 2006 Identity Theft Survey Report (Federal
Trade Commission, 2007a) are examples of FTC studies that highlight the trends
in identity theft in the corresponding study periods11.



Over the last few years, Cybersource UK has conducted fraud studies on the
trends of online fraud in the UK. For example, the Fourth Annual UK Online
Fraud Report: Online Payment Fraud Trends, Merchant and Consumer
Response (CyberSource UK, 2008) and the Fifth Annual UK Online Fraud
Report: Online Payment Fraud Trends, Merchant and Consumer Response
(CyberSource UK, 2009) highlight the trends in online payments fraud
prevention in the corresponding study periods.



The study by Charlton and Taylor (2004), Online Credit Card Fraud Against
Small Businesses (published by the Australian Institute of Criminology), focuses
on online credit card fraud on small businesses in Australia. The study
established that only a small percentage of businesses discovered fraud by
themselves; while the vast majority were advised of fraud by their financial
institution (Charlton & Taylor, 2004, p. xii). However, because it took a long

11

More discussion on these studies and other works of the FTC is in Chapter 6.
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time for a trader to receive an advice about a fraud, a business may have
processed several transactions on the same credit card and therefore had higher
and continuous fraud losses (Charlton & Taylor, 2004, p. xii).


The study by KPMG, the Fraud Survey 2004, had the primary objective of
describing the current fraud issues in Australia and New Zealand (KPMG, 2004,
p. 2). The study established that the most common form of identity fraud was
obtaining credit or purchasing consumer goods by assuming someone else’s
identity (KPMG, 2004, p. 27). This included using someone else’s credit card or
using the identity of someone with a good credit history to obtain a loan (KPMG,
2004, p. 27).



In Indonesia, a study by Owen et al. (n.d.), Indonesia — Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) Assessment (January 16–February 5, 2001),
was carried out with the main objective of advancing the understanding of the
extent of ICT employment in Indonesia to support its further development. The
study suggests that Indonesian businesses’ fear of the threats from credit card
fraud was among the factors that hindered the development of ICT in the country
(Owen, Sulaiman, Baldia, & Mintz, n.d., p. 45).



The study in Indonesia by CastleAsia (2002, p. 1), SMEs and E-Commerce,
identifies the benefits and obstacles of the use of the internet for e-commerce by
Indonesian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It also suggests that
customers’ fear of disclosing their credit card details in online transactions was a
factor behind the slow progress of e-commerce activities in the country (Castle
Asia, 2002, p. 42).
19



The study by ICT Watch and USAID (2003, pp. 16-25), The Condition of the
Indonesian Internet Cafe (Medan, Makassar, Bandung, Jogja, Jakarta
Suburban), focuses on the internet café industry in Indonesia, and found that the
existence of internet cafés in Indonesia also contributed to the growth of credit
card fraud during the corresponding study period. The anonymity provided by the
use of internet access at such cafes, and the lack of attention from the
management of these establishments were identified by this study as among the
causes for these problems (ICT Watch & PEG-USAID, 2003, pp. 16-25).



Indradi (2006) in his study, Carding: Modus Operandi, Investigation and
Prosecution (translated title), describes and assesses the investigation process of
online credit card fraud as well as the implementation of the existing criminal
law in the prosecution of offenders in West Java, Indonesia. This study concludes
that the lack of sufficient laws12 made the investigation of online credit card
fraud offences and the prosecution of offenders very difficult and challenging
tasks (Indradi, 2006, pp. 161-162).

Despite the various perspectives used in the current literature, such as in the above
studies, few (if any) discuss the strategy at the Indonesian national level to prevent
credit card fraud. Therefore, this study is part of the efforts to shed more light on the
issues of credit card fraud and prevention. It focuses on the trends of offences and

12

This matter has been addressed by the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 11 of 2008 on
Electronic Information and Electronic Transaction (see Chapter 8).
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prevention strategy, from commerce and criminological perspectives13, using
benchmarking14 to formulate recommendations for Indonesia, based on the
experiences of the US, the UK and Australia.

SCOPE OF STUDY
This study is concerned with payment card fraud prevention with special reference to
credit card fraud prevention in the payments systems of Indonesia, the US, the UK
and Australia. This study is of Forensic Accounting nature. As explained by Bologna
and Lindquist (1987):
Forensic and investigative accounting is the application of financial skills and an
investigative mentality to unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of
evidence. As a discipline, it encompasses financial expertise, fraud knowledge, and a
strong knowledge and understanding of business reality and the workings of the legal
system.

Markman et al. (2006, p. 525) believe that since the emergence of large scandals such
as those of Enron and WorldCom, forensic accountants’ works have often been
viewed by many as associated with crime investigations. However, as argued by
Markman et al. (2006, p. 525):
In reality, forensic accountants offer a much wider range of services…in their
consulting role, forensic accountants may provide discovery assistance, prove
business facts, compute damages, and assist counsel in the development of
strategy.

13

Unlike much of the other literature, which puts greater emphasis on the legal and technological
points of view, this study focuses on the financial side of payment fraud prevention practice. This
often becomes a challenge to the payments industry in particular, and the payments system in
general, because in order to reduce the financial cost of fraud they must also use their financial
resources to generate net benefits (where benefits exceed costs), and thus, theories and concepts
from the field of criminology are often implemented to achieve the desired objectives. For more
discussion, see Chapter 3.
14
See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.
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In this study, the researcher examines evidences particularly those of financial nature
to understand the national strategy or its equivalent on credit card fraud prevention in
the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia. The benchmark countries are selected for
their importance to this research primarily due to the availability of the relevant data
and information on credit card fraud and prevention initiatives thereof. Other factor
behind this selection is the fact that their credit card industries are older than
Indonesia’s. As discussed in Chapter 2, the US was the birthplace of the first
universal credit card in the world. As such, the US credit card industry is also known
as the oldest in the world from which other countries may learn from its experience
including that of fraud prevention. The UK credit card industry is also among the
oldest in the world from which Indonesia may learn about fraud prevention15. The
UK was the first country in the world to complete a national rollout of the chip and
PIN technology which was later on followed by other countries including Malaysia
and Indonesia16. Australia is selected as a representation of a country with low level
of fraud relative to other countries in the world and is geographically close to
Indonesia17. Examination of the country’s payment fraud prevention practice may
help Indonesia in developing its own anti fraud strategy.
Despite their similarities, the US, the UK and Australia are still three different
countries with different economy, politics, culture, to name a few. This study, as
explained in the following discussions, focuses on the economic aspects of the credit

15

For more discussion, see Chapter 7.
For more discussion, see Chapter 7.
17
For more discussion, see Chapter 7.
16
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card fraud prevention practices18. From this point of view, as discussed in Chapter 2,
credit card networks in the three countries as well as in Indonesia and the rest of the
world are structurally similar to one another which makes comparison feasible. From
economic point of view, it is of importance to acknowledge the fact that the
benchmark countries’ economies are stronger than Indonesia’s which influence their
ability to spend resources for crime prevention. An expensive fraud prevention
initiative, for example, may be suitable for a country with strong economy such as
the US but not for one with less developed economy such as Indonesia.
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 2, the credit card industries of the three
countries are also older than Indonesia’s which also means that other aspects such as
consumers’ understanding of and regulators’ experience in credit card fraud and
prevention is better than in Indonesia. Decades of experience has made payments
system regulators in the benchmark countries to be more capable of dealing with
issues within credit card networks. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the payments
systems of the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia as important parts of the four
countries’ economies.
This study does not see merely copying fraud prevention initiatives from one country
to another as a feasible solution. The technical application of fraud prevention
initiatives is not this study’s primary concern. It focuses more on the principles upon
which such initiatives are built. In other words, this study examines the major credit
card fraud prevention measures in the US, the UK and Australia to highlight the

18

Due to the limited time and resources and to maintain focus, other aspects such as politics and
culture are not analysed in this study.
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universal aspects of their fraud prevention practices which can be applied in
Indonesia.
As discussed in Chapter 4, this study uses ‘strategic benchmarking’ and is
emphasizing on credit card fraud prevention on a strategic level. This study’s analysis
emphasizes on the national strategy (or its equivalent) employed by the US, the UK,
and Australia rather than technical issues in their credit card fraud prevention
practices. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 8, this study’s recommendation to
Indonesia does not emphasize on technical issues, but rather, a nationwide strategy.
This study looks at the ‘stories behind the number’ by examining various financial
figures directly or indirectly related to credit card fraud. Nevertheless, such figures
particularly payment fraud statistics from different countries are often categorized
and calculated in different ways which makes side by side comparison in terms of
nominal value very difficult if not impossible to be conducted. Therefore, this study
does not attempt to do so, but instead, it identifies based on the available financial
evidences the most common credit card fraud problems in the US, the UK and
Australia and changes thereof over time as well as the patterns of prevention practice
to mitigate such problems.
Terms such as ‘payment fraud’ or ‘plastic card fraud’ are used in this study to reflect
the scope of some discussions where clear identification of the type of fraud in
question is not possible. For example, the APACS, in its publicly available fraud
data, categorizes credit card fraud and debit card fraud under ‘plastic card fraud’.
Payment fraud, in this study, means all types of fraud which involves payment
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instruments such as cheque, internet banking, credit card, debit card, to name a few.
Plastic card fraud, on the other hand, is a narrower category which includes only
card-based payment instruments such as debit card and credit card.
As the term suggests, ‘credit card fraud’ is a type of fraud perpetrated against or
using credit card. The essential part of any fraud is the use of deception to obtain
benefits. As defined by Wells (2005, p. 8), four general elements must be present for
an offence to be called ‘fraud’:


A material false statement;



Knowledge that the statement was false when it was uttered;



Reliance on the false statement by the victim; and



Damages resulting from the victim’s reliance on the false statement.

In practice, crimes involving credit cards do not necessarily fall into the category of
‘fraud’, but are often considered an ‘abuse’. This commonly includes offences
involving the use of legally obtained credit cards for unauthorised or unlawful
activities, and these fall into the category of ‘credit card abuse’. The term ‘abuse’
itself is commonly associated with misuse of trust. The Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary (2009) includes these definitions of ‘abuse’:


A corrupt practice or custom;



Improper or excessive use or treatment;



A deceitful act;



Language that condemns or vilifies usually unjustly, intemperately, and angrily; and



Physical maltreatment.
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An example of credit card abuse is the unauthorized use of a company’s credit card
by an employee to whom the card is entrusted to for personal benefits. To avoid
confusion, and to maintain its focus, this study covers only credit card crime under
the category of ‘credit card fraud’. In other words, this study focuses on ‘external
threats’ (for example, data breaches by hackers), rather than ‘internal threats’ (for
example, corrupt employees). John Marti and Anthony Zeilingger define ‘credit card
crime’ as (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 84):
…a person commits an offense if he uses a credit card for the purpose of obtaining
property or services with knowledge that: (1) the card is stolen or forged; or (2) the card
has been revoked or cancelled; or (3) for any other reason his use of the card is
unauthorized.

The Internet Crime Complaint Center, a partnership between the US Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the National White Collar Crime Center, define ‘card
fraud’ as (Internet Crime Complaint Center, n.d.):
The unauthorized use of a credit/debit card to fraudulently obtain money or property.
Credit/debit card numbers can be stolen from unsecured web sites, or can be obtained in
an identity theft scheme.

As internet technology has progressed, the term ‘carding’ has emerged to describe the
use of information and communication technology (ICT) in credit card fraud
offences. As defined by the US Department of Justice (2001), carding is a term used
by hackers to describe the use of stolen credit card information to purchase items or
services. This study defines ‘credit card fraud’ as an act of deception involving the
use of illegally obtained (stolen, forged, cancelled and so on) credit card or credit
card data to obtain goods and/or services.
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This study assesses fraud prevention practices, which are defined by this study as
being any efforts by regulatory institutions (for example, central banks) and/or other
parties in the payments system to prevent credit card fraud offences from occurring.
In doing its assessment, this study chooses financial perspective similar to that which
is used by credit card industry in managing fraud risk. As discussed in chapter II, in
this perspective, credit card fraud loss is a financial expense which must be borne by
a financial institution or any other parties in a credit card network. Such expense
must be minimised to maintain profitability. As discussed in Chapter 2, from
financial point of view, a credit card network represents a set of economic activities
organised by an association and involves primarily the four groups of main
participants: issuers, acquirers, merchants and cardholders. Each of these parties joins
the network to gain benefits from credit card transactions and they will try to
minimize the cost of their participation in the network including fraud loss19.
The payments system instead of criminal justice system is chosen as the area of focus
for this research because the credit card is commonly one of the payment instruments
in the payments systems of most (if not all) countries in the world. A ‘payments
system’ is defined as a system that enables payments or transfer of funds to be made
within a country20. More discussion on the definition, principles of governance within
a payments system, and an overview of the development of payments systems in the

19
20

For more discussions, see Chapters 2 and 3.
Some authors use slightly different terms to refer to this system (for example, ‘payment system’ or
‘payment systems’). This study uses the term ‘payments system’, referring to the name of the
Australian body in charge of determining the Reserve Bank’s payments system policy, the
Payments System Board (PSB). Nevertheless, for direct quotations or some other references, the
original term is still used.
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US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia21 are in Chapters 3 and 5. This study also
believes that the participants of a payments system (for example, consumers, banks,
industry body) are in an important position to prevent fraud, because many (if not
most) fraud prevention measures (for example, chip cards, fraud prevention
campaign, bank fraud prevention policies) originate from this system. This does not,
of course, undermine the roles of the criminal justice system (for example, police,
prosecutors, courts) in payments fraud prevention and deterring potential offenders
from committing their offences.
This study focuses on and analyses events that occurred during the five-year period 1
January 2003 to 31 December 2007. However, some events that occurred outside this
time period are also part of the discussions, because they are considered integral to,
or substantially affect, the events within the time period. The primary data analysed
in this study are those generated from the self-reporting mechanism within a
payments system. Such data are selected as they are the closest to represent the actual
population of payments fraud victim. For example, a cardholder, as soon as he or she
realizes that his or her credit card is stolen, will immediately report to at least the
financial institution which issues the card to, among other things, ask for the card to
be blocked so the fraud offender will not be able to use it. This report will be part of a
nationwide statistics collected by an institution authorized to do so. In other words,
this study focuses on victim data.

21

Because many data and statistics used in this study are in different currencies (for example, $US
1,000 and $AU 1,000), single currency will be used. $US is selected as the standard currency for
this study. The exchange rate is based on OANDA Currency Converter for 1 January 2007 (the
starting point of this study). Some figures (for example, in line charts) remain in their original
currencies because the raw data are not available.
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OBJECTIVES
As discussed in Chapter 4, this study uses benchmarking to highlight the lessons
from the credit card fraud prevention practices in the US, the UK and Australia, in
order to construct recommendations to address similar problems in Indonesia. The
systematic objectives of this study are:
1. to provide an overview of the trends of credit card fraud and prevention in the
US, the UK and Australia, and to highlight the lessons from such practices
2. to assess current pattern of credit card fraud prevention practices in Indonesia in
order to identify the major gaps therein which need to be closed
3. to provide recommendations for closing the gaps and strengthening Indonesia’s
defence against credit card fraud in the future.

PROBLEMS
For the purpose of achieving the above objectives, this study endeavours to answer a
set of questions based on the principles of ‘learning from the best performers’ or
‘benchmarking’. Such questions represent aspects of these issues: ‘What is there?’,
‘What should be there?’ and ‘How can we close the gaps?’ in credit card fraud
prevention practices. The analysis on the benchmark countries (the US, the UK and
Australia) should provide answers to the question of ‘What should be there?’;
whereas the analysis on Indonesia answers ‘What is there?’. Upon the identification
of major gaps based on the answers to the first two questions, the ‘How can we close
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the gap’ question is then answered. In summary, as discussed in Chapter 4, the
further questions this study seeks to answer are:
1. What is to be benchmarked?
2. To whom or what should we compare?
3. How should the data be collected?
4. Are the US, the UK and Australia better than Indonesia in terms of credit card
fraud prevention practices to minimize offenders’ opportunity?
5. If so, why are they better?
6. What credit card fraud prevention practices do the three countries have to
minimize offenders’ opportunity?
7. How can their practices be incorporated or adapted for implementation?
More detailed discussions on the benchmark questions of this study, including
theoretical foundations thereof are part of Chapter 4.

CONTRIBUTION
This study is part of the continuing efforts to circumvent the problems of payments
fraud — particularly credit card fraud — in the Indonesian payments system, by
developing a better understanding of current problems and how we might address
them. This study also offers recommendations for closing the major gaps within
credit card fraud prevention practice in Indonesia. Based on the analysis on the trends
of credit card fraud and prevention in the benchmark countries, this study also
formulates a framework of the essential elements of a sound credit card fraud
30

prevention practice as the basis of recommendations. This framework also serves as
the map for future studies in the area of payments fraud prevention in Indonesia.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study uses a case study approach to establish benchmarks to analyse credit card
fraud and prevention in the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia. The primary data
for this study are in the form of financial figures, especially focusing on credit card
industries in the four countries, including the losses from fraud that they bear. Such
data were obtained from the payments systems of the four countries and are freely
available to the public. Due to a less robust fraud data management in Indonesia,
fieldwork was conducted in the Indonesian payments system to obtain data and
information comparable to those from the benchmark countries. By looking at ‘the
stories behind the numbers’, this study identifies the trends of credit card fraud and
prevention in the US, the UK and Australia in order to highlight the lessons that can
be applied to Indonesia. Chapter 4 discusses this study’s research methodology in
more detail.

THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis is divided into nine chapters, each with specific purposes. The chapters
are organised into five parts: introduction, theoretical framework22, methodology,
analysis and conclusion (see Table 1). In addition to these chapters, additional
supporting information is included in the appendices.

22

The theoretical framework is generally a set of commonsense ideas derived from the existing
theories and concepts, which the researcher used to construct his analysis.

31

Table 1 Summary of Thesis Division
Part

Chapter Title

Introduction

1

Introduction

Theoretical
Framework

2

The Fundamentals of the Credit Card Network

3

Theories and Concepts of Credit Card Fraud and
Prevention

Methodology

4

Learning from the Better Performers: A Methodological
Framework

Analysis

5

Going Cashless: An Overview of the Payments Systems of
the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia

6

The Big Picture: A Strategic View of the Trends of Credit
Card Fraud in the US, the UK and Australia

7

Patterns of Credit Card Fraud Prevention Practices in the
US, the UK and Australia

8

Trends in Credit Card Fraud and Prevention in Indonesia:
Building up Stronger Defences

9

Answers to the Benchmark Questions

Conclusion

Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter primarily aims to introduce the study by highlighting its important
elements. The discussion in Chapter 1 includes: background of study, scope of study,
objectives, problems, contribution, summary of research methodology and thesis
structure.
Chapter 2: The Fundamentals of the Credit Card Network
This chapter primarily discusses the theoretical framework of the credit card network,
including the basic structure and mechanism of the network, as well as the key ‘rules
of the game’. Because the credit card industry is part of a payments system, this
chapter also discusses the principles of payments system governance, including the
concepts of self-regulation. In summary, the discussion in this chapter includes: the
concepts of ‘public interest’, the history of the credit card, the basic structure and
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mechanism of the credit card network and the principles of payments system
governance.
Chapter 3: Learning from the Better Performers: Methodological Framework
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of credit card fraud and prevention. It
discusses fundamental theories and concepts in the areas of commerce and
criminology which underlie the discussions about the occurrence and dynamics of
crime, as well as effective and efficient crime prevention practice. The chapter
includes discussion on: factors behind the occurrence and changes of crime, the
financial and non-financial costs of credit card fraud, and fraud management practice
by the credit card industry.
Chapter 4: Learning from the Better Performers: Methodological Framework
This chapter primarily describes the methodological framework of the study. It
explains the research procedures used, particularly in collecting and analysing its data
and information. The discussion in this chapter includes: history, theories and
concepts of benchmarking, the benchmark questions answered by this study and how
such questions might be answered.
Chapter 5: Going Cashless: An Overview of the Payments Systems of the US, the
UK Australia and Indonesia
Following the discussion in Chapter 2 on the principles of payments system
governance, this chapter provides an overview of the current state of the payments
systems in the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia. The focus of the discussion is
the growth and development of non-cash payments instruments, which represents the
four countries’ transformation into cashless societies, as well as the fraud risks
thereof. The discussion covers matters such as: the concepts of the ‘cashless society’,
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an overview of the US payments system, an overview of the UK payments system, an
overview of the Indonesian payments system and crime opportunities within a
‘cashless society’.
Chapter 6: The Big Picture: A Strategic View of the Trends of Credit Card Fraud
in the US, the UK and Australia
This chapter describes the trends of credit card fraud in the US, the UK and Australia.
The discussion is based primarily on payments fraud victim data from the three
baseline countries’ payments systems, based on which similarities and differences of
the trends of credit card fraud are highlighted. The chapter attempts to uncover the
‘stories behind the numbers’ by finding and analysing evidence that may explain
some of the current fraud problems. The discussion includes the prevalence and costs
of credit card fraud in the US, the UK and Australia and a comparison of these trends.
Chapter 7: Patterns of Credit Card Fraud Prevention Practices in the US, the UK
and Australia
Building on the trends of credit card fraud in the US, the UK and Australia outlined
in Chapter 6, this chapter describes the patterns of prevention practices in the three
countries. This chapter discusses how the three countries handle the problems of
credit card fraud within their payments systems. The discussion includes patterns of
prevention in the US, the UK and Australia and the framework of the essential
elements of a good payments fraud prevention practice based on the experiences of
the three countries. This framework is the basis of the present study’s analysis of the
credit card fraud prevention practices in Indonesia to formulate recommendations to
strengthen such practice.
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Chapter 8: Trends in Credit Card Fraud and Prevention in Indonesia: Building up
Stronger Defences
Based on the previous analysis of credit card fraud prevention in the US, the UK and
Australia, this chapter focuses on the application of the lessons from the three
countries to Indonesia. The discussion covers the prevalence and costs of credit card
fraud in Indonesia, as well as major fraud prevention measures that have become
trendsetters in the country. Based on the framework formulated in Chapter 7, this
chapter analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the major fraud prevention
measures in the Indonesian payments system, in order to identify the gaps that must
be closed, and then suggests possible improvements based on the experiences of the
US, the UK and Australia.
Chapter 9: Answers to the Benchmark Questions
This final chapter summarises the findings in response to the study’s research
questions (benchmark questions), based on the discussions in the previous chapters.
Such answers cover matters related to the ideal state of credit card fraud prevention
practices in a country (‘What should there be?’) based on the experiences of the US,
the UK and Australia, the current state of such practices in Indonesia, including the
strengths and weaknesses thereof (‘What is there?’) and how to overcome such
weaknesses (‘How can we close the gaps?’).
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CHAPTER 2: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
THE CREDIT CARD NETWORK
INTRODUCTION
The payments system statistics from many countries that show continuous usage of
credit card over time suggest that the credit card is currently a vital component in
their economic activities23. However, there is more to a credit card than just a plastic
card. Its operation comprises the interaction of multiple elements in its networks.
This chapter discusses the fundamental rules of operation which constitute the basic
structure and mechanism of the credit card network24. These discussions also include
the history and development of the credit card as well as the principles of payments
system regulation within which the credit card is a payment instrument. This chapter
also discusses the concept of self-regulation as an alternative to government
regulation in the payments industry.

PUBLIC INTEREST: AN OVERVIEW
The concept of the ‘public interest’ is fundamental to the credit card networks in
particular, and the payments system in general. However, despite the wide use of the
term, the precise definition of public interest remains difficult to pin down. As argued
by Mitnick (1980, p. 259):

23

For examples, see the overview of the credit card industry in the payments systems of the US, the
UK, Australia and Indonesia in Chapter 5.
24
For discussion about the structure of the card itself, see Figure 72 in appendices.
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The meaning of phrase ‘public interest’ has been the subject of a voluminous literature
in political theory, and there remains no accepted definition of the phrase, much less an
accepted operational definition offering indicators that we may use to determine
empirically whether something is in the public interest.

Mitnick (1980, pp. 92-93) identifies five concepts to define public interest:
1. Balancing
The public interest results from the simultaneous satisfaction of selected aspects of
different particularistic interests.
2. Compromising
Particularistic interests are made to concede part of what they desire so that the overall
result is in the ‘public interest’.
3. Trade-off
Particularistic interests affected by regulation are made to provide some costly service or
other benefit judged to be in public interest in exchange for certain private benefits to
them.
4. Overriding national or social goals
Certain social, societal or national objectives are held to be in the public interest and to
supersede private interests.
5. Particularistic, paternalistic, or personal dictated
Public interest is equated with the preferences of a particular person, group or
organization, or system.

Decades have passed since Mitnick published his work in 1980, and many definitions
have changed and evolved. Yet the difficulty in finding a precise definition of the
public interest remains. As stated by Pal and Maxwell (2004, p. 3):
Nevertheless, despite its importance and apparent centrality to our thinking about public
policy, the concept of the public interest is notoriously slippery. Virtually every
treatment in the literature — even those that are squarely supportive of the idea —
begins with the caveat that the public interest is susceptible to many different
interpretations and approaches. Even in societies with a modest degree of diversity in
socio-economic, cultural, and ethical backgrounds and views, it will often be difficult to
discern how any one policy proposal will be in everyone’s interest.

Pal and Maxwell (2004, p. 4) suggest five approaches for understanding and defining
public interest: process, majority opinion, utilitarian, common interest and shared
value. The opinions regarding these approaches of public interest are as follows:
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Process (Monypenny, 1953, p. 441)
The primary determination of the public interest for public servants is by the action of
their political and hierarchic superiors, acting through conventional channels, by
legislation and court decisions, where applicable.

In the ‘process approach’, the focus is on procedures as the basis for arriving at
decisions in the public interest, such as fair representation of all interests,
transparency, legality and due process, to name a few (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 4).
Majority Opinion (Cox, 1973, p. 238)
If something is in the public interest, it will also be in the interests of a majority of
members of the public. However, the converse does not hold: a policy can clearly be in
the interests of a majority, without being in the public interest. A policy that favours the
interests of men, where women are marginalised, is a simple example of this. Thus, what
is in general true of public-interest policies will not necessarily be true of majorityinterest policies; what is in general true of majority-interest policies will also be true of
public-interest policies.

In the majority opinion approach, what a significant majority of society think about
an issue is the guide to regulatory decisions (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 4). These
authors assert that, although the majority concept of what constitutes the public
interest is simple and broadly popular, without protections for minorities, tyranny is a
possible result.
Utilitarian (Boudreau, 1950, p. 371)
Following from the previous argument, the public interest must necessarily represent a
working compromise and be subject to continuous redefinition, as the need arises, along
the process of achieving an often delicate balance between conflicting interests.

The utilitarian approach believes that the public interest is achieved through
balancing interests by means of negotiation and compromise for producing maximum
satisfaction (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 5). As argued by Pal and Maxwell (2004, p. 5),
among the benefits of this approach is prevention of tyranny by the majority, because
it considers how intensely preferences are felt by different individuals or groups.
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Common Interest (Cassinelli, 1958, p. 50)
On the basis of this interpretation of the connection between the public and the public
interest, the latter can be determined by examining the relevant individuals and
determining what interests they hold in common.

The common interest approach generally defines public interest as something that
everyone shares (or at least what they might realise that they share), should they be
entirely rational and dispassionate (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 5). In other words,
common interest is as a set of public goods that cannot feasibly be enjoyed by one
person without being enjoyed by everyone (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 5).
Shared Value (Sorauf, 1957, p. 619)
For perhaps the greatest number of its supporters, the public interest has come to mean
commonly held interests or values, which, if they are not universally accepted, are at
least very widely held. Regardless, they are distinguished by the large numbers of people
who share or support them. In other words, some interests are more general than others.

This approach sees shared values as the basis of interests in guiding the decisionmaking process (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 4), and is similar to the common interest
approach in the sense that it is substantive, but different in the way that shared values
(which are generally more transcendent and less variable than ‘interest’ itself) serves
as the foundation of the shared interests (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 5).
The challenges in understanding and applying the concept of public interest are not
only in finding a precise definition. Assuming that a society has decided that a
particular definition is applied in regulation, some important questions remain to be
answered in the process. Prat (2009)
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argues that among such questions is: ‘Did

Andrea Prat, a professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, London School of
Economics and Political Science, wrote a good review on how conflicts of interest are behind the
failure of financial regulation, and referred to recent cases in the US and the UK. See Prat (2009).
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regulators make full use of the rules they had, given the information they had?’ and
gave the following arguments and examples:
I have no doubt that, even with only the rules and information they had, regulators could
have been more incisive. The most obvious case in point is the Madoff affair. The SEC
had information — it was tipped off repeatedly by reliable sources about a potentially
enormous Ponzi scheme. The SEC also had a well-established regulatory framework at
hand — securities fraud law. Why was such a classic and macroscopic alleged violation
not investigated? In the UK, Paul Moore, who was head of group regulatory risk at
HBOS, reported serious concerns about the amount of risk taken by his bank (Mr Moore
was subsequently dismissed by HBOS). Given that the information came from a
reputable source, why did the Financial Services Authority (FSA) not pursue a matter of
such potential importance with the energy it deserved? If they had, they might have
saved the British taxpayers billions of pounds in bailout money.

Referring to Prat’s argument and example, private interest will always be an issue in
ensuring that the condition of public interest is achieved. For example, in recruiting
employees, regulatory bodies often face a trade-off between the need for experienced
professionals and the need for independent people to run the organisation, and this
can create potential conflicts of interests (Prat, 2009). For example, Prat (2009)
points to Sir James Crosby, the former CEO of HBOS from 2001 to 2006, who was
also on the board of the Financial Services Authority from 2004 to 2009 (occupying
overlapping positions from 2004 to 2006) (Prat, 2009; BBC NEWS, 2009). As shown
by the biography of its board members (as at 1 April 2009) on the website of the
Financial Services Authority (FSA), possibilities of other conflicts of interests exist
due to overlapping positions (Prat, 2009; Financial Services Authority, n.d.(a)).
According to Prat (2009) that the head of a regulated institution was overseeing the
regulator was inappropriate, due to possible conflict of interests within. Therefore,
regulatory bodies should have a sound procedure for recruitment that balances
expertise with independence.
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Given so many definitions of various approaches exist, this study neither settles on
the best nor formulates a new one. For the sake of the discussions on crime
prevention in the next chapters, this study assumes that crime prevention is generally
accepted as a public interest, because the need for security is something that everyone
shares (or at least what they might realise that they share), should they be entirely
rational and dispassionate (Pal & Maxwell, 2004, p. 5). This study also assumes that
the regulatory bodies in the payments systems have already made full use of the rules
they had, given the information they had at the time.

CREDIT CARD HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT: AN
OVERVIEW
HISTORY
Credit was first used in Assyria, Babylon and Egypt approximately 3,000 years ago.
Later, the bill of exchange (the forerunner of banknotes) was established in the 14th
century, by which debts were settled using one-third coin and two-thirds bill of
exchange (Rahman, 2007). Paper money followed only in the 17th century (Rahman,
2007). Edward Bellamy envisions the use of credit cards in his 1887 novel, Looking
Backward, set in the year 2000 (Soudatt, 2006, p. 8). The use of credit cards
originated in the US during the 1920s, when individual firms, such as oil companies
and hotel chains, began issuing them to customers for purchases made at company
outlets (Jagett, 2009). Bellamy’s prediction was late by some 80 years (Soudatt,
2006, p. 8).
In 1950, Diners Club, Inc. introduced the first universal credit card that could be used
at a variety of establishments (Diners Club Australia, 2006). The brand was
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established by Frank McNamara and Ralph Schneider (Diners Club Australia, 2006).
As described by Diners Club Australia (2006):
It was in 1950 when businessman Frank McNamara, dining with his lawyer Ralph
Schneider in a New York restaurant, forgot his wallet. McNamara, though saved this
time by the arrival of his wife who paid the bill, was irritated that he could only spend
the money in his pocket, regardless of the amount he had in the bank. At a later meal in
the restaurant, McNamara signed the bill and attempted to pay with a small cardboard
card that carried his signature — which he dubbed a ‘diners’ club card’. It worked.
McNamara and his lawyer founded Diners Club — which is now an emblem of
convenience.

The first general-purpose credit card was introduced in 1966 by Bank of America
with the establishment of the BankAmerica Service Corporation which franchised the
BankAmericard (now Visa) (Gerson & Woolsey, 2007). Other competitors, such as
American Express and Charte Blanche, joined the competition in the same year
(Stearns, 2007, pp. 40-41). In 1966, established by a group of banks, MasterCard
(initially named Interbank Card Association) entered the card business as a
competitor to BankAmeriCard (Brooker & Levinstein, 2004; Sienkiewicz S. , 2001,
p. 4). In 1966 the first all-purpose credit card in the Europe was issued by
Barclaycard in the UK (Barclaycard, 2010). Australia issued its first credit card in
1974: Bankcard (Australian Bankers’ Association Inc., 2004; Bankcard, n.d.;
Collectors, 2008).
Currently, many participants compete in the world’s credit card industry, among
which are major credit card associations such as Diners Club, Visa, MasterCard,
American Express and Discover Card, and these compete for global market share,
while also shaping the world’s credit card industry. As evidenced by payments
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system statistics (for example, those of the US, UK, and Australia) Visa and
MasterCard are currently known to be the strongest brands in credit card industry26.
As mentioned before, credit cards are operated as networks. The first credit card
networks were generally ‘closed-loop’ systems consisting of consumer, merchant and
card issuer (Gerson & Woolsey, 2007). According to Sienkiewicz (2001, p. 3), in this
structure, the issuer both authorises and handles all aspects of the transaction and
settles directly with both the consumer and the merchant. In other words, the card
issuer, transaction processor, payer to the merchant, bill sender to the card user and
receiver of card-users’ payments are effectively the same firm (Sienkiewicz S. , 2001,
p. 3).
The later emergence of the open-loop system was generally marked by the
introduction of the bank card to the industry. In order to expand the coverage of
credit card operation, banks such as the BankAmerica Service Corporation and
Interbank Card Association introduced bank credit cards. These new bank card
associations differed from their predecessors in that an open-loop system was now
created, requiring inter-bank cooperation and funds transfers (Sienkiewicz S. , 2001,
p. 4). An open-loop system generally consists of four parties: consumer, merchant,
card issuer and acquirer. The open-loop system is more complex than the closed-loop
one, because the issuing bank is separate from the merchant’s bank, and thus the
transaction between the two must be processed through a centralised system that
authorises and settles the transaction (Sienkiewicz S. , 2001, p. 4).

26

See chapter V.
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DEVELOPMENT
After being accepted worldwide, over the decades, the credit card industry has
undergone some major changes, primarily characterised by its globalisation. This is
evidenced by, for example, the decision of banks around the world to affiliate with
credit card associations such as Visa and MasterCard (Association for Payment
Clearing Services, n.d.(b); Stearns, 2007; Sun & Tse, 2007; Akers, Golter, Lamm, &
Solt, 2005). Further evidence is seen in the number of business combinations, in the
form of business acquisitions made by credit card providers, an example of which is
the acquisition of MBNA by Bank of America on 30 June 2005 (Nader, 2005, p. 4).
This acquisition had made Bank of America among the world’s largest credit card
issuers, because it combined the country’s largest domestic bank with one of the
largest providers of credit card and payment products (Consumeraffairs.com, 2005).
The development of information technology also contributed to the evolution of the
credit card industry by facilitating communication between transacting parties as well
as the exchange of data in transactions. Internet payment using the credit card has
been widely accepted by customers and merchants all over the world for its
simplicity and efficiency. This contributed to the emergence of ‘e-commerce’
(electronic commerce) which is defined by Bandyo-padhay (2002, p. 3) as ‘doing
business electronically’ such as trading goods, services and expertise using computer
networks. Its basic principle is the utilization of features of the internet to transform
business process for competitive advantage (Bandyo-padhay, 2002, p. 6).
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CREDIT CARD NETWORK: BASIC STRUCTURE AND
MECHANISM
Credit cards are generally transacted within networks with each network set by an
association. As described by Chakravorti and Shah (2001, p. 51), participants in
credit card networks primarily comprise consumers, issuers, merchants, acquirers and
network operators, who are involved in a series of interrelated bilateral transactions.
Credit card networks, as stated by Chakravorti (2003, p. 54), can be classified into
two types: proprietary and open networks. Proprietary networks, such as American
Express and Discover Card sign up merchants and issue the cards to consumers,
which means each of them operates as issuer, acquirer and network operator
(Chakravorti, 2003, p. 54; Kingson, 2005). However, possibly due to competition,
closed network like American Express is now seemingly moving toward becoming or
at least adopting some features of open networks which enable them to reach wider to
participating banks’ customers27. The advantage of this network lies within its
simplicity because of fewer participants than the open network. As stated by
American Express in its comments submitted to the FTC on the Commission’s
Hearings on Global Competition and Innovation (American Express , 1996):

27

National Australia Bank, for example, launched its American Express credit card (National Ant
American Express Card) on 13 July 2004, which theoretically would not be possible in a closedloop system or a proprietary network (because there would be no place for an issuing bank in the
network). See National Australia Bank (2004).
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Utilizing the benefits of this ‘closed loop network’, American Express is able to match
merchants with their cardholder customers and to make offers to cardholders that, based
on prior behavior, the cardholder is likely to find attractive. In the business customer
context, the ‘closed loop network’ enables American Express to provide business
customers with the ability to track and manage their business spending. These and other
attributes, including the high regard in which our brand is held around the world and our
global network of travel offices which are part of our charge card network infrastructure,
providing emergency card replacement and check cashing services to cardholders, make
the American Express network distinctive and attractive to other issuers both in the US
and overseas.

However, as suggested by the structure of a closed network, the advantages from
network simplicity come with disadvantages among which is that the network will
theoretically be unable to expand its market by inviting, for example, commercial
banks to be its issuers and acquirers. Figure 1 shows the basic structure of a
proprietary network.

Figure 1 Single-Issuer Model (Closed/Proprietary Network)28
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (n.d.(a)) .

An open payment network, like the bankcard associations, Visa and MasterCard and
most electronic funds transfer (EFT) networks, allows many banks to participate
(Hunt, 2003, p. 80). Open networks are comprised of member banks that can be
issuers, acquirers or both (Chakravorti, 2003, p. 54). The advantages of an open
28

Also known as ‘closed-loop’ system.
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network, as suggested by its structure, are generally the results of having more
participants in the network compared to a proprietary network. As stated by
MasterCard (2008):
Since their establishment in the 1960s, open payment systems or, as they are often
called, ‘four-party payment systems’ have delivered immense benefits to all constituents
in the payments chain. These constituents include consumers, merchants, and financial
institutions. Increasingly, four-party payment systems are becoming four-party ‘plus’
systems, as other organizations—including retailers with co-branded cards, universities,
unions with affinity cards, and a range of specialist processors—participate in the value
chain.

On the other hand, an open network, as suggested by its structure has to deal with the
complexities within as the result of the large number of participants which makes the
system to be less flexible than a proprietary network. Associations such as Visa and
MasterCard, for example, despite their role as rule setters (for example, setting fee
prices for the merchants) are relying on their bank members to issue the cards
(Kingson, 2005). As stated by Sienkiewicz (2001, p. 6):
A key element of the ‘open-loop’ system is that it requires the cooperation of all four
parties for the transaction to be completed. If the parties acted independently, it is
unlikely that the transaction would be successful. The actions necessary for the
transaction to occur require the acceptance of the payment card by the merchant, the
consumer, and both the acquiring and the issuing bank. In essence, these are jointly
produced transactions requiring satisfaction of joint demand among the participating
parties.
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Figure 2 Multiple Card Issuer Model (Open Network)29
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (n.d.(b)).

A credit card transaction consists of a series of processes within the network.
Generally, the sequence of a credit card transaction is as follows (Akers, Golter,
Lamm, & Solt, 2005, p. 27) :

29



Cardholder presents the credit card to the merchant to purchase a good or service.



The merchant transmits to the acquiring bank the cardholder’s account number and
the amount of the transaction.



The acquiring bank forwards this information to the card association network
requesting authorization for the transaction.



The card association forwards the authorization request to the issuing bank.



The issuing bank responds with its authorization or denial through the network to the
acquiring bank and then to the merchant.



If approved, the issuing bank also sends to the acquiring bank, via the network, the
transaction amount less an interchange fee which is established by the card
association.

Also known as ‘open-loop’ system.
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For the transaction illustrated in Figure 2, as described by Akers et al. (2005, p. 27),
the example shows $98.00 ($100.00 purchase price minus 200 basis point
interchange fee) flowing from the issuing bank, though the network, to the acquiring
bank which, after subtracting its own service fee, passes the payment on to the
merchant. In the scenario presented in Figure 2, the merchant receives $97.50 ($98.00
minus a 50 basis point fee) (Akers, Golter, Lamm, & Solt, 2005, p. 27).
A credit card network is operated under a set of rules set by the associations such as
Visa and MasterCard. An association serves a credit card network by meeting the
needs of their members by providing a set of rules, underlying infrastructure and
some level of research and development to improve their networks (Chakravorti,
2003, p. 54). Nevertheless, as discussed later in this chapter, in several cases such as
in Australia, regulators such as central bank may disagree with the rules of operation
(or at least some parts of them) set by a credit card network and thus decide to
interfere by modifying the rules so as to comply with a certain standard like
economic efficiency and competition promotion30.
The credit card in an open network represents a complex form of two-sided markets
where merchants are more willing to accept cards that have many cardholders and
cardholders prefer cards that are accepted at many establishments (Akers, Golter,
Lamm, & Solt, 2005, p. 26). In other words, as stated by Hunt (2003, p. 84), a
payment card is more valuable to consumers when more merchants accept the card.
This also means that every consumer who obtains a card and every retailer who

30

See Reserve Bank of Australia (2007).
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accepts a card increases the value of the network to all other cardholders and all other
merchants who accept it (Hunt, 2003, p. 84).

NETWORK PARTICIPANTS
Network participants are those who contribute to the existence and operation of a
credit card network. Generally, a credit card network in a country has five main
participants: association, consumers or cardholders, merchants, issuers and acquirers
(Cornish, Delpha, & Erslon, n.d., pp. 4-5). Additional parties such as processors may
be invited to support the operation of a credit card network (Cornish, Delpha, &
Erslon, n.d., pp. 4-5). The participation of the participants is based on the rules set by
an association’s network. Generally, an association is a cooperative group of
financial institutions, each of whom acts as an acquirer and/or issuer, to enable the
use of credit cards for value exchange between participating merchants and
cardholders (Cornish, Delpha, & Erslon, n.d., p. 5). Other than setting the rules, an
association’s role in the network is also to facilitate its operation by providing
supports in the forms of underlying technology infrastructure and business
applications to facilitate transaction processing and payments between participants
(Cornish, Delpha, & Erslon, n.d., p. 5).
Consumers31, according to Chakravorti (2003, p. 52), are provided by credit cards
with a secure, reliable and convenient means of payment. Consumers receive
incentives to use their credit cards such as in the forms of dispute resolution services,
frequent-use awards and interest-free short-term loans if no balances are carried

31

Also known as ‘cardholders’

50

between billing periods (Chakravorti, 2003, p. 52). Credit cards also provide various
security features and limit consumer liability in the event of fraudulent use
(Chakravorti, 2003, p. 52).
Merchants join a credit card network because they receive several benefits from
accepting credit cards. As argued by Chakravorti (2003, p. 53), credit cards allow
merchants to sell to illiquid consumers or to those paying with future income. In the
case of fraudulent transactions, network rules typically promise to pay merchants for
fraudulent transactions provided the network’s procedures are followed (Hunt, 2003,
p. 84).
Issuers (in open networks) earn revenue from consumers and acquirers (Chakravorti,
2003, p. 53). Consumers may pay annual fees (and finance charges if they use
‘revolving credit’) and other fees, such as cash advance and over-limit fees; whereas
acquirers pay interchange fees32 to issuers to compensate them for costs of attracting
and maintaining a cardholder base, which are set at the network level (Chakravorti,
2003, p. 53). On the other hand, acquirers (in open networks) earn their net revenue
from the difference between the merchant discount rates received from merchants
and interchange fees paid to acquirers (Chakravorti, 2003, p. 54). In a competitive
market such as in the US, some larger merchants are charged merchant discounts
close to the interchange fee (Chakravorti, 2003, p. 53).

32

In the US, these fees vary, depending on the types of merchants and other characteristics of the
transaction, such as whether the merchant views the physical card or processes it electronically
(Chakravorti, 2003, p. 53). In Australia, interchange fees are the same for all classes of merchants,
but differ depending on whether the payments were processed electronically with card and
cardholder present or not (Chakravorti, 2003, p. 53).

.
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These characteristics suggest that the participants of a credit card network join the
network because they believe they will accrue benefits from doing so, which they
expect to outweigh the costs incurred. The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(n.d.(c)) summarises the common costs and benefits network participants should
expect when they join a credit card network, and these form Table 2.
Table 2 Benefits and Costs for Participants in the Credit Card Industry
Type of
Participant

Function

Benefits

Costs

Cardholder

Purchases goods and
services

Convenience of making
purchases without carrying
cash
Ability to time payments
to match cash flows
Access to credit
Access to float
Use of bonus features

Interest rates and
fees
Difficulty
managing credit

Merchants

Sells goods and services

Access to large number of
consumers
Ability to sell to consumer
needing credit without
carrying credit risk
Guarantee of payment

Need to pay
interchange fees
on sales to
cardholders
Loss of private
credit accounts
(customer loyalty,
marketing
information,
interest income)

Issuing
Bank

Collects payments from
cardholders
Extends credit to
cardholders
Distributes cards
Finances receivables
Authorises transactions
Ability to collect on
interest rate spreads

Ability to collect fees from
cardholders
Ability to share in
interchange fees from
merchants
Ability to cross-sell to
consumers

Operational costs
Fraud risk
Credit risk

Acquiring
Bank

Issues payments to
merchant
Routes information
enabling authorisation,
billing and payment to

Shares in interchange fees
from merchants

Operational costs
Some fraud risk
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Type of
Participant
Card
Association

Function
merchant

Benefits

Costs

Promotes the brand
Establishes rules,
standards and protocols
governing participation in
network
Sets interchange fee
structure

Collects transaction fees
Collects assessment fees

Marketing costs
Cost of fraud
reduction
programs
Operational costs
of maintaining
network

Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (n.d.(c)).

THE MAJOR ‘RULES OF THE GAME’
A credit card network runs on a set of rules, set by associations such as Visa and
MasterCard, which govern, among other things, interactions among participants in
the network, including how a participant can benefit from others. The most
fundamental (and often debatable) rules in credit card networks concern interchange
fees, no surcharge, honour all cards and no steering. These fundamental rules
generally apply to all credit card networks worldwide in the absence of government
(for example, a central bank) intervention. However, in cases where a country’s
government decides to interfere, changes may apply to the rules of credit card
transaction.
Interchange Fee
As stated by Rochet and Tirole (2003, p. 69), interchange fees are those that
merchants’ banks (acquirers) pay to cardholders’ banks (issuers) in relation to
transactions between their respective customers (that is, merchants and cardholders).
The default values for these fees are set by payment card associations (for example,
Visa and MasterCard), and these apply to transactions within their systems in the
absence of specific bilateral agreements (Rochet & Tirole, 2003, p. 69). Such
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interchange fee values differ across countries as well as transaction types (Rochet &
Tirole, 2003, p. 69). This rule, according to Chakravorti (2003, p. 58), raises concerns
on whether or not an interchange fee is really needed, the effects of collective setting
of interchange fees and the differences between a profit-maximising interchange fee
and a socially optimal one. Over the years these questions have been the subjects of
debates among economists from various perspectives (Chakravorti, 2003, pp. 58-60)
33

.

The interchange fee has also become a controversial issue related to matters such as
business monopolies and antitrust allegations. For example, in the US, retailers and
merchants have struggled with interchange fees in the financial industry, because the
hidden costs of accepting credit and debit cards can diminish their profits while
benefiting banks (Bosworth, 2008). This situation led the US Congress to issue a new
legislation, the Credit Card Fair Fee Act 200834, which enabled merchants to
negotiate the fees they pay for accepting payment cards (Bosworth, 2008).
No-Surcharge Rule
The no-surcharge rule basically prohibits merchants from applying a fee to customers
who wish to pay with their credit or debit card (Monnet & Roberds, 2006, p. 55).
This rule is related to another rule called the one-price policy, defined by Chakravorti
(2003, p. 55) as a policy set by law, card networks or acquirers that requires
consumers to pay the same price regardless of the type of payment instrument used.
Hunt (2003, p. 88) argues that, theoretically, merchants may shift any difference in
33

For examples, see Baxter (1983); Frankel (1998); Carlton and Frankel (1995); Schmalensee (2002);
Rochet and Tirole (2003); Wright (2004); and Gans and King (2003).
34
See US House of Representatives (2008).
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their cost of accepting different payment cards to the customers who use those cards
to boost their profits. Nevertheless, as the rule from the network prohibits them from
doing so, this means that they must find other ways to deal with the high costs of
accepting payment cards.
Honour-All-Cards Rule
This rule requires merchants who accept a network’s branded product also to accept
all of its other branded products35 (Chakravorti, 2003, p. 63). For example, if a
merchant accepts a network’s branded credit card, the network’s branded debit card
must also be accepted (Chakravorti, 2003, p. 63). An important question is whether
or not a merchant must accept different types of cards, even if it prefers to accept
only one type (Hunt, 2003, p. 89), a consideration of importance to merchants’
profitability, because different card may have different costs. Having too many
transactions on expensive cards are certainly not favourable to merchants. The
supporters of this rule consider the honour-all-cards rule as necessary to provide
certainty for the customers, or, as Hunt (2003, p. 85) puts it:
The honour-all-cards rule and the no-surcharge rule reduce the uncertainty consumers
would otherwise face. This was especially important in the late 1960s and 1970s, when
the card associations were trying to build nationwide acceptance of credit cards issued
primarily by small banks.

Nevertheless, Hunt (2003, p. 85) also questions whether these mechanisms are still
necessary when a payment card network becomes well established. Hunt (2003, p.
90) suggests that a way the honour-all-cards rule can be better applied is if we

35

In practice, such as in Australia, the rule has two dimensions: first, the merchants should honour all
issuers; second, the merchants should also honour all products under the same brand (Reserve
Bank of Australia, 2008, p. 6). The requirement to honour all products attracts many critics, such
as in the example of the reform of Australia’s payments system (discussed later in this chapter).
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consider credit and debit cards as distinct products, and thus the rule for each type of
card may be enforced separately.
No-Steering Rule
This rule prevents merchants from steering customers to other forms of payment
(Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007, p. 9). In other words, merchants are prohibited to
express their preference to certain forms of means of payment over the others
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , 2007, p. 9). For
example, merchants cannot tell cardholders that, although a given credit card can be
accepted, they would prefer the cardholders to use debit cards or pay by cash or
cheque (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , 2007, p. 9).
Theoretically, without this rule, merchants would not be able to avoid the fees
incurred if they accepted payment cards that they believed to be too high
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , 2007, p. 9).
In Australia, prior to the so-called ‘reform of Australia’s payment system’, the nosteering rule prevented merchants that accepted American Express cards from
encouraging customers to use another method of payment (equivalent rules did not
exist in the MasterCard, Visa and Diners Club schemes) (Reserve Bank of Australia,
2007, p. 10). The Reserve Bank of Australia later saw this rule as inappropriately
restricting competition and, after some discussions, American Express agreed to
remove the rule (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007, p. 10).
Chargeback
Chargeback is an important credit card transaction rule, especially in cases where
fraudulent transactions occur. Generally, it operates when a card issuer returns a
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transaction to a merchant bank as a financial liability, and then a merchant bank
(acquirer) may return it to a merchant (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2007, p. 69), and is a
reversal of transaction with the following sequence (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2007, p. 69):


The card issuer subtracts the transaction dollar amount from the cardholder’s Visa
account. The cardholder receives a credit and is no longer financially responsible for
the dollar amount of the transaction;



The card issuer debits the merchant bank for the dollar amount of the transaction;
and



The merchant bank will, most often, deduct the transaction dollar amount from the
merchant’s account. The merchant loses the dollar amount of the transaction.

Other than fraud, chargeback may also occur from other events, such as customer
disputes, processing errors authorisation issues and non-fulfilment of copy requests
(only if fraud exists or the receipt is illegible) (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2007, p. 69). The
mechanism of chargeback is determined by the credit card association and is
continuously revised over time36. For merchants who accept Visa, for example, the
association has ruled (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2007, p. 70):
From the administrative point of view, the main interaction in a chargeback is between a
card issuer and a merchant bank. The card issuer sends the chargeback to the merchant
bank, which may or may not need to involve the merchant who submitted the original
transaction. This processing cycle does not relieve merchants from direct responsibility
for taking action to remedy and prevent chargebacks. In most cases, the full extent of
your financial and administrative liability for chargebacks is spelled out in your
merchant agreement.

Therefore, in practice, merchants are very careful in selecting customers to transact
with to avoid the risk of incurring chargeback. Bhatla et al. (2003, p. 1) are of the
opinion that contrary to common perception, merchants bear more risk from credit
card fraud than cardholders, because even though cardholders may find it difficult to
36

For examples of chargeback rules, see Rules for Visa Merchants: Card Acceptance and Chargeback
Management Guidelines (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2007) and MasterCard Chargeback Guide: October
2008 (MasterCard, 2008).
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reverse their fraudulent charges, merchants may lose the cost of product sold as well
as the liability to pay chargeback fees, and they could also have their merchant
accounts closed. (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 1).

ESSENTIALS OF PAYMENTS SYSTEM REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION
THE PRINCIPLES OF PAYMENTS SYSTEM REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
As discussed above, the rules and mechanisms by which credit card networks operate
are fairly similar from one country to another. This is due to the domination of credit
card associations such as Visa and MasterCard in designing such rules and
mechanisms. Nevertheless, because credit card networks are always part of payments
systems that are run under the supervision of regulatory bodies such as central banks,
questions often arise regarding who holds the highest power in regulating the
networks and whether or not the rules of credit card networks promote safety,
efficiency and competition in the payments systems. The scope of this study does not
extend to such questions; however, a discussion on the principles of the supervision
of payments systems within which the credit card is a payment instrument is
nevertheless important to the discussions on the mechanism of the credit card
network itself.
‘Payment systems’37 as defined by the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems (CPSS)38 (2001, p. 1) are the means by which funds are transferred among

37

This study uses the term ‘payments system’ to describe a nationwide system that enables payments
to be made in a country. However, the Committee on Payment and Settlement System (CPPS) uses
the term ‘payment systems’ to describe the group of individual systems that constitute the
nationwide system (for example, credit card system, electronic banking system and so on).
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banks. Payment systems are important elements of financial system. As defined by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2004):
A financial system consists of institutional units and markets that interact, typically in a
complex manner, for the purpose of mobilizing funds for investment, and providing
facilities, including payment systems, for the financing of commercial activity.

Additionally, ‘institutional unit’ is defined by the IMF (2004) as:
An entity, such as a household, corporation, government agency, and so on, that is
capable, in its own right, of owning assets, incurring liabilities, and engaging in
economic activities and in transactions with other entities.

Each payment system has a different degree of importance to a country’s financial
system, and thus some systems are more significant than others (significantly
important payment systems). According to the CPPS (2001, p. 5):
A payment system is systemically important where, if the system were insufficiently
protected against risk, disruption within it could trigger or transmit further disruptions
amongst participants or systemic disruptions in the financial area more widely… A
systemically important system does not necessarily handle only high-value payments;
the term can include a system which handles payments of various values, but which has
the capacity to trigger or transmit systemic disruption by virtue of certain segments of its
traffic.

38

Established in 1990 by the G10 governors, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
(CPSS) is a forum for central banks to monitor and analyse developments in domestic payment,
clearing and settlement systems, as well as in cross-border and multicurrency settlement schemes
(Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2007, p. 1). This institution is hosted by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (established in 1930) and has now become a central bank
of many of the world’s central banks (Carew, n.d.). The BIS aims to foster international monetary
and financial cooperation (Bank for International Settlements, n.d.(a)). To achieve its aim and to
fulfil its mandate, the BIS acts as: a forum to promote discussion and policy analysis among central
banks and within the international financial community, a centre for economic and monetary
research, a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions, and agent or trustee
in connection with international financial operations (Bank for International Settlements, n.d.(a)).
To date, the BIS has produced several publications (continuously revised) to set the standards of
regulation and supervision of payment systems to achieve effectiveness and efficiency, such as the
Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, 2001) and the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006a). Many countries, including the US, the UK and
Australia, have used BIS’ publications as their references in, among other things, regulating and
supervising their payment systems. For examples, see Reserve Bank of Australia (1997); Bank of
England (2008); and Federal Reserve (2009).
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In practice, differentiating between payment systems that are systematically
important and those that are not because the boundary between the two groups is not
always clear is often difficult (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001,
p. 5), and requires a central bank’s careful consideration as to where the boundary
should be drawn (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 5). To
support the operation of financial system, payment systems need to be safe and
efficient (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 1). Formulated by
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPPS) in the Core Principles
for Systematically Important Payment Systems, ten minimum requirements must be
fulfilled to achieve safety and efficiency in payments systems as the objectives of
public policy (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 3):


The system should have a well founded legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions.



The system’s rules and procedures should enable participants to have a clear
understanding of the system’s impact on each of the financial risks they incur
through participation in it.



The system should have clearly defined procedures for the management of credit
risks and liquidity risks, which specify the respective responsibilities of the system
operator and the participants and which provide appropriate incentives to manage
and contain those risks.



The system should provide prompt final settlement on the day of value, preferably
during the day and at a minimum at the end of the day.



A system in which multilateral netting takes place should, at a minimum, be capable
of ensuring the timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to
settle by the participant with the largest single settlement obligation.



Assets used for settlement should preferably be a claim on the central bank; where
other assets are used, they should carry little or no credit risk and little or no liquidity
risk.



The system should ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and
should have contingency arrangements for timely completion of daily processing.



The system should provide a means of making payments which is practical for its
users and efficient for the economy.



The system should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for participation,
which permit fair and open access.
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The system’s governance arrangements should be effective, accountable and
transparent.

The Core Principles were formulated as universal guidelines to encourage the design
and operation of safer and more efficient systemically important payment systems
worldwide (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 1). Despite the
lack of binding power, the Core Principles have been supported by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) member countries, as well as several non-member
countries39. As stated by Geiger and Klein (Geiger & Klein, 2004, p. 38):
The Core Principles do not constitute legally binding regulation; they are intended for
use as guidelines to encourage the design and operation of safe and efficient payment
systems worldwide. They define the key roles and the responsibilities of central banks in
applying the principles.

To fulfil the minimum requirements set in above core principles within a payments
system, the roles of central bank are of importance. As stated by the CPPS (2001, p.
3), the roles of a central bank are:

39



The central bank should define clearly its payment system objectives and should
disclose publicly its role and major policies with respect to systemically important
payment systems.



The central bank should ensure that the systems it operates comply with the Core
Principles.



The central bank should oversee compliance with the Core Principles by systems it
does not operate and it should have the ability to carry out this oversight.



The central bank, in promoting payment system safety and efficiency through the
Core Principles, should cooperate with other central banks and with any other
relevant domestic or foreign authorities.

For example, Australia’s compliance with the Core Principles is discussed by the Payments System
Board in its annual reports over the last few years. See Payments System Board (2006; 2007;
2008). Despite the fact that the Core Principles are not enforceable (they serve only as a
benchmark against which the effectiveness of banking supervision regimes can be assessed), they
have been used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their supervisory systems
and for identifying future work needed to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices.
See eStandardsForum (n.d.) and Bank for International Settlements (n.d.(b)).
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In other words, a central bank’s objectives represent high-level goals that guide a
country’s payments system activities and form the foundation for the central bank’s
relationship with that payments system (Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems, 2001, p. 59). Frequent, significant changes in these objectives are unlikely
to occur (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 59). To fulfil
these objectives, a central bank’s roles may include acting as owner, operator,
overseer, settlement institution and liquidity provider (Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 59). Additionally, central bank can set policies for its
own systems and for systems it oversees (Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems, 2001, p. 59).
To achieve the objective of safety and efficiency in the payments system, sound
supervision is vital. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2006a, p. 2), 25 core principles are necessary for a supervisory system to be
effective, and these are categorised into seven groups: objectives, independence,
powers, transparency and cooperation (Principle 1), licensing and structure
(Principles 2 to 5), prudential regulation and requirements (Principles 6 to 18),
methods of ongoing banking supervision (Principles 19 to 21), accounting and
disclosure (Principle 22), corrective and remedial powers of supervisors (Principle
23) and consolidated and cross-border banking supervision (Principles 24 and 25).
See Table 36 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in the appendices for
more details.
As previously mentioned, a central bank’s responsibility is to promote safety and
efficiency in a country’s payments system. This relates to the fact that a payments
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system’s operations face various risks, and these must be managed. Described by
Geiger and Klein (2004, p. 33), generally, five risks exist within a payments system:
market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and reputation risk.
Market risk arises from the possibility that market prices will change before the
transaction is completed, and is commonly caused when a transaction is concluded
one day, but is settled some days later (Geiger & Klein, 2004, p. 33). Credit risk is
related to the possibility that one party may fulfil its obligation in a transaction, but
the other does not (Geiger & Klein, 2004, p. 33). Liquidity risk concerns the
possibility that one party fulfils its obligation on time, while the other does, but
delays, so one party must incur the cost of financing the gap (Geiger & Klein, 2004,
p. 33). Operational risk is related to various other risks from the entire transaction and
payment process (Geiger & Klein, 2004, p. 33). Reputation risk is related to the loss
of reputation from payment function problems that may cause a reduction of future
growth and earning potentials (Geiger & Klein, 2004, p. 33).
In addition to the above risks, legal systemic risks should also be considered in
payments system regulation (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001,
p. 5). Legal risk is associated with a poor legal framework that exacerbates credit or
liquidity risk (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 5). Systemic
risk, on the other hand, is the failure of one participant (or a disruption in the system
itself) to fulfil its obligations, which may cause a failure of other participants in the
system to meet their obligations (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems,
2001, p. 5). Therefore, systemic risk may also trigger other risks, such as credit or
liquidity risk (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2001, p. 5).
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Sound regulation is important to achieve safety and efficiency in the payments
system. From a safety point of view, as established by the CPSS (2001, p. 4):
To pursue the objective of safety in a payment system, it is necessary first to identify
and understand how risks of various types may arise or be transmitted within the system
and to determine where they are borne. Once these risks are properly analyzed and
assessed, appropriate and effective mechanisms must be devised to monitor, manage and
control them.

In terms of ‘efficiency’, the CPSS (2001, p. 4) argues that payments systems
designers and operators should understand the costs of their system, including the
charges that are passed on to users for the sake of efficiency. A payments system
should be designed with regard to the existing cost constraints that will influence its
functionality and safety (2001, p. 4).
As the focus of this study, fraud in the payments system is commonly considered as
an operational risk. According to Geiger and Klein (2004, p. 35), examples of
operational risks are: system breakdown; loss of data centre or operational centre (for
example, from terrorism, epidemic); loss of telecommunication links; corrupted data
and/or software; unforeseen events; fraud (external or internal); and clerical errors.
Therefore, crime prevention must also be part of payments system regulation and
supervision. As stated by the CPSS (2001, p. 59):
Other possible objectives, which might or might not be the responsibilities of the central
bank, include protecting consumer rights, and preventing fraud and money laundering.

Additionally, Principle 18 (abuse of financial services) the Core Principles states that
supervisors of payments systems must be satisfied that banks are not used
(intentionally or unintentionally) for criminal activities by ensuring that adequate
policies and processes are in place (for example, ‘know-your-customer rules’) (Basel
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Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006a, p. 4) 40. To achieve this state, according
to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006b), twelve essential criteria
should be met (see Table 37 Essential Criteria of Principle 18 (Abuse of Financial
Services) in the appendices for details). As an additional criterion, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006b, p. 31) states that should other authorities
not address the prevention of criminal activities, the supervisor must have its own
resources with specialist expertise to handle problems. These criteria represent the
contribution of the members of payments systems in crime prevention in the country.

REGULATOR’S INTERVENTION: AN AUSTRALIAN CASE
As described by the Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems, a
main objective of payments system regulation is achieving safety and efficiency
within. Regulators need to act decisively should any conditions occur that do not
promote safety and efficiency. For the credit card industry, regulators’ actions may
include intervention in the existing conditions by, for example, setting new
regulations. In relation to the rules operating credit cards discussed above, and the
fact that the credit card is one of the payment instruments under a country’s payments
system, regulators’ interventions in credit card networks may occur, for example, in
the case of interchange fees. Generally, as previously discussed, interchange fees in
most countries are set by credit and debit card networks (Pacheco & Sullivan, 2006,
p. 87); however, as argued by Pacheco and Sullivan (2006, p. 87):

40

For further references, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1998; 2001; 2003;
Consolidated KYC Risk Management, 2004) and Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (2003; 2004).
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…one country, Australia, the central bank is regulating interchange fees, and in several
other countries and areas, including the European Union (EU), Mexico, the Netherlands,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, public officials are taking or are considering taking a
more hands-on regulatory stance. And in the United States, it is largely the court system
that is debating interchange issues.

Australia is among the countries in the world with the most intensive intervention
from its central bank in the country’s credit card networks. The process is known as
‘the reform of Australia’s payments system’. The reform began soon after the
publication of the report Debit and Credit Card Schemes in Australia: A Study of
Interchange Fees and Access (October 2000)41, whose results suggest the need for
changes in the Australian payments system to improve its performance. Based on the
findings in the report, the reforms of Australia’s payments system began in 2000 with
the credit card system as the first target, and finalised in August 2002 before coming
into effect during 2003 and 2004 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008, p. 2).
According to the Reserve Bank of Australia (2008, p. 3) the reforms coverage is of
three broad areas: the removal of various restrictions on merchants imposed by the
card schemes, the regulation of interchange fees and the introduction of more liberal
access arrangements. In terms of restrictions on merchants, as identified by the
Payments System Board, the rules of card schemes that are considered to be
impeding efficiency and competition in the payments system are: the no-surcharge

41

This is a joint study between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission. For details, see Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (2000).
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rule, the honour-all-cards rule and the no-steering rule (Reserve Bank of Australia,
2008, p. 4)42.
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) (2000, p. 73) argues that although an interchange fee was
intended to encourage a payment network to grow larger than it would have if the
financial institutions earned revenues only from direct charges on their customers, an
economic analysis did not indicate the direction an interchange fee should flow or
how it should be calculated. The report Debit and Credit Card Schemes in Australia:
A Study of Interchange Fees and Access (October 2000), as summarised by the
Reserve bank of Australia (2008, p. 2), concludes that:
… credit card interchange fees had contributed to many holders of credit cards facing
negative effective prices for credit card transactions, while interchange fees in the
EFTPOS system contributed to many people facing positive effective prices for
EFTPOS transactions. This higher price for EFTPOS transactions was despite the
EFTPOS system having substantially lower operating costs per transaction than the
credit card system. The Joint Study also concluded that the case for an interchange fee in
debit card systems on the grounds of balancing issuers’ and acquirers’ costs (as
advocated by the card schemes) was not strong43.

Regarding matters of access arrangement and promotion of competition, the RBA
and ACCC’s inquiry found that the access rules set by credit card schemes were too
restrictive, and could limit competition. As stated by the RBA and the ACCC (2000,
p. 74):

42

For more details, see previous discussion in this chapter on credit card networks’ rules of operation.
Also see Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(2000) and Reserve Bank of Australia (2008).
43
For further details on the results of the report, see Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (2000, pp. 73-79).
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Competition in credit card issuing and acquiring is limited by restrictions on access to
credit card schemes. Excluding all institutions other than authorized deposit-takers from
access to acquiring, in particular, is difficult to justify on risk grounds.

Although the credit card schemes argued at the time that this restriction was
necessary for their own protection as well as for their members, the RBA (despite the
fact that it accepted the idea of the need for some entry criteria) argued that the
existing criteria of the time were unnecessarily restrictive (Reserve Bank of Australia,
2008, p. 7).
In summary and based on the RBA’s report, Reform of Australia’s Payments System:
Preliminary Conclusions of the 2007/08 Review — April 2008, the summary of the
reform is described in Table 3.
Table 3 Payments System Reforms in Australia (as at April 2008)
Standards
Interchange Fees
Credit Cards

Weighted-average interchange fees in the MasterCard and Visa schemes
must not exceed 0.50 per cent of the value of transactions.
MasterCard and Visa must publish their actual credit card interchange
fees.

Visa Debit

The weighted-average interchange fee for Visa debit transactions must
not exceed 12 cents per transaction.
Visa must publish its actual debit card interchange fees.

EFTPOS

EFTPOS interchange fees for transactions that do not involve a cash-out
component must be between 4 and 5 cents per transaction.

Merchant Restrictions
Honour
Cards

all Visa is not permitted to require a merchant to accept Visa debit cards as a
condition of accepting Visa credit cards, or vice versa.
Visa debit cards must be visually and electronically identifiable as debit
cards, and acquirers must provide merchants with information required to
electronically distinguish Visa debit and Visa credit card transactions.

Surcharges

The card schemes must not prohibit a merchant from imposing a
surcharge for MasterCard or Visa credit card transactions, or for Visa
debit card transactions.

Access Regimes
Credit

Cards Schemes must treat applications for membership from specialist credit
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Standards
and Visa Debit

card institutions on the same basis as those from traditional authorised
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs).
A participant in the MasterCard or Visa credit card schemes, or in the
Visa debit system, must not be penalised by the scheme based on the
level of its card issuing activity relative to its acquiring activity, or vice
versa.
Schemes must make available the criteria for assessing applications to
participate in the MasterCard credit card system, or the Visa credit or
debit card systems. The schemes must: assess applications in a timely
manner, provide applicants with an estimate of the time it will take to
assess an application and provide reasons for rejected applications.

EFTPOS

The price of establishing a standard direct connection with another
participant must not exceed a benchmark published by the Reserve Bank,
currently $78,000 (ex GST).
An existing acquirer (issuer) cannot require a new issuer (acquirer) to pay
(accept) a less favourable interchange fee than any other issuer (acquirer)
connected to the acquirer (issuer).

Voluntary Undertakings
American
American Express and Diners Club have provided the Reserve Bank with
Express
and written undertakings to remove restrictions in their credit and/or charge
card schemes preventing merchants from charging any fee or surcharge
Diners Club
for the use of a card.
American
Express

American Express has provided the Reserve Bank with a commitment to
modify provisions in its merchant contracts that would otherwise prevent
a merchant from ‘steering’ a customer’s choice of payment instrument.
Also, in the event that American Express introduces a debit card in
Australia, the merchant agreements and pricing for that product is
separate from those for credit and charge cards.

MasterCard

MasterCard has provided the Reserve Bank with a written undertaking to
voluntarily comply with the Visa debit interchange standard and the
honour-all-cards standard, as they apply to credit and debit card
transactions, as well as the standard on surcharging as it applies to debit
card transactions.

Other
EFTPOS
Access Code

Under the EFTPOS access code, developed by the Australian Payments
Clearing Association, new and existing EFTPOS participants have
specific rights to establish direct connections with other participants
within a set time frame.

Scheme data

Since August 2005 the Reserve Bank has published aggregated data on
the average merchant fee for each of the schemes as well as data on
market shares.

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia (2008, p. 5).
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Although credit card associations may disagree with them, such interventions are
believed to be necessary to promote public interest in the form of safety and
efficiency of payments systems. In the case of the reform of Australia’s payments
system, the disagreement from the associations was evidenced by, for example, the
actions of Visa and MasterCard by launching their legal challenges to the RBA’s
powers to designate the credit card systems and impose standards and access regimes
after the reforms were finalized (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008, p. 3). As described
by the Reserve Bank of Australia (2008, p. 3), this effort was unsuccessful, because
when the case was heard in 2003 in the Federal Court, the decision was found in
favour of the Reserve bank of Australia on all grounds44.

PAYMENTS INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION
As previously discussed, a central bank has responsibility for ensuring the efficiency
and safety of a country’s payments system, including maintaining the security of
payment instruments within. However, in practice, even a central bank has limitations
in performing this task, which thus makes room for self-regulation to step in.
According to Mr Temogen Hield45 of the Australian Payments Clearing Association
(APCA), in rapidly evolving and complex industries (particularly those with network
characteristics, such as payments), successful self-regulation is better than good
public regulation (Hield, 2007, p. 6). In terms of definition, Nunez (2007, p. 210)
explains:

44

See Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (with corrigendum dated 14
October 2003) [2003] FCA 977 (19 September 2003)); (MasterCard International Incorporated v
Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 1260 (10 November 2003)); and (MasterCard International
Incorporated v Reserve Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 1489 (16 December 2003)).
45
Head of self-regulation at APCA of the time.
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As the name suggests, self-regulation is essentially a scheme whereby the enforcement
of quality is delegated to the suppliers. The whole rationale for self-regulation rests on
the notion that suppliers must somehow form an organization (namely a Self-Regulatory
Organization (SRO)) in order to monitor the quality provided by its members and
disclose evidence of malpractice and product failure to consumers.

Hield (2007, p. 6) also believes that successful self-regulation, as opposed to direct
government regulation, offers a means of addressing public policy objectives, that:


is a better balance between public policy concerns and industry interests



is more flexible, responsive to changing participant needs and innovation



creates lower compliance costs



is more certain, because participants control its evolution.

In other words, an advantage of self-regulation is the opportunity to gain
understanding of the actual problems that need to be solved. As argued by
Kleinsteuber (2004, p. 62):
Regulation in the original sense refers to an arbitrary process under the rule of the State,
usually centred in a (more or less) independent regulatory body. This body makes
decisions in situations where there are conflicting interests. The idea is that decisionmaking is so complex that a specialized body of independent experts is better equipped
to do this than state bureaucrats.

According to the International Council of Payment Association Chief Executives
(ICPACE)46 (2007, p. 1), the self-governance framework comprises three broad
levels: objectives, processes and rules and actions.

46

The ICPACE was established in 2004 to provide a forum for peak national payment institutions to
exchange information for the development of international payments systems, and is comprised of
representatives from Australia, Canada, Ireland, South Africa, the UK and the European Payments
Council (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2007a). On 27 November 2007 it released its
Principles of Payments Industry Self-Governance as a guide to improve and develop payments
system governance by means of co-regulatory partnership between industry participants and
government regulators (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2007a). Outside of the
payments industry itself, the self-regulation system has also been adopted by various industries,
such as the accounting industry, the information technology industry and the insurance industry, to
name a few. For examples, see Kleinsteuber (2004); International Federation of Accountants
(2007); and Montoya (2005). Although the term used in the Principles of Payments Industry SelfGovernance guide is ‘self-governance’, the literature often uses the term ‘self-regulation’, and
therefore, to avoid confusion, this study considers the two terms as synonymous.
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Figure 3 The Self-Governance Framework
Source: ICPACE (2007, p. 1).

Table 4 Elements of the Self-Governance Framework
Element

Description

Objectives

Represent the purpose and policy goals of the governance framework. They
must answer the question: why are we setting up this framework?

Processes

Represent the structural arrangements and understandings adopted by
participants, including the role of each and the self-governance procedures to
be followed. They should articulate the powers, rights and obligations of each
stakeholder. They must answer the questions: ‘Who will do what?’ and ‘How
will they do it?’

Represent all the output of governance processes, made to enforce those
instruments. They answer the question: ‘What must we do to participate?’
Rules and Rules and actions can apply to the entire industry, illustrated by the upper
layer, such as a rule book, code of conduct or technical standard, or to
Actions
particular participants, illustrated by the lower layer, such as a licence, an
approval or a ruling against a single party.
Source: ICPACE (2007, p. 1).

The ICPACE, in its guideline, the Principles of Payments Industry Self-Governance,
also formulates five principles that characterise a sound self-governance framework
for a payments system: certainty, legitimacy, transparency, flexibility and efficiency
(see Table 38 Principles of Sound Self-Governance in the appendices for a summary)
(International Council of Payment Association Chief Executives, 2007, p. 2). Hield
(2007, p. 6) contends that successful self-regulation addresses public policy
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objectives for accommodating the interests of the government regulator and the
industry, which means that:


the regulator must be satisfied that its public policy objectives are being met —
otherwise direct regulation will result



the industry needs to be satisfied that, notwithstanding the need to meet public policy
objectives, a self-regulatory solution is better than direct regulation because it
delivers benefits such as those described above.

Thus, an important element of self-regulation system is the balance between public
and private interests. However, some commentators doubt the ability of the selfregulation system to deal with complex issues where strong vested interests are
involved (Hamilton, Self-Regulation, Anyone?, 2007b, p. 2). Mr Chris Hamilton47, of
the APCA, believes that this could be the result of the misunderstanding surrounding
the concepts of self-regulation, where some people believe that the public regulator
would simply walk away and leave everyone to pursue their own commercial selfinterest (Hamilton, 2007b, p. 2). According to Mr Hamilton (2007b, p. 2):
Most self-regulatory frameworks specify coordinated roles for both industry participants
and a public regulator. Usually, the public regulator needs to define minimum public
interest requirements, and has emergency powers to override self-regulation if it is
demonstrably not working. This is what is meant by ‘co-regulation’ — industry takes
responsibility for getting regulation right, but must accept accountability to public
regulators for what they do.

Therefore, according to the ICPACE (2007, p. 6), in practice, self-regulation and
government-imposed regulation will almost certainly co-exist and support each other.
Bartle and Vass (2005, p. 35) classified the varieties of self-regulation practices that
represent various degrees of independence from government (public authority and

47

The CEO of the APCA.
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law) regulation into five categories (perceptions): cooperative, delegated, devolved,
facilitated and tacit (see Figure 4)48.
As stated by Mr Temogen Hield49, of the APCA, in self-regulation, the role of the
regulator and the industry as well as the level of engagement required to achieve
success vary, depending on the matter under consideration (Hield, 2007, p. 7). Hield
(2007, p. 7) describes such relationship in Figure 4.

Role of Public
Authority and Law

Categories

Strong role of public 1. Cooperative
authority and law

Weak role of public
authority and law

Descriptions
Cooperation between regulator and regulated
on the operation of statutory backed
regulation.

2. Delegated

Delegation of statutory powers by public
authority.

3. Devolved

Devolution by parliament of statutory powers
to a self-regulatory scheme.

4. Facilitated

The explicit encouragement and support of
self-regulatory schemes by a public authority.
The schemes themselves are not backed by
the full force of statute.

5. Tacit

No statutory backing and little explicit role
for public authorities.

Figure 4 Levels of the Role of Public Authority and Law in Self-Regulation
Source: Adapted from Bartle and Vass (2005, p. 35).

48

Some of the literature categorises self-regulation practices differently. However, this study refers to
the work of Bartle and Vass (2005), because it was selected among the references to formulate the
ICPACE’s Principles of Payments Industry Self-Governance.
49
Head of self-regulation of APCA of the time.
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Figure 5 Industry/Regulator Engagement50
Source: Hield (2007, p. 7).

According to Hield (2007, p. 7), the relationships between the regulator and the
industry represented in Figure 5 are as follows:
Any self-regulatory issue (in respect of public policy objectives) is somewhere between:


What are the public policy objectives that the regime is trying to achieve; and



How the requirements of those objectives are implemented;
o

The regulator has the greatest responsibility for the ‘what’ and least for the
‘how’ and that the industry has the greatest responsibility for the ‘how’
and least for the ‘what’; and

o

The level of engagement between the regulator and the industry should
increase for the issues for which both the regulator and industry are
responsible.

Further, Hield (2007, p. 8) believes that optimum engagement between the regulator
and the industry is required in developing and reviewing the success criteria because:


the regulator must ensure that the success criteria are an accurate measue of the
relevant public policy objectives)

50

The term ‘success criteria’ refers to the means used to determine whether public policy objectives
such as safety, efficiency and competition, are met (Hield, 2007, p. 8).
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the industry better understands the fundamentals of what is actually happening in the
relevant markets, what is likely to happen in the future and therefore what changes
will signify achievement or movement towards the relevant public policy objectives



dual responsibility and maximum engagement increase confidence of the industry
and other stakeholders in the self-regulatory regime, and are more likely to foster the
right levels of regulator/industry cooperation.

According to the ICPACE (2007, p. 1), the self-governance practice, when executed
properly51, can correct market failures, deliver certainty, ensure equity among
industry participants, promote efficient competition and innovation and deliver other
important policy goals.

CONCLUSION
The credit card payments system is operated within networks consisting primarily of
two main components: participants and rules of operations. As a network set by the
associations, the credit card operation is by nature a complex structure constituted by
the activities of the four main groups of participants: issuer, acquirer, merchant and
cardholder. Each of these parties joins the network because of the expected excess of
benefits over costs from doing so.
The rules set by credit card associations are applied worldwide, and have been the
subject of criticisms for matters including restriction of competition and monopoly
practice. Due to the responsibility which payments system regulators must fulfill to

51

In practice, several factors may contribute to the failure of a self-regulation system, such as
corruption, manipulation, impunity and cover-up, and these represent conflicts of interests within
the self-regulatory body (SRO) (Nunez, 2007, p. 209). See Chapter 8 for more discussion.
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the society, some interventions (for example, reform of Australia’s payments system)
are occasionally made to ensure that the objectives of payments system regulation
(such as achieving safety and efficiency within and promotion of competition) are
achieved. Alternatively, when matters become too complex for government to handle
— especially in a network-based system such as the payments industry — selfregulation can be an option to develop payments system.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS
OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD AND
PREVENTION
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding its ability to promote economic efficiency, the credit card payment
instrument has produced some disadvantages for society. Like a double-edged sword,
the benefits of the credit card come hand in hand with its drawbacks. Credit card
fraud is among the negative sides of this payment instrument. This chapter discusses
the theories and concepts of occurrence and dynamics of crime, with a special focus
on crime opportunity and the application of the concept of situational crime
prevention by credit card industry. The discussions in this chapter include: factors
behind the occurrence and changes of crime, financial and non-financial costs of
credit card fraud and fraud management practice by the credit card industry.

CREDIT CARD FRAUD
STRATEGIC VIEW

AND

PREVENTION:

A

OVERVIEW OF NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF CRIME
Since the dawn of human civilisation, crime has been the subject of analyses by
myriad experts. Several models have been developed to explain the occurrence of
crime. Generally, each has analysed the relationships between factors, such as the
presence of offender and victim, the absence of a capable guardian, motivation,
opportunity and rationalisation, to name a few. Two examples of such models are the
crime triangle and the fraud triangle.
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Adapted from the routine activity theory, Schmerler et al. (2006, p. 13) formulated
the crime triangle model52, in which generally, three elements are required to
constitute a crime in the community: an offender, a victim and a crime scene or
location. As explained by the UK Home Office (n.d.), routine activity theory (RAT)
is one of the main theories of environmental criminology, and was developed by
criminologists Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson53. Similar theories are often used
in analysing crime to formulate sound crime prevention strategies. As stated by the
New South Wales Attorney General’s Department (New South Wales Attorney
General’s Department, n.d.(b)):
The theory states that a crime occurs when the following three elements come together
in any given space and time: an accessible target; the absence of capable guardians that
could intervene; and the presence of a motivated offender.
Offender

CRIME
TRIANGLE

Target/Victim

Crime Scene

52

Developed by William Spelman and John Eck, based on earlier work by Marcus Felson (Schmerler,
Perkins, Phillips, Rinehart, & Townsend, 2006, p. 41).
53
For further discussion, see Cohen and Felson (1979) and Felson and Clark (1998).
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Figure 6 Crime Triangle
In Figure 6 (although not as explicitly described as it is in the fraud triangle)
opportunity plays an important role in the occurrence of crime. Schmerler et al.
(2006, p. 15) state that:
There are people or things that can exercise control over each side of the triangle so that
crime is less likely. Offenders can sometimes be controlled by handlers such as the
police and probation and parole officers. Targets and victims can be protected by the
presence of guardians. Places can also have guardians or managers influencing both
offenders and victims.

Additionally, according to Cohen and Felson (1979, p. 588):
Rather than emphasizing the characteristics of offenders, with this approach we
concentrate upon the circumstances in which they carry out predatory criminal acts.
Most criminal acts require convergence in space and time of likely offenders, suitable
targets and the absence of capable guardians against crime. Human ecological theory
facilitates an investigation into the way in which social structure produces this
convergence, hence allowing illegal activities to feed upon the legal activities of
everyday life.

As mentioned above, the presence of handlers, guardians and managers should create
a sort of barrier against offenders committing crimes. This also means that the
absence of such factors should provide or increase the opportunity to commit crime54.
Applying the routine activity theory to explain the occurrence of credit card fraud can
be a challenging task because, as discussed in Chapter 6, 7 and 8, the offence is
perpetrated in various ways, ranging from simply physically stealing a credit card to
hacking a merchant’s database to steal customers’ credit card information. The
triangle, for example, can be applied straight forward to offence such as credit card
theft but not card-not-present fraud. This is so because the whereas the former occurs
by convergence of victims and offenders in a place where capable guardian is absent,
54

For further discussion, see Felson and Clarke (1998).
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the later often occurs in cyberspace with no geographical boundaries and without the
need for victim-offender direct interaction. As Clark (2004, p. 55) proposes, the
growth and development of technology has created new crime opportunities for
traditional crimes to evolve and yet it also delivers new ways to mitigate them. These
include the ways crime is analysed in criminology55. Further, Clark (2004, p. 55)
argues that:
This new environment of crime and crime controls has radical implications for
criminology....that if the discipline is not to become sidelined and irrelevant
criminologists must make changes that go far beyond a re-focusing of research topics.
The changes must address criminology’s mission, its theories and methodologies with
the collective result of making the discipline more directly relevant to crime control. The
need for this has long been apparent and has only been made more obvious by advancing
technology.

Yar (2005, p. 424), suggests that in an online crime, whereas the ‘motivated
offenders’ can be considered as largely similar to those of terrestrial crime, the
concept of ‘suitable targets’ is more complex as it is similar in terms of value but is
significantly different in inertia, visibility, and accessibility. In traditional crime, the
suitability of target for offender may be measured using the concept of VIVA
(value56, inertia57, visibility58, and accessibility59) (Yar, 2005, p. 419). As Cohen and
Felson (1979, p. 591) proposed:

55

See Grabosky (2001) for discussions on how technology changes the landscape of crime and
criminology.
56
Although greater value means more suitability, in practice, target valuation can be complicated as it
depends on what an offender desires to do with the target (e.g. personal belonging) once it is
acquired (e.g. personal use, for sale or to support criminal activities) (Yar, 2005, p. 419).
57
As this concept represents the physical properties of objects or persons, the greater the inertial
resistance (e.g. big objects or large persons) the less suitable the targets become (Yar, 2005, p.
420).
58
A potential offender must have the knowledge about the existence of the target (Bennett, 1991, p.
148).
59
A potential offender must have the ability to establish physical contact with the target as well as to
get away from the crime scene (Bennett, 1991, p. 148; Felson, 1998, p. 58).
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Target suitability is likely to reflect such things as value (i.e., the material or symbolic
desirability of a personal or property target for offenders), physical visibility, access, and
the inertia of a target against illegal treatment by offenders (including the weight, size,
and attached or locked features of property inhibiting its illegal removal and the physical
capacity of personal victims to resist attackers with or without weapons).

As mentioned above, with the changing environment, especially with the advent of
cashless societies (see Chapter 5) and ecommerce which brings virtual world closer
to the real world, there has been shifting in the concept of ‘suitable targets’ for online
crime such as card not present fraud.
Newman and Clarke (2002), propose that the efforts of crime offenders are driven by
the criminogenic attributes of information systems known as SCAREM; Stealth;
Challenge; Anonymity; Reconnaissance; Escape and Multiplicity. ‘Stealth’ means
that offenders can perpetrate their offences without being recognized or detected by,
in principal, the victims (Newman & Clarke, 2002). The complexity of cyberspace is
by far providing crime offenders with high degree of invisibility to the victims and
also hinders the investigation by law enforcers (Denning & Baugh, 1999, pp. 251276).
’Challenge’ refers to the overwhelming desire of the offenders to ‘beat’ the targeted
system as often demonstrated by their seemingly perpetual efforts in breaking into a
system (Newman & Clarke, 2002). ‘Anonymity’, is different to ‘stealth’ as whereas
the later is sneaky and secretive, the former is a common nature of business activity
where, for example, when cash purchases are made at department store, identifying
buyers and sellers is not of importance (Newman & McNally, 2005, p. 42; Newman
& Clarke, 2002).Within online environment, anonymity and thus deception are
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everywhere, for example, e-mail addresses can be freely obtained with little or no
personal data and with little or no verification whatsoever (Newman & Clarke, 2002).
In terms of ‘reconnaissance’, to avoid detection and ensure that an offence is
perpetrated successfully, offender will first gather information on the potential
victims before selecting the most vulnerable one (Newman & McNally, 2005, p. 42).
The widespread availability of information on the internet makes it easier for
offender to do so (Newman & McNally, 2005, p. 42). ‘Escape’ is all about the ease
of the offenders to flee the crime scene. The other criminogenic attributes of
information system such as ‘stealth’ and ‘anonymity’ contribute to the ability of the
online crime offenders to get away from the crime scene relatively easily compared
to those of terrestrial crimes (Newman & Clarke, 2002). ‘Multiplicity’ refers to the
fact that online environment enables crime offenders to easily multiply the offence
exponentially. For example, when a hacker manages to steal a bank’s customer
account information he may then use such information to facilitate the commission of
other crimes such as extorting money from the bank for the return of the database
(Newman & Clarke, 2002; Newman & McNally, 2005, p. 42).
With the growth and development of e-commerce, the online environment is now a
new crime scene for offence such as card-not-present fraud60. As Reyns (2010, p. 58)
puts it:
… the victim and offender converge not in space, but within a network (e.g., telephone
and internet systems, mail/package delivery). Further, in the context of online
victimization, motivated offenders and targets do not necessarily have to converge online
at the same time.
60

See, for example, Cross (2008) for discussions on the scene of cybercrime.
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This presents, for example, law enforcers, with a challenge to establish guardianship
in online environment (Yar, 2005, pp. 422-423). Defined as ‘the capability of persons
and objects to prevent crime from occurring’, the success of guardianship depends
primarily on the guardian’s co-presence with the potential target and the potential
offender at the same time and same place (Tseloni, Wittebrood, Farrell, & Pease,
2004, p. 74; Yar, 2005, p. 423). However, Yar (2005, p. 423) argues that in relation
to cybercrime, establishing and maintaining such co-presence for formal social
guardianship is very difficult if not impossible due to offender’s high mobility and
temporal irregularity of online activities. These create the need for adapting the
concepts and practices of guardianship to cope with the new environment. Grabosky
(2001, p. 248) contends:
Capable guardianship has evolved over human history, from feudalism, to the rise of the
state and the proliferation of public institutions of social control, to the postmodern era in
which employees of private security services vastly outnumber sworn police officers in
many industrial democracies. The policing of terrestrial space is now very much a
pluralistic endeavour. So too is the policing of cyberspace. Responsibilities for the
control of computer crime will be similarly shared between agents of the state,
information security specialists in the private sector, and individual users. In cyberspace
today, as on terrestrial space two millennia ago, the first line of defence will be selfdefence.

As discussed in Chapter 7, various fraud prevention initiatives such as the Address
Verification Service (AVS), Card Verification Number, Verified by Visa and
MasterCard SecureCode have been employed to address the problems of, among
other things, online credit card fraud. These initiatives represent the modern
guardianship in online environment.
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Opportunity

FRAUD
TRIANGLE

Motivation

Rationalization

Figure 7 Fraud Triangle
Based on the work of criminologist Donald Ray Cressey, the fraud triangle is another
example of a model of crime occurrence analysis, and focuses on so-called ‘trust
violators’61.
Cressey’s theory suggests that in order for a trust violation to occur three elements
must be present: motivation, opportunity and rationalisation. This theory is still used
today to analyse problems of fraud, particularly that which occurs in organisations
where trust is involved62. In terms of motivation, Cressey (1950, p. 97) argues that in
all cases that he had investigated, non-shareable problem always preceded the
criminal violation of financial trust. ‘Non-shareable’ describes the situation where a

61

The fraud triangle concepts, which were initially proposed by Donald Ray Cressey, are now among
the most well-known frameworks for analysing frauds around the world. In his original work,
during the course of his PhD study, Cressey often (if not always) used the term ‘trust violation’ in
describing the offence in question —embezzlements. For more discussion, see Cressey (1950). For
his PhD study, Cressey, in the late 1940s, interviewed nearly 200 incarcerated embezzlers,
including convicted executives. For more details on Cressey’s research method for his PhD, see
Cressey (1950, pp. 27-55).
62
For example, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 2002 published the
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,
within which the fraud triangle (incentive/pressure, opportunity and attitude/rationalisation) is used
to describe the characteristics of fraud. See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(2003); Wells (2005, pp. 347-355); and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2008).
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problem-bearer cannot inform other people, let alone ask for help. This creates a
somewhat strong motivation for committing fraud. When motivation exists, any
opportunity to commit fraud can be considered as a solution to a person’s nonshareable problem. As Cressey (1950, pp. 123-124) states:
The trusted person must have a certain amount of knowledge or information about trust
violation in general, and specifically he must be aware that the violation of his trust will
aid in the solution of the problem.

Finally, to complete the triangle, rationalisation is a way for the offender to justify
their actions. According to Cressey (1950, p. 201), rationalisations are not merely ex
post facto justifications for conduct which have already been enacted, but are
pertinent and real reasons which the person has for acting. This is to say that
offenders may have their justifications before or after their actions. Clark et al. (2006,
pp. 135-136) are of the opinion that rationalisation can take various forms, such as:
‘it’s just temporary’, ‘management doesn’t care’, ‘management participates in,
expects and rewards this kind of behaviour’, ‘no one is hurt and the company is
helped’ and ‘I deserve this’.
Much of the literature has sought to compare crime occurrence models in the hope of
finding one to explain why frauds occur and thus assist in the development of
effective countermeasures. However, the present study does not attempt to compare
models to determine which are better, but instead focuses on a theoretical
exploration, in relation to credit card fraud, of one particular factor acknowledged
either implicitly or explicitly by most crime occurrence models: opportunity.
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TYPES OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD
As suggested by the discussions in Chapter 6, credit card fraud has been categorised
variously by different parties. However, theoretically, the offence is commonly
classed into five types: 1) application fraud, 2) card not received, 3) lost and stolen
card 4) counterfeiting and 5) card not present. Although the following discussions
attempt to explain each offence separately based on the existing literature, in reality,
each type of offence can be related to several others63. Furthermore, as described in
Chapter 6, institutions that collect payments fraud data (such as the Australian
Payments Clearing Association (APCA) and the Association for Payment Clearing
Services (APACS)) may have slightly different ways for categorising the offences,
including the use of slightly different terms.
Application Fraud
Application fraud occurs at the early stage of the credit card lifecycle: the application
process. Various ways exist for an offender to commit this offence, such as by using
false identification documents or assuming another person’s identity. Generally, the
basis of this offence consists of exploiting loopholes in the application process so that
an offender can have their credit card application approved64. Commonly, during
their credit card application process, offenders give banks or financial institutions
false information about their financial status (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 4).
63

64

For example, in February 2008, the Indonesian Police uncovered what was believed to be the
largest credit card fraud case in Indonesia ever. Total losses were estimated at $US 3.3 billion. ).
The fraud was conducted by an organised syndicate with a sophisticated modus operandi which
included the use of networks in stealing data from banks, buyers of the counterfeit cards,
establishment of a factory for producing counterfeit cards, production of counterfeit cards, and the
use of counterfeit cards at merchants (Kompas.com, 2008c; Suara Merdeka, 2008).
For example, as discussed in Chapter 8, Indonesia, due to its lack of effective and efficient identity
management practice, has been struggling with identity-related crime, such as credit card
application fraud using multiple IDs as well as false identification documents.
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Another common way to commit application fraud is through ID theft or using other
person’s identity to open an account. According to Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 16), identity
theft usually involves taking on the identity of the victim for malevolent purposes. As
defined by the FTC in accordance with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
2003 is as follows (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, n.d.(d); United States
Congress, 2003):


The term ‘identity theft’ means a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying
information of another person without lawful authority.



The term ‘identifying information’ means any name or number that may be used,
alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual,
including any:
o

Name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government issued
driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government
passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number;

o

Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or
other unique physical representation;

o

Unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or

o

Telecommunication identifying information or access device.

This offence can employ techniques ranging from low-tech means such as ‘dumpster
diving’65 and social engineering66 to the highly sophisticated, such as computer
hacking67. Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 18) believe that low technology methods are made
possible by the victims’ lack of personal responsibility (for example, improper
disposal of receipts) as well as the theft of information from paper records not in the
cardholders’ control. On the other hand, high technology methods can also exploit
human vulnerability by more sophisticated means, such as ‘phishing’, which is a
65

Looking through other people’s trash for valuable information such as credit card details
(SearchSecurity.com, 2002; Spamlaws, n.d.).
66
The process by which an offender deceives others, convincing them to disclose valuable data for the
offender’s benefit (Rusch, 2001).
67
The act of intentionally accessing a computer without authorisation, or exceeding authorised access
(U.S. Legal, Inc., n.d.).
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form of online identity theft that employs both social engineering and technical
deception to steal consumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials
(Anti-Phishing Working Group, n.d.). Emigh (2005, p. 1) explains that:
Phishing is online identity theft in which confidential information is obtained
from an individual. Phishing includes deceptive attacks, in which users are
tricked by fraudulent messages into giving out information; malware attacks, in
which malicious software causes data compromises; and DNS-based attacks, in
which the lookup of host names is altered to send users to a fraudulent server.
Card Not Received
According to Burns and Stanley (2002, p. 3), this offence occurs when an
individual’s mail is intercepted by an offender. The perpetrators of this scheme rely
on the loopholes of the credit card delivery process to intercept the cards.
Technically, the cards are stolen in transit, after card companies send them out and
before the genuine cardholders receive them (Association for Payment Clearing
Services, 2008b, p. 15). In several cases, especially in countries where mailboxes are
unsecured, this offence is relatively easy to perpetrate. Properties with communal
letterboxes, such as flats and student halls of residence and people who do not get
their mail redirected when they change address are at high risk of being victimised by
this type of offence (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 15).
Lost and Stolen Card
In this scheme, credit cards are simply ‘lost’ by the cardholders (for example, left
behind at a point of sale) (Cornish, Delpha, & Erslon, n.d., p. 13). According to
Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 13), credit cards may also be removed from purses or
briefcases at work, school or other settings if left unattended by the cardholders. This
type credit card fraud can also be a predicate offence for card-not-present fraud,
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because offenders can use a card or card number for criminal purposes over the
telephone or the internet (Cornish, Delpha, & Erslon, n.d., p. 9).
Counterfeiting
In this scheme, offenders create fake credit cards by using the illegally obtained
details of real credit cards (Burns & Stanley, 2002, pp. 3-4). To obtain credit card
details, offenders may employ sophisticated method such as hacking into merchants’
databases or simply ‘engineering’ the victims into giving their credit card details. As
stated by Burns and Stanley (2002, p. 4):
Prior to the introduction of real time terminal authorizations, criminals were able to
create false cards simply by obtaining card information from discarded sales receipts. In
today’s electronic world, additional information contained on the card’s magnetic stripe
is read by the authorization terminal. Simple hand held devices are now available to
criminals that can be used to ‘skim’ the magnetic stripe and obtain all the information
needed for the creation of a fraudulent card68. Virtually all merchant terminals employ
this technology in the form of an electronic card reader.

Card Not Present (CNP)
Card-not-present fraud occurs without the presence of the card. This is part of the risk
a merchant must be willing to take when accepting card-not-present transactions (for
example, internet transactions). Burns and Stanley (2002, p. 6) discuss how credit
card use where the physical card is not present at the point of sale (POS) creates a
different set of challenges. Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 12) believe that card-not-present
fraud poses a great threat to merchants, because they are not protected with the
physical verification features present in ‘brick and mortar’ businesses. This occurs
68

This scheme is often mentioned as ‘skimming’. As discussed in Chapter 6, skimming is basically the
theft of credit card data which will then be used in counterfeit card fraud. As shown by, for
example, the APCA’s statistics, the two offences are often considered as a single type of fraud,
‘counterfeit/skimming’ (see Chapter 6). As discussed in chapter 7, the Chip and PIN technology
was created with a primary aim of preventing counterfeit/skimming fraud and has become a
worldwide standard for offline credit card fraud prevention. The UK was the first country in the
world to complete a national rollout of the technology (see further discussions in Chapter 7).
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because neither the card nor the cardholder are present at the point of sale, so the
merchant is unable to verify the signature or photo identification of the cardholder.
Therefore, disputing a cardholder claim that a purchase was not made is difficult, and
thus the merchant assumes the full risk of credit purchases (Cornish, Delpha, &
Erslon, n.d., p. 12). Although internet is often accused of being the means by which
card-not-present frauds are perpetrated, telephone and mail can also be effective
means. This is known as mail order/telephone order (MOTO) fraud. According to
APCA (2008b, p. 9), this crime commonly involves the theft of genuine card details
in the real world which are then used to make a purchase over the internet, phone or
mail order.
The above classifications are just some examples of how the literature tries to put
credit card fraud into perspective. More discussions on these classifications, as well
as the prevalence and costs of credit card fraud in the US, the UK and Australia, are
part of Chapter 6. From the above examples of credit card fraud classifications, we
may generally identify three stages in the credit card lifecycle that are often targeted
by offenders: application (for example, application fraud), delivery (for example,
card-not-received fraud) and usage (for example, lost or stolen card, counterfeiting
and card-not-present fraud). From the point of view of the card69, despite the
existence of several types of credit card information details in a card, the primary

69

This study is not intended to discuss technical issues related to credit card frauds deeply, because it
puts a greater emphasis on examining the trends of credit card fraud prevalence and prevention for
the purpose of national strategy formulation. The inclusion of the discussion on the mechanics of
credit card validity checking aims only to give an overview of the pattern of offences.
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target is often the credit card number, whose validity is determined by the LUHN-10
algorithm70. As stated by Tervo71 (2002b):
One of the most widely used algorithms for character-based error control is known as
the LUHN-10 Algorithm. This simple but effective error detection method is commonly
used by companies and organizations when issuing account and membership numbers.
The algorithm is specified in the ISO-7812-1 standard defining a common format for
credit cards.

The mechanics of this algorithm to check the validity of credit card in a transaction is
fairly simple, as described by Tervo (2002b):
If a ‘weighted sum’ is constructed by multiplying adjacent digits by a different constant
(in this case, either 1 or 2) the problem of adjacent swapped digits going undetected can
be eliminated. A checksum is constructed from the sum of the resulting digits. If a
product results in two digits (e.g. 2 x 6 = 12), the individual digits (1 and 2) are added
separately into the checksum. The final digit is computed so that the weighted sum is an
exact multiple of 10. In other words, the overall sum ‘modulus 10’ equals zero.

Simply put, a credit card number is considered valid when the overall sum ‘modulus
10’ equals zero. In other words, the final result of the equation must be a multiple of
ten as an indication of a credit card number’s validity. The above procedure is a
common part of the transaction processing systems of credit card networks to check
the validity of credit cards. However, as argued by Tervo (2002b), the LUHN-10
algorithm was never designed for security — it was initially designed for error
checking72. As demonstrated by the above explanation by Tervo (2002b), the
algorithm (even manually calculated) is fairly simple to use73 (for example, to create

70

The algorithm was invented by an IBM scientist, Hans Peter Luhn, and was patented on 23 August
1960. See United States Patent Office (1960).
71
Richard Tervo is a Professor at the Department of Computer and Electrical Engineering at the
University of New Brunswick.
72
For more technical discussion on this matter, see Tervo (2002b) and Gilleland (n.d.).
73
For more technical explanation on how to use the algorithm to check the validity of a credit card
number, see Tervo (2002a).
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valid numbers)74 and can create an opportunity for offenders to conduct credit card
frauds, particularly card-not-present fraud75. Moreover, even in terms of error
detection, the algorithm is theoretically not flawless. As argued by Tervo (2002b):
If a LUHN-10 protected number is totally garbled (or forged!), the use of modulus 10
implies that there is one chance in ten that the (random) number will nonetheless pass
the error detection test. Conversely, there are 9 chances out of 10 that the error will be
detected. Consequently, while single-digit errors are all detected and most swapped
adjacent digits can be detected, other types of errors should be detected with 9/10 = 90%
reliability.

THREATS OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD
Generally known to cause financial losses, further advancement of credit card fraud
can also result in more serious losses, such as loss of lives. The following discussions
are an overview of losses from credit card fraud which this study categorises as
‘calculable’ losses (or those that represent financial losses) and ‘incalculable’ losses
(non-financial losses). To demonstrate how severe non-financial losses from credit
card fraud can be, terrorist financing is used as an illustration.
‘Calculable’ Losses
The seriousness of credit card fraud is evident in, among other things, the losses
thereof which represent the financial threat to the credit card industry. Among the
factors that contributed to this condition is the advancement of information and

74

Theoretically, by understanding the mechanic of the LUHN-10 algorithm, the offenders can predict
valid credit card numbers based on another valid number. In practice, instead of performing
manual calculations, the offenders can simply use the credit card generator software based on the
algorithm, which can create up to hundreds of valid credit numbers within seconds (Jovan, 2006,
pp. 20-22). Such software can also create valid credit card numbers (including other details, such
as expiry dates) out of other valid credit card numbers to make transactions with (Jovan, 2006, p.
21).
75
See Jovan (2006) for more discussion.
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communication technology. Mr Frank W. Abagnale76, in his book, The Art of the
Steal, states that nowadays, the level of fraud threat is increasing, due to the
development of the information and communication technology (ICT) (Abagnale,
2001, pp. 151-185), because, among other things, the victim can be anyone anywhere
in the world (Abagnale, 2001, pp. 151-185). Even though a former legendary con
artist himself, Mr Abagnale was, at one time, a victim of card-not-present fraud
(Abagnale, 2001, pp. 151-153).
In the incidents of fraud, all main parties in a credit card network will suffer losses to
various degrees. For cardholders, it is commonly assumed that the loss that they must
bear is the least of all. As Bhatla et al. (2003, p. 6) state:
It’s interesting to note that cardholders are the least impacted party due to fraud in credit
card transactions as consumer liability is limited for credit card transactions by the
legislation prevailing in most countries.

On the other hand, merchants generally absorb most of the fraud losses. Bhatla et al.
explain (2003, p. 7):
Merchants are the most affected party in a credit card fraud, particularly more in the
card-not-present transactions, as they have to accept full liability for losses due to fraud.
Whenever a legitimate cardholder disputes a credit card charge, the card-issuing bank
will send a chargeback to the merchant (through the acquirer), reversing the credit for
the transaction. In case, the merchant does not have any physical evidence (e.g. delivery
signature) available to challenge the cardholder’s dispute, it is almost impossible to
reverse the chargeback.
76

Mr Frank William Abagnale is currently one of the world’s leading security experts specialising in
the area of prevention of forgery, embezzlement and secure documents (Abagnale and Associates,
n.d.). Mr Abagnale has over 35 years of experience in working with hundreds of financial
institutions, corporations and government agencies around the world, including providing advices
and consultancy (Abagnale and Associates, n.d.). Part of Mr Abagnales’s experience in fraud
prevention came from his own experience as a con artist. According to his short biography in
Abagnale and Associates’s website, his most well-known acts of fraud were committed when he
was between the ages of 16 and 21, and before he was apprehended by the French police, and
include him successfully posing as an airline pilot, an attorney, a college professor and a
pediatrician, and successfully cashing $2.5 million in fraudulent checks in every US state and in 26
foreign countries (Abagnale and Associates, n.d.).
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In practice, chargeback is just one of the costs associated with fraud. Other costs
include: costs of goods sold, shipping cost, card association fees, merchant bank fees,
administrative cost and loss of reputation (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 7). Banks
(and financial institutions) that act as credit card issuers and acquirers also bear some
losses from credit card fraud. Based on the scheme rules defined by associations such
as MasterCard and Visa, for example, it is possible77 that issuers or acquirers may
bear the cost of fraud (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 7). Furthermore, even in cases
when issuers or acquirers do not bear the direct costs of the fraud, some indirect costs
still must be borne by them (for example, administrative and labour costs) (Bhatla,
Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 7).
‘Incalculable’ Losses: A Case Study of Terrorism
In practice, losses from credit card frauds can be more than just financial. The
proceeds of the offences can be used to support other crimes, such as terrorism.
Although terrorism is outside the scope of this study, the fact that it is among the
world’s most serious crimes and can be related to credit card fraud, suggests that it is
a good example among other threats posed by credit card fraud. Lormel (2008, p. 2)
argues:
There is no empirical statistical data establishing the nexus between credit card
exploitation and terrorism, but there are ample anecdotal case studies demonstrating
how extensively terrorists rely on credit card information in furtherance of their heinous
activities.

77

These generally apply to any members (for example, issuers) who do not comply with the security
procedures set by the associations. For examples, see Visa International Operating Regulations:
Volume I — General Rules (Visa Inc., 2008a); Visa International Operating Regulations: Volume
II — Dispute Resolution Rules (Visa Inc., 2008b); Visa U.S.A Inc. Operating Regulations: Volume
I—General Rules (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2008a); and Visa U.S.A. Inc. Operating Regulations: Volume
II—Dispute Resolution Rules (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2008b).
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Terrorism requires funding for its operations, and thus sources of funds are an
important part of the crime itself. In other words, terrorists must have effective
financial infrastructures, including sources of funding, the means of laundering funds
and the availability of funds (Lormel, 2008, p. 2). In terms of terrorist funding, the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) (2008b, p. 7) argues that:
The first step in identifying and forestalling the flow of funds to terrorists is to
understand the funding requirements of modern terrorist groups. The costs associated
not only with conducting terrorist attacks but also with developing and maintaining a
terrorist organisation and its ideology are significant. Funds are required to promote a
militant ideology, pay operatives and their families, arrange for travel, train new
members, forge documents, pay bribes, acquire weapons, and stage attacks. Often, a
variety of higher-cost services, including propaganda and ostensibly legitimate social or
charitable activities are needed to provide a veil of legitimacy for organisations that
promote their objectives through terrorism.

According to the FATF (2008b, p. 17) a market exists for illegally obtained personal
details, including credit card account numbers, as well as personal information such
as the cardholder’s full name, billing address, telephone number, start and expiry
dates and the security number on the rear of the card, to name a few. Underground
markets can be utilised by terrorists to obtain credit card or credit card details
illegally to be used in terrorist financing activities. As argued by Lormel (2008, p.
10), terrorists are opportunists, and are adept at obtaining credit card information
through the formal financial system by a variety of means. This threat must be taken
seriously, because, according to Lormel (2008, p. 2), even though financing a
terrorist group requires significant funding, financing a terrorist attack usually does
not (compared to the resulted damages and casualties). Table 5 shows some examples
of the cost estimations of some well-known terrorist attacks.
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From the list of terrorist attacks in Table 5, the first Bali bombings (2002) are a good
example of the use of credit card fraud for terrorist funding. According to Lormel
(2008, p. 14), in relation to the bombings, more than any other case study, the case of
Imam Samudra highlights the critical importance of credit card information security.
While in prison in 2004, Imam Samudra wrote a jailhouse manifesto, in which one
chapter describes hacking (Lormel, 2008, p. 14). The chapter does not focus on
specific techniques, but instead provides information on how to find techniques on
the internet as well as how to connect with people in chat rooms to hone credit card
fraud skills (Lormel, 2008, p. 14). Further, the FATF (2008b, p. 18) gives another
example:
A North African terrorist funding group accumulated details of nearly 200 stolen cards
and raised more than GBP 200 000 to fund the al-Qaeda terrorist network through
international credit card fraud. Twenty to thirty ‘runners’ collected the names and credit
card details of almost 200 different bank accounts from contacts working in service
industries such as restaurants. These details were not used in their country of origin (the
UK) but sent on to associates in Spain and the Netherlands. These associates used the
cards to fraudulently collect more than GBP 200 000 for al-Qaeda cells around Europe.

Table 5 The Direct Attack Costs of a Terrorist Conspiracy
Attack

Date

Estimated Cost78

London transport system

7 July 2005

$US15,67379

Madrid train bombings

11 March 2004

$US10,000

Istanbul truck bomb attacks

15 & 20 November 2003 $US40,000

Jakarta JW Marriot Hotel bombing 5 August 2003

$US30,000

Bali bombings

12 October 2002

$US50,000

USS Cole attack

12 October 2000

$US10,000

East Africa embassy bombings

7 August 1998

$US50,000

Source: FATF. (2008b, p. 7).

78

Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are adapted from the August 2004 report of the UN
Monitoring Team Report on al Qaeda and the Taliban (Financial Action Task Force , 2008b, p. 7).
79
The UK Home Office, cited in the FAFT (2008b, p. 7).
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Studies by the FATF80 and other institutions around the world acknowledge that
many terrorist activities are funded or are believed to have been funded by credit card
frauds. Given the surfeit of evidence that terrorists take advantage of credit card
fraud, such crime should not be considered as a purely financial threat to society, but
also as a threat to public safety.
In some of the relevant literature (such as the FATF81) terrorist financing is often
associated with money laundering in the sense that the latter is a prominent means
among terrorist financing. As explained by the FATF (n.d.):
Money laundering is the processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal
origin. This process is of critical importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy these
profits without jeopardising their source.

Generally, money laundering is conducted in three stages: placement, layering and
integration (Clark, Kenyon, & Shel, 2006, p. 511). In the placement stage, the illegal
profits are introduced to the financial system by, among other things, breaking up
large amounts of cash into smaller sums before depositing them into bank accounts
(Financial Action Task Force, n.d.). Other techniques in this stage include the
purchasing of a series of monetary instruments (such as cheques and money orders),
which are then collected and deposited into accounts at another location (Financial
Action Task Force, n.d.). In the layering stage, offenders try to obscure the origin of
the funds (once they have been placed in the financial system) by initiating several
related transactions, such as moving the funds between financial products and often
between institutions and across jurisdictions (Clark, Kenyon, & Shel, 2006, p. 511).

80
81

For examples, see Stana (2004) and Financial Action Task Force (2005; 2008a; 2008b).
For examples, see Financial Action Task Force (2005; 2008a; 2008b).
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Finally, in the integration stage, the laundered funds are extracted from the financial
system to be used for investment (for example, real estate, luxury assets or business
ventures), or even to finance other crimes, after which new laundering cycles begin
(Clark, Kenyon, & Shel, 2006, p. 511; Financial Action Task Force, n.d.).
As stated

in

FATF’s Special

Recommendations on

Terrorist

Financing

(Recommendation II) (Financial Action Task Force, 2004):
Each country should criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist
organisations. Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as money
laundering predicate offences.82

With a common assumption that money laundering and terrorist financing are closely
related, a question arises about whether or not credit cards are also closely related to
money laundering. A study that sought to answer this question was conducted by the
US General Accounting Office (GAO) through an inquiry whose results were
presented as a report to the Chairman of Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Committee on Governmental Affairs of US Senate83. The report concludes that credit
cards are not a major threat in money laundering due to their limitations. As the GAO
(2002e, p. 3) puts it:
Bank regulators, credit card industry representatives, and law enforcement officials we
interviewed generally agreed that credit card accounts were not likely to be used in the
initial stage of money laundering when illicit cash is first placed into the financial
system, because the industry generally restricts cash.

Furthermore, as established by the GAO (1998, p. 4) in its report:
82

Broome (2005, pp. 532-534), expresses his disagreement with the notion that ‘terrorist financing is a
predicate offence to money laundering’ because ‘effective’ terrorist financing is generally
supported by legitimate funds, thus eliminating money laundering in the process to minimise the
risks.
83
The report was titled Money Laundering: Extent of Money Laundering through Credit Cards is
Unknown. See United States General Accounting Office (2002e).
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Industry representatives generally reported that they did not have AML policies and
programs focused on credit cards because they considered money laundering using
credit cards to be unlikely. In their view, the banks’ application screening processes,
systems to monitor fraud, and policies restricting cash payments and prepayments84
made credit cards less vulnerable to money laundering. Industry representatives also
described policies and programs to minimize financial risks of credit card fraud, which
they believed to be helpful in detecting money laundering.

In summary, even though the GAO report concludes that credit cards are not a major
problem in relation to money laundering, it also mentions the possibility that the lack
of cases reported may also suggest that the monitoring process is not thorough
enough to detect credit card-supported money laundering activities (United States
General Accounting Office, 2002e, pp. 3-6). The same conclusion can be drawn from
the case of Indonesia. The researcher’s discussion with Mr Eddy Manindo Harahap85
of the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC)

revealed that, based on INTRAC’s database, credit cards are not a common
instrument in money laundering offences in Indonesia (Harahap, 2008), and despite
the close relationship with terrorist financing, credit card frauds appear to be
unsuitable for supporting money laundering86.

SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION
As discussed above, an effective way of preventing crime is by reducing offenders’
crime opportunities, known as ‘situational crime prevention’. As defined by the
Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) (2003, p. 1):

84

Defined by GAO, a prepayment is a payment in an amount that exceeds the total balance of the
credit card which may result in a large overpayment (United States General Accounting Office,
2002e, p. 4).
85
Head of the Directorate of Compliance and Supervisor of INTRAC.
86
The literature suggests that among the emerging new payment cards, prepaid cards are considered to
carry a high risk of being used to support money laundering. For more discussion, see Financial
Action Task Force (2006) and Sienkiewicz (2007).

100

Situational crime prevention is a primary prevention measure. This means that it is
directed at stopping crime problems before they occur. Like other primary crime
prevention measures, situational prevention tends to focus on reducing crime
opportunities than on the characteristics of criminals or potential criminals.

According to the AIC (2003, p. 1), situational crime prevention seeks to reduce
opportunities for specific categories of crime by increasing the associated risks and
difficulties and reducing the rewards. The AIC (2003, p. 1) states that situational
crime prevention comprises three main elements: an articulated theoretical
framework, a standard methodology for tackling specific crime problems and a set of
opportunity-reducing techniques. As the AIC (2003, p. 1) puts it:
The theoretical framework is derived from approaches that emphasize that crime and
criminal involvement is often a function of existence of a practical or attractive
opportunity to commit a crime (for example, an unlocked car or open window).
Common theoretical perspectives include the routine activity model, crime pattern
analysis and rational choice. The standard methodology is a version of the action research
paradigm in which researchers work with practitioners to analyse and define problem, to
identify and try out possible solutions, and evaluate and disseminate the results. The
opportunity-reducing techniques range from simple target hardening to more sophisticated
methods of deterring or discouraging offenders and reducing the attractiveness of
specific crime targets.

In terms of credit card fraud prevention, many fraud prevention measures are
employed by the industry that aim to diminish offenders’ crime opportunities.
Technically, each prevention measure (such as smartcard, Verified by Visa87 and
MasterCard SecureCode88) was designed to target specific types or specific groups of
credit card frauds, which means that multiple prevention measures should create
better protection.

87

A global authentication program that provides an additional layer of security for online transactions.
It verifies a Visa cardholder’s identity in real time through the use of a password when making
transactions with participating merchants (Visa Australia, 2008, p. 5).
88
Defines a set of rules and underlying technology for fraud prevention that allows a cardholder to
create and use a password on a participating website, before a transaction can be completed
(Cornish, Delpha, & Erslon, n.d., p. 11).

101

Basically, the prevalence and prevention of credit card frauds involves understanding
the decision-making processes of both offenders and crime preventers89. Generally,
offenders will react to the reduction of crime opportunities cased by crime prevention
measures, which is often called crime displacement. As stated by The New South
Wales Attorney General (n.d.(a)):
Displacement theory argues that removing the opportunity for crime or seeking to
prevent a crime by changing the situation in which it occurs does not actually prevent
crime but merely moves it around.

Understanding the principles of crime displacement should assist decision makers
(such as credit card issuers) to determine the best prevention measures to employ.
Offenders are always seeking the greatest benefits in their actions, as an application
of the rational choice theory. The rational choice perspective is a universal concept
acknowledged by several different fields of study, and is believed to have been
inspired by Cesare Beccaria’s well-known work, An Essay on Crimes and
Punishments (1872) (Beccaria & Voltaire, 1872; Hayward, 2007, p. 233).
As stated by Satz and Ferejohn (1994, p. 71):
The theory of rational choice plays a central role in the social sciences. The received
view among philosophers who study rational-choice theory (both proponents and critics)
holds that the theory is psychological and individualistic. Rational-choice theory is taken
to be a psychological theory in that it explains a person’s actions in terms of her mental
states. A rational choice or action is one in which the agent takes the best available
action given her preferences and beliefs. The theory is also taken to be an individualistic
theory in that it applies directly only to individuals (that is, only individuals have
preferences).

89

This study considers all parties in credit card networks (for example, issuers, acquirers, merchants
and cardholders) as having the potential to be crime preventers, in addition to regulatory bodies in
the payment systems (for example, central banks).
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In criminal activities, this means that in committing their offences, offenders will try
to seek the greatest benefits with the least costs. Furthermore, as Hayward (2007, p.
233) argues, basically, in terms of criminality, it is human nature to search for
pleasure and to avoid pain, and thus human action is organised around calculative
strategies aimed at utility maximisation.
Felson and Clarke (1998, p. 25) established five main ways in which displacement
theory suggests crime is moved around:


Crime can be moved from one location to another (geographical displacement);



Crime can be moved from one time to another (temporal displacement);



Crime can be directed away from one target to another (target displacement);



One method of committing crime can be substituted for another (tactical
displacement); and



One kind of crime can be substituted for another (crime type displacement).

Evidence exists of the above movements in credit card fraud cases. For example, as
discussed in Chapter 6, credit card fraud statistics in the US show changes over time,
partly due to offence displacement. Innovations in fraud prevention such as smart in
the UK had caused counterfeit card fraud offenders moved their crimes to different
targets, methods and types. Additionally, as stated by Alaric Systems Ltd.90 and
Stratus Technologies91 (2007, p. 3):
The global rollout of Chip and PIN, particularly in Europe and Asia, has been deemed to
have been successful in reducing fraud in card present transactions, but has resulted in
displacement to CNP fraud where the physical prevention devices are ineffective.

90

Alaric Systems Ltd is a supplier of advanced technology payments based products and services
(Alaric Systems Ltd., n.d.).
91
Stratus Technologies is a company which provides system solutions for essential business processes
and applications (Stratus Technologies, n.d.).
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This raises an important question about how to predict the decisions made by
offenders for preventive purposes. Rational choice theory assumes that offenders
respond selectively to characteristics of particular offences, particularly to their
opportunities, costs and benefits, in deciding whether or not to displace their
attentions elsewhere (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 934). As described by Cornish and
Clarke (1987, p. 933):
This ‘rational choice’ perspective on crime assumes that offenders seek to benefit
themselves by their criminal behavior; that this involves the making of decisions and
choices, however rudimentary on occasions these choices might be; and that these
processes, constrained as they are by time, the offender’s cognitive abilities, and by the
availability of relevant information, exhibit limited rather than normative rationality.

On the other hand, from the point of view of the offence, each choice (in the form of
different offences) that offenders can choose in crime displacement has the so-called
‘choice-structuring properties’ defined by Cornish and Clarke (1987, p. 935) as the
characteristics of offences which render them differentially attractive to particular
individuals or subgroups (or to the same individuals and groups at different times).
Cornish and Clarke (1987, p. 935) argue that decisions to offend are influenced by
the characteristics of both offences and offenders, and are the product of interactions
between the two. In other words, at the end of the day, the interaction between
offenders’ rationalisations and the choice-structuring properties of the offences will
result in decisions such as crime displacement.
Despite the evidence that crime displacement cases are caused by situational crime
prevention practices, some commentators do not fully agree with the theory. Based
on other research, some authors argue that the reduction of criminal opportunities
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will not always create crime displacement. The New South Wales Attorney General
states that (n.d.(a)):
There has been a great deal of discussion about the nature and extent of crime
displacement and whilst there are examples of apparent displacement, there are many
studies which report that displacement does not occur at all, or only to a limited extent.

Moreover, even when displacement can be shown to occur, it may not be complete
displacement, and thus does not produce important net reductions in crime (New
South Wales Attorney General’s Department, n.d.(a)). Mativat and Tremblay (1997)
studied the crimes waves92 of credit card fraud (counterfeiting) in Montreal for the
period of 1992–1994. Their study (Mativat & Tremblay, 1997, p. 165) establishes
that:
Even though stolen-based and altered credit card frauds are tightly related offences and
involve a homogeneous population of potential offenders, the actual difference in payoff was not significant enough to trigger systematic switching in crime tactic
preferences.

An increase of opportunity in Mativat and Tremblay’s study was caused by the
marketing of technology and devices that facilitated altered card fraud93, which later
proved unable to produce a significant increase of the benefits from committing
altered card fraud, and thus no crime waves resulted from the displacements (Mativat
& Tremblay, 1997, pp. 181-182). This is likely because, referring to the rational
choice theory, offenders will displace their crimes only when the benefits for doing
so outweigh the costs (Felson & Clarke, 1998, p. 27).

92

93

‘Crime waves’ generally refer to sudden and significant increases in crime rates (Mativat &
Tremblay, 1997, p. 165).
For example, compact and efficient encoding and embossing equipment and sophisticated
photocopying and printing devices (Mativat & Tremblay, 1997, pp. 181-182).
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Based on the existing debates on crime displacement in relation to changes in crime
opportunities, the researcher of the present study believes that no precise way exists
to predict the occurrence of crime displacement, even though several theories for
doing so have been proposed by scholars. Nevertheless, such theories can still
provide some degree of explanation regarding crime displacements which might
occur in the future. Therefore, the possibility of crime displacement should always be
considered in crime prevention practice.

MANAGING FRAUD
Principles of Crime Prevention: An Overview
As illustrated by credit card fraud prevention in the US, the UK, Australia and
Indonesia (see Chapters 7 and 8), crime prevention activities can be resourceconsuming, and thus efficiency as well as effectiveness should be considered. From a
crime preventer’s point of view, the best fraud prevention strategy targets the actual
problems, so no resources are wasted. As stated by Gilling (1996, p. 11):
The core of this approach is its dynamism and flexibility: it is problem- rather than
practice-oriented, which means there are no preconceived notions of how best to tackle
the specific crime problem under investigation. Instead, the object is to fully research all
of the information available about the situation of a particular crime problem, drawing
data from as many different agency sources as is both possible and necessary. From this
research, a full picture of the crime problem should be possible, enabling those involved
in the exercise to pinpoint exactly where, and often also when, a preventive strategy
needs to be directed. Thereafter, it is a case of deciding what this strategy should
actually be, and then implementing it together with a built-in monitoring system that can
subsequently be used for purposes of fine-tuning and program evaluation. The process is
quintessentially rational, with each step following on logically from the preceding one.

In other words, it is innapropiate for crime prevention practice to rely on assumptions
or perceived notions, because these will lead to incorrect decision making. Sufficient
knowledge of the actual situation must be acquired beforehand to understand the
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actual problems crime preventers must deal with. The nature of the problems should
determine the solutions (Sutton, Cherney, & White, 2008, p. 26). Sutton et al. (2008,
p. 26) argue that such processed should follow a systematic approach by means of indepth collection of relevant data on crime problems, as well as accumulate evidence
on what has been successful in reducing the particular crime problem to determine
the selection of strategy objectives and interventions. Extensive and intensive crime
monitoring is the first step in the formulation of problem-oriented fraud prevention
strategy.
Sutton (1996, p. 58) argues that attempts to apply opportunity reduction and problemfocused approaches often encounter obstacles and resistance not mentioned in
mainstream accounts. A major challenge in crime monitoring is that the collection of
reliable crime data is often very difficult. For example, as stated by Sutton (Sutton,
1996, p. 66):
While particularly useful for demonstrating that ‘hot spots’ existed, crime data was
comparatively unhelpful for illuminating what factors made these places crime prone. In
particular, police systems yielded very little detail on how relevant offences were being
committed and why particular targets were selected.

In order to overcome the above obstacles in the process of crime data collection,
coordination and cooperation between government, industry and other parties
committed to crime prevention is essential. Political leaders and policy coordinators
should articulate a clear and powerful vision capable of coordinating and guiding the
wide range of players who must be involved in strategy and program implementation
(Sutton, Cherney, & White, 2008, p. 29).
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Hough and Tilley (1998, p. 36) are of the opinion that designing and implementing
problem-oriented crime prevention strategy is a continuous process that involves
routine scanning and analysis of problems, devising strategies to address problems,
implementing attempted solutions to problems and monitoring of strategy and crime
problem, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the solutions (see Figure 8).

Routine scanning and analysis of problems

Devising strategies to address problems

Implementing attempted solutions to
problems

Monitoring strategy and crime problems
& evaluation of effectiveness of solutions

Figure 8 The Problem Solving Process
Source: Hough and Tilley (1998, p. 36).

Sutton et al. (2008, p. 22) argue that crime preventions are divided into two broad
categories: the social approach (consisting of primary, secondary and tertiary
prevention) and the environmental approach (consisting of crime prevention through
environmental design or CPTED and situational crime prevention or SCP).
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Table 6 Classifications of Crime Prevention
Social Approach
Tries to reduce the likehood that individuals
or groups will include crime in their
repertoire or behaviours by strengthening
informal and institutionally-based incentives
to be law abiding.

Primary Prevention
Refers to measures put in place early and
which target entire populations.
Secondary Prevention
Focuses on individuals or groups assessed
at ‘risk’ of engaging in criminal activities.
Tertiary Prevention
Focuses on rehabilitating those who are
already engaged in criminal activities.

Environmental Approach
Concentrates on addressing the target and
guardianship aspects of crime, aiming to
modify the physical contexts in which crimes
can occur and potential offenders operate —
and particularly to minimise the extent to
which such environments give rise to
criminal opportunities.

Crime
Prevention
through
Environmental Design (CPTED)
Ensuring that the settings in which people
work, live and find recreation are not ‘built’
in ways that undermine capacities for
surveillance and guardianship.
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP)
Concentrates on manipulating specific
environments or environment types (for
example, banks, cars, airport terminals and
transport interchanges) in ways that will
increase the risks and efforts associated
with offending and reduce associated
rewards and excuses.

Source: Adapted from Sutton et al. (2008, pp. 21-69).

Among the classifications in Table 6, situational crime prevention has been seen to be
employed by the credit card industry as countermeasures to reduce the opportunity of
committing crime by means of, for example, smartcard and online security, which
offences such as counterfeit card fraud and card-not-present fraud more difficult to
commit (see Chapter 7 for more discussions). The implementation of tighter
procedures for mailing credit cards to reduce the opportunity of card-not-received
fraud is also an example of situational crime prevention initiative (Linden, 2007, p.
150).
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As mentioned before, one of the stages of the problem-solving process is the
evaluation of the crime prevention strategy to determine whether or not it has been
successful. However, doing so is often difficult, due to differences of perspectives
and methods thereof. As argued by Sutton et al. (2008, p. 71):
…no one method of evaluation will necessarily be appropriate in all circumstances.
Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of various evaluation methods is important
to building a repertoir of evaluation designs and evidence that can inform the
development, implementation, and assessment of crime prevention plans.

Therefore, as stated by Armstrong and Francis (2003, p. 4):
The challenges to evaluators is to develop evaluation frameworks that are able to engage
with the dynamic, diverse and complex programs delivered in different contexts, by a
multitude of actors operating within a diverse range of relationships and to produce the
reliable evidence required for valid assessments of a program’s performance.

Several methods are available for evaluators to choose in evaluating crime prevention
practices. Table 7 shows the major types of crime prevention evaluation methods.
Table 7 Major Types of Crime Prevention Evaluation Methods
Outcome Evaluation
Concerned
with
examining the impact of
the
intervention
to
determine whether or not
94

Experimental Method
Involves a high degree of control over where, when, how and to
whom an intervention is administered, so that program effects
can be determined by comparing initially equivalent ‘treatment’
and ‘control’ groups96.

94

Sutton et al. (2008, p. 72).
Sutton et al. (2008, p. 72).
96
Australian Government Attorney General’s Department (n.d.).
95
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Quasi-Experimental Design
Generally similar to experimental method, but with the selection
treatment and control groups conducted so as to match each
other on the basis of similar characteristics (not randomly)97.
Non-Experimental Method
Involves taking pre-test and post-test measures of program
objectives without random allocation or comparison groups,
such as assessing if crime was reduced following the
intervention, or if the behaviour or life circumstances of the
target group was improved while being served by the program98.
Systematic Reviews
A form of secondary
analysis of existing
evaluation studies which
does
not
involve
researchers or academics
immersing themselves in
a primary evaluation that
requires
coordination
and management of
evaluation plan99.

Meta-Analysis
Designed to synthesise empirical
relationships across studies, such as
the effects of a specific crime
prevention intervention on criminal
offending behaviour100. This method
focuses on the size and direction of
effects across studies, examining the
consistency of effects and the
relationship between study features
and observed effects101.
Narrative Reviews
Similar to meta-analysis, but more
descriptive and can form part of a
meta-analysis, especially if few
rigorous evaluation studies can be
included in the final meta-review102.
They aim to describe program aims,
components and process (for
example, strategy implementation)
and the full gamut of outcomes
achieved, but do not employ the
statistical methods adopted in metaanalysis103.
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Sutton et al. (2008, p. 74).
Sutton et al. (2008, p. 75).
99
Sutton et al. (2008, p. 76).
100
Wilson (2001, p. 71).
101
Wilson (2001, p. 71).
102
Sutton et al. (2008, p. 77).
103
Sutton et al. (2008, p. 77).
98
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Cost
and
Benefit
Analysis
Assessing whether the
benefits
of
crime
prevention programs are
exceeding the costs of the
programs
using
the
analogy of calculating the
return on investment104.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)
Comparing the outcomes of policy options with comparable
costs105. The least-cost alternative to produce the defined
outcome (or set of outcomes) is the most desirable option,
subject to account being taken of wider outcomes that cannot be
incorporated in the analysis106.
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)
An advancement of CEA, which attaches monetary values to the
outcomes and intervention107. Once both the costs of inputs and
the value of outcomes (benefits) are expressed in monetary
terms, a direct comparison can be made108.

Process Evaluation
Concerned with examining strategy implementation, rather than outcomes. Looks at the
underlying mechanisms that drove the implementation of a strategy and assesses whether
they hindered or facilitated its delivery109. A process evaluation may focus on a broad range
of factors relating to the roles of different agencies within the scheme, the decision-making
process underpinning policy formation and barriers encountered during strategy delivery110.
Source: Adapted from various sources (see the footnotes).

In the credit card industry, the success of fraud prevention initiatives is commonly
evaluated against a financial cost-benefit perspective111. A common performance
evaluation involves fraud statistics, which depict figures such as the changes of
financial losses over time (see Chapter 6 for examples). In practice, efforts have been
dedicated to develop a cost-benefit analysis to better achieve this; that is, to
determine accurately if the benefits from the resource allocation to crime prevention
practice outweigh the costs thereof. As argued by Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 54):
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Welsh and Farrington (2000, p. 306).
Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 56).
106
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It can be argued that, from a policy perspective, cost-benefit analysis has always been
present in the study of crime prevention. Like it or not, cost-benefit analysis (hereafter
CBA) is implicit to almost all crime prevention effort, in the same way it is implicit in
most evaluation and assessment.

Nevertheless, as the literature suggests, so far, only a few methods exist (Roman &
Farrell, 2002, p. 54). According to Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 54), four reasons for
this exist:
1. Crime prevention is a relatively new area of research;
2. Many programs, decision makers (and researchers) adhere to the notion that, where
there are positive programmatic outcomes, logic dictates that the benefits truly
outweigh the costs (and you just know it);
3. It is sometimes difficult and expensive, in relative terms, to do a comprehensive CBA
of crime prevention that includes quantification of the whole range of costs and
benefits; and
4. Even the most sophisticated analyses of costs and benefits can often be picked apart
as and when necessary by the critic, so that many programs are reticent about
undergoing a cost-benefit analysis.

However, as argued by Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 54), a cost-benefit mindset has
always been present in every decision made in crime prevention activities so far.
Although the literature suggests that cost-benefit analysis is just one crime prevention
evaluation approach, its substance actually lies within every other method. As Roman
and Farrell (2002, p. 54) state:
In fact, the argument can be made that cost-benefit analysis is a second-generation
evaluation tool for crime prevention, since it moves beyond the questions ‘Can crime be
prevented?’ and onto the more advanced questions Where and when is crime prevention
most efficient?’, or, rather, What factors allow crime prevention to maximize the net
social benefit that it can produce?.

In practice, crime prevention strategy often requires significant resource allocation,
which must be evaluated later to determine its level of success as well as its
continuity (Dhiri & Brand, 1999, p. 17). Parties such as policy makers are the most
concerned with the cost-benefit evaluation of the project. However, putting the
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theories of cost-benefit analysis into practice has always been difficult, because many
things need to be identified and put into equation, for example, inputs, outputs,
impacts on risk factors, outcomes, costs and benefits112. For these elements, Dhiri and
Brand (1999, p. 12) assign the following definitions:
Inputs
Defined as any additional human, physical and financial resources that are used to
undertake a project. For example, in an intervention that installs fences across paths at
the backs of houses as a target hardening measure to prevent domestic burglary, inputs
would include the materials and labour used to install the fences.
Outputs
Defined as the direct products of the process of implementation. They can arise only
during the implementation period. Following the above example, the fences installed are
outputs and the number of fences installed is an output measure.
Impacts
Defined as the effects of outputs that disrupt the causes of criminal events. Measuring
such impacts is therefore a way of monitoring the process through which the intervention
is expected to reduce crime. In our fence example, this could be a reduction in nonresidents entering the path, thereby reducing the opportunity for burglary.
Outcomes
Defined as the consequences of the intervention. These can arise both during and after
the implementation period. Key outcomes will relate to the stated objectives of the
intervention. In our example, the reduction in burglaries attributable to the installation of
fences is the primary outcome. But there are likely to be wider outcomes such as a
change in the fear of crime or the reduction in other types of crime. These wider
outcomes may or may not be measurable and can be negative as well as positive.
Costs
Defined as the monetary value of inputs.
Benefits
Defined as the value of outcomes to society that are attributed to the intervention,
expressed in monetary terms. Negative outcomes attributed to the crime
prevention/reduction program intervention will be referred to as disbenefits.
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According to Dhiri and Brand (1999, p. 11), by systematically recording and
comparing the cost of inputs with the outputs and outcomes of an intervention, the
analysis allows us to determine the economic efficiency of interventions. Further,
according to Dhiri and Brand (1999, p. 11), this should enable evaluators to answer
the following questions:



What was the true cost of the intervention?



Did the outcomes achieved justify the investment of resources?



Was this the most efficient way of realising the desired outcomes?





Could the same outcomes have been achieved at a lower cost through an
alternative course of action?
How should additional resources be spent?

To answer these questions, a monetary unit is commonly used in cost-benefit
equations despite the limitations thereof. As stated by Roman and Farrell (2002, p.
56):
…monetary units of measurement for cost-benefit analysis are merely a commonly
accepted reference point for marginal utility units (i.e., welfare gain or loss).

Additionally, Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 56) state:
While many commentators are generally content that most costs and benefits can be
converted to a consistent unit of analysis (i.e., can be monetized) some find this notion
abhorrent, perhaps misunderstanding the rationale. The key aspects of the rationale are
that utility units are the real issue, but that money is used as a more readily
comprehendible proxy, and that while measurement is often imperfect, a far worse
option is to exclude such cost items altogether.

In other words, many researchers have been looking in the wrong direction, by
questioning how money can be used to measure costs and benefits of crime
prevention practices. What they really need to inquire into is how to develop a

115

measurement unit that can reasonably represent the elements involved in a costbenefit analysis. For this, continuous research is the only solution.
In current cost-benefit analysis practices using monetary units, the most debatable
matter is how to measure non-monetary costs or benefits. For example, as stated by
Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 68):
Whether to include, and if so, how to measure non-monetary costs, are important issues
for the study of crime prevention and for crime policy in general. Two key and related
questions seem to underpin the debate The first is: ‘Are non-monetary costs important
enough to warrant inclusion in cost-benefit analysis?’ The second is: ‘Can non-monetary
costs be estimated?’

A common way to estimate non-monetary costs is by comparing them with the
existing practices of a different ‘market’. According to Roman and Farrell (2002, p.
68), the economic literature generally suggests the use of a shadow market113 in
evaluating the costs associated with a transaction for which no market exists. The
shadow market can be used in two ways to estimate non-monetary costs: willingnessto-pay estimates and victim compensation. Table 8 shows the major classifications of
the two methods.
Table 8 The ‘Shadow Market’ Methods
Willingness-to-Pay Estimates
Based on the price one would be
willing to pay to avoid damages, such
as death or disability, that result from
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Required Compensation
Estimates the price that an individual would have
to receive in order to risk exposure to a dangerous
event115.
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Property Value
Comparing differences in crime rates and property
values to estimate the amount individuals will pay
to avoid crime and its costs116.
Quality of Life
Estimates costs
disability117.
Victim Compensation (Willingness
to Accept)
The aggregated amount that would
have to be paid to a victim to
compensate for their tangible and
intangible costs118.

according

to

degrees

of

Jury Compensation
Values victim costs at the rate juries compensate
victims of crime, including health care, lost
productivity and intangible costs, such as pain and
suffering119.
Discounted Future Earnings Estimates
Based on a cost-of-illness approach, using survey
data to aggregate the tangible cost of crime
including health and lost productivity (discounting
victim’s future earnings)120.

Source: Adapted from Roman and Farrell (2002) and Roman and Harrell (2001).

In terms of non-monetary costs and benefits of crime prevention practice, an accurate
cost-benefit equation in crime prevention evaluation will require a possibly infinite
number of elements to elaborate in the equation (for example, loss of lives in credit
card fraud-financed terrorist attacks). Therefore, for the sake of this study, only
monetary costs and benefits are considered.
To draw a theoretical picture of the mechanism of crime prevention practice and the
success or failure thereof, economic models can be an option121. Becker (1968, p.
170) contends that:
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Although the word ‘crime’ is used in the title to minimize terminological innovations,
the analysis is intended to be sufficiently general to cover all violations, not just felonies
— like murder, robbery, and assault, which receive so much newspaper coverage — but
also tax evasion, the so-called white-collar crimes, and traffic and other violations.
Looked at this broadly, ‘crime’ is an economically important activity or ‘industry’,
notwithstanding the almost total neglect by economists.

Roman and Farrell (2002) use the ‘market’ analogy and describe criminal activities as
the ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ of crime opportunity at the price known as ‘risk’. ‘Risk’,
according to Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 63) incorporates elements of time and
effort required by an offender to commit an offence. This is because situational crime
prevention, which aims to reduce crime opportunities, also simultaneously increases
crime risk for offenders. Therefore, manipulating the risk to bring it to the highest
level possible is an important part of crime prevention (Roman & Farrell, 2002, p.
63). For this, the concepts of victim surplus and offender surplus are used in the
‘market’ analogy. According to Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 64):
A victim surplus is incurred since, at a given market level of risk required to commit an
offense, some members of society would (unwillingly) supply criminal opportunities at
a lower level of risk. That is, some targets would have provided some easier criminal
opportunities. These potential targets decline in number as risk levels decline, down to a
very small number who take virtually no anti-crime measures. These persons are
society’s free-riders, who have purchased less than the market level of protection
(perhaps less guardianship or less security), so that the victim surplus is not a good thing
for society.

Additionally, Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 64) are of the opinion that:
An offender surplus is also incurred since, at any given risk level, some offenders would
have committed crimes at a higher risk level. However, society loses since these higherrisk crimes are not committed. Therefore, if offenders are not allowed to stockpile
reduced risk (i.e., offenders are made to commit riskier crimes closer to their highest
level of risk tolerance), then society benefits from a reduction in offender surplus.

Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the effect of intervention in the form of crime
prevention practice to the given situation. The two figures resemble the common
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graph of supply and demand with one major difference: neither victim surplus nor
offender surplus is good for society. This means the smaller the surpluses, the better.

Source: Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 66).

Source: Roman and Farrell (2002, p. 66).

Figure 9 ‘Crime Market’ Before theFigure 10 ‘Crime
Intervention
Intervention

Market’

After

the

Where:
A: Victim (producer) surplus
B: Offender (consumer) surplus
C: Lost victim surplus (benefit to society)
D: New victim surplus/lost offender surplus (transfer)
E: Lost offender surplus (a benefit to society)
p1: The risk level of ‘market’
q1: Quantity of crime committed
S1: Supplies of criminal opportunities by unwilling victims
D1: Demand for crime by offenders
(Roman & Farrell, 2002, p. 66)

From the demand side, theoretically, the higher the risk of committing crime, the
lower the number of committed offences (see Figure 9) (Roman & Farrell, 2002, pp.
63-65). On the other hand, from the demand side, the (potential) victims will
(unwillingly) supply criminal opportunities only at a certain risk and, as the supply
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goes up, the risk will also be increased122. The point (p1, q1) is the equilibrium
between supply and demand123.
As depicted in Figure 10, after an intervention (for example, the implementation of
crime prevention program), a shift occurs in the supply curve from S1 to S2, with the
demand curve remaining the same (D1)
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. This change represents a decrease of

supply of criminal opportunity in society125. The increasing risk (from p1 to p2) from
the implementation of situational crime prevention contributes to the reduction of the
quantity of crime (from q1 to q2)
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. Such a decrease also creates a reduction of

offender surplus (E) and victim surplus (C) which, combined together, are the total
benefits to society127.
Fraud Prevention in Credit Card Industry
The credit card, as part of unsecured consumer credit, exposes banks and financial
institutions granting it to various risks, such as credit risk and fraud risk. The term
‘credit risk’ refers to the ability to repay loan and the magnitude of potential loss —
in other words, the potential for the financial obligations not to be fulfilled (Sathye,
Bartle, Vicent, & Boffey, 2003, p. 109). Assessing credit risk is particularly
important during the consumer loan application phase. Generally, like all other
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evaluations of loans, the assessment is done by using the three Cs128: character,
capacity and collateral (Sathye, Bartle, Vicent, & Boffey, 2003, p. 146).
Character is by far the most important, but is also the most difficult to assess. It
includes: track record of the individual, ability (for example, education and
experience), purpose of loan, integrity of the borrower and spending habits (Sathye,
Bartle, Vicent, & Boffey, 2003, pp. 146-147). As argued by Nadler (1992, p. 10):
Character always has been and will continue to be a vital force, most lenders concede.
Without the debtor’s will to repay the debt and conviction that meeting obligations is
vital to a business venture, nothing can protect the creditor. Lenders report again and
again that if the debtor wants to steal from you, there is no way to protect yourself.

Capacity to repay can be assessed by factors such as net income, deposit balances
with the bank, stability of job, stability of residence and borrower’s margin
(borrower’s capital in the total investment) (Sathye, Bartle, Vicent, & Boffey, 2003,
pp. 147-148). According to Nadler (1992, p. 10):
Capacity also remains as significant as always. Without the ability to produce goods
efficiently enough to meet or better the competition, nothing can make an operation
enough of a success to ensure that it can pay its bills, unrealistic assumptions as to what
can be accomplished and what the marketplace will pay for products remains a basic
cause of business failure and loan default. But acute lenders have always known this,
and continue to monitor this ‘C’ closely.

Collateral, which literally means something that goes ‘alongside’ the loan, is often
considered to be synonymous with ‘security’ (Sathye, Bartle, Vicent, & Boffey,
2003, p. 148). Collateral is essentially something in reserve to which a lender can
turn, should a borrower be unable to pay their loan due to changes in their
128
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circumstances, and is the last resort when all other means to secure loan repayment
have failed (Sathye, Bartle, Vicent, & Boffey, 2003, p. 148). In other words,
collateral also refers to a borrower’s property (such as business inventory and
equipment, or property purchased using the borrowed fund) used to protect the
lender’s interest (Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants, 1999, p. 9).
Another aspect of risk in consumer lending is fraud. Unlike credit risk, the threat of
fraud may come from virtually anywhere, including parties outside the network, and
thus assessing the level of risk is practically much more difficult. As defined by
Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 10), payment card security management comprises the
collective set of activities to develop and implement physical card designs that
combat fraud, and to design policies and procedures to protect and control stocks of
blank cards to prevent them from being stolen and turned into counterfeit cards.
According to Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 10), credit risk is the potential for financial losses
resulting from making poor credit decisions when member banks issue credit cards or
sign up merchants for acceptance; while fraud risk is the potential for financial losses
resulting from fraudulent activities.
In security and risk management, the credit card industry can employ various fraud
prevention measures. For example, Visa and MasterCard have employed various
services and applications to manage fraud. Table 39 Examples of Fraud Management
Measures Employed by Visa and Table 40 Examples of Fraud Management
Measures Employed by MasterCard (in the appendices) list some examples of fraud
management measures employed by Visa and MasterCard, and cover the areas of
awareness, detection and prevention of fraud. As discussed in Chapter 6, the latest
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development in credit card security also includes the use of smart cards (chip cards)
to replace conventional magnetic stripe cards. As described by Cornish et al. (n.d., p.
20), instead of, or in addition to, a magnetic stripe on the back of the card, smart
cards have an embedded CPU or electronic chip. Further, according to Bhatla et al.
(2003, p. 12):
Smart credit cards operate in the same way as their magnetic counterparts, the only
difference being that an electronic chip is embedded in the card. These smart chips add
extra security to the card. Smart credit cards contain 32-kilobyte microprocessors, which
is capable of generating 72 quadrillion or more possible encryption keys and thus
making it practically impossible to fraudulently decode information in the chip.

The implementation of chip-based credit cards will require several adjustments,
including those of the card and the electronic data capture (EDC), which requires a
certain standard of operability. To overcome this problem, the EMVCo was formed
in 1999 by Europay International, MasterCard International and Visa International to
maintain and develop the EMV ICC specifications for payment systems (The Logic
Group, n.d., p. 10). These specifications aim to ensure global interoperability, so that
any EMV-compliant card can be accepted at any EMV-compliant point of sale
anywhere in the world (The Logic Group, n.d., p. 10).
The fraud management measures listed in Table 39 and Table 40 (in the appendices)
are just a few of many employed by credit card issuers around the world to serve
three basic purposes: awareness, detection and prevention (Cornish, Delpha, &
Erslon, n.d., p. 10). Although this study focuses on credit card fraud prevention, in
practice, awareness, detection and prevention are of the same importance and are
related to one another. We cannot prevent a fraud effectively if we do not see it
coming; and thus awareness and detection should ensure that proper responses are
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taken. Each of the measures depicted in Table 39 and Table 40 (in the appendices)
serves at least one purpose in fraud prevention (see the example below).

Figure 11 Contributions of Fraud Prevention Measures to the Achievement of the
Intended Fraud Management Goals (MasterCard Case)
Source: Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 12).

As depicted in Figure 11, the services and applications employed by MasterCard aim
to manage the risk from five major types of credit card fraud: ID theft, counterfeit,
card not present, lost and stolen and card never received. As discussed previously, all
these types of credit card result from the events that occur in credit card network
activities (that is, application, delivery and usage). Figure 12 shows the common
events that may contribute to the increasing risk of credit card fraud.
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Figure 12 Risk Map for Cardholder
Source: Burns and Weir (2008).

Described by Bhatla et al. (2003, p. 13), an efficient fraud management solution
minimises the total cost of fraud, and includes the financial loss due to fraud as well
as the cost of fraud prevention systems. Figure 13 illustrates a cost-benefit analysis in
a company’s fraud prevention practice.
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Figure 13 Example of Trade-off Between Fraud Reduction and the Cost of
Achieving that Reduction
Source: Bhatla et al. (2003, p. 13).

For this illustration, Bhatla et al. (2003, p. 13), explain:
The graph depicts the total cost of fraud as the sum of the actual fraud losses plus the
cost of review, which is typically proportional to the volume of transactions being
reviewed. The column on the left shows a scenario where fraud losses dominate the total
cost, because insufficient screening and review is applied. In this example, fraud loss
account for 1% of total value of processed transactions while only 2% of the
transactions are being reviewed.
The column on the right shows the opposite extreme — 30% of the processed
transactions are being reviewed and fraud losses are down to 0.06% of the total value of
processed transactions. In this case, however, the cost of review drives up the total cost
of fraud. While fraud losses are no longer an issue, the cost of achieving this result is not
acceptable. Finally, the column in the middle shows the optimal scenario; minimized
total cost with acceptable review cost and ‘manageable’ fraud losses.

Figure 13 represents a problem credit card industry must often deal with, that is
determining how much financial resources must be allocated to minimise losses from
fraud. Figure 13 shows three situations: underestimation of fraud (‘insufficient
screening’), overestimation of fraud (‘excessive reviews’) and proper estimation of
fraud (‘balanced screening’). Although overestimation of fraud may result in the
lowest fraud losses, the ideal condition is of course the one that balances fraud loss
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reduction and the cost of achieving such reduction. Therefore, an important
determinant in achieving the optimum result in credit card fraud prevention is the
ability to determine properly the amount of resources that should be allocated such a
purpose. To achieve this, extensive knowledge of the situation (such as the nature and
changes of the fraud in question) must be gathered before decisions are made.

CONCLUSION
Credit card fraud is a type of risk that the credit card industry must manage in its
daily operation. The threats posed by credit card fraud are commonly in the form of
financial losses, but when not properly tackled, further use of the proceeds of this
crime to finance other crimes may result in more severe damage to the society. The
success of preventing credit card fraud is not solely determined by the effectiveness
of the employed measures, but also by the efficiency of the resources used to achieve
the identified objectives. From a financial point of view, the desired objectives are
commonly those related to the excess of benefits over costs (net benefits). In other
words, benefits must exceed costs.
To achieve optimum results, crime preventers need extensive knowledge of the
various aspects of the targeted crime, including its nature and dynamics. Such
knowledge is essential as the basis for deciding the most effective and efficient fraud
prevention strategies. To acquire such knowledge, a monitoring process in the form
of, for example, fraud data collection and analysis must be conducted continuously to
keep the crime preventers updated with the latest situations.
The next chapter discusses the methodological framework of this study.
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CHAPTER 4: LEARNING FROM THE
BETTER PERFORMERS: A
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, countries all over the world have made their best efforts to
counter credit card fraud by, among other things, putting in place various prevention
measures. The problem of credit card fraud is now at a global level, because the
majority (if not all) countries in the world experience it — primarily due to the
globalisation129 of the credit card itself. Each country must cope with relatively
similar credit card fraud problems130, so lessons can be learned from one another, in
terms of the most effective strategy to counter this crime by using benchmarking.
This chapter constructs a methodological framework for benchmarking the effective
credit card fraud prevention practices from the experiences of the US, the UK and
Australia, in order to meet the research aim of strengthening Indonesia’s credit card
fraud prevention practice. The discussions in this chapter include the principles of
benchmarking, the benchmarking questions for this study and the principles of crime
analyses.
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See the discussion on the history and development of the credit card industry in Chapter 2.
For example, see, the discussion in Chapter 6 on the trends of credit card fraud in the US, the UK
and Australia.
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BENCHMARKING: AN OVERVIEW
The term ‘benchmarking’ is acknowledged by various fields. It represents an
organisation’s willingness to be open-minded by setting goals based on the
performance of others. Benchmarking is commonly used to improve an
organisation’s performance based on the actual practices of other organisations
(Lankford, 2002, p. 57). As described by Lankford (2002, p. 57):
Benchmarking is basically learning from others. It is using the knowledge and the
experience of others to improve the organization. It is analyzing the performance and
noting the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and assessing what must be
done to improve.

Additionally, as argued by Nakanishi (2007):
In benchmarking, we compare performance, but against what? If we compare our
performance against past performance, then we will get incremental improvements, as
you can see. However, if we compare our performance against peers in our industry, we
do a little better. But when we start thinking outside of the box, benchmarking against
other industries, we could realize enormous changes.

Benchmarking is the continuous search for an adaptation of significantly better
practices, which leads to superior performance by investigating the performance and
practices of other organisations or benchmark partners (SM Thacker & Associates,
n.d.). From a historical perspective, the concept of benchmarking has been evolving
over time to cope with changing demands. According to Watson (1993, pp. 5-8),
since the 1940s, the concept of benchmarking has evolved into at least five main
generations: reverse engineering, competitive benchmarking, process benchmarking,
strategic benchmarking and global benchmarking. From a scientific point of view,
Xerox was known as the company to first construct the concept of benchmarking into
a science, by initiating a process called competitive benchmarking (Camp, 1989, p.
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6). Benchmarking was first started at Xerox Manufacturing Operations and used to
examine its unit manufacturing costs by comparing the operating capabilities and
features, including tearing down mechanical components for analyses of the selected
product comparisons (copying machines) (Camp, 1989, p. 6). As described by
Lankford (2002, p. 61):
The Xerox of today is not the Xerox of the sixties and seventies. During that time period
the organization experienced market erosion from competitors, primarily Japanese.
These competitors were marketing higher quality products in the United States at the
same price or lower as Xerox. Xerox found that the Japanese were able to assemble
quality products at a low price. This was hard for Xerox to grasp because they were the
first to develop the photocopy and their name had come to be synonymous with
photocopies. How could the Japanese be beating them at their own game? Xerox found
that they had to regroup. In doing this they used reverse engineering and made
competitive benchmarking a fundamental part of their operations by the early eighties.
Xerox began to study other organizations within and out of their industry. By 1983,
Xerox had bench marked more than 230 process performance areas in their operation.
They looked at all aspects of their business. Identifying the best processes used by
others, Xerox adapted them for their own use.

The first generation, reverse engineering (or competitive product analysis), was the
earliest concept of benchmarking (Kyro, 2003, p. 213). It is product oriented in the
sense that it compares product characteristics, functionality and performance of
competitive offerings (Kyro, 2003, p. 213). Watson (1993, p. 6) considers this to be
product-oriented reverse engineering in nature or, alternatively, it may also be a form
of competitive product analysis. As described by Watson (1993, p. 7):
Reverse engineering, which tends to be technical, engineering based-approach to
product comparisons, including tear-down and evaluation of technical product
characteristics. In contrast, competitive product analysis compares market-oriented
features to evaluate the relative capabilities of the competitive product offerings.
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The second generation, competitive benchmarking131, involves comparisons of
processes with those of competitors — instead of output comparisons (Kyro, 2003, p.
213). Watson (1993, p. 7) argues that this type of benchmarking moves beyond
product-oriented comparisons and includes the comparisons of processes with those
of the competitors. Xerox developed this type of benchmarking to analyse factors that
make product delivery processes of its competitors more efficient (Watson, 1993, p.
7).
The third generation, process benchmarking132, promotes the idea of learning from
companies from different industries, meaning that sharing of information can become
less restricted and information gathering non-competitive (Kyro, 2003, p. 213).
Instead of targeting only competitors, in this type of benchmarking, a company can
also target other companies with better performance from different industries
(Watson, 1993, p. 7). This requires an in-depth understanding of the similarities of
the processes that may not be clearly visible from the outside (Watson, 1993, p. 7).
The fourth generation, strategic benchmarking, involves the evaluation of
alternatives, the implementation of strategies and improvement of performance by
understanding and adopting successful strategies from other companies (Watson,
1993, p. 8). This type of benchmarking focuses on continuous and long-term
development to create fundamental changes in process within an organisation (Kyro,
2003, p. 213). Watson (1993, p. 79) argues that strategic benchmarking has the
purpose of sustaining the long-term improvement of key business processes that
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provide continuing competitive advantages for a company. As Lankford (2002, p. 58)
puts it:
Strategic benchmarking deals with top management. It deals with long term results.
Strategic benchmarking focuses on how companies compete. This form of
benchmarking looks at what strategies the organizations are using to make them
successful.

The fifth generation, global benchmarking, is generally an advancement of the
already existing benchmarking types (such as strategic benchmarking) by adding
global orientation to the process (Kyro, 2003, p. 213). As argued by Watson (1993, p.
8):
A future generation of benchmarking lies in a global application where international
trade, cultural, and business process distinctions among companies are bridged and their
implications for business process improvement are understood.

The above five generations of benchmarking are more about the ‘evolution’ than the
‘classification’ of benchmarking (see Figure 14 The Evolution of Benchmarking).
The most advanced form of benchmarking is the latest one — strategic benchmarking
with global orientation, or global benchmarking. Consequently, this study uses
strategic benchmarking (with global orientation) as its analysis approach.

132

Figure 14 The Evolution of Benchmarking
Source: Watson (1993, p. 6), modified by Anand and Kodali (2008, p. 261).

The five types of benchmarking described in Figure 14 are helpful for classifying
benchmarking from the ‘evolution’ perspective. In current practice, experts have
made several other classifications for benchmarking (Anand & Kodali, 2008, p. 260)
133

. Two examples are competence benchmarking and network benchmarking.

Competent benchmarking promotes the idea that a change in the actions and
behaviours of individuals and teams within an organisation are the foundation of the
organisational change process (Kyro, 2003, p. 214). Conversely, network
benchmarking rests on the notion that ‘learning from others’ can be accompanied by
‘learning with others’ within an organisation as well as between organisations (Kyro,
2003, p. 215).
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See also Anand and Kodali (2008) for further discussion on the differences of benchmarking
classifications.
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The work of Fong et al. (1998, p. 407) offers more comprehensive classifications of
benchmarking, and classifies benchmarking into eleven types, based on three major
classifications (see below figure). As Fong et al. (1998, p. 407) put it:
With reference to the nature of the referent other, there are internal, competitor, industry,
generic, and global benchmarking. When talking about the content of benchmarking, we
should focus on process, functional, performance, and strategic benchmarking; all of
these types extend beyond the industry boundaries. If there is difference in interorganizational relationships, one may choose either competitive or collaborative
benchmarking, or a combination of both of them.

Table 9 Classification of Benchmarking
Basis of
Classification

Nature of
Referent Other

Content of

Types

Descriptions

Internal
Benchmarking

Comparing the performance of similar business units or
processes within one organisation134. This approach
eliminates problems associated with overcoming
barriers between strangers, especially when it appears
that competitive advantage will not be compromised135.

Competitor
Benchmarking

Comparing one company with its direct competitor to
find out which is the better performer in the practice
which is chosen to be benchmarked136.

Industry
Benchmarking

Comparing with other companies in the same industry,
including non-competitors, which will result in more
benchmarking (or comparison parties) compared to
competitor benchmarking137.

Generic
Benchmarking

Comparing with organisations that extend beyond
industry boundaries138. Compares particular business
functions of two or more organisations, regardless of
their industry139.

Global
Benchmarking

Comparing with organisations with a geographical
location that extends beyond country boundaries140 —
includes organisations on a global scale141.

Process

Comparing discrete performance and functionality with
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Anand and Kodali (2008, p. 261).
Fong et al. (1998, p. 407).
136
Fong et al. (1998, p. 407).
137
Fong et al. (1998, p. 407) and Anand and Kodali (2008, p. 261).
138
Anand and Kodali (2008, p. 261).
139
Watson (1993, p. 260).
140
Anand and Kodali (2008, p. 261).
141
Watson (1993, p. 261).
135
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Basis of
Classification
Benchmarking

Types

Descriptions

Benchmarking

organisations whose performance is excellent in
analogous business processes142.

Functional
Benchmarking

Comparing a particular business function at two or
more
organisations
by
means
of
process
benchmarking143.

Performance
Benchmarking

Comparing, in terms of performance measurement, one
organisation’s product against another’s, using a
standard testing procedure to establish relative
superiority in the capability of specific product
features144.

Strategic
Benchmarking

Evaluation of options, implementation of strategies and
improvement of performance by understanding and
adopting successful strategies from other companies145.

Competitive
Benchmarking

Making comparisons in order to gain superiority over
others, or winning the competition146. Compares
organisational
performance
against
competing
organisations for aspects such as product designs,
process capabilities or administrative methods147. In this
type of benchmarking, generally information flows one
way, from the ‘best in class’ organisation to the
benchmarking team organisations148.

Collaborative
Benchmarking

Generally making comparison for developing a learning
atmosphere and sharing of knowledge149. Unlike
competitive benchmarking, the information flows many
ways and is shared between groups of organisations150.

Purpose for the
relationship

Source: Adapted from various sources (see footnotes).

Watson (1993, pp. 47-50) contends that benchmarking is conducted based on the
principles of reciprocity, analogy, measurement and validity, and believes that good
benchmarking practice promotes a ‘win–win situation’ among the participants, and

142

Watson (1993, p. 261).
Watson (1993, p. 260).
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Watson (1993, p. 261).
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Watson (1993, p. 8).
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Anand and Kodali (2008, p. 261).
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Watson (1993, p. 260).
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Lankford (2002, p. 59).
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Anand and Kodali (2008, p. 261).
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Lankford (2002, p. 59).
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that no fear of intrusion or misappropriation (the reciprocity principle) should exist.
This is to say that benchmarking is different from unethical or unlawful conduct,
such as corporate spying.
Lankford (2002, p. 60) argues that although benchmarking can lead or may be
considered as copycatting, essentially the two are not the same, because the latter
leads to the demise of creativity and generates stale ideas. Therefore, some codes of
conduct have been developed by institutions such as the Strategic Planning Institute
(SPI) Council on Benchmarking and the International Benchmarking Clearinghouse
specifically to avoid unethical benchmarking activities (Lankford, 2002, p. 60).
Good benchmarking must be analogous to the attempt to achieve the highest degree
of knowledge transfer between the benchmarking partners (the analogy principle)
(Watson, 1993, p. 47). As Watson (1993, p. 47) puts it:
Benchmarking a company with a non-analogous process is like going to a vegetarian
barbecue. An enjoyable experience, but where’s the beef? Even if the food is tasty, the
menu cannot satisfy a meat lover.

The measurement principle, as an objective of benchmarking, aims to understand
why the different levels of performance exist and how higher performance is
achieved. This approach employs careful measurements and observes the analogous
processes, in order to help an organisation to adapt the identified the process
enablers151 to its own processes (Watson, 1993, p. 48). Watson (1993, p. 48) believes
that in order to understand how the whole process fits together, recognising the
specific key aspects of a process that lead to the increased performance is essential.
151

The ‘why’ and ‘how’ of process performance — in other words, the specific practices that caused
increased performance (Watson, 1993, pp. 48-49).
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Finally, Watson (1993, p. 49) argues that reliable facts and data are of significance
for process comparisons (the validity principle) and that reliance on intuition, opinion
or assumption will only lead to invalid and unreliable guesstimates.

From the above principles, several benchmarking methods have been developed and
practised152. Xerox is a pioneer in the science of benchmarking, with its
benchmarking model (see Figure 15) which, according to Anand and Kodali (2008,
pp. 267-269) has been widely used and is becoming a major reference in the
development of the science of benchmarking.
In the planning phase, the objective is to plan for the benchmarking investigations
concerning the ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ (Camp, 1989, p. 16). The questions to be
answered in this phase are: ‘What is to be benchmarked?’, ‘To whom or what will we
compare?’ and ‘How will the data be collected?’ (Camp, 1989, p. 16). The answers to
these questions highlight the benchmark partners and the data collection methods
used in the process (Anand & Kodali, 2008, p. 269).
In the analysis phase, after determining what, how and who, the actual data gathering
and analysis are then conducted (Camp, 1989, p. 18). According to Camp (1989, p.
18), the questions to be answered in this phase are: ‘Is the benchmarking partner
better?’, ‘Why are they better?’, ‘By how much?’, ‘What best practices are being
used now or anticipated?’ and ‘How can their practices be incorporated or adapted
for implementation?’. The answers to these questions constitute the understanding of
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See Anand and Kodali (2008) for a good review of the different methods in benchmarking.
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the current performance gap as well as the expected results from the benchmarking
process (Camp, 1989, p. 18).

1. IDENTIFY WHAT IS TO BE BENCHMARK

PLANNING

2. IDENTIFY COMPARATIVE COMPANY
3. DETERMINE DATA COLLECTION
METHOD AND COLLECT DATA

PLANNING

4. DETERMINE CURRENT COLLECTION

5. PROJECT FUTURE PERFORMANCE
6. COMMUNICATE BENCHMARK FINDINGS
AND GAIN ACCEPTANCE
INTEGRATION

7. ESTABLISH FUNCTIONAL GOALS

8. DEVELOP ACTION PLANS

ACTION

9. IMPLEMENT SPECIFIC ACTIONS AND
MONITOR PROGRESS

10. RECALIBRATE BENCHMARKS

Figure 15 Xerox Benchmarking Model
Source: Camp153 (1989, p. 17).
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Dr Robert C. Camp is known as the ‘father of benchmarking’ (The Global ExpertBase, n.d.).
Before retiring after 23 years from Xerox Corporation’s United States Customer Operations
(USCO), Dr Camp was the Manager, Benchmarking Competency, Quality Office of the company
(The Global ExpertBase, n.d.). He was appointed to this position in August 1990 with the
responsibility of expanding and intensifying benchmarking in all USCO units (The Global
ExpertBase, n.d.).
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In the integration phase, as stated by Camp (1989, p. 18), the findings from the
previous phase is used to set the operational targets for change, and this involves two
important steps. The first step is to gain operational and management acceptance of
the benchmark findings and communicate such findings to all organisational levels
(Camp, 1989, p. 18). This requires the use of reliable and credible data to
demonstrate that the findings are correct, and based on these, an action plan can be
developed (Camp, 1989, p. 18). The second step is to acquire support, commitment
and ownership, by communicating the findings to all organisational levels (Camp,
1989, p. 18).
Finally, in the action phase, the benchmarking findings (and operational principles
based on them) are converted into specific implementation actions (Camp, 1989, p.
19). The results thereof are measured and assessed periodically and, when needed,
recalibration can be performed (Camp, 1989, p. 19). Therefore, the existence of
ongoing reporting mechanisms, by which progress is reported to all stakeholders, is
of high importance in this phase (Camp, 1989, p. 19).
As indicated by its early use by Xerox154, benchmarking was originally created for
business purposes. Therefore, from the experiences of Xerox and current practice,
benchmarking is an important tool for any company to compete in the market.
Benchmarking was not designed for crime prevention. However, over the years, the
concept of ‘learning from others’ as the essence of benchmarking has evolved into a
more universal concept acknowledged and used by various fields of knowledge,
including crime studies. In terms of crime prevention, benchmarking can be used to
154

See the previous discussion on the evolution of benchmarking.
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seek ways to improve the performance of a crime prevention strategy by learning
from other successful crime prevention strategies. Many studies around the world
utilise benchmarking to learn from others for the purpose of developing better crime
prevention strategies. Some examples of the studies are as follows:



9th Annual Online Fraud Report: Online Payment Fraud Trends, Merchant
Practices and Benchmarks (2008) by CyberSource155. This study aims to
understand the impact of payment fraud for online merchants156, including
aspects such as detection, prevention and management of online fraud
(CyberSource, 2008, p. 5).



Reducing Alcohol Harm: International Benchmark (2008) commissioned by the
UK National Audit Office (NAO)157. This study identifies areas of good policy
and practice that could be transferable to the UK, through comparison of the
alcohol trends and other socioeconomic indicators in the UK with those of
Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the US (Rabinovich, Tiessen,
Janta, Conklin, Krapels, & Stolk, 2008, p. xi).



Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2007: How Banks are Facing up to the
Challenge (2007) by KPMG158. This study supported companies and regulators
to benchmark banks’ anti-money laundering (AML) systems and controls against
trends, peer comparisons and opportunities in a more precise way (KPMG, 2007,
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See CyberSource (2008).
This report is based on a survey of 318 online merchants with the decision makers (who
participated in this survey) representing a blend of small, medium and large organisations based in
North America (CyberSource, 2008, p. 2).
157
See Rabinovich et al. (2008).
158
See KPMG (2007).
156
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p. 5). This study also provides insight into how the industry fulfils new
requirements and provides some inputs for future AML policy direction (KPMG,
2007, p. 5).


Benchmarking Crime Trend Data: 1995–1996 to 1999–2000 (2000) by the Drugs
and Crime Prevention Committee, Parliament of Victoria159. This study
benchmarks official crime data from Victoria Police and the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) over a five-year period to highlight several emerging crime
trends (Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee, Parliament of Victoria, 2000, p.
v).

The above studies exemplify how the concept of benchmarking has been developed
from simply a business tool to a universally accepted concept of ‘learning from
others’. As discussed in Chapter 3, from the credit card industry perspective, credit
card fraud is considered as a cost that must be minimised by investing in crime
prevention efforts. This implies that in relation to the nature of ‘cost minimisation’
(for example, reducing the cost of fraud) in credit card fraud prevention initiatives
that also becomes a reason Xerox developed the concept of benchmarking in the
1970s , this study believes that benchmarking can also be used in such efforts.
However, from this growing recognition of the use of benchmarking, among the
major challenges is to develop a universal benchmarking procedure that can be used
in most (if not all) cases of benchmarking. However, even for business purposes, in
the field of marketing, for example, as argued by Donthu et al. (2005, pp. 14741475):
159

See Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee, Parliament of Victoria (2000).
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There are no formal scientific benchmarking procedures that have been universally
accepted in marketing. To the best of our knowledge, there has not even been an
academic study conceptualizing benchmarking or offering specific methodology to
assist marketing managers in their efforts to benchmark marketing productivity. One of
the main reasons for the lack of benchmarking research in marketing is the lack of
formal methodologies and measurement tools to help managers identify the areas that
need improvement and the magnitude of the improvement needed.

Additionally, Mann (2008, October 9-10, p. 3) believes that generally, no single
benchmarking methodology fits into all benchmarking circumstances. Further,
according to Mann (2008, October 9-10, p. 3), various benchmarking methodologies
have emerged because of the wide appeal and acceptance of the benchmarking
concept. This is to say that a benchmark practitioner must be able to adapt to different
situations and create the most appropriate scenario for conducting benchmarking by
referring to the theoretical framework of benchmarking.
Using the principles of benchmarking, this study assesses the credit card fraud
prevention practice in Indonesia with the benchmarks of the credit card fraud
prevention practices in the US, the UK and Australia, by means of qualitative crime
analysis (discussed later in this chapter). This study uses the Xerox benchmarking
model as the main reference of its benchmark analysis. However, due to the academic
nature of this study, only the steps in planning and analytical phase are adopted
here160. Because the results of this study are expected to contribute to the future
development of crime prevention strategy in Indonesia, the benchmarking analysis is
of a strategic nature. In terms of ‘strategy’, as described by Watson (1993, p. 25):
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As depicted by Figure 15, a complete Xerox benchmarking model consists of ten steps (each with
four phases), including the implementation of the benchmarking-based plan by the
organisation/company to achieve the desired result (closing the gap).
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Strategy is what generals do for living. Strategy is what a coach does before the big
game. Strategy is what a housewife does when she cleans her house, feeds her family,
purchase groceries, and keeps her children amused — and still has time for herself.
Strategy is also what management does at off-site meetings.

Watson (1993, p. 26) further defines ‘strategy’ as:
The art of developing plans that deploy the focused capabilities and competencies of an
organization against a recognized competitive environment in a manner that provides the
maximum support for the leadership’s policy and allows flexibility to permit those realtime adaptations necessary for achieving evolutionary success.

To formulate a sound strategy, ‘strategic thinking’ is an important element in the
process, which can be defined as the matching of one’s opportunities with the
available resources to develop a direction or course of action to achieve success
(Watson, 1993, p. 27). As depicted by the discussions in Chapters 6 and 7, countries
such as the US, the UK and Australia have employed many different types (although
similarities in patterns do exist) of credit card fraud prevention measures based on the
available resources. This study analyses the data and information from the benchmark
countries’ payments systems161 to highlight their credit card fraud prevention
strategies as a benchmark against which Indonesia is evaluated. The study’s analysis
also includes the patterns of resource allocation by the three countries in credit card
fraud prevention.
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A country’s payments system is a large one, and thus this study focuses on credit card network in
its benchmarking analysis. Mr Harrold Abraham Gaspersz, of the AKKI, in a discussion with the
researcher, suggested that generally, credit card networks in different countries are operated under
similar (if not the same) rules of operation set primarily by associations such as Visa and
MasterCard (Gaspersz, 2008a). Recently, through its regulations, Bank Indonesia has also begun to
demonstrate a more significant role in regulating the Indonesian credit card industry, particularly in
relation to security (Gaspersz, 2008a). Mr Gasperz also believed that the trend of credit card fraud
in Indonesia is also fairly similar to that in other countries, with counterfeit card fraud as the most
common type (Gaspersz, 2008a). These opinions provide justification for the researcher’s decision
to choose benchmarking as the better method to be used in the present analysis.
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THE BENCHMARKING QUESTIONS
This study refers to the first two phases of the Xerox benchmarking model (planning
and analysis) in its analysis. Therefore, based on the model, the formulated questions
of this study are:

PLANNING PHASE
What is to be benchmarked?
The answer to this question is ‘credit card fraud prevention practice’. Simply put, this
study assesses Indonesia’s credit card fraud prevention practice against similar
practices of the better performers.
To whom or what will we compare?
As discussed in Chapter 1, the benchmark countries selected for this study are the
US, the UK and Australia. This study compares the credit card fraud prevention
practice of Indonesia with those of the benchmark countries.
How will the data be collected?
To answer this study’s benchmark questions, data and information regarding the
credit card fraud prevention practices of the four countries (the US, the UK, Australia
and Indonesia) were needed. This study employs two means for answering its
benchmark questions: document review and expert interview. In the document review
section, the primary documents were obtained from the payments systems of the four
countries, and include:



annual reports of the Indonesian payment system by Bank Indonesia



annual reports of the US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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reports on identity thefts from the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)



Payment Systems Oversight Reports by the Bank of England



reports on payment frauds by the UK Association for Payment Clearing Services
(APACS)



annual reports of the Payments System Board of the Reserve Bank of Australia



reports on payment frauds by the Australian Payments Clearing Association
(APCA).

The above documents are publicly available for analytical purposes. Other relevant
documents and literature on credit card fraud and prevention in Indonesia, the US, the
UK and Australia were also reviewed to answer the above benchmark questions.
Additionally, expert interviews (or elite interviews) were conducted to ensure the
completeness and reliability of the information from the Indonesian payment system.
Gillham (2000, p. 63) defines ‘elite interviewing’ as interviewing persons in a
position of authority (such as experts or authoritative people) who are capable of
providing the required information to the researcher. Further, Gillham (2000, p. 64)
describes the special characteristics of elite interviewing:


The Interviewees will know more about the topic and the setting than the researcher
does, to a large extent they can tell the researcher what questions he or she should be
asking, he or she need to know.



By virtue of their authority and experience the interviewees will have their own
structuring and knowledge. They will not tamely submit to being interviewed where
the researcher directs a series of questions at them.



The best the researcher can hope is that he or she will raise topics that the
interviewees will respond to.
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Where the interviewees can be particularly informative is where (and what)
documents or records are to be found; other people the researcher should particularly
speak to; what he or she can and cannot expect to be able to do.



The interviewees will expect to have some control over what the researchers do and
will usually demand a level of accountability and reporting back. If the researcher
can accept that, the interviewees, in return, can be important ‘facilitators’.

For the purpose of this study, experts from the institutions of Bank Indonesia, the
Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI), the Indonesian National Police, the
Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) and the
Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) were interviewed162. These
interviews were considered necessary primarily because the performance data
management of the Indonesian payments system is not yet at the benchmark
countries’ level.

ANALYSIS PHASE (BASED ON THE XEROX BENCHMARKING MODEL)
Based on the data and information obtained by the above means, the next step is to
conduct analysis. This requires the following questions based on the Xerox
benchmarking model to be answered163:
1. Are the US, the UK and Australia better than Indonesia in terms of credit card
fraud prevention practices to minimize offenders’ opportunity?
2. Why are they better?

162
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See Chapter 8 for details.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a major approach in preventing payment fraud such as credit card fraud
is the minimization of offender’s opportunity. This is accomplished by means such as consumer
education and identity management. In relation to crime prevention approaches previously
discussed in chapter 3, the answers to these questions will describe primarily how in a strategic
point of view resources are allocated in the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia to minimize crime
opportunity for credit card fraud offenders. From this discussion, the highlighted lessons from the
US, the UK and Australia are then assessed in terms of their feasibility to be implemented in
Indonesia.
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3. What credit card fraud prevention practices do the three countries have to
minimize offenders’ opportunity?
4. How can their practices be incorporated or adapted for implementation in
Indonesia?
The answers to the above questions will determine any performance gaps — positive,
negative or parity164. To interpret the data and information from the above sources,
this study employs qualitative crime analysis principles. The answers to the above
four questions are discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

PRINCIPLES OF CRIME ANALYSIS
Defined by the Massachusetts Association of Crime Analysts (n.d.):
Crime analysis is a discipline of public safety analysis, which provides information support for
the missions of law enforcement or criminal justice agencies. Strictly speaking, crime analysis
involves:


The study of criminal incidents



The identification of crime patterns, crime trends, and crime problems



The analysis of these patterns, trends, and problems



The dissemination of information to a police agency so that the agency can develop tactics
and strategies to solve patterns, trends, and problems.

Boba (2006, p. 6) offers this definition:
Crime analysis is the systematic study of crime and disorder problems as well as other
police-related issues—including sociodemographic165, spatial166, and temporal
factors167—to assist the police in criminal apprehension, crime and disorder reduction,
crime prevention, and evaluation.
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See Camp (1989, p. 18).
Concerning personal characteristics of individual and groups (Boba, 2006, p. 6).
166
Concerning geographical aspects (Boba, 2006, p. 7).
167
Concerning the temporal nature of crime (Boba, 2006, p. 7).
165
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Osborn and Wernicke (2003, p. 1) contend that:
Crime analysis is the act of analyzing crime. More specifically, crime analysis is the
breaking up of acts committed in violation of laws into their parts to find out their nature
and reporting statements of these findings. The objective of most crime analysis is to
find meaningful information in vast amounts of data and disseminate this information to
officers and investigators in the field to assist in their efforts to apprehend criminals and
suppress criminal activity.

According to Burrows (1998, p. 2), what generally constitutes the logic of crime
analysis involves using well-documented cases, where one may find that a good
proportion of criminal incidents occur at certain locations or times or in particular
circumstances. Reviewing documents on crime may contribute significantly to the
identification of the pattern of crime. Burrows (1998, p. 8) believes that such logic is
not a new concept, and it has been considered a part of sound management principles
in the security field, where a sound strategy is based on accurate and reliable analysis
of the actual problems. This aligns with the discussions in Chapter 3 where, from
criminology perspective, crime prevention should be problem- instead of simply
practice-based.
The above definitions are just a few of many that try to conceptualise crime analysis
as a fairly new field of science. As argued by Osborne and Wernicke (2003, p. 1):
Crime analysis is an emerging field in law enforcement without standard definitions.
This makes it difficult to determine the crime analysis focus for agencies that are new to
the field. In some police departments, what is called ‘crime analysis’ consists of
mapping crimes for command staff and producing crime statistics. In other agencies,
crime analysis might mean focusing on analyzing various police reports and suspect
information to help investigators in major crime units identify serial robbers and sex
offenders. Some analysts do all this and other types of analysis. The role of the crime
analyst varies from agency to agency.

Crime analysis, at least from the above argument, is commonly applied to support the
criminal justice system (for example, law enforcement agencies) in fulfilling their
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responsibilities to society. However, in practice, the concept of crime analysis can
also be used by other parties (such as business entities) to prevent crime168. Burrows
(1998, p. 2) believes that although payoffs from crime prevention initiatives can be
uncertain from a business perspective, resources allocated for such initiatives must be
based on a reasonable assessment of the dimensions of the initial problem, as well as
with the intended objectives in mind. Therefore, as argued by Burrows (1998, p. 2),
applying crime analysis to ensure that only the right actions are taken may help meet
this challenge.
Fritz et al. (2004, p. 158) believe that despite the variety of ways crime analysis has
been categorised over the years, traditionally it has been classified into three types:
tactical, strategic and administrative. According to Fritz et al. (2004, p. 158), tactical
crime analysis refers to an inductive approach used to identify, describe and forecast
crime series. It involves analysing data to develop information on the ‘where’, ‘when’
and ‘how’ to assist officers and investigators in identifying and building knowledge
on specific and immediate crime problems (Osborne & Wernicke, 2003, p. 5).
Strategic crime analysis focuses on the development of effective strategies that
emphasise long-term trends in solving crime problems (Fritz, Bair, Helms, & Hick,
2004, p. 159). The aspects of such strategies include problem solving, resource
allocation and general operational approaches to address crime-related issues and
service delivery (Fritz, Bair, Helms, & Hick, 2004, p. 159). In administrative crime
analysis, the analysts address the political and monetary elements for providing
public safety (Fritz, Bair, Helms, & Hick, 2004, p. 161). According to Fritz et al.
168

For example, Burrows (1998) in his paper, ‘Retail Crime Prevention through Crime Analysis’,
discussed the use of crime analysis by retailers to prevent crime.
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(2004, p. 161), in doing so, qualitative data sources and document analysis can
provide valuable information in the analysis of crime and police-related information
for administrative purposes (political and budgetary in nature).
In relation to the strategic benchmarking approach previously discussed, from the
crime analysis side, this study’s approach uses strategic crime analysis, because
among its objectives is to understand the credit card fraud prevention strategy of the
US, the UK and Australia in order to highlight lessons that can be transferred to
Indonesia. This study then uses these learnings to formulate a recommendation for
developing credit card fraud prevention practice in Indonesia.
Over the years, the US, the UK and Australia have been collecting and publishing
fraud data and information, such as those of credit card fraud, in an effort to
continuously improve their fraud preventions strategies169. Such data and information
has been provided to assist users to aid their understanding of the actual situation of
credit card fraud and prevention. This study employs qualitative analysis in its
benchmarking process. Fritz et al. (2004, p. 157) assert that qualitative analysis relies
on field research, document or content analysis, open-ended interviews and
ethnographies170. Additionally, as Creswell (1998, p. 15) puts it:
Qualitative research is an enquiry process of understanding based on distinct
methodological traditions of enquiry that explore a social or human problem. The
researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of
informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting.

169
170

See the discussion on list of primary documents examined for this study.
Due to limited resources, this study focuses on document review and expert interview to answer its
benchmark questions.
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This study also uses crime analysis principles in understanding the trends of credit
card fraud and prevention in the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia. Drawing a
clear picture of a crime such as credit card fraud requires accurate and valid data and
information from reliable sources. However, crime data is, by its nature, not easy to
collect. In law enforcement practice, for example, Schmerler et al. (2004, p. 121)
argue that three structural limitations of the current crime analysis paradigm exist:


Crime analysis relies almost exclusively on police reports of crime while the
majority of public safety problems do not involve criminal activity.



Data available for crime analysis are consistently of poor integrity because of
missing variables, underreporting, delayed reporting, data errors, and reliance on
broad crime classifications.



Analysis of poor quality data produces insight for police responses. The best that
traditional crime analysis can offer is to summarize where and when reported
offences occur, generally pointing police to resource-intensive increased patrols or
surveillance rather than more effective responses.

Nevertheless, as argued by Schmerler et al. (2004, p. 121), despite the limitations
thereof, crime analysis can still contribute to society in the form of, for example,
increasing public safety by providing better a understanding of the pattern of crime,
which will enable proper actions to be taken. The researcher behind this study is fully
aware of such limitations, so uses data and information from the payments system
(for example, reports of central banks) instead of the criminal justice system (for
example, police reports) to build an analysis. This is mainly because if a cardholder
becomes a victim of a credit card fraud, they will immediately call their bank — not
the police. Given that credit card issuing banks are members of payment systems, this
implies that the most reliable data on credit card fraud are available from the
payments system.
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CONCLUSION
The science of benchmarking has been applied in business for decades.
Benchmarking has evolved from a simple product comparison method (with that of
the competitors) to a universal concept of ‘learning from others’, which is applicable
to various fields, including crime studies. This study uses the concept of
benchmarking to analyse credit card fraud prevention practices of four countries: the
US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia. This study also uses benchmarking for crime
analysis to answer the benchmark questions from a strategic perspective to highlight
the fraud prevention strategies used by the US, the UK and Australia, as well as to
glean the lessons from those practices which can be implemented in Indonesia.
This study uses the Xerox benchmarking model as a framework, based on which, a
set of benchmark questions are answered. Three questions of the planning phase are
answered in this chapter, and the remaining four questions are answered in the
following chapters. The next chapter includes discussions that aim to answer the
remaining questions of the analysis phase.
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CHAPTER 5: GOING CASHLESS: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE PAYMENTS SYSTEMS
OF THE US, THE UK, AUSTRALIA AND
INDONESIA
INTRODUCTION
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one area of limitation in this study is in the payments
system, within which most of the payment fraud prevention initiatives originate.
Therefore, as discussed in the next chapters, the majority of data and information
used in this study were obtained from payments system institutions in the US, the
UK, Australia and Indonesia.
This chapter discusses the growth and development of non-cash payment instruments
in the four countries which, as discussed in the next chapters, is believed to have
largely contributed to the increase of crime opportunities for payments fraud,
particularly credit card fraud. The discussion includes the concept of a ‘cashless
society’, an overview of non-cash payment instruments in the payments systems of
the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia, and crime opportunities in a cashless
society.

ESSENTIALS OF CASHLESS SOCIETY
A cashless society can be simply defined as a society without cash. Conceptually, in
a cashless society, there are no notes and coins circulated in the economy by the
central bank (Costa & De Grauwe, 2001, p. 2). Costa and De Grauwe (2001, p. 2).
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argue that in a cashless society all money in circulation is issued by private financial
institutions (for example, banks and other institutions). Although central bank is still
in operation, it has no monopoly over the issuance of money (Costa & De Grauwe,
2001, p. 2). Many countries have been integrating this concept into their payments
system development strategies — they are already transforming, to various degrees,
into cashless societies171. The emergence of various non-cash payment instruments is
evidence that this transformation has been in motion for some time.
Mr Erkki Liikanen172, of the Bank of Finland, in his speech to the European
Parliamentary Financial Services Forum in Brussels (1 April 2008), states that the
movement to a cashless society has been a topic of discussion for a long time
(Liikanen, 2008, p. 1). Further, according to Mr Liikanen, in the 1960s and 1970s,
cash was expected to be replaced by debit and credit cards; then later, in the 1980s
and 1990s, chip cards and e-money were introduced for the same purpose. Yet cash
remains in use, and its market share has fallen only gradually over the years
(Liikanen, 2008, p. 1). The transformation of countries into cashless societies is a
long process, because the complete elimination of cash from our economy is difficult.
Therefore, as argued by McKay (2007, p. 28), cash erosion by more convenient
methods of purchase is the only way to achieve a truly cashless society. The use of a
cellphone payments system in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and even rural South
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For example, payments systems in the US, The UK and Australia have shown an increasing trend
in the use of non-cash payment instruments as evidence of their transformation towards becoming
cashless societies (discussed later in this chapter).
172
The Governor of the Bank of Finland.
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Africa173, and the use of credit cards in the US for a major portion of consumer
payment, are just a few examples of the development of non-cash payment
instruments that constitute a major indication of the transformation of countries
around the world into cashless societies (Warwick, 2007, p. 42).
Cashless society comes with its benefits and costs. The benefits can be in the form of
economic efficiency, such as avoiding costly cash handling practices and allowing
commercial operators to monitor personal monetary transactions (James, 1996).
Making cash available can be very costly (Mussenden, 2007, p. B. 10). In the case of
Europe, for example, as McKay (2007, p. 28) puts it:
According to the European Payments council, the annual cost of the euro, including
production, distribution and collection, as well as quality checks for counterfeits and
note degradation, is €50 million, of which 60% is the cost of recycling cash (collection
and distribution). on average, notes are re-circulated through national central banks 3.5
times a year with an average note life of 2.5 years.

Conversely, aside from the financial costs of providing and maintaining non-cash
payment instruments such as interchanges fees (for credit card acquirers) and annual
fees (for credit cardholders), the cost of crimes (for example, chargebacks borne by
merchants) can also be significant. This is because the development of non-cash
payment instruments often goes hand in hand with the development of technology.
Grabosky (2007, pp. 145-161) believes that due to the developments in technology,
new types of crime, as well as newly organised criminals, are emerging (this is
discussed later in this chapter).
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Even in countries in Africa, as stated by Scott et al., (2004, p. 8), people are already making
innovative use of mobile technology for cashless transfer system. For example, scratch cards (used
by texting the code number to another person as a means of making cashless transfers) are used in
Uganda (Scott, Batchelor, Ridley, & Jorgensen, 2004, p. 8).
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Although the general perception is that transforming into a cashless society is
beneficial for the society (for example, the cost of issuing and maintaining euro
currency), the discussions on the actual the costs and benefits of a cashless society
can be very sophisticated, because various factors must be included in the equation.
Generally, the literature that discusses the cashless society tends to focus on a
particular perspective or aspect (such as the credit cardholders’ perspective)174 in
their analyses. For example, a study by MasterCard (2009, p. 25) that examined the
costs and benefits of using credit cards from a consumer’s perspective concludes that
credit cards are the optimal means of effecting payments, and the overall benefits
exceed the costs. However, Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006a, p. 177) argue that:
Several scholars have evaluated the costs of various payment instruments. Most ignore
the benefits side of the equation altogether; others do an incomplete job of examining
costs. A few look solely at benefits without considering costs175.

Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006a)176 illustrate the importance of careful cost-benefit
analyses in addressing key policy questions involving payment instruments. From the
financial perspective, they propose that, to understand the concept of costs and
benefits in a cashless society, we need to imagine ourselves in a world without
payment cards (or electronic payment methods more generally) and pose the
question: ‘Would the introduction of these payment instruments be beneficial to
society?’ Based on this fundamental question, Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006a, pp. 195-

174

For example, the study by MasterCard (2009, p. 2) examined the costs and benefits of using credit
cards from a consumer’s perspective.
175
For examples, see Wells (1996); Humphrey et al. (1996); Stavins (1997); and Humphrey et al.
(2003).
176
See Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006a) for how to calculate the benefits and costs of a cashless society.
For more discussion, see also Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006b).
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196) analysed the costs and benefits of the use of non-cash payment instruments by
US merchants and conclude that:
At smaller transaction sizes, the net social marginal cost of all payment instruments —
paper and electronic alike — are remarkably similar. No one instrument stands out as
more socially efficient. At larger transaction sizes, however, significant differences
emerge. …the relative merits of different payment methods change significantly when
all parties are counted and benefits are included.

Different parties in the payments system may receive (or bear) different benefits (or
costs) from the use of non-cash payment instruments. For example, in the case of the
reform of Australia’s payments system177, the regulators generally claimed that card
payments systems charged ‘unjustifiably high’ fees to merchants for payment cards,
while the banks that issue payment cards provide consumers with below-cost services
and loyalty rewards (Garcia-Swartz, Hahn, & Layne-Farrar, 2006a, p. 176). Based on
the study by Arango and Taylor (2008-2009, p. 16) in Canada, the perception of
merchants of the notion that cash is more expensive than non-cash payment
instruments depends on, among other things, merchants’ awareness of the true costs
of cash (for example, labour and other costs) and the types178 of merchants. Another
challenge in understanding the costs and benefits of a cashless society relates to the
quantification of the identified costs and benefits. For example, Garcia-Swartz et al.
(2006a, p. 196) state that although they could identify the potential benefits (and
costs) of parties such as merchants, they could not quantify any of them179.

177

See Chapter 2 for more discussion.
For example, whereas larger merchants might prefer card payments over cash due to the efficiency
of card processing, smaller merchants may find card payments too costly and may therefore prefer
cash over cards (Arango & Taylor, 2008-2009, p. 16).
179
Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006a; 2006b), in both their works used the case studies of the transactions of
grocery, discount and specialty electronics stores in the US to illustrate the financial benefits and
costs of using non-cash payment instruments in their business transactions.
178
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From the above discussions, and from a financial perspective, the true extent of the
benefits and costs of a cashless society remains difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the
fact that the transformation is already underway is evidence that the future benefits of
such a transformation will exceed its costs. Yet more studies are needed to shed light
on the true costs and benefits of a cashless society.

THE US PAYMENTS SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW
Compared to most other countries, according to Murphy (2004, p. 68), the payments
system in the US has two distinct characteristics:


The use of the cheque as a means of payment is far greater in the United States than
in any other country, even though the number of cheques has actually declined in
recent years and the share of cheques in total non-cash payments has been declining
for some time.



In the United States, the central bank (the Federal Reserve System) owns and
operates substantial segments of the payment system. In most countries, the central
bank supervises but does not operate the retail payment system.

The two major components of the US payments system are the institutions and the
payment instruments. Major institutions in the US payments system include: the
Federal Reserve, commercial banks, thrift institutions and other institutions (see
Table 41 Major Institutions in the US Payments System in the appendices for a
summary of the roles of the major institutions in the US payments system).
To support the operation of the US payments system, various payment instruments
are employed to enable payment activities to take place. Generally, such payment
instruments can be classified into cash and non-cash. Several changes within the US
payments system have contributed to the growth and development of non-cash
payment instruments (this is discussed later in this chapter). Major payment
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instruments used in the US include cash, cheque, automated clearing house (ACH),
Fedwire and CHIPS, payment cards and electronic benefits transfers (EBT) (see
Table 42 Major Payment Instruments in the US Payments System in the appendices
for a summary description of these payment instruments).
The payments system of the US consists of numerous institutions, complex
regulatory structures and various types of payment instruments, and has been
developed and then moved towards a ‘chequeless, cashless society’ for cost
efficiency and practicability. As Murphy (2004, p. 67) puts it:
It is now three decades since the dawn of the ‘checkless, cashless society’ was
proclaimed. Cash is still in use, although much of it is outside the United States, and
many checks are still being written180. …However, major changes in the US payment
system as a whole are underway. These changes will have an effect on costs,
profitability, mix of business, and delivery systems that must be considered in an
assessment of the future of banking in the United States.

Based on the statistics from the Federal Reserve’s 2007 Federal Reserve Payments
Study181, the number of non-cash payments in the US was 93.3 billion in 2006, with a
total value of $US75.8 trillion. This has been increasing at an annual rate of 4.6 per
cent since 2003 (Federal Reserve , 2007, p. 4) — a somewhat faster pace than the
previous three-year period (4.0 per cent)182 (Federal Reserve , 2007, p. 6).

180

This implies that total transformation into a fully cashless society can be a long process, and thus,
countries like Indonesia prefer to use the term ‘less-cash society’ (meaning a society that uses cash
less frequently) to reflect a more realistic plan for the future. See also the discussion on the
Indonesian payments system in this chapter.
181
See Federal Reserve System (2007).
182
In the original report, the 2004 Federal Reserve Payments Study, stated the figure was 3.8 per cent;
however, due to revisions and adjustments, the 2004 Federal Reserve Payments Study stated it as
being four per cent (see Table 10 Number of Non-Cash Payments and Table 11 Number of NonCash Payments). For further details, see Federal Reserve System (2004, p. 3; 2007, p. 4) .
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Table 10 Number of Non-Cash Payments183
2003

2006

CAGR
(%)184

Total (billions) 81.4

93.3

4.6

Cheques (paid) 37.3

30.6

-6.4

Debit card

15.6

25.3

17.5

Signature

10.3

16.0

15.8

PIN

5.3

9.4

20.6

Credit card

19.0

21.7

4.6

ACH

8.8

14.6

18.6

EBT

0.8

1.1

10.0

Figures may not add due to rounding.
Source: Federal Reserve System (2007, p. 4).

From the total number of non-cash payments, based on the 2007 Federal Reserve
Study, electronic payments (debit card, credit card and ACH) exceeded two-thirds of
all non-cash payments (see also Figure 16 Distribution of the Number of Non-Cash
Payments (2003–2006)) (Federal Reserve , 2007, p. 4). This number owes to changes
in the financial behaviour of consumers and businesses, particularly payment
instrument choice (Federal Reserve , 2007, p. 4).
Table 11 Number of Non-Cash Payments185
2000

2003

CAGR
(%) 186

Total (billions) 72.5

81.2

3.8

Cheques

41.9

36.7

-4.3

Credit Card

15.6

19.0

6.7

ACH

6.2

9.1

13.4

183

In this report, payments made using large-value funds transfer systems are excluded from the
estimates of non-cash payments (Federal Reserve , 2007, p. 6).

184

Compound annual growth rate.
The study does not include Fedwire funds transfers and funds transfers processed by the Clearing
House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), because such payments are large in value but small in
number (Federal Reserve, 2004, p. 3).

185

186

Compound annual growth rate.
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Offline Debit

5.3

10.3

24.9

Online Debit

3.0

5.3

21.0

EBT

0.5

0.8

15.4

Source: Federal Reserve System (2004, p. 3).

For example, according to the Federal Reserve (2007, pp. 4-5), electronic payments
are used more frequently in transactions where cheques or cash may have been used
in the past (Federal Reserve , 2007, pp. 4-5). The increase in the use of electronic
payments is also contributed to by the growth in economic activity and population
(Federal Reserve , 2007, pp. 4-5). The same explanation also applies to Table 11.
According to the Federal Reserve System, in its 2004 Federal Reserve Study (Federal
Reserve, 2004, p. 4):
Many factors, such as growth in economic activity and population, contributed to the
increase in electronic payments. Some of the increase is likely also due to the
replacement of some cash and check payments with electronic payments. While, by
number, checks remain the largest single non-cash payment type, the majority of noncash payments made in the United States are now initiated electronically, using one of
the three major electronic payment types: debit cards, credit cards, or ACH.

Among the non-cash payment instruments in the US payments system, card-based
payment instruments (debit and credit card) are the two major payments instruments
which, according to the 2004 Federal Reserve Study and the 2007 Federal Reserve
Study, have been experiencing continuous growth over the past few years. Figure 16
and Figure 17 depict the distribution of the number of the non-cash payments in the
US payments system.
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Figure 16 Distribution of the Number of Non-Cash Payments (2003–2006)
Source: Federal Reserve System (2007, p. 5).

Figure 17 Distribution of the Number of Non-Cash Payments (2000–2003)
Source: Federal Reserve System (2004, p. 4).

From Figure 16, we can observe a rising trend in the use of debit and credit cards
from 2003 to 2006 as part of the increase in electronic non-cash payments. Of the two
types of payment cards, the debit card was slightly more popular than the credit card
in 2006, as reflected by an increase from 19 per cent to 27 per cent throughout the
three-year period. Despite its lower percentage in 2006 compared to that of the debit
card in Figure 16, the credit card is still a major payment instrument in the US
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payments system with a steady share of 23 per cent in both 2003 and 2006 periods.
Additionally, Figure 17 shows that in the previous years (2000–2003), the credit card
had been showing a steady share in the distribution of non-cash payments: 22 per
cent in 2000 and 23 per cent in 2003.
According to Akers et al. (2005, p. 24), the credit card industry is currently a mature
market187. Therefore, significant changes are not expected in the future. The
contemporary US credit card industry, as in other countries such as the UK and
Australia, is dominated by Visa and MasterCard. Figure 18 shows the US market
share (based on the consumer spending) of the major credit card networks, with Visa
and MasterCard as market leaders from 2000 to 2007. As stated in the board of
governors in the Federal Reserve System’s report, and based on the data from the
Nilson Report (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008) 188:
The US general purpose credit card market is dominated by VISA and MasterCard
labeled cards that combined accounted for an estimated 599.4 million cards in 2007, up
6.8 percent from 2006.8 In addition, American Express and Discover provided another
109 million general purpose cards to consumers in 2007.

187

188

A market whose growth has stopped and which is functioning without change or innovation
(BusinessDictionary.com, n.d.(b)).
For more discussion, see also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007; 2006;
2005).
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Figure 18 Spending by US Cardholders at Merchants
Source: The Nilson Report (2008).

In conclusion, the US payments system statistics have shown a strong indication that
the nation is moving toward becoming a cashless society. With the exception of
cheque, the growth of non-cash payment instruments is evidence to this process. This
is influenced by factors such as the development of electronic payments as well as the
growth in economic activity and population. Dominated by Visa and MasterCard,
credit card industry in the US has already reached its maturity. As the oldest credit
card industry in the world, other countries may learn from the experience of the US in
managing and regulating its credit card industry.

THE UK PAYMENTS SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW
The development of the UK payments system has been influenced the by the
National Payments Plan, launched by the Payment Council on 14 May 2008 as the
first national plan for UK payments. The plan provides a strategic framework for
future payments innovation and change (Payments Council, n.d.), and its vision is to
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promote the development of modern and efficient payment services which are
responsive to user needs and operate with a high degree of integrity (Payments
Council, 2008b, p. 13). As stated by the Payments Council (2008b, p. 13), the
National Payments Plan aims to:


Identify gaps in the services offered by UK payment service providers and assess
how they can be filled;



Facilitate an environment that supports innovation and competition;



Move the UK to more efficient methods of payment and more efficient delivery
channels;



Ensure that current and emerging payment methods continue to operate securely and
that effective methods of fraud control are adopted; and



Identify and respond to the needs of all categories of payment service users, ensuring
that the payment requirements of financially disadvantaged sections of society are
adequately met.

Another important guideline that influenced the UK payments system development
over the last few years is the publication of the Core Principles for Systematically
Important Payment Systems, which was set by the CPSS189 and, according to the
Bank of England (2007, p. 29), is a useful device for organising oversight, motivating
overseen payments systems to improve the risk management and communicating the
result of that work in a coherent fashion.
The UK payments system is fundamental to the functioning of that country’s
economy (Bank of England, 2008). It consists of various elements, two of which are
the system’s institutions and its instruments. Major payments system institutions
include the Bank of England, the Financial Service Authority (FSA), the Payment
Council, the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS — now known as

189

See Chapter 2 for further discussion on the Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment
System.
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the UK Payments Administration)190 and the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS)
(see Table 43 Major Institutions in the UK Payments System in the appendices for a
brief summary of the roles of these institutions in the UK payments system). Major
payment instruments in the U.K. payments system include: cash; CHAPS; TARGET;
CREST; LCH Clearnet Ltd.; CLS; BACS; C&CC; LINK; debit card and credit card;
and SWIFT (see Table 42 for a brief summary).
As with the payments systems of other countries, the UK payments system has also
joined the world in transforming into a cashless society, as indicated by the growth
and development of its non-cash payment instruments. Figure 19 shows the upward
trends in the use of non-cash payment instruments transactions over the past few
years.

190

See Chapter 7 for more discussion.
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Figure 19 Trends of UK Non-Cash Transactions by Method of Payment
Source: Payments Council, cited in Office for National Statistics (2009, p. 89).

Figure 19 also shows that, except for cheques191, the use of non-cash payment
instruments indicate increasing trends over more than a decade. Among the reasons
for this rising trend were the demographic preferences and continuing efforts by users
and payment service providers to encourage migration to more efficient payment
methods (Payments Council, 2008a, p. 11). Additionally, various new payment
schemes (for example, automated payments for payrolls, pensions and state benefits
and mobile phone payments) have seen widespread use, and these have offered
customers more efficient methods of payments (Payments Council, 2008a, pp. 10191

According to the Payment Council in its National Payments Plan, managing the decline of cheques
is among the priority areas for future development of the UK payments system (Payments Council,
2008b, p. 6). This is because, according to the Payment Council (2008b, p. 6), while viable
alternatives already exist for cheques in many areas, there are still gaps, where adequate
alternatives are not yet available for some or all categories of users. Additionally, some users are
unaware of the alternatives to cheques that already exist (Payments Council, 2008b, p. 6).
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11). Due to the expected benefits from using electronic payments systems, the
movement to a ‘cashless, paperless society’ is also part of the National Payments
Plan. As stated by the Payments Council (2008b, p. 1):
Opportunities to innovate should be positively encouraged. We have an open process for
assessing proposals for new developments and ensuring that their potential is
appropriately realised. This is a time when there is much potential for innovation, as
new channels are opened up. We see our role both as ensuring that proposals are
properly considered and as facilitating collaboration across the payments sector where
this is needed to ensure that new ideas are taken up.

Based on the estimation by the Payments Council, the further growth and
development of non-cash payment instruments are expected to continue into the
future. Figure 20 and Figure 21 show the forecasted growth of cash and non-cash
payment instruments in the UK.

Figure 20 Forecast for Cash Payment Volumes and Values
Source: Payments Council (2008a, p. 11).
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Figure 21 Forecasts for Non-Cash Transaction Volumes
Source: Payments Council (2008a, p. 10).

As depicted by Figure 20 and Figure 21, the use of cash in the future in the UK
payments system is forecast to experience a declining trend, partly due to the rising
use of non-cash payment instruments which may be more efficient. For credit cards,
the Payments Council has forecasted that, due to the current economic conditions,
credit cards will experience a rising trend in transaction value and volume (see Figure
22). As stated by the Payments Council (2008a, p. 15):
The supply of credit has been constrained, and with disposable incomes under pressure
and consumer confidence vulnerable to any sustained fall in house prices or increase in
unemployment, developments in the wider economy will bear down on demand for
credit card credit. It is expected that the market will remain subdued before picking up
in tune with the economic cycle. A boost may also come from the use of contactless
cards. It is forecast that personal credit card payment volumes will grow from 1.8 billion
in 2007 to 2.6 billion in 2017.
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Figure 22 Forecast for Personal Credit Card Volumes and Values
Source: Payments Council (2008a, p. 15).

According to the APACS (2006, p. 4), 74.6 million credit and charge cards and 67
million debit cards provided cardholders with convenience and flexibility. As stated
by the Bank of England in its Payment System Oversight Report 2007, Visa and
MasterCard are the major debit and credit card operators, processing an average of
24.5 million electronic payments, with a value of approximately $ 3 billion per day in
the UK (Bank of England, 2008, p. 25).
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Figure 23 Average Daily Volume of Payments through the Debit and Credit Card
Systems192193
Sources: APACS and Bank of England calculations, cited in Bank of England (2007, p. 26).

Figure 24 Average Daily Value of Payments through the Debit and Credit Card
Systems194
Source: APACS and Bank of England calculations, cited in Bank of England (2008, p. 26).
192

193

194

Data includes ‘on us’ transactions (where the merchant and cardholder use the same
member/licensee). ‘On us’ transactions are processed internally by the member/licensee (Bank of
England, 2008, p. 26).
S2 card services includes Maestro and Solo transactions. Visa includes both Visa debit and Visa
credit transactions (Bank of England, 2008, p. 26).
Data includes ‘on us’ transactions (where the merchant and cardholder use the same
member/licensee). ‘On us’ transactions are processed internally by the member/licensee (Bank of
England, 2008, p. 26). S2 card services include Maestro and Solo transactions. Visa includes both
Visa debit and Visa credit transactions (Bank of England, 2008, p. 26).
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In conclusion, the payments system statistics of the UK that depicts the growth of
payment instruments over the past few years suggest that the nation is moving on the
path to become a cashless society. Additionally, the forecasts by the Payments
Council show that in the next decade, the use cash will continue to decline whereas
non-cash payment instruments such as debit card, credit card and cheque will
experience upward trend in usage. The need for efficiency has been among the
reasons behind this transformation. The National Payments Plan as the UK’s first
national plan for UK payments was formulated to support this movement. Just like in
the US, Visa and MasterCard are the major credit card brands in the UK whose
average daily volume and value have been on an upward trend for the past few years.

THE AUSTRALIAN PAYMENTS SYSTEM: AN
OVERVIEW
In common with other countries, the Australian payments system has undergone
major changes in the last decade, influenced largely by the Wallis reforms, which
include (Tyree, 2002):


Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 — amendments made
in 1998 provide for the Australian Securities and Investment Commission to regulate
consumer protection in the financial system;



Banking Act 1959 — amendments made in 1998 provide for regulation of authorised
deposit taking institutions;



Cheques Act 1986 — amendments made in 1998 provide for the turnback of certain
cheques, permit cheques to be drawn on non-banks, and clarifies electronic
presentment;



Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 — gives the Payment Systems Board
certain powers to regulate payment systems;



Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998 — legitimises multilateral netting and deals
with the ‘zero hour rule’ (see below); and
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Reserve Bank Act 1959 — amendments made in 1998 provide for the establishment
of the Payment Systems Board.

From 1945 to 1985, the payments system in Australia was Generally a closed system.
As Tyree (2002) puts it:
Until 1985, the Australian payments system reflected the structure of the Australian
financial industry. That structure could best be described as a closed shop. No new
banking license had been issued between 1945 and 1985 and over 80% of deposits and
customers were controlled by the four major banks. Current accounts paid no interest,
and lending was subject to direction from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).

In a closed system such as this, although stability seems preserved, competition was
restricted, mainly because of the difficulty of entering the banking industry as a result
of the licence restriction (Tyree, 2002). In this closed system, current accounts paid
no interest, as a consequence of the ‘free’ cheque facility (Tyree, 2002). The only
benefit of putting money in the banks at the time was safety. Recent developments in
the Australian payments system, particularly regarding payment cards, were largely
influenced by the reforms initiated around 2000. The credit card system was the first
target, and the reforms were finalised in August 2002, before coming into effect
during 2003 and 2004195, 196.
As in the US and the UK, the two major components of the Australian payments
system are institutions and instruments. Major payments system institutions include
the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the Payments System Board (PSB), the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian Payments Clearing Association
(APCA), the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), the Council
195
196

See Reserve Bank of Australia (2008, p. 2).
See Chapter 2 for further discussion on the case study of the reforms of Australia’s payments
system.
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of Financial Regulators, the Financial Sector Advisory Council (FSAC) and the
Banking Ombudsman (see Table 45 Major Institutions in the Australian Payments
System in the appendices for a brief summary of the roles of the institutions in the
Australian payments system). Major payment instruments in the Australian payments
system include cash, cheque, direct entry (DE), payment cards, automated teller
machines (ATM), electronic fund transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS), third-party bill
payments, Austraclear, Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System (RITS) and
clearing house electronic sub-register system (CHESS) (see Table 46 Major Payment
Instruments in the Australian Payments System in the appendices for summary
descriptions of major payment instruments in the Australian Payments System).
As discussed in Chapter 2, among the major issues in the Australian credit card
industry is the reform of the Australian payments system. The reform began soon
after the publication of the report Debit and Credit Card Schemes in Australia: A
Study of Interchange Fees and Access (October 2000)197, whose results suggest the
need for changes in the payments system to improve its performance. Based on the
findings in the report, the reforms of Australia’s payments system were initiated in
2000, with the credit card system as the first target. The reforms were finalised in
August 2002 before coming into effect during 2003 and 2004 and covered three
broad areas: the removal of various restrictions on merchants imposed by the card

197

This was a joint study between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission. For details, see Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (2000, p. i).
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schemes, the regulation of interchange fees and the introduction of more liberal
access arrangements (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008, pp. 2-3) 198.
In relation to the world’s transformation into a cashless society, the Australian
payments system has shown itself also to follow such a trend, evidenced by the
growth of the use of non-cash payment instruments — particularly the electronic
forms. Figure 16 Distribution of the Number of Non-Cash Payments (2003–2006)
shows the trend of the use of non-cash payment instruments over the last decade,
with the exception of cheques. Figure 16 shows that a continuous long-term shift
towards electronic payment instruments has occurred, with the number of cheques
written per person declining further, while the use of all electronic payment
instruments rose199.

198
199

For further discussion on the case of the reform of Australia’s payments system see Chapter 2.
Payments System Board (2008, p. 8).
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Figure 25 Non-Cash Payments Per Capita (Per Year)200
Source: ABS, APCA, BPAY and RBA, cited in Payments System Board (2008, p. 8).

According to the Payments System Board (2008, p. 8), non-cash retail payments in
Australia generally rose strongly in the period 2007–2008, as they have for the past
decade, with the total number of payments increasing by 9.1 per cent and the total
value by 12.6 per cent. Table 12 shows that the debit card and the credit card are the
most commonly used means of payments, with 29.5 per cent and 25.2 per cent shares
respectively.
Within the credit card system, the combined market share of the Bankcard,
MasterCard and Visa schemes was 83.4 per cent of the value of credit and charge
card transactions (see Figure 26) (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007, p. 8). As stated
by the Payments System Board (2007, p. 8), the distribution of market shares of the
credit and charge card market among the total schemes remained broadly unchanged
over recent years. Eventually, the domestic Bankcard credit card scheme closed in the
first half of 2007 after many years of declining market share.

200

Apart from BPAY, data from 2002 onwards are based on the RBA’s Retail Payments Statistics
(Payments System Board, 2008, p. 8). Data for earlier years come from APCA and the RBA, and
have been adjusted for differences between these sources and the Retail Payments Statistics
(Payments System Board, 2008, p. 8).
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Table 12 Non-Cash Retail Payments

Source: BPAY and RBA, cited in Payments System Board (2008, p. 8).

Figure 26 Market Shares of Card Schemes201 (by Value of Purchases)
Source: RBA, cited in Payments System Board (2007, p. 8).

In conclusion, Australia’s transformation into a cashless society has been evidenced
by the growth of the use of non-cash payment instruments (with the exception of
cheque) in particular those of electronic forms. Just as in many other countries, Visa
and MasterCard are the major brands in the Australian credit and charge card
industry. A major event in the Australian Credit card industry has been the reform of
the Australian payments system which put credit card system as its first target. The
201

Credit cards and charge cards.
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reform has affected several important ‘rules of the game’ in credit card networks in
Australia.

THE INDONESIAN PAYMENTS SYSTEM: AN
OVERVIEW
As in other countries (such as the US, the UK and Australia), the payments system in
Indonesia is a complex structure (see Figure 27), consisting of different subsystems,
whose components include policy, institutions, payment instruments, operational
mechanisms, infrastructure and legislation to manage its efficiency, effectiveness and
reliability (Bank Indonesia, 2007a).

Figure 27 Technical Architecture of The Indonesian National Payments System
(2004 Revision)
Source: Bank Indonesia (2006a).
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At the top of the management structure of the Indonesian payments system is Bank
Indonesia, which features as the country’s central bank. The role of Bank Indonesia
as an independent central bank began when the new central bank Act, Law No.
23/1999 was enacted on 17 May 1999, later amended by Law No. 3/2004 on 15
January 2004, based on which, the institution holds the status as an independent state
institution free from interference by government or any other external parties in
formulating and implementing its tasks and authorities (Bank Indonesia, 2008c).
With the mission of achieving and maintaining rupiah stability by maintaining
monetary stability and by promoting financial system stability for Indonesia’s longterm sustainable development, Bank Indonesia’s strategic objectives are (Bank
Indonesia, 2008d):


Maintaining monetary stability;



Maintaining the financial sustainability of Bank Indonesia;



Strengthening the effectiveness of monetary management;



Creating a sound and effective banking system and financial system stability;



Maintaining the security and effectiveness of the payment system;



Increasing the effectiveness of Good Governance implementation;



Strengthening the organization and build highly competent human resources with the
supporting of a knowledge-based work culture; and



Integrating Bank Indonesia’s transformation in line with Bank Indonesia’s
destination statement of 2008.

Other major participants in the Indonesian payments system include the commercial
banks. By the end of 1997, in the middle of the Asian currency crisis, too many banks
were established in Indonesia, due to wide-ranging financial deregulation in 1988,
and these numbered 222 at the end of 1997 (Ministry of Finance Japan, n.d., p. 68).
Later, coordinated by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), established
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in January 1998, some banks were provided with public money. Others were
nationalised, closed or merged, resulting in a 35 per cent reduction in the number of
banks (Ministry of Finance Japan, n.d., p. 68).
The Indonesian banking law classifies Indonesian banking institutions into
commercial and rural banks202 (Bank Indonesia, n.d.(a)). In September 2009, 121
commercial bamks existed, consisting of four state banks and 117 private national
banks, which were classified into Islamic and non-Islamic banks (Bank Indonesia,
n.d.(a)). From the 2,296 rural credit banks in Indonesia, 132 were in the Islamicbased category and the remaining 2,164 were in the non Islamic-based category
(Bank Indonesia, n.d.(a)).

Figure 28 Recapitulation of Banking Institution in Indonesia (September 2009)
Source: Bank Indonesia (n.d.(a)).
202

Rural banks, unlike commercial banks, do not involve directly in payment system and have
restricted operational area (Bank Indonesia, n.d.(a)).
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Indonesian banks, along with non-bank financial institutions, provide cash and noncash payment services to the Indonesian society (Titiheruw & Atje, 2009b, pp. 7-8).
Cash is still used in the payments system, in the forms of bank notes and coins —
especially in low-value payment transactions (Titiheruw & Atje, 2009b, p. 7).
Despite the recent development of non-cash payment instruments, Indonesian
society’s preference for cash is still high, and marked by a rising trend in the value of
cash circulation (see Figure 29).
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Figure 29 Position of Cash in Circulation (in $US Billions)
Source: Adapted from Bank Indonesia (n.d.(f)).

In 2007 cash circulation activity in Indonesia evidenced significant growth, with
average daily cash in circulation of $US19.2 billion, a 21 per cent increase on the
previous year’s figure of $US15,895 billion (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 11).
Society’s preference for cash for making transactions rose again in 2008, marked by
the increase of the average growth of cash in circulation from 21.0 per cent in 2007 to
26.3 per cent in 2008 (from the average daily cash in circulation of $US19.2 billion
trillion in 2007 to $US24.3 billion in 2008) (Bank Indonesia, 2009a, pp. 3-58). Bank
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Indonesia (2009a, p. 58) asserts that factors such as inflation, political condition and
society’s behaviour in anticipating price increases also contributed to the significant
development of cash in 2008, which was considered to be the highest growth in the
previous 10 years.

In terms of value, non-cash payment systems can be categorized into large-value
payment systems and retail payment systems (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, pp. 14-38).
The large-value non-cash transactions are generally performed using the Bank
Indonesia real-time gross settlement (BI-RTGS) system; however, due to its time
efficiency, recently, Indonesian society has also begun to use the system for lowvalue transactions (Bank Indonesia, 2009a, p. 7). Generally, for low–value, non-cash
transactions, payments are done via Sistem Kliring Nasional Bank Indonesia
(SKNBI, or Bank Indonesia National Clearing System) (Titiheruw & Atje, 2009b, p.
8). In principle, the SKNBI was established for transfers of funds less than $US11
million; whereas the Bank Indonesia real gross settlement system, although having
no value limit set, processes high-value transfers in real time (faster than the SKNBI,
which is not a real-time system) (Bank Indonesia, 2009a, p. 7). According to Bank
Indonesia (2008b, p. 10), in 2007, the BI-RTGS was mostly at a high growth level,
compared to the previous years, which had transactions value of $US4,664 trillion,
which represented a 45.6 per cent increase from the previous year’s figure ($US3,201
trillion). The transaction volume was $US935 thousand in 2007 — a 22.5 per cent
increase from the previous year’s figure of 759 thousand (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p.
10). The increase was also experienced by the SKNBI, with the value of $US154
billion in 2007 (a 1.13 per cent increase from the previous year’s figure) from 79.22
182

million transactions (a 1.05 per cent increase from the previous year’s figure) (Bank
Indonesia, 2008b, p. 21).
Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 14) contends that economic growth and development were
among the major factors behind the increase in activities of the BI-RTGS system,
including the increase in the society’s economic activities, such as stock market
settlement, foreign exchange settlement and customer transfer. Bank Indonesia
(2008b, p. 21) also believes that that economic growth and development was largely
attributable to the increase in SKNBI activities.
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Figure 30 Value of RTGS Transactions 2002–2009 (In $US Billions)
Source: Bank Indonesia (n.d.(e)).
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Figure 31 Volume of RTGS Transactions 2002–2009
Source: Bank Indonesia (n.d.(e)).

Non-cash payment instruments in Indonesia can also be broadly categorised into
paper-based (for example, cheque), card-based (for example, credit card and debit
card) and electronic-based (for example, prepaid card and e-money) (Titiheruw &
Atje, 2009b, p. 8).

Figure 32 Indonesian Payments System Components
Source: Titiheruw and Atje (2009a).
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Cheques, or bilyet giro203, are common forms of paper-based payment instruments in
the Indonesian payments system (Bank Indonesia, 2009a, p. 24). In 2007, 3.32
million cheques were drawn, with the value of $US13.5 billion and 36.12 million
bilyet giros were transacted, with the value of $US 95.7 billion (Bank Indonesia,
2008b, p. 24). Despite the growth and development of other non-cash payment
instruments, paper-based payment instruments remain widely used by Indonesian
society for transferring funds, and statistically, these do not show any indications of
future decline (see Figure 33) (Bank Indonesia, 2009a, p. 9).
Card-based payment instruments in the Indonesian payments system generally
include account-based cards (for example, debit and ATM cards) and credit cards
(Titiheruw & Atje, 2009b, p. 10). According to Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 29), cardbased payment instrument activities in 2007 were enhanced by the addition of new
facilities, functions and various features in ATM card, debit + ATM cards and credit
cards, as part of the efforts of (among others) card issuers to attract more customers.
The statistics from Bank Indonesia point to increasing activities of ATM and ATM +
debit cards in 2007, compared to 2006, with a 19 per cent increase in the number of
cards in circulation — from 29.6 million in 2006 to 35.2 in 2007 (Bank Indonesia,
2008b, p. 30). In Indonesia, the transaction volume experienced a 14 per cent
increase from 943 million in 2006 to 1.1 billion in 2007, with a 42 per cent increase
in transaction value from $US130.1 billion in 2006, to $US184.7 billion in 2007
(Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 30). Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 30) believes that the
increase of such figures reflect the increase in economic activities — particularly in
203

An instruction presented to a bank to debit the issuer’s account and credit another account that
cannot be cashed in (Titiheruw & Atje, 2009b, p. 9).
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2006 — including the frequent use of ATM cards and ATM + debit cards for cash
withdrawals, purchases and fund transfers. Such a trend has been reflected in Bank
Indonesia’s statistics over the past several years (see Figure 35 and Figure 36).
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bilyet giro

cheque

Figure 33 Value of Cheque and Bilyet Giro 2007–2008 (in IDR Millions)
Source: Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 9).
Million
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Figure 34 Volume of Cheque and Bilyet Giro 2007–2008
Source: Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 9).
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Figure 35 Account-Based Cards in Circulation 2006–2009
Source: Adapted from Bank Indonesia (n.d.(b)).
14,000.00
12,000.00
10,000.00
8,000.00

Cash Withdrawal

6,000.00

Intrabank

4,000.00

Interbank

2,000.00

Purchase
Oct-09

Jul-09

Apr-09

Jan-09

Oct-08

Jul-08

Jan-08

Apr-08

Jul-07

Oct-07

Apr-07

Jan-07

Oct-06

Jul-06

Apr-06

Jan-06

0.00

Figure 36 Value of ATM/Debit Card Transactions 2006–2009 (in $US Millions)
Source: Adapted from Bank Indonesia (n.d.(c)).

Another common option for non-cash payment in the Indonesian payments system is
the credit card. In 2007 the credit card industry in Indonesia experienced a rapid
growth compared to the previous year, with an 11.7 per cent increase in cards in
circulation, from 8.2 million cards in 2006 to 9.2 million in 2007 (Bank Indonesia,
2008b, p. 32). The transaction value in 2007 was $US8 billion, representing a 26.9
per cent increase from the previous year ($US6.3 billion) with the transaction volume
of 129.5 million (in 2007) representing a 13.7 per cent increase from 113.9
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transactions in 2006 (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 32). The upward trend has also been
depicted by Bank Indonesia’s statistics over the past few years (see Figure 37, Figure
38 and Figure 39).
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Source: Adapted from Bank Indonesia (n.d.(b)).
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Bank Indonesia (2008b, pp. 32-33). believes that the growth of credit card industry
can be attributed to society’s higher consumption need and issuers’ aggressive
marketing activities (for example, price discount, reward, non-annual fee card,
competitive interest rate and easy application process). The inherent benefits of credit
cards, such as efficiency in transaction, lack of need to carry large amount of cash
and the emerging chip and PIN technology for security, are also determinants of the
high growth of the credit card industry in Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 33).
In mid-2007, a new payment option, the e-money system204 (consisting of card-based
and operator server-based technologies) emerged in the Indonesian payments system
and gained wide acceptance in society — particularly the prepaid card (Bank
Indonesia, 2008b, p. 35). According to Bank Indonesia, the issuance of e-money is
generally made for frequent low-value transactions that require time efficient
processes (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 35). Using e-money is fairly simple: it only
requires a holder to insert a nominal value (for example, at the authorised points of
sale), and transactions can be made soon afterwards (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 35).
In 2007 there were 165.2 thousand e-money units, with 586 thousand transactions at
the value of $US583 thousand (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 35).

204

As described by Bank Indonesia (2006b, p. 8), generally, e-money is a payment instrument with
these characteristics: stored value is deducted during a transaction, the consumer has control over
the payment media and transaction verification can be done at the merchant level. In 2009 a new
specific regulation on e-money, Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 11/12/PBI/2009 on Electronic
Money, was issued to regulate the operation of the instrument (Bank Indonesia, 2009c). Under this
regulation, the e-money is classified based on whether or not a holder’s personal identity must be
registered (Titiheruw & Atje, 2009b, p. 11). Previously, the operation of the prepaid card as a type
of e-money was regulated under Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 7/52/PBI/2005 on Card-Based
Payment Instruments Operation (Bank Indonesia, 2005b).
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Figure 40 Value of E-Money Transactions (in $US Millions)
Source: Adapted from Bank Indonesia (n.d.(d)).
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Figure 41 Volume of E-Money Transactions
Source: Adapted from Bank Indonesia (n.d.(d)).

As shown by Figure 40 and Figure 41, despite its lower level of activities relative to
other payment instruments, the Indonesian society appears to embrace e-money as a
new payment option (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 35). Furthermore, Bank Indonesia, in
its survey of e-money in Indonesia, Efforts to Promote the Use of Non-Cash Payment
Instruments through the Development of E-Money, which involved customers,
merchants, banks and potential issuers, concludes that the potential for developing emoney is high in Indonesia (Initiative Team 2006 for the Grand Design of the Efforts
to Develop Non-cash Payment Instruments, 2006, pp. 15-18). Bank Indonesia asserts
that in the future, due to the growing need and awareness of society of the
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convenience, practicality, efficiency and security of transactions, e-money activities
will continue to rise (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, pp. 36-37).
Payments systems around the world are currently in the process of transforming into
cashless systems in search of economic efficiency. The Indonesian payments system
is no exception, indicated by the continuous growth of non-cash payment
instruments. Initiated in 2006 and supported by Bank Indonesia, the ‘less cash
society’ is among the targets of Indonesia’s payments system in the near future (Bank
Indonesia, 2007c, pp. 35-37).
However, unlike other countries that use the term ‘cashless society’, Indonesian
payments system members, particularly Bank Indonesia, prefer the term ‘less cash
society’ to describe a society accustomed to using non-cash payment instruments in
its economic activities. Mr Iwan Setiawan205 of Bank Indonesia, in a discussion with
the researcher, explained how the term ‘less cash society’ is used instead of the more
common term, ‘cashless society’, to describe a more realistic plan for developing
non-cash payment instruments in Indonesia (Setiawan, 2008).
Van Hove (2006, p. 20) believes that efforts toward a less cash society are more
realistic than trying to reach a cashless society, considering the fact that eliminating
cash from payments systems is very difficult (if not impossible). Bank Indonesia’s
commitment to promoting and supporting a less-cash society formation is evidenced
by the initiatives taken and/or supported by the institution, which includes the (Bank
Indonesia, 2007c, pp. 36-37):

205

IT Senior System Analyst of Bank Indonesia.
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Development of the grand design of the efforts to improve non–cash payments206;



The international seminar, ‘Toward Less Cash Society’;



Development of studies on roadmap model of National Payment Gateway
development207;



Development

of

studies

on

preference,

perception,

and

behavior

of

society/payment service provider institutions in utilizing non–cash payment
media208;


Development of studies on the role of non – cash transaction in the economy209;



Facilitation of system development by market participants to support less cash
society; and



Formulation of ratios for the purpose of measuring the development of non – cash
payments210.

Indonesian society is already familiar with some types of common non-cash payment
instruments, such as the ATM card, debit card and credit card, which provide several
facilities, such as cash withdrawal and transaction payments with better security (for
example, compared with carrying a large amount of cash) (Initiative Team 2006 for
206

An example of the efforts is the publication of the report Efforts to Promote the Use of Non-Cash
Payment Instruments through the Development of E-Money (translated) (Initiative Team 2006 for
the Grand Design of the Efforts to Develop Non-cash Payment Instruments, 2006).
207
For example, the matter was part of the discussion at the international seminar, Towards a Less
Cash Society in 2006 (Morris, Mulyadi, & Bambang, 2006, pp. 27-31).
208
For example, Study on Perception, Preference and Behaviour of Society/Payment System Service
Providers in using Non-Cash Payment Instruments (translated) (Directorate of Accounting and
Payment System of Bank Indonesia & Faculty of Economics and Management of Bogor
Agriculture Institute, 2006).
209
An example of the studies supported by Bank Indonesia is The Impacts of Non-Cash Payments on
the Economy and Monetary Policies (Pramono, Yanuarti, Purusitawati, & Emmy, 2006).
210
Despite the absence of any official indicator in Indonesia, we may generally refer to three methods
to measure the development of non-cash payment media in Indonesia: transaction volume of noncash payment media, private consumption to real money ratio and real money to cheque and cardbased payment ratio (Bank Indonesia, 2006b, pp. 19-20).
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the Grand Design of the Efforts to Develop Non-cash Payment Instruments, 2006, p.
12).
Mr Burhanuddin Abdullah, Governor of Bank Indonesia at the time of writing, in his
speech to the international seminar Towards a Less Cash Society in Indonesia (June
2006), states that just like other countries (such as China) which has developed its
payments system technology to support its transformation into a less cash society
(Abdullah, 2006, p. 9).
Indonesia is also moving in the same direction (Abdullah, 2006, p. 9). According to
Mr Abdullah, this is evidenced by the current development of non-cash payment
instruments in Indonesia, in which several innovations have emerged, in the form of
paper-based, card-based and electronic-based payment instruments for faster
settlement processes (Abdullah, 2006, pp. 9-10). Pramono el al. (2006, p. 25) argue
that the use of non-cash payment instruments not only decreases transaction costs and
promotes time efficiency, but also increases society’s revenue by means of, for
example, interest from cash held in their bank accounts. For example, in terms of
reduction of procurement cost of Indonesian currency, according to Mr Sigit
Pramono211, of the Indonesian Banks Association (Perbanas), the printing,
distribution and maintenance cost of every Rp1,000 currency is higher than its
nominal value, and therefore this creates inefficiency in the Indonesian economy
(Daniel, 2008). In other words, the reduction of the use of cash in the economy
through the of development of non-cash payment instruments can be expected to sort
out this matter.
211

Chairman of the Indonesian Banks Association (Perbanas) of the time.
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Banks and other payment instrument issuers will also receive benefits in the forms of,
for example, monthly administrative fees and transaction fees paid by customers
(Pramono, Yanuarti, Purusitawati, & Emmy, 2006, p. 25). The benefits of non-cash
payment instruments have also been recognised by Indonesian merchants, as
evidenced by the increasing number of outlets that accept non-cash payment
instruments that are also widely accepted by customers (Initiative Team 2006 for the
Grand Design of the Efforts to Develop Non-cash Payment Instruments, 2006, p. 12).
However, the benefits from using non-cash payment instruments come with costs,
among which is the increase of several risks, such as default, IT security breakdown,
payments system failure and the possible instability of the financial system
(Pramono, Yanuarti, Purusitawati, & Emmy, 2006, pp. 27-28). Van Hove (2006, pp.
21-22) contends that additional challenges that may hinder the development of noncash payment instruments include social exclusion; user resistance; social, cultural
and demographic condition; fear of technological changes; privacy issues; and the
disruption of continuity of the instruments. Abnur (2006, p. 25) believes that legal
certainty and user protection may include clear sanctions for those who unlawfully
use non-cash payment instruments, because what customers basically need are
privacy protection, security of transaction and non-discrimination.
In conclusion, although the use of cash by the society is still on an upward trend, the
movement toward becoming a less cash society (a preferred term over ‘cashless
society’) has been one of the major agendas in the Indonesian payments system for
the past few years. Efforts have been made particularly by the Bank Indonesia (for
example, facilitation of system development and studies on the feasibility of non194

cash payments instruments development in the nation) to support this transformation.
The Bank Indonesia’s payments statistics indicate that, over the years, the increasing
use of non-cash payment instruments such as debit card, credit card and e-money has
shown to be on the rise. This is an indication that a less cash society is in the making.
The need for more efficiency in economic activities has been a driving factor behind
this transformation. For credit card industry, society’s higher consumption and
aggressive marketing have been contributing to its growth in Indonesia. An upward
trend of the number and value of credit cards in circulation over the past few years is
a sign that this industry will likely to progress further in the future.

NEW CRIME OPPORTUNITIES
As discussed above, the transformation toward a cashless/less cash society aims to
achieve efficiency in the economy — or at least reduce inefficiencies. However, the
growth and development of non-cash payment instruments may also provide new
crime opportunities, because the products of new technologies, new forms of
organisation and new markets can create new offenders as well as new victims212
(Graycar, 2001, June 21-22, p. 2). According to Graycar (2001, June 21-22, p. 3),
four factors contribute to the creation of the opportunities for the new crimes to
emerge: demographic change, economic reform, globalisation and technological
advancement. As implied in the above discussions, the transformation into a
cashless/less cash society has the potential to create at least two changes: economic
reform and technological advancement, and thus the emergence of new crimes may
be among the emerging problems.
212

See the discussion in Chapter 3 on the basic criminology concepts of crime opportunity.
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In terms of economic reform, as depicted by the above payments system statistics of
the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia, changes are evident in the preference and
use of payment instruments — non-cash instruments are becoming more common in
society by the year. Although using less cash may reduce the risks of cash-related
crimes such as robberies and forgeries, using more non-cash instruments may
increase the risks of crime in different ways. For, example, as stated by Felson and
Clarke (1998, p. 23):
In the United States, and most likely also in Britain and elsewhere, these developments
in the past few years have brought an exponential growth in the use of plastic money or
of smaller packets of cash, with a major shift in the direction of a cashless society. In the
process, there is far less cash around to steal or rob. It is present in such small amounts
as to feed less crime.

Furthermore, as argued by Graycar (2001, June 21-22, p. 5):
The move to a cashless society also heralds significant potential changes to the scope
and nature of crime and crime control. The advent of the so-called ‘smart cards’
inevitably invite attempts at counterfeiting whilst credit card and funds transfer fraud are
likely to increase. The less cash used for everyday transactions, the less the opportunity
for robbery. However the sheer volume and velocity of financial transactions by
computers pose significant challenges for investigation of offences such as money
laundering and tax evasion.

The development of technology to support the operation of non-cash payment
instruments in the economy may also provide offenders with a wide range of new
methods to perpetrate their offences which, in many cases, could result in the
emergence of new types of crime (Graycar, 2001, June 21-22, p. 7). As discussed in
the next chapters, among the negative impacts of the transformation into a cashless
society are the growing problems of payments fraud, particularly those of credit card
fraud. Such problems are characterised by the growing importance of information and
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the protection thereof, and are often associated with privacy issues213. As stated by
Mr Paul Richard of the San Diego-based National Centre for Financial Education
(New Dawn Magazine, 1995):
The real danger is too heavy a hand watching over your life. It’s nobody’s business
where you spend your money so long as you earn it legally. No government entity
should know where you spend money for groceries.

According to Di Nicola and Scartezzini (Di Nicola & Scartezzini, 2000, p. 345), as a
market transforms into a cashless economic model, new types of payment
instruments are developed, based on information transmission technologies, and thus
the information itself becomes an important factor of production which needs to be
managed to support decision processes and develop business strategies. Over the
years, this has contributed to the emergence of new types of crime by providing new
crime opportunities, for example, the e-commerce transactions conducted over the
internet that become the target for card-not-present (CNP) fraud214. Based on the
experience of the US credit card industry, for example, several factors that contribute
to the enormous rise in credit card fraud are: the increased use of credit cards, the
ease with which an individual can commit credit card fraud, the invisibility of the
offence and the lack of law enforcement efforts and inadequate laws (Caminer, 1985,
pp. 747-748) 215. Wahlert (1996, p. 28) argues that law enforcement will face greater
challenges in coping with crime problems arising from the society’s movement to
fewer face-to-face financial transactions, among which are the increasingly
anonymous nature of crime as well as the use of technology in supporting
213

For more discussion, see Chapter 6.
In the US, UK, and Australia, this scheme is statistically the most prevalent and costly type of
payment card fraud. See Chapter 6 for more discussion.
215
For more discussion, see Chapters 6 and 7.
214
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sophisticated criminal offences216. Therefore, the major challenges in promoting the
concept of cashless society include how to manage the security within technology
innovation so as to be accepted by society as well as to provide end-to-end risk
assessment (McKay, 2007, p. 29).

CONCLUSION
The above discussions suggest that, despite being in different countries, payments
systems in the US, the UK, Australia and Indonesia are currently experiencing many
similar changes which accompany the transformation into societies without or with
less cash, or ‘cashless/less cash societies’. Such changes are evidenced by, among
other things, the growth and development of non-cash payment instruments,
including paper-based, card-based and electronic-based forms. Over the years,
payments system statistics of the four countries have consistently shown upward
trends in the number, transaction volume and transaction value of such instruments,
indicating the growth of societies’ acceptance of the concept of a cashless society.
Measuring the true extent of benefits and costs of a cashless society has always been
a difficult task. The growth and development of non-cash payment instruments are
constructed at least in part on the expectations that future benefits of becoming a
cashless society will exceed the costs thereof. In addition to the identifiable financial
expenditures required to establish a cashless society, the increase of fraud risk is
among the non-identifiable and often non-quantifiable costs component. The
increasing threats of payments fraud (such as credit card fraud) have created a new
challenge — not just for the economy, but also for law enforcement practices.
216

For more discussion, see Chapters 6 and 7.
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The next two chapters discuss the trends in payment fraud, particularly credit card
fraud in the US, the UK and Australia, as well as measures that have been taken to
solve the problems.
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CHAPTER 6: THE BIG PICTURE: A
STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE TRENDS OF
CREDIT CARD FRAUD IN THE US, THE UK
AND AUSTRALIA
INTRODUCTION
The problem of credit card fraud is now at an alarming level, because most (if not all)
countries in the world experience this problem, due to, among other things, the
globalisation of the credit card, which itself changes aspects of society, particularly
the economy (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2009a). The previous
discussions217 in this report on the theoretical framework of crime and crime
prevention suggest, among other things, that a good crime prevention practice is one
that is problem- and not just practice-based.
This study uses benchmarking principles to gather lessons from the benchmark
countries (the US, the UK and Australia) in order to transfer these to Indonesia. This
particular chapter discusses the trends of credit card fraud in the three benchmark
countries to highlight the problems they currently face, before discussing how they
deal with such problems in the next chapter. The discussions in this chapter generally
cover the prevalence and costs of credit card fraud in the US, the UK and Australia.
More specifically, the analysis in this chapter highlights the trends of credit card
fraud in the three countries, as well as the major events that contribute to the changes
of the trends.
217

See Chapter 3.
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TRENDS OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD IN THE UNITED
STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND AUSTRALIA
The following discussions focus on the trends of credit card fraud in the US, the UK
and Australia, in order to highlight the major problems that the three countries face in
their struggle against payment frauds. In particular, the analyses highlight the most
common types of credit card fraud and how they are changing over time. The two
main questions to be answered in the following discussions are: ‘What are the recent
most common types of credit card fraud in the US, the UK and Australia?’ and ‘What
are the major factors that contribute to the existence or changes of these offences?’ In
crime prevention practice, the answers to these questions are of importance
particularly to crime prevention strategy formulators in the three countries, who must
make sound decisions regarding where they should allocate their resources to achieve
optimum results.
In relation to the data and information used to build the analysis in this chapter, it is
important to acknowledge the nature and limitations thereof. The data and
information on payment frauds, including credit card frauds, used in this study came
from the payment systems of the US, the UK and Australia. Such data and
information fall under the category of ‘consumer data’, which are available to the
public, generally for raising awareness as well as education on the issues of fraud and
fraud prevention. Such data and information are collected from the ‘consumer side’
by means such as fraud complaints and fraud reports collection, and thus they
generally do not provide information regarding offenders. In relation to this
limitation, the discussions on offence displacement, for example, are built on the
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grounds of ‘possibility’, rather than ‘certainty’, because little reliable information
about offenders is available for further verification. Additionally, the publicly
available fraud data and information from the FTC, the APACS and the APCA
generally do not separate credit card fraud from other, similar offences (for example,
debit card fraud and charge card fraud). Therefore, as with several other studies, this
study assumes that the changes in the trends of the category in which credit card
fraud is included also represent the changes of the trends in credit card fraud218
themselves.
Holtfreter et al. (2005, p. 268), referring to the existing researches on consumer fraud,
asert that it is common for such studies to rely mostly (if not totally) on victim data
and information, rather than data about offenders, because the former are easier to
obtain. Holtfreter et al. (2005, p. 269) argue that:
However, the theory-based approaches to consumer fraud victimization and victim
reporting exceed those focused on offending. This disjoint is likely due to the numerous
difficulties faced by researches in obtaining samples of offenders. Surveying victims has
proved to be a much simpler task, although this approach could be strengthened
considerably with the inclusion of more theoretically driven measures.

This is not to undermine the significance of the victim data and information, because
practically, to a certain degree, they are still considered to be reliable resources
(Holtfreter, Slyke, & Blomberg, 2005, pp. 265-269). Holtfreter et al. (2005, p. 268)
further suggest that means such as semi-structured, in-person interviews with
incarcerated offenders who are serving time for fraud convictions may be utilised to
inquire more deeply into matters such as the nature of offences and offenders’
relationship to victims, in addition to other resources of information, for instance, the
218

This assumption is commonly used by other literature on credit card fraud. For example, see The
Independent (2008); Nugent (2005); Brignall (2005); and Moneyfacts.co.uk (2009).
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internet (Holtfreter, Slyke, & Blomberg, 2005, p. 268). Rawlinson (2008, p. 19)
argues that qualitative interviewing with offenders may benefit the researcher by
dismantling or amplifying may of the preconceptions that accompany the label
attached to the subjects — the very label that targeted them for interview in the first
place. Arsovska (2008), by referring to her PhD research on the Albanian organised
crime groups, suggests the use of the ‘triangulation’ method, supported by the use of
‘snowball sampling’219, whose purpose is to obtain confirmation of findings through
convergence of different perspectives to obtain information from, among others,
offenders. However, in practice, obtaining data and information on offenders
(particularly the incarcerated ones) requires criminal justice systems to track down,
investigate and prosecute offenders. Such a task is not without great challenges,
because, among other things, perpetrators often hide behind technology (Holtfreter,
Slyke, & Blomberg, 2005, p. 266). Provided information technology such as the
internet is involved, certain problems may hinder the investigation and prosecution of
offenders, such as (Brenner, 2001):

219



The lack of cybercrime-specific penal laws and/or the inadequacy of penal laws that
were crafted to deal with criminal conduct occurring in the real, physical world, not
in or by means of the virtual world of cyberspace;



The lack of international agreements on cybercrimes which exacerbates the problems
posed by the lack/inadequacy of local penal law and the often conflicting
requirements local procedural laws;



The difficulty of ascertaining which nation(s) has/have jurisdiction to prosecute a
cybercriminal and, once this determination has been made, of asserting jurisdiction
over that person; and



The difficulty of determining how many offenses have been committed, against
whom and the damage resulting from those offenses.

Snowball sampling is a modification of convenience or accidental sampling used when the
participants of interest are from a population that is rare, or when whose members are unknown to
the researcher, such as persons with unusual attributes, beliefs or behavioural patterns who do not
belong to known groups with identifiable members (Gliner & Morgan, 2000, p. 155).
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Furthermore, according to Grecke (2007, pp. 8-9), the investigation of internetrelated fraud by law enforcement agencies faces great challenges, such as: the high
potential number of victims; the availability of instructions on how to carry out an
offence (for example, instructions on the internet); the international dimension of the
offence, where victims and offenders do not need to be at the same place (or even
country); and the availability of the information technology that allows offenders to
automate their attacks on the victims, thus increasing the numbers of potential
victims220.
In its Strategic Plan on combating identity theft,221 under which credit card fraud is
categorised in the US, the President’s Identity Theft Task Force states (2007a, p. 12)
that:
Unlike some groups of criminals, identity thieves cannot be readily classified. No
surveys provide comprehensive data on their primary personal or demographic
characteristics. For the most part, victims are not in a good position to know who stole
their information or who misused it. According to the FTC’s 2003 survey of identity
theft, about 14 percent of victims claim to know the perpetrator, who may be a family
member, friend, or in-home employee.

In response to the above problem, the US Secret Service supported a study by
Gordon et al. (2007) on identity theft that focused on offenders222. The study
examined the closed United Service Secret Service cases with identity theft
components from 2000 to 2006, and its findings represented four areas: the case, the
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For example, the I Love You virus, which originated from the Philippines, is sent automatically to a
large number of email addresses immediately after victims open their infected emails (CBC News,
2000).
221
Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a).
222
Identity Fraud Trends and Patterns: Building a Data-Based Foundation for Proactive Enforcement
(Gordon, Rebovich, Choo, & Gordon, 2007).
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offenders, the commission of the crime and victimisation223 (Gordon, Rebovich,
Choo, & Gordon, 2007, p. 1). However, generally in crime prevention practice, and
despite the limitations of the fraud data and information from the payment systems,
they are still considered to be an essential basis on which decisions are made about
what prevention measures need to be implemented. An example of this is the
acknowledgement of the Federal Trade Commission’s Identity Theft Data
Clearinghouse (the FTC’s fraud database whose statistics are used in this chapter) by
the US President’s Identity Theft task Force in its Combating Identity Theft: A
Strategic Plan, as ‘vital resources’ for consumers and law enforcement agencies
(President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 1). The limitation of data and
information from the consumer (victim) side create challenges not just for this study,
but also for strategy formulators (for example, central banks and industry
associations) in building effective and efficient prevention strategies. The researcher
behind this study believes that one way to overcome this problem is to analyse
multiple possibilities that may have contributed to the issues in question (for
example, why a particular type of offence is more prevalent and costly than others).
Based on this analysis, parties such as strategy formulators may develop prevention
measures that address most (if not all) such possibilities. The President’s Identity
Theft Task Force’s Strategic Plan, for example, addresses multiple issues some of
which concern, at least indirectly, the prevention of other crimes which are not
traditionally categorised under the ‘identity theft’ category224.

223
224

Discussed further later in this chapter.
Discussed further in the next chapter.
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PREVALENCE AND COSTS OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD IN THE US
In the US, credit fraud is generally categorised as a type of identity theft225. Defined
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), ‘identity theft’ occurs when someone
appropriates another’s personal identifying information (for example, social security
number or credit card account number) to commit fraud or theft (Federal Trade
Commission, 2008a, p. 74). However, in practice, several different definitions apply
to identity-related offences.
According to the Australian Centre for Policing Research (ACPR) and the Australian
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) (2006, p. 5), despite efforts
for more comprehensive classifications, the term ‘identity theft’ in the US is
generally used to cover all types of identity crime. However, in practice, other
definitions are also in use to describe the offence, such as ‘identity crime’ (used in
Australia) and ‘identity fraud’ (used in the UK) (Australian Centre for Policing
Research & Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, 2006, pp. 5-10).
According to the definition from ACPR and AUSTRAC (2006, pp. 9-10): ‘identity
crime’ refers to offences in which a perpetrator uses a false identity in order to
facilitate the commission of a crime, ‘identity fraud’ refers to the gaining of money,
goods, services or other benefits through the use of a false identity, while ‘identity
theft’ involves the theft of a pre-existing identity. This study does not attempt to
amend the definition of ‘identity theft’ used in the US, but it does acknowledge the
different ways the term is defined. Majoras (2006, p. 1) believes that:

225

The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has been including credit card fraud in its identity
theft reports over the years. For example, see Federal Trade Commission (2008a, p. 3; 2007b, p. 3).
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Identity theft is a particularly pernicious crime requiring swift action on many fronts, as,
like a virus, it spreads through our economic system, striking randomly and often
inflicting great harm on innocent victims.

Identity theft in the US is currently a serious national problem posing many threats to
society. Regarding issues of immigration, for example, Mr Richard M. Stana226,
Director of Justice Issues at the US General Accounting Office (GAO) states (United
States General Accounting Office, 2002b, p. 6) asserts:
Aliens and others have used identity theft or other forms of identity fraud to create
fraudulent documents that might enable individuals to enter the country and seek job
opportunities. With nearly 200 countries using unique passports, official stamps, seals,
and visas, the potential for immigration document fraud is great. In addition, more than
8,000 state or local offices issue birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and other documents
aliens can use to establish residency or identity. This further increases the number of
documents that can be fraudulently used by aliens to gain entry into the United States,
obtain asylum or relief from deportation, or receive such other immigration benefits as
work permits or permanent residency status.

In terms of financial costs, just as with other types of crime, the true costs of identity
theft in the US remain difficult to quantify. Several studies have made efforts to
estimate the costs of identity theft using different methods and different respondents,
and one example is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 2006 Identity Theft Survey
Report227. Table 13 shows the estimation of the costs of identity theft in the US,
based on this study.
Table 13 Costs of Identity Theft (in $US)228
New Accounts Existing Nonand Other
Credit Card
Frauds
Accounts

Existing Credit
Cards Only

All ID Theft

Value of Goods and Services Obtained by Identity Thieves
Median

$1,350

$457

$350

226

$500

Director of Justice Issues at the US General Accounting Office (GAO) at the time of writing.
Preceded by 2003 Identity Theft Survey (Federal Trade Commission, 2003). See also a similar study
by the Javelin Strategy & Research (2008).
228
Covering misuses discovered since 2001.
227
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90th Percentile

$15,000

$3,800

$4,000

$6,000

95th Percentile

$30,000

$6,000

$7,000

$13,000

Victims’ Out-of-Pocket Expenses
Median

$40

$0

$0

$0

90th Percentile

$3,000

$900

$132

$1,200

95th Percentile

$5,000

$1,200

$400

$2,000

Sample Size (n)

138

164

257

59

Source: 2006 Identity Theft Survey Report 229— see Federal Trade Commission (2007a, p. 5).

Table 13 shows that the median value of goods and services obtained by offenders for
all categories of identity theft was $US500, with 10 per cent of victims reporting that
offenders obtained $US6,000 or more, while five per cent reported that offenders
obtained at least $US13,000 in goods and services (Federal Trade Commission,
2007a, p. 6). In terms of out of pocket expenses, Table 13 shows that although the
median value of the new accounts and miscellaneous category was $US40, the
median value for all categories of ID theft was $0 (Federal Trade Commission,
2007a, p. 6). According to the FTC, this represents the fact that in more than 50 per
cent of identity theft cases, victims incurred no out-of-pocket expenses (Federal
Trade Commission, 2007a, p. 6). This is also to say that some victims did incur
substantial out-of-pocket expenses, with 10 per cent reporting out-of-pocket expenses
of $US1,200 or more, and five per cent reporting $US2,000 (Federal Trade
Commission, 2007a, p. 6). In relation to the costs of identity theft, the President’s
Identity Theft Task Force (2007a, p. 11) states that:

229

The study was conducted through telephone interviews using a random-digit-dialling (RDD)
sampling methodology to obtain a random sample of US adults age 18 and older (Federal Trade
Commission, 2007a, p. 3). Between 27 March and 11 June 2006 a total of 4,917 interviews were
conducted (Federal Trade Commission, 2007a, p. 3).
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Although greater empirical research is needed, the data show that annual monetary
losses are in the billions of dollars. This includes losses associated with new account
fraud, a more costly, but less prevalent form of identity theft, and misuse of existing
accounts, a more prevalent but less costly form of identity theft. Businesses suffer most
of the direct losses from both forms of identity theft because individual victims
generally are not held responsible for fraudulent charges. Individual victims, however,
also collectively spend billions of dollars recovering from the effects of the crime.

As one of the objects of identity theft, the credit card in the US is not merely a
payment instrument, but is also a money-making industry. Mudd (2007, p. 13)
contends that credit facilities are now available to the vast majority of Americans on
a scale never before seen. Slotter (1997) believes that industries that expand at a rapid
rate are often vulnerable to fraud schemes devised by those seeking to gain unlawful
benefits from the emerging criminal opportunities (for example, dated security
measures and outdated laws). In many cases of identity theft, the offences are so
sophisticated that the victims do not even know how their personal information was
stolen. A report by the Federal Trade Commission, the 2006 Identity Theft Survey
Report, established that the majority of the victims of identity theft did not know how
their information was stolen (see Figure 42).
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Figure 42 How Identity Theft Victims’ Information was Obtained
Source: Federal trade Commission (2007a, p. 30).

A major source of the information regarding the prevalence and costs of identity
theft, including credit card fraud in the US, is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
which continuously conducts data collection and publishes identity theft cases. Over
the years, based on the reports of the FTC, credit card fraud is the most common type
of identity theft. As stated by the FTC in its report, Consumer Fraud and Identity
Theft Data: January–December 2007 (Federal Trade Commission, 2008a, p. 3):
Credit card fraud (23%) was the most common form of reported identity theft followed
by phone or utilities fraud (18%), employment fraud (14%) and bank fraud (13%). Other
significant categories of identity theft reported by victims were government
documents/benefits fraud (11%) and loan fraud (5%).

Based on the FTC’s previous reports, credit card fraud has also been the most
common type of identity theft in previous years (Federal Trade Commission, 2007b,
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p. 3). Table 14 summarises the percentage distribution of the types of identity theft
based on the complaints received by the FTC for a five-year period (2003–2007).
Table 14 Types of Identity Theft Based on Consumers’ Complaints230
Offences

2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 2006 (%) 2007 (%)

Credit Card Fraud

32

28

26

25

23

Phone or Utilities Fraud

20

19

18

17

18

Employment-Related Fraud

11

13

12

14

14

Bank Fraud

17

18

18

16

13

Loan Fraud

5

5

5

5

5

Other Identity Theft

19

22

25

24

25

Attempted Identity Theft

8

6

6

6

5

Government Documents or
8
Benefit Fraud

8

9

10

11

Source: Adapted from FTC (2008a, p. 13; 2007b, p. 13; 2006, p. 13).

In terms of the classification of credit card fraud offences, unlike in the UK and
Australia, where more detailed classifications are used, credit card frauds in the US
are generally classified, particularly by the FTC, into only three broad categories:
new accounts, existing accounts and unspecified231. Table 15 shows the percentage
distribution of credit card fraud (based on the number of complaints) over a period of
five years.
Table 15 Credit Card Fraud in the US
Subtype

2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 2006 (%) 2007 (%)

New Accounts

19.3

16.5

15.6

15.2

14.2

Existing Account 12.0

11.9

11.4

10.7

9.4

Unspecified

1.4

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

Total

32

28

26

25

23

230

The total percentage of each year is more than 100 because some complaints fall under more than
one category (Federal Trade Commission, 2008a, p. 13; 2007b, p. 13; 2006, p. 13).
231
See Federal Trade Commission (2008a, p. 13).
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Source: FTC (2008a, p. 13; 2007b, p. 13; 2006, p. 13).

In the new accounts category, offenders generally use the identity of victims to
establish new credit card accounts, and then use the cards for making purchases
before disappearing without paying the bills that appear on the victims’ credit reports
(Federal Trade Commission, 2005, p. 3). Also, instead of creating new accounts
using the stolen identities, offenders may also take over the existing credit card
accounts by stealing the credit card or the credit card information by means such as
skimming (using skimming devices), dumpster diving232, mail theft and social
engineering233, and these fall into the ‘existing accounts’ category (Federal Trade
Commission, 2005, pp. 2-4). Other offences that are not part of either category
simply fall into the ‘unspecified’ category.
Table 15 shows that the most common type of identity theft and possibly credit card
fraud in the US is the new accounts type, and that this continually exceeds the
existing account category (in number of complaints) for the five-year period. This
suggests that the US has some issues outstanding, regarding, among other things, the
mechanism of the creation of new accounts (such as credit card accounts) as part of
the nation’s identity management234. Some commentators believe that the loopholes
232

An identity theft method where the offenders dig through rubbish bins and other discarded matter to
find useful personal information (Wisconsin Identity Theft Lawyers, 2009).
233
A method of obtaining sensitive information about a company through the exploitation of human
nature (Solomon, Barrett, & Broom, 2005, p. 17). Also the process of encouraging someone else to
carry out a task (normally requiring more access to a particular resource) on the offender’s behalf
(Solomon, Barrett, & Broom, 2005, p. 272).
234
Defined as the combination of technical systems, rules and procedures that define the ownership,
utilisation and safeguarding of personal identity information whose primary goal of the process is
to assign attributes to a digital identity and to connect that identity to an individual (National
Science and Technology Council, 2008, pp. ES-1).
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in identity management contribute to the occurrence of serious crimes, particularly
terrorist attacks. For example, findings of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) highlights, among other
things, the failure of US documentation system in spotting the ‘red flags’ (for
example, some offenders should have been denied entry to the US for failure to fulfil
their visa application requirements or violations of their immigration status) which, if
responded to properly, may have helped prevent the incident (National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 564). Based on this, among the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission was the establishment of a sound
identification system that covers several areas, including the application of new credit
card accounts235 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
2004, p. 389).
For many cases of identity theft offences, in addition to the crime opportunities
unwillingly provided by consumers, other sources of such opportunities include those
presented by the organisations that keep consumer data and information. This is often
associated with the incidents of data breaches236 within the US where offenders steal
sensitive consumer data and information, particularly from organisations that
maintain large amounts of sensitive personal information (United States Government
Accountability Office, 2007, p. 9).
235
236

See discussion in the next chapter.
Data breach can be perpetrated using various techniques. The study by the Verizon RISK Team and
the US Secret Service discovered that misuse and hacking are the two most common ways data
breaches are committed in the US (Verizon RISK Team & United States Secret Service, 2010, p.
20). Other techniques include: malware, social tactics and physical actions (Verizon RISK Team &
United States Secret Service, 2010, p. 20). For statistics and discussions, see Figure 75 in
appendices.
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According to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2007, p.
5), regardless of the absence of comprehensive data available, the evidence suggests
that breaches of sensitive personal information have occurred frequently and under
widely varying circumstances. For example, according to the GAO (2007, p. 5),
…more than 570 data breaches have been reported in the news media from January
2005 through December 2006, according to our analysis of lists maintained by three
private organizations that track such breaches. Further, a House Government Reform
Committee survey of federal agencies identified more than 788 data breaches at 17
agencies from January 2003 through July 2006. Of the roughly 17,000 federally
supervised banks, thrifts, and credit unions, several hundred have reported data breaches
to their federal regulators over the past 2 years. In addition, officials in New York
State—which requires public and private entities to report data breaches to a centralized
source — reported receiving notice of 225 breaches from December 7, 2005, through
October 5, 2006.

Such types of personal information are generally used by the identification
documents broadly categorised into two groups: base identity documents such as
birth certificates and passports and secondary identity documents, which can be
obtained using base identity documents, such as driver’s licences and credit cards
(Kochems & Keith, 2006, p. 2). A recent report from the GAO suggests that despite
the steps that have been undertaken at the federal, state and local level in preventing
identity theft, vulnerabilities remain in public as well as private sectors, including:
display and use of social security numbers, availability of personal information
through private information resellers, and security weaknesses in federal agency
information systems which may lead to data security breaches involving personally
identifiable information (United States Government Accountability Office, 2009, p.
8). Further, the GAO also suggests that there are five major categories of persistent
weaknesses

of

information

system

controls

Accountability Office, 2009, p. 11):
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(United

States

Government

(1) access controls, which ensure that only authorized individuals can read, alter, or
delete data; (2) configuration management controls, which provide assurance that only
authorized software programs are implemented; (3) segregation of duties, which reduces
the risk that one individual can independently perform inappropriate actions without
detection; (4) continuity of operations planning, which provides for the prevention of
significant disruptions of computer-dependent operations; and (5) an agency-wide
information security program, which provides the framework for ensuring that risks are
understood and that effective controls are selected and properly implemented.

Among the sensitive personal information that can become the target of identity theft
offenders are social security numbers (SSNs) (United States General Accounting
Office, 2002f, p. 2). Crime opportunities related to SSNs are related to the fact that
since their first use, the number of federal agencies and others which rely on them has
grown beyond the original intended purpose (United States General Accounting
Office, 2002f, p. 3). According to the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a,
p. 23), although originally created in 1936 to track workers’ earnings for social
benefits purposes, the use of SSNs has been growing over decades237. For example,
in 1961, using the SSN as the identification number, the Federal Civil Service
Commission established a numerical identification system for all employees, and
later, in 1962, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began to use the SSN for Taxpayer
Identification Numbers (TINs) (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 23).
The widespread use of SSNs as identifiers by both government agencies and private
enterprises eventually render them valuable targets for identity theft offenders,
because they often become important elements in the authentication of consumers’
identities (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 23). In other words,
offenders can use unlawfully obtained SSNs and other information to open new

237

For more discussion, see Social Security Online (2007).
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accounts such as credit card accounts in the victims’ names (President’s Identity
Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 23). As stated by the GAO (2002f, p. 4):
… SSNs and other personal information are used to fraudulently obtain credit cards,
open utility accounts, access existing financial accounts, commit bank fraud, file false
tax returns, and falsely obtain employment and government benefits. SSNs play an
important role in identity theft because they are used as breeder information to create
additional false identification documents, such as driver’s licenses.

The problem of the excessive use of the SSN and other personally identifiable
information in the US is currently at an alarming level, and has become among the
government’s primary concerns in identity theft prevention practices238. The
seriousness of the problems of data breach in the US is evidenced by, among other
things, the inclusion of the matter in the President’s Identity Theft Task Force’s
Strategic Plan, Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan239, and for the next couple
of years, it will be among the priorities in the nationally coordinated identity theft
prevention practices in the US240.
A review of the reports of the FTC did not glean much information on the values ($)
of identity thefts, particularly credit card frauds. However, by comparing the two
studies by the FTC, 2003 Identity Theft Survey Report and 2006 Identity Theft Survey
Report, some differences in fraud figures emerged. In the 2006 study, the FTC found
that the average amount (per victim) obtained by the identity theft offenders was
$US1,882, a 60 per cent decrease from the previous study’s figure of $US4,789
(United States General Accounting Office, 1998, p. 8). However, as stated by the
FTC (2007a, p. 8), these discrepancies were likely caused by the changes in the
238

See the next chapter for more discussion.
See President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a).
240
Discussed further in the next chapter.
239
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methodology, rather than actual changes in the prevalence and costs of the fraud
themselves241.
A study report by CyberSource, the 9th Annual Online Fraud Report: Online
Payment Fraud Trends, Merchant Practices and Benchmarks242 reveals that, in 2007,
the estimated losses from online fraud, including online credit card fraud, was
$US3.6 billion, representing a 1.4 per cent increase from the previous year. Figure 43
shows the losses from online fraud based on the CyberSource study.

Figure 43 Online Revenue Losses Due to Fraud (in $US)
Source: CyberSource (2008, p. 4).

241

As mentioned earlier, a major challenge in highlighting the prevalence and costs of identity theft in
the US is that the statistics thereof, particularly those of the FTC, often do not show some figures
that are normally part of similar statistics from other countries (for example, value ($) of losses
from the offences and explanation as to the factors behind the changes in the figures). This may
lead the data users to form different interpretations of the same issues. For example, see
Handschuh (2009). To overcome this problem, this study uses other relevant literature in
discussing the changes in the trends of identity theft in the US, including those of credit card fraud.
242
Based on a survey of 318 online merchants where the decision makers who participated represented
a blend of small, medium and large organisations based in North America (CyberSource, 2008, p.
2).
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The data in Figure 43 suggest that online fraud was on an upward trend from 2000 to
2007. This, according to CyberSource (2008, p. 5), was due to, among other things,
the continuous growth of online transactions (approximately 15–20 per cent per
year), which creates the growing problem of online order screening and
simultaneously increases crime opportunities (differentiating fraudulent from nonfraudulent transactions). The upward trend in credit card fraud losses, as shown by
Figure 43, may also indicate that the US is vulnerable to online frauds such as cardnot-present fraud.
Other possible explanations on the changes of the landscape of identity theft trends in
the US are offered by Cebula et al. (2007). These authors assert that the upward trend
of identity theft in the US was contributed to by factors such as: the number of the
undocumented immigrants, the state unemployment rates, law enforcement, religious
belief and practice and the level of internet access (Cebula, Koch, & Unemori, 2007,
p. 5). The study by Cebula et al. (2007, p. 1) concludes that:
…ID theft rates tend to be an increasing function of the unemployment rate and
the proportion of the population concentrated in urban areas, and a decreasing
function of the relative amount of resources devoted to law enforcement and the
percentage of individuals who claim a religious affiliation. We also find ID theft
to be an increasing function of the extent of undocumented immigration. Internet
access, on the other hand, is found to negatively impact the incidence of ID theft,
underscoring the decisive role of immigration and economic variables as determinants of
ID theft. Educational attainment in the US does not seem to be a factor.

Although not explicitly mentioned by the FTC in its fraud reports, the fact that the
US has not shown any major coordinated efforts in implementing the chip and PIN
technology nationwide suggests that the country is vulnerable to, among others,
counterfeit card frauds (Johnson A. , 2008). Therefore, the US is also very likely to
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be the target place for the migration of offences from other countries with chip and
PIN technology243. This is evidenced in the fraud statistics of the APACS in the UK
(see Figure 44).
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Figure 44 Top-Five Countries for Losses ($US millions)from UK-Issued Credit
Card and Debit Card Fraud Abroad 2005–2007 (UK-Issued Cards or Card Details
Used fraudulently Overseas)
Source: APACS (2008b, p. 25).

A shown by Figure 44, the changes within the graphs may indicate changes of crime
opportunities in relation to the implementation of chip and PIN technology in the UK
(see also the following discussion on the trends of credit card fraud in the UK). In
relation to this matter, the APACS (2008b, p. 25) contends:

243

According to the APACS report, Fraud the Facts 2008, in 2007, losses from fraud committed
abroad on UK-issued cards in 1997–2007 were £207.6 million, within which £24.6 million were
from the US (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 24).
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The countries where fraud abroad is occurring on UK-issued cards have changed over
the past three years; there has been a marked decline in France and Spain as those
countries continue their chip and PIN rollout. Fraud on UK-issued cards in the USA,
however, has increased by 118% since 2005, to £24.6 million in 2007. It is now the top
country for fraud abroad committed on UK-issued cards. Italy and Australia have also
moved into the top three, with fraud at £9.6 million and £8.2 million respectively. As
more and more countries around the world progress their chip and PIN rollouts, it is
expected that fraud will continue to shift towards countries such as the US, which as yet
has no plans to implement chip and PIN.

The reasons behind US resistance to adopt chip and PIN technology are generally
cost-benefit considerations. The data and information from the Federal Reserve on
the spending behaviour of US consumers shows an increasing trend in the use of noncash payment instruments over the years244. The development and availability of the
internet in the US has also been a major driving factor behind consumers’ growing
use of payment instruments such as internet banking and online credit card
transaction245. The dominance of online transactions, according to Harzog (2009), has
forced the security system to focus more on online security in transactions246. In other
words, the participants in the US credit card industry generally still consider that the
sacrificed resources for having the smart card technology are not worth the expected
benefits thereof (Johnson A. , 2008). However, certain disadvantages have been
recently recognised regarding the resistance of the US to adopt smart card
technology, such as difficulties for US credit cardholders in making transactions in
smart card user countries such as UK (Johnson A. , 2008). As stated by Sullivan
(2008, pp. 55-56), recent re-evaluations of the costs and benefits of smart card
adoption have shown that it is now more economically beneficial for the US to adopt
244

The 2007 Federal Reserve Payments Study: Non-Cash Payment Trends in the United States: 2003–
2006. See Federal Reserve System (2007).
245
See Bell and Hogarth (2009); Newburger (2001); Day, Janus and Davis (2005); and Mediamark
Research Inc. (2006).
246
See the next chapter for more discussion on the trends of credit card fraud prevention in the US.
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the technology. Nevertheless, the fact that, for example, future implementation of
chip and PIN technology is not mentioned (at least explicitly) in the President’s
Identity Theft Task Force’s published national strategy247 suggests that the chip and
PIN technology will not be introduced in the US any time soon.
The study by Gordon et al. (2007) focuses on the identity of theft offenders, rather
than victims. Supported by the US Secret Service, the study concludes, among other
things, that offences in the identity theft category can occur anywhere within the US,
despite evidence of concentration in some areas (Gordon, Rebovich, Choo, &
Gordon, 2007, p. 65). The study also suggests that offenders fall into two broad
groups: those who offend due to the presence of the crime opportunities (isolated
events), and those who, demonstrated by their criminal histories, actively pursue
identity theft as part of their criminal career (Gordon, Rebovich, Choo, & Gordon,
2007, pp. 65-66). Based on the evidence found in the study, offenders’ crime
opportunities were enhanced by, among other things, the use of the internet and/or
other technological devices as well as, in some minor cases, the organised activities
of offenders (Gordon, Rebovich, Choo, & Gordon, 2007, p. 66). To add to the
knowledge about the victims from the previous victim-oriented studies (for example,
the FTC’s studies), the study by Gordon et al. also suggests that the typical identity
theft criminal took advantage of victims who did not know them personally (Gordon,
Rebovich, Choo, & Gordon, 2007, p. 66).

247

Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan. This documents national strategy, which lists the future
initiatives to combat identity theft in the US (discussed further in the next chapter) (President’s
Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a).
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In relation to the questions this chapter aims to answer, and from the above
discussions, the broad classification used in the US, particularly to describe identity
theft under which credit card fraud is categorised, did not explicitly show the most
common types of the offence. However, the evidence suggest that, in relation to
similar problems in other countries, despite the lack of explicit acknowledgement by
the available fraud data and statistics, the major threats of credit card fraud in the US
are most likely those of card-not-present fraud and counterfeit card fraud types.
In relation to card-not-present fraud, the growth and development of non-cash
payment instruments, including means to support them (such as the internet), which
provide benefits (such as efficiency) for the economy, have also contributed to the
increase of crime opportunity for offenders. Conversely, as discussed above, for
counterfeit card frauds, the threats thereof are believed to be among the results of the
lack of protection, mainly due to the slow progress of the smart card technology that
caused, among other things, offence migration from smart card user countries to the
US. The perception that the future benefits of the implementation of smart card
technology will not outweigh its costs is seen to be among the major factors behind
US resistance to accepting smart card technology.
Evidence also supports the argument that loopholes, such as weak identity
management practices (for example, in cases of unlawfully created credit card
accounts using stolen personal documents or information), including the problems in
safeguarding consumers’ personal identifiable information (for example, SSNs)
which were believed to have contributed to the prevalent incidents of data breaches in
the US also play a role in the rising trend of identity theft in general.
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PREVALENCE AND COSTS OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD IN THE UK
As previously discussed in this chapter, the growth and development of non-cash
payment instruments, particularly the credit card, which represents UK’s
transformation into a cashless society, has increased opportunities for crimes such as
credit card frauds to occur. In the UK, credit card fraud is considered, particularly by
the APACS, as a type of plastic card fraud248. Fraud is a sophisticated crime from
which even finding reliable information thereof (for example, financial costs) can be
very difficult (Brand & Price, 2000, p. 47).
Over the years, the APACS has been a major source of data and information
regarding plastic card fraud, and it continues to collect and publish data and
information on the prevalence and costs of plastic card fraud in the UK.
Unfortunately, despite all the information provided by the APACS in its fraud
reports, and based on a review of the APACS’s publicly available plastic card fraud
reports over the last five years (2003–2007), this study concludes that the APACS
does not separate credit card fraud from debit card fraud it its reports. In other words,
the losses from plastic card fraud mentioned by the APACS in its reports represent
the combined losses from the two types of cards (debit card and credit card).
In the report, Fraud The Facts 2008, the APACS establishes that the losses from
plastic card fraud In the UK for the year 2007 alone was $ 1048.31 million
(Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 5). From this amount, the
highest contributor was the card-not-present fraud category, with $ 569 million of
losses (see Table 16 Annual Plastic Card Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–
248

For example, see Association for Payment Clearing Services (2008b, p. 5).
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2007 (in USD Millions)). The data from the APACS (see Figure 45 Plastic Card
Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007 and Table 16 Annual Plastic Card
Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007 (in USD Millions)) reveal that the
losses from plastic card fraud have shown an upward trend over the period of 1997–
2007 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 5).
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Figure 45 Plastic Card Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007(in $US
Millions)
Source: APACS (2008b, p. 5).

Table 16 Annual Plastic Card Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007 (in
USD Millions)
Fraud
type

1997

199 1999
8

2000

Card
not
present

10.0

13.6 29.3

72.9

Counter
feit

20.3

26.8 50.3

107.1

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

95.7

110.1

122.1

150.8

183.2

212.7

290.5

160.4

148.5

110.6

129.7

96.8

98.6

144.3
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Fraud
type

1997

199 1999
8

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Lost/
Stolen

66.2

65.8 79.7

101.9

114.0

108.3

112.4

114.5

89.0

68.5

56.2

Card ID
Theft

13.1

16.8 14.4

17.4

14.6

20.6

30.2

36.9

30.5

31.9

34.1

Mail
NonReceipt

12.5

12.0 14.6

17.7

26.8

37.1

45.1

72.9

40.0

15.4

10.2

Total

122.0

135. 188.4
0

317.0

411.5

424.6

420.4

504.8

439.4

427.0

535.2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2005

2006

2007

Source: APACS (2008b, p. 6).
Fraud type

1997

1998

1999

19.6

26.6

57.4

142.8

187.5

215.7

239.2

295.4

358.9

416.7

569.1

39.8

52.5

98.5

199.6

314.2

290.9

216.7

254.1

189.6

193.2

282.7

129.7

128.9

156.1

34.1

223.3

212.2

220.2

224.3

174.4

134.2

110.1

Card ID Theft

25.7

32.9

28.2

34.7

28.6

40.4

59.2

72.3

59.8

62.5

66.8

Mail
NonReceipt
Total

24.5

23.5

28.6

621.0

52.5

72.7

88.4

142.8

78.4

30.2

20.0

239.2

264.5

368.9

1032.2

806.2

831.8

823.6

989.0

861.0

836.7

1048.7

Card
not
present
Counterfeit
Lost/Stolen

2000

2007

Table 16 suggests that the APACS classifies plastic card (debit and credit) fraud into
five major categories: card not present, counterfeit, lost/stolen, card ID theft and mail
non-receipt. Among the five categories, in 2007, card-not-present fraud appears to be
the most serious type of offence, with losses of $US569 million, which accounted for
54 per cent of the year’s total losses; followed by counterfeit card, with losses of
$US282.7 million, which accounted for 27 per cent of the year’s losses.
In card-not-present fraud, the offences include fraud conducted over the internet,
telephone, fax and mail order (Association for Payment Clearing Services, n.d.(d)).
According to the APACS (2008b, p. 9), this type of plastic card fraud commonly
involves the theft of card details, which are then used to make card-not-present
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purchases over the internet, by phone or by mail order. The huge increases in the
number of online transactions contribute to this offence being the most common type
of plastic card fraud in the UK (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p.
9). Over the last ten years, this type of plastic card fraud has also shown an upward
trend in losses (see Figure 46).
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Figure 46 Card-Not-Present Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007(in $US
Millions)
Source: APACS (2008b, p. 10).

The absence of both the card and the cardholder in a card-not-present transaction
creates two major challenges: first, merchants accepting these transactions are unable
to check the card’s physical security features to determine its authenticity; and
second, without a signature or PIN, operators have less certainty that the customer is
the legitimate cardholder (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 9).
In counterfeit card fraud, offenders create fake cards using unlawfully obtained card
details, usually from magnetic stripe cards or from chip and PIN cards that still have
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magnetic stripes249 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 11).
According to the APACS (n.d.(d)), a counterfeit card is one that has been printed,
embossed or encoded without permission from the card issuer, or one that has been
validly issued, but then altered or recoded. To obtain card details, offences commonly
involve skimming, a process where the data on a card’s magnetic stripe is
electronically copied, without permission, from the legitimate cardholder’s card onto
another card (Association for Payment Clearing Services, n.d.(d)).
Based on the report of the APACS, Fraud The Facts 2008, the losses from
counterfeit card fraud in 2007 were $US282.7 million, representing an increase of 46
per cent from the previous year’s figure (Association for Payment Clearing Services,
2008b, p. 12). The use of chip and PIN in the UK over the past few years, has made
creating and using fake cards much more difficult, and restricted the growth of
counterfeit card fraud in the country (Association for Payment Clearing Services,
2008b, p. 11).

249

The fake cards are commonly used in other countries which have not yet used chip and PIN cards
(Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 11).
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Figure 47 Counterfeit Card Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007(in $US
Millions)
Source: APACS (2008b, p. 12).

Lost and stolen card fraud generally occurrs when a card is physically stolen from the
owners’ wallet or home, or it is lost and then used by a criminal posing as the
legitimate owner, to obtain goods and services (Association for Payment Clearing
Services, n.d.(d)). According to the APACS (2008b, p. 13), lost and stolen cards
could be used in establishments that have not yet implemented chip and PIN
technology, and they could also be used to commit card-not-present fraud via a
phone, internet or mail order transactions. In 2007 losses from lost and stolen card
fraud were $US110.1 million, representing an 18 per cent decrease from the previous
year (2008b, p. 14). Figure 48 shows the losses from lost and stolen fraud over the
period of ten years.
As shown by Figure 48, losses in 2007 were the lowest in the period of 1997–2007.
This, according to the APACS (2008b, p. 11), was due to the introduction of the chip
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and PIN technology, by which it is difficult for an offender to use a stolen card
without knowing its PIN.
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Figure 48 Lost and Stolen Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007 (in $US
Millions)
Source: APACS (2008b, p. 14).

Card ID theft, according to the APACS (2008b, p. 17), occurs when an offender uses
an unlawfully obtained card or card details and other personal information to open or
take over an account held in someone else’s name. The APACS (2008b, p. 17)
classifies this offence into two categories: application fraud and account takeover
fraud. In application fraud, offenders use stolen or fake documents to open an
account using another persons’ name (Association for Payment Clearing Services,
2008b, p. 17). Offenders unlawfully obtain personal information through the theft of
original documents (such as utility bills and bank statements), or they simply use
counterfeited documents (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 17).
In account takeover fraud, an offender fraudulently gathers a victim’s personal
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information to unlawfully use their card (credit or debit) account (Association for
Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 17). As stated by the APACS (2008b, p. 17):
This involves a criminal fraudulently using another person’s credit or debit card account,
first by gathering information about the intended victim, then contacting their bank or
credit card issuer whilst masquerading as the genuine cardholder. The criminal will then
arrange for funds from the account to be transferred out of the account, or will change
the address on the account and ask for new or replacement cards to be sent to the
changed address.

During the period 1997–2007 this type of plastic card fraud has shown an upward
trend, with losses in 2007 at $US66.8 million, representing a seven per cent increase
from the previous year (2008b, p. 18). Figure 49 shows losses from card ID theft
during the period 1997–2007.
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Figure 49 Card ID Theft on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007 (in $US Millions)
Source: APACS (2008b, p. 18).

In the mail non-receipt fraud category, offences involve the cards being stolen
(intercepted) in transit, once they have been sent out to the legitimate cardholders
from the issuing banks or financial institutions (Association for Payment Clearing
Services, n.d.(d)). According to the APACS (2008b, p. 16), properties with
communal letterboxes (such as flats and student halls) as well as people who do not
230

get their mail redirected when they change addresses, are particularly at risk of this
type of plastic card fraud. Losses from this type of plastic card fraud in 2007 were
$US20 million, representing a 34 per cent decrease from the previous year
(Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 15). Over the period 1997–
2007, the losses from this type of plastic card fraud were at their highest in 2004, at
$US142.8 million (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 16), before
they decreased to $US20 million in 2007 (see Figure 50). As stated by the APACS
(2008b, p. 15), the main cause of this decrease was the improvement in the credit
card delivery system250 in addition to fewer cards being sent to cardholders recently,
which reduced the opportunities for offenders to intercept cards. Within the
improvement in the credit card delivery process is the procedure of sending the PINs
separately from the cards, which makes it difficult for offenders to use the stolen
cards without knowing their PINs (Association for Payment Clearing Services,
2008b, p. 15).

250

The UK banking industry, in cooperation with Royal Mail and other card delivery organisations,
continuously monitor card losses, identify fraud hotspots and take preventative action (Association
for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 15). Card companies use secure couriers to deliver to
high-risk postcodes, or cards may be sent to a customer’s branch for personal collection
(Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 15). Card companies may also require some
customers to call their card companies to activate their cards before they can be used (Association
for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 15).
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Based on the statistics of the APACS, from 1997 to 2007, although the major types of
card (credit and debit) fraud remained the same, some changes in the percentage
distributions of the losses occurred. Figure 51, Figure 52 and Figure 53 show
comparisons of the trends of plastic card fraud in 1997, 2002 and 2007 (by
percentage of total losses).
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Source: Adapted from APACS (2008b, p. 6).
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Based on the data in Figure 51, Figure 52 and Figure 53, in 1997 lost/stolen fraud
was the most common type of plastic card fraud in the UK, with losses of 54 per cent
of the total losses of the year. However, in 2002 counterfeit card fraud emerged as the
most common type of plastic card fraud in the UK, contributing 35 per cent of the
total losses of the year. In 2007 the most common type of plastic card fraud in the
UK was card-not-present fraud, with losses of 54 per cent of the year’s total losses.
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The changes in the landscape of the UK plastic fraud were largely attributable to the
implementation of chip and PIN technology251 and the country’s transformation into
a cashless society252. In response to the implementation of chip and PIN technology,
there appears to be offence displacement to different types of plastic card fraud253
(for example, from lost/stolen or counterfeit card fraud to card-not-present fraud) 254,
as well as to different countries without or with less protection of chip and PIN
technology255. The APACS, in its press release of 12 March 2008, states that
(Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008a):
2007 card fraud figures released today (12 March 2008) by APACS, the UK payments
association, show that total card fraud losses rose by 25 per cent in the past year to
£535.2m. A key driver behind this is the 77 per cent increase (up £90.5m) in fraud
committed overseas by criminals using stolen UK card details — which typically occurs
in those countries yet to upgrade to chip and PIN. Fraud abroad now accounts for over
one third (39 per cent) of total card fraud losses.

From the above APACSstatement, the theft of UK card details is still possible
becuase, despite the high level of security of the chip and PIN system (the smart card
system in the UK), some loopholes remain, one of which is the use of magnetic stripe
system to allow cardholders to make transactions in countries without smart card
technology (Everett, n.d.) 256. The magnetic stripe system in a chip and PIN card is
also used as an alternative means of authorising transactions whenever a chip cannot
be used (for example, broken chip), and is known as a ‘fallback’ mechanism257. By
251

See the APACS press release, 8 March 2005 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2005).
See previous discussion on UK payments system.
253
See Chapter 3 for more discussion on crime displacement.
254
See the APACS press release, 8 March 2005 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2005).
255
See the APACS press releases, 19 March 2009 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2009a)
and 8 March 2005 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2005).
256
More discussion on the chip and PIN system is in the next chapter.
257
See Visa International Operating Regulations: Volume I — General Rules (Visa Inc., 2008a, p.
354) and LogicGroup (n.d., p. 8).
252
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exploiting this particular loophole, an offender can create a counterfeit magnetic
stripe credit card from a stolen chip and PIN card (or card details) and use it overseas
or over the internet. Generally, the full protection of smart card technology can only
be achieved when the technology is adopted worldwide (Everett, n.d.). As shown by
Table 17 and Figure 54, starting from 2004, when chip and PIN technology began to
be implemented, plastic card frauds (on UK-issued cards) committed in the UK
experienced a downward trend, while the same offences committed overseas were on
an upward trend.
Table 17 Annual Plastic Card Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007 (all
Figures in $US Millions)
Fraud
type
UK Fraud
Fraud
Abroad
Total

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

181.80

196.11

262.72

418.07

534.83

576.76

619.66

807.74

698.62

607.13

641.80

57.21

68.37

106.18

202.77

271.14

255.07

203.94

181.22

162.21

229.41

406.71

239.01

264.48

368.90

620.84

805.97

831.83

823.61

988.95

860.83

836.54

1048.51

Source: APACS (2008b, p. 6).

UK’s transformation into a cashless society has also contributed to increasing crime
opportunities for plastic card fraud offenders. The APACS, in its press release of 12
March 2008, states that (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008a):
…these losses have to be seen in the context of huge increases in the amount of people
shopping online and over the phone, and the numbers of shops offering telephone or
online shopping — from 2001 to 2006 card-not-present fraud losses rose by 122 per
cent; over the same time period, the total value of online shopping transactions alone
increased by 358 per cent (up from £6.6 billion in 2001 to £30.2 billion in 2006).
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Figure 54 Plastic Card Fraud Losses by Locations UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007
(all Figures in $US Millions)
Source: Adapted from APACS (2008b, p. 6).

In conclusion, in relation to the questions this chapter aims to answer, and based on
the above discussions and evidenced by the fraud data and statistics in the UK, the
current most common and most costly types of credit card fraud are card-not-present
fraud and counterfeit card fraud. The emergence of card-not-present fraud as the
current most common and most costly type of credit card fraud was largely
influenced by the implementation of smart card technology, which reduces crime
opportunities for, among others, counterfeit card offenders. This resulted in, among
other things, offence displacement to the relatively less-affected type of offence:
counterfeit card fraud. The data and information from the APACS also indicate the
possible migration of offences to other countries with less protection from smart card
technology. In relation to counterfeit card fraud, regardless of the implementation of
smart card technology (which, in theory, would make forging credit card more
difficult), the offence category remains high in prevalence and costs. This problem
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was believed to have been caused by offence displacement to other countries where
counterfeit card frauds were easier to commit.

PREVALENCE AND COSTS OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD IN AUSTRALIA
Just as with other countries that follow the world’s transformation into cashless
societies, Australia also has to deal with the problem of credit card fraud among the
consequences of the development of non-cash payment instruments in the country.
However, despite the rising concerns on the problem of payment frauds, including
credit card frauds, in the world, based on the report of the Payments System Board
(PSB), Annual Report 2008, Australia had relatively low payment instruments fraud
rates258 in 2007 compared with rates overseas (Payments System Board, 2008, p. 12).
As stated by the Payments System Board (2008, p. 12):
The fraud rate for Australian-issued credit and charge cards increased considerably from
around 37 cents for each $AU1,000 transacted in 2006 to the current level of 44 cents
per $AU1, 000 transacted. This increase is mainly attributable to a rise in fraud related
to card-not-present transactions.

The Payments System Board (2008, pp. 12-13) also states that:
Taking debit and credit cards together, the weighted-average fraud rate was 28 cents for
each $AU1,000 transacted during 2007, compared with 24 cents during 2006. Despite
the increase, this fraud rate remains relatively low by international standards; for
example, it is less than one third of that experienced in the United Kingdom over the
same period where high card-not-present fraud was experienced in conjunction with the
introduction of chip and PIN security for point-of-sale transactions.

258

For identity related fraud, the SIRCA report estimated that the cost thereof in 2002 was $US868.2
million with financial institutions (for example, banks, utility organisations, retailers and
government welfare agencies) as the predominant target organisations (Cuganesan & Lacey, 2003).
Based on the study by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), victims of bank card fraud in
Australia all suffered financial losses (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008, p. 11). 26% reported
losses between $US78 - $US395, 25% bore losses of less than $US79, and 3% lost more than
$7,893 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008, p. 11).
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As a major source of data and information on payment frauds, the Australian
Payments Clearing Association (APCA) has been conducting data collection since
2006259 on different types of payment frauds. In its reports, the APCA focuses on
cheques and plastic cards, which are classified into three categories: cheque fraud,
debit card fraud and credit and charge card fraud. Table 18 shows the number and
value of fraudulent transactions in 2007 based on the database of the APCA.

Figure 55 Fraud on Australian-Issued Cards (Per Cent of Transaction Value, 12
Months Ended)
Source: Payments System Board (2008, p. 13).

259

See the APCA media release, 10 November 2006 (Australian Payments Clearing Association,
2006, p. 1).
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Value ($US)
Fraud
Transactions

No. of Fraud
Transactions

Instruments

1,561

11,296,520

Debit
Card

44,823

11,357,334

Credit
and
Charge
Card

326,186

Total

372,570

In Basis Points

In Basis Points

1,420,250 0.0004

Cheque

Fraud as % of
Total Value ($US)
of Transactions

Total Value ($US)
of All
Transactions
($ Millions)
Fraud as % of
Total
No.
of
Transactions

411,563

of

Total No.
of
All
Transactions
(Thousands)

Table 18 Fraud Perpetrated on Australian Issued Payment Instruments (1 January
2007–31 December 2007) 260

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Card Schemes and Australian Payments Clearing Association,
cited in Australian Payments Clearing Association (2008b).

Table 18 shows that the APCA, in is fraud reports, considers a credit card and a
charge card as falling under the same category, despite the fact that the two are not
exactly the same261. Table 18 also shows that in 2007 credit and charge card frauds
were the most common type of payment fraud in the country, with losses of over
$US88.4 million. Additionally, since the APCA published its first payment fraud
statistics in 2006, credit and charge card fraud was always the most common type of
payment frauds, and losses thereof have risen continuously (see also Table 19 and
Figure 56) alongside the continuous decrease in the losses from cheque fraud.

260

Updated December 2008 (in $AU). For post 2007 reference, see Table 50, Table 51, Table 52 and
Figure 70 and Figure 71 in the appendices.
261
A charge card provides a non-revolving credit line that enables its holder to make purchases (and
possibly cash advances), but it offers no extended credit, and thus the full amount of the incurred
debts must be settled at the end of a specified period (Reserve Bank of Australia, n.d.(c)).
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Table 19 Value ($AU) of Fraudulent Transactions 2006–2007262
Instruments

2006 (1 January 2006 to
31 December 2006) in $AU

2007 (1 January 2007 to
31 December 2007) in $AU

Cheque

32,399,347

14,312,074

Debit Card

14,393,443

14,389,122

Credit
and
85,215,615
Charge Card

112,143,145

Total

140,844,340

132,008,405

Source: Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b).
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Figure 56 Trends in Fraudulent Transactions 2006–2007 (in $US)
Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b).

In terms of credit and charge card fraud category, the APCA classifies this offence
into

six

categories:

lost/stolen,

never

received,

fraudulent

application,

counterfeit/skimming, card not present (CNP) and other. Table 20 provides
descriptions for these categories.

262

Updated December 2008 (in $AU). Until December 2007, the APCA had produced four
publications on fraud perpetrated on cheques and plastic cards to cover four periods: 1 July 2005
to 30 June 2006, 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2006, 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, and 1
January 2007 to 31 December 2007. However, to avoid confusion in highlighting the prevalence
of credit card fraud in Australia, only the statistics for the periods 1 January 2006 to 31 December
2006 and 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2007 are analysed in this study.
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Table 20 Types of Credit and Charge Card Fraud
No. Types

Definitions

1.

Lost/Stolen Card

The fraud results from the loss or theft of an existing card,
and a transaction has taken place without the cardholder’s
consent or authority.

2.

Card Never Received

A card is intercepted (stolen) during delivery to the customer
and then used by the offender to make transactions.

3.

Fraudulent Application An offender who applies for card accounts uses a fictitious
identity, someone else’s identity or provides false
information during the application process.

4.

Counterfeit/Skimming,

5.

Card Not
(CNP)

6.

Other

An offender uses altered or illegally reproduced cards,
including the replication/alteration of the magnetic stripe and
changes to the details on the face of the card with intent for
fraudulent purposes. Generally, skimming is a form of
magnetic stripe counterfeiting in which an offender copies
the magnetic stripe track information (including card
verification value, or CVV) from a valid card before
encoding it on a counterfeit or stolen card and then uses the
card for making purchases.

Present An offender uses account information without the possession
of the physical card, via phone, mail, internet and so on,
without permission from the cardholder. Included in this
category is fraud in which a card should normally be present
(for example, in a retail transaction), but for some reasons, a
merchant chooses to accept the transaction based on a card
number only, which turns out to be a fraudulent one.
Includes frauds that cannot be categorised under any of the
above categories. For example, the use of imprints of cards at
merchants, or the use of an existing account without the
cardholder’s consent, in which the offender gains access to
the account through means such as fraudulent change of
address or fraudulent re-issuance request (not lost or stolen).

Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2008b).

Altogether, the six categories in Table 20 account for total losses of $US88.4 million,
in 2007. Table 21 and Figure 57 show the statistics of the six credit and charge card
fraud categories in 2007.
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Table 21 Credit and Charge Card Fraud Perpetrated in Australia and Overseas on
Australian-Issued Cards (1 January 2007 to 31 December 2007)
Australia
Category

Number

Lost/Stolen

Overseas
Value
($US)

Number

Total
Value
($US )

Number

Value
($US)

45,820

9,379,959

14,274

4,338,985

60,094

13,718,945

Never Received

9,588

2,275,044

848

179,833

10,436

2,454,878

Fraudulent Application

4,999

2,225,637

613

215,296

5,612

2,454,878

Counterfeit/Skimming

23,152

11,560,018

27,276

14,349,451

50,428

25,909,469

(CNP)

57,512

15,684,357

132,727

26,775,324

190,239

42,459,680

Other

7,610

1,239,449

1,767

291,230

9,377

1,530,679

Total

148,681

42,364,464

177,505

46,150,118

326,186

88,528,529

Card Not Present

Source: Australian Payments Clearing Association (2008b).
Other
2%
Lost /
Stolen
15%
Card Not
Present
(CNP)
48%

Never
Received
3%
Fraudulent
Application
3%

Counterfeit
/ Skimming
29%

Figure 57 Credit Card and Charge Card Fraud Losses in 2007 Split by Types (in
Percentages of Total Losses)
Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2008b).

Table 22 and Figure 58 show that card-not-present fraud is currently the most serious
payment card fraud in Australia, and that this type accounts for over $US41.8
million of losses (representing 48 per cent of the year’s total losses), followed by
counterfeit/skimming, with losses of nearly $US26 million (representing 29 per cent
of the year’s total losses). Based on the APCA’s payment fraud statistics, over the
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past two years, card-not-present fraud was the dominant type of payment card fraud
in Australia (see Figure 58 ).
Table 22 Values ($US) of Credit and Charge Card Fraud Perpetrated (in Australia
and Overseas) on Australian-Issued Cards (1 July 2005 to 31 December 2007)
Categories
Lost/Stolen
Never Received
Fraudulent Application
Counterfeit/Skimming
Card Not Present (CNP)
Other

2006
11,444,592
3,277,535
3,896,113
22,632,866
25,092,252
917,327

2007
13,718,945
2,454,878
2,440,932
25,909,469
42,459,680
1,530,679

Total

67,260,685

88,514,584

Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b)
45,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
Lost/Stolen

30,000,000

Never Received
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Fraudulent Application
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Counterfeit/Skimming

15,000,000

Card Not Present (CNP)

10,000,000

Other

5,000,000
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Figure 58 Trends of Credit and Charge Card Fraud Perpetrated (in Australia and
Overseas) on Australian-Issued Cards 2006–2007 (in $US)
Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b).
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Table 23 Credit Card and Charge Card Fraud Perpetrated on Australian-Issued
Cards Split by Locations (in Australia or Overseas)263

Category

2006

2007

(1 January to 31 December)
In Australia
($US)
Overseas ($US)

(1 January to 31 December)
In Australia
Overseas
($US)
($US)

Lost/Stolen
Never Received
Fraudulent Application
Counterfeit/Skimming
Card Not Present (CNP)
Other

7,941,124
2,662,666
3,114,286
9,564,653
12,145,746
639,903

3,503,468
614,869
781,828
13,068,213
12,946,506
277,424

9,379,959
2,275,044
2,225,637
11,560,018
15,684,357
1,239,449

4,338,985
179,833
215,296
14,349,451
26,775,324
291,230

Total

36,068,377

31,192,308

42,364,465

46,150,119

Source: Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b).

As shown by the data in Table 22, Figure 58 and Table 23, the highest losses of credit
and charge card fraud are in the category of card-not-present fraud, which, according
to Mr Chris Hamilton264 of the APCA, is consistent with the trends reported in the
UK and the Asia-Pacific region over the last few years265. This aligns with the
world’s transformation into cashless society, which gives incentives to online
transactions to grow and prosper and simultaneously offers more online crime
opportunities.
Counterfeit/skimming fraud, with the second-highest losses, also shows an upward
trend in the two-year period. This was very likely caused by the fact that Australia is
yet to fully migrate to chip and PIN technology, and this makes it more vulnerable as
a target for offenders from other countries already adopting the technology.
According to the Payments System Board (2008, p. 4):

263

In $AU.
Chief executive officer of the APCA.
265
See the APCA media release, 30 May 2008 (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2008d, p.
1).
264
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The introduction of chip and PIN in some countries has meant that fraudsters are
increasingly being driven to countries that have not yet implemented this technology; for
example, following migration to chip and PIN in the United Kingdom, there has been an
increase in fraud committed in Australia on UK — issued cards. In contrast, there has
been a decline in fraud committed on UK — issued cards266 in countries that have
migrated to chip and PIN.

Similar to the case of the US, the slow adoption of the chip and PIN technology in
Australia seems to be caused by costs and benefits considerations, because, according
to Mr Chris Hamilton267 of the APCA, unlike other countries (such as the UK),
Australia does not have the same extent of fraud to stimulate a rush to use chip and
PIN technology (Tung, 2008). Without any mandate to implement chip and PIN
technology in Australia, businesses (such as retailers, banks and card issuers) will roll
out the technology only when the business case makes sense for them (Tung, 2008).
A recent initiative to combat fraud in Australia is the Pen or PIN program, initiated
on 4 June 2008, by which cardholders may choose between signature and PIN to
authorise their transactions268 (Tripodi, 2009). Many still believe that this initiative is
no substitute the protection from the chip and PIN technology with its two-factor
authentication (the chip card and the PIN) (Tripodi, 2009). This is because the Pen or
PIN program focuses more on convenience (for example, faster transaction time for
the cardholders), rather than security269.
Recently, despite the statistically low fraud rate within the country, concern has been
rising about the future of credit card safety in Australia, because many countries have
now fully implemented the chip and PIN technology. Even Nigeria, with less
266

See Association for Payment Clearing Services (2008b, p. 25).
Chief executive officer of the APCA.
268
Discussed further in the next chapter.
269
See the media release of the Pen or PIN program (Pen or PIN, 2008b).
267
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advanced banking system (compared to Australia) is now prepared to adopt the
technology (Grey, 2009). This will leave Australia even more vulnerable to offence
migration in the future (Calligeros, 2009). The number of chip and PIN supporters
has been growing, as indicated by, among other things, the introduction of chip and
PIN credit cards by major banks such as ANZ and NAB to the Australian market,
regardless of the additional financial burden thereof270. However, credit cards are
only a part of the system, and without the support from other parties (such as
merchants by, for example, providing chip and PIN compliance EFTPOS terminals
for using the cards), optimum consumer protection can never be achieved. In
Australia, although thousands of new machines (for ‘swiping’ or using the chip and
PIN cards) are already in circulation, the Australian Bankers Association argues that
it will be some time before all (or at least the majority) ATMs and EFTPOS outlets in
the country comply with the chip and PIN cards (Calligeros, 2009).
In relation to the questions this chapter seeks to answer, and based on the above
discussions, the most common and most costly types of credit card fraud in Australia
are card-not-present fraud and counterfeit card fraud. While the former was believed
to be contributed to by, among other things, the growth and development of non-cash
payment instruments (for example, online credit card transactions), the latter was
likely to have been contributed to by the slow adoption of chip and PIN technology,
which caused offence migration from other countries that had already fully adopted
the technology to Australia.

270

See ANZ (2009) and National Australia Bank (2007).
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PREVALENCE AND COSTS OF CREDIT CARD FRAUD
IN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND AUSTRALIA: A COMPARISON
As mentioned previously, the limited data and information on credit card fraud that
creates challenges in crime prevention strategy formulation can be addressed by
creating prevention measures that deal with most (if not all) possible factors that may
have contributed to the occurrence or changes of the offences in question. The
following discussions analyse, based on the relevant literature, the possible factors
that may have shaped the trends of credit card fraud in the three benchmark countries.
These were because they are based on the available data and statistics with a focus on
the most common and costly types of credit card fraud.

SUMMARY OF THE ‘END RESULTS’
Based on the above discussions, the major differences between credit card fraud
offences in the three benchmark countries is the way they are classified by
institutions such as the Federal Trade Commission (US), The APACS (UK) and the
ACPA (Australia). As discussed above, credit card fraud is classified differently in
the three countries. In the US, credit card fraud is categorised as a type of identity
theft, in the UK it is a type of plastic card fraud and in Australia it is a payment card
fraud.
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Table 24 Classifications of Credit Card Fraud in the US, UK and Australia
The US
The UK
Australia
(FTC’s Classification) (APACS’s Classification) (APCA’s Classification)
New Accounts
Existing Accounts
Unspecified

Card not present
Counterfeit
Lost/Stolen
Card ID Theft
Mail Non-Receipt

Card not present
Counterfeit/Skimming
Lost/Stolen
Fraudulent Application
Never Received
Other

Source: See Table 15 Credit Card Fraud in the US, Table 16 Annual Plastic Card Fraud Losses on
UK-Issued Cards 1997–2007 (in USD Millions) and Table 20 Types of Credit and Charge Card
Fraud.

From the above different classifications of credit card fraud in the three countries, the
US classification appears to be the simplest, with only three categories, while those
of the UK and Australia are more complex, with more categories involved. The
APACS and the APCA have similar ways of classifying credit card fraud, with just
minor differences. The APACS (UK) includes identity theft as part of credit card
fraud, which includes application fraud and account takeover fraud; while the APCA
(Australia) considers application fraud (or fraudulent application) to be a separate
type of credit card fraud, and puts account takeover under the category of other fraud.
Based on the above discussions on the fraud categories in the three benchmark
countries, and despite their differences, the credit card fraud classifications of the
three countries generally describe similar offences. While the FTC’s classification
does not explicitly mention all other categories identified by the APACS and the
APCA, offences on the APACS and the APCA’s lists involve either new account
frauds (for example, fraudulent applications using fake identities or other people’s
identities) or existing account frauds (for example, stealing other peoples’ credit card
information). This suggests that the three countries generally face relatively similar
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types of credit card fraud and that they can learn from one another to solve the
problem. Finally, although no explanation is in the FTC’s fraud reports, based on the
fraud reports of the APACS and the APCA, the most serious types of credit card
fraud are card-not-present fraud and counterfeit card fraud, and the statistics of the
APACS and the APCA list the two as the most common and the most costly of all
credit card fraud types.

BEHIND THE ‘END RESULTS’
The statistical figures discussed above are the end financial results of, among other
things, the occurrence and changes of crime within a given period of time in given
locations (the US, the UK and Australia). In other words, in order for such figures to
arrive as they appear in the statistics, several events (for example, credit card fraud
offences) must occur beforehand. For the cases of the US, the UK and Australia, the
focus of the following discussions is on discussing the major events that may have
caused card-not-present fraud and counterfeit card fraud to become the most common
and costly types of credit card fraud, so far as the statistics are concerned.
The official fraud data and information from institutions such as the FTC, the
APACS and the APCA suggest that credit card frauds, like other crimes, have
adapted to, among other things, the changes in crime opportunities caused by various
events, such as the implementation of new crime prevention measures. From the data
and information from the APACS, the introduction of the chip and PIN technology,
since its first trial in Northampton in May 2003 and then its national rollout in
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October 2003271, has been a major influence on the changes of the trends in credit
card fraud in the UK, as well as other countries such as the US and Australia. These
changes were mainly due to the reduction of crime opportunities for credit card fraud
offenders to commit ‘offline’ fraud, particularly counterfeit card fraud (Walters,
2006). The two-factor authentication (the card and the PIN)272 as the major security
features of chip and PIN technology, makes the creation of fake credit cards very
difficult, due to the existence of the chip element in the card. Additionally, even in
cases where cards are stolen (lost/stolen fraud) or intercepted during delivery (mail
non-receipt fraud), offenders are unlikely to be able to use them in the absence of
their PINs, which are sent separately to the cardholders (Association for Payment
Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 15).
This crime prevention step was then taken up by other countries in Europe and other
parts of the world, particularly those with counterfeit card fraud problems such as
Malaysia (Salek, 2008). In 2004, a year after the initiation of the chip and PIN
program, the fraud statistics in the UK unexpectedly showed a rising trend in cardnot-present fraud as well as counterfeit card fraud, which raised questions about the
effectiveness of the chip and PIN program (Association for Payment Clearing
Services, 2005). Based on the statement from the APACS, the alleged cause of the
increase in both types of offences was that offenders tried to maximise their profits

271
272

See Association for Payment Clearing Services (n.d.(c)).
The chip ensures that the card is authentic and the PIN ensures that the cardholder is genuine (The
Logic Group, n.d., p. 6). Three areas can be used for authentication: something that ‘you know’
(for example, password and PIN), something that ‘you own’ (for example, credit card), and
something that ‘you are’ (for example, fingerprint) (Kemshall & Underwood, 2007, p. 4). The twofactor authentication’s principle utilises two of these three areas (Kemshall & Underwood, 2007, p.
4).
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from the remaining magnetic stripe cards while shifting their offences to card-notpresent fraud to find an alternative source of unlawful income (Association for
Payment Clearing Services, 2005). Recent statements from the APACS suggest the
possibility that UK credit card fraud offenders are also shifting their offences
overseas to find ‘softer targets’ for their offences, such as the US and Australia,
which have not fully adopted chip and PIN technology (Association for Payment
Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 23). For example, indications have recently emerged that
UK-based global credit card fraud syndicates have targeted, among others, the
tourism industry in Botswana (Sunday Standard, 2009). The offences were believed
to have started in the UK, where offenders established their credit card cloning
operations, and ended in Ghanaian commercial banks, where the unlawfully obtained
money from Botswana was deposited (Sunday Standard, 2009). In 2009, multiple
credit card fraud offences in different countries were believed to have been connected
to similar offences in the UK, where unaware cardholders had their card details used
to withdraw money from countries including Australia, Canada, Ghana, India,
Thailand, Malaysia and the US (The Economic Times, 2009). The card details were
allegedly stolen when the cardholders used their cards at a Shell petrol pump on
Uppingham Road in Leicester, and the police then launched an inquiry into the case
(The Economic Times, 2009). As more countries adopt chip and PIN technology, the
last countries to do so will likely become easier targets for credit card fraud offenders
(Calligeros, 2009).
The above overview of how the implementation of chip and PIN technology was
believed to have changed the landscape of credit card fraud trends (at least in parts)
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also indicates the ability of offenders to adapt to new environments. Recently, the
adaptability of offenders to the new crime prevention measures seems to be greater,
due to, among other things, the development of information technology such as the
internet. Card-not-present fraud, for example, does not require the presence of an
offender on the crime scene, and thus this method reduces the risk of apprehension by
the authorities. As argued by Holtfreter (2005, p. 266):
Over time, the perpetrators of consumer fraud have hidden themselves behind
technology, although their methods increasingly resemble street criminals. Consumer
fraud has become a borderless crime, with networks of offenders striking across
international waters, never to have face-to-face contact with their victims.

The case of Shadowcrew, an underground cybercriminal group273 that provided a
‘one-stop online marketplace’ for credit card fraud offenders, is an example of the
exploitation of information technology to facilitate fraudulent activities (United
States Department of Justice, 2004). The group used their websites to promote and
facilitate various offences, such as electronic theft of personal identifying
information, credit card and debit card fraud and the production and sale of false
identification documents (United States Secret Service, 2004). According to Peretti
(2009, pp. 380-386), cybercriminal groups such as Shadowcrew, Carderplanet, The
International Advancement of Criminal Activity (IAACA), The Theft Service,
Cardersmarket and CCpowerForums have been seen to engage in ‘carding’274

273

274

Defined by Choo and Smith (2008, p. 40) as an organised criminal group of like-minded
individuals, who usually know each other only online, but are involved in an organisational
structure working collectively towards a common goal, because the internet makes it far easier to
meet and plan activities.
The use of account numbers and counterfeit identity documents to undertake identity theft and
defraud banks and retailers (United States Department of Justice, 2004).
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activities by, among other things, establishing internet forums that provide supports
for card fraud offences, including275:



tutorials on different types of carding-related activities



private and public message posting, enabling members to buy and sell blocks of
stolen account information and other goods and services



hyperlinks for hacking tools and downloadable computer codes to assists in
network intrusions



other exploits, such as source codes for phishing webpages



lists of proxies276



areas designated for naming and banning individuals who steal from others.

In relation to the existence of underground market for credit card details, Wilson
(2008, p. 5) believes that supply and demand conditions exist for stolen identities,
including credit card details, and are now booming. On the supply side, organised
cybercriminal groups provide the ID data; whereas on the demand side, other
offenders use such unlawfully obtained information to perpetrate card-not-present
fraud easily (Wilson S. , 2008, p. 5). Ester and Benzmüller (2009, p. 2) contend that
the current development of underground economy in which stolen credit card
information is traded includes the establishment of all elements of a ‘genuine’
economy such as producers, traders, service providers, fraud offenders, and
275

276

Peretti (2009, pp. 380-386), with reference to United States v Warren, No. 3:06-cr-00372-HEH-1
(E.D. Va. 2007) [hereinafter Warren Indictment]. See United States District Court for The Eastern
District of Virginia (2006).
Refers to ‘proxy servers’, which are computers that store copies of files and data normally held on
a slow server, and so allow users to access files and data quickly and are often used as a firewall
between an intranet in a company and the public internet (Collin, 2004, pp. 269-270).
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customers. The underground economy, just as the real economy is also subject to
economic pressure and it often adapts the real world practices to cope with its needs
(Luvender, 2010, p. 4; Symantec, 2008, p. 16). Among such adaptations is the socalled Fraud as a Service (FaaS) infrastructure which resembles the Software as a
Service (SaaS) used by corporate IT managers in satisfying on demand software
needs (Luvender, 2010, p. 4).

Figure 59 Fraud as a Service (FaaS) in Underground Economy
Source: FirstData, cited in Luvender277 (2010, p. 4).

Just like the SaaS, the FaaS provides users with fast and efficient way to access a
wide range of applications as well as satisfying the need for advancing knowledge of
and control over their technology infrastructure (Luvender, 2010, p. 4). The heart of
the FaaS is the fraud forums where participants (individuals, groups and
organizations) engage in trading fraudulent goods and services (Luvender, 2010, p.
4). They also offer their skills as well as purchase and sell stolen goods (Luvender,
277

Rick Van Luvender is the Director of First Data InfoSec Incident Response Center.
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2010, p. 4). Ester and Benzmüller (2009, p. 2) argues that the forum is also known as
‘boards’ which offers a venue for discussions about botnets, spam, data theft, to name
a few.
According to the study by Symantec Corp. on the underground economy (July 2007
to June 2008), credit card information is the most requested product in the
underground economy servers with 31% of total requests in the study period
(Symantec, 2008, p. 16). This is so because as a fraud product, credit cards are low
cost to acquire yet may yield high profit (Ester & Benzmüller, 2009, p. 3; Symantec,
2008, p. 17). In practice, the numerous ways to steal credit card information (for
example, phishing, skimming, and database hacking) has made credit card data
plentiful and relatively easy to convert to cash (Ester & Benzmüller, 2009, p. 3;
Symantec, 2008, p. 17). Therefore, it is of no surprise that Symantec’s study finds
that the from total advertised goods value of $US276 million, 59% are from credit
card information (Symantec, 2008, p. 27).
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Table 25 Goods and Services Available for Sale in Underground Economy Servers,
by Category
Rank for
Sale

Rank
Requested

Category

1
2

1
3

Credit card information278
Financial accounts279

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2
4
5
7
6
9
8
10

Spam and phishing information 280
Withdrawal service281
Identity theft information282
Server accounts283
Compromised computers284
Website accounts285
Malicious applications286
Retail accounts287

Percentage
For Sale
31%
20%

Percentage
Requested

19%
7%
7%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%

21%
13%
10%
4%
4%
2%
2%
1%

24%
18%

Source: Symantec (2008, p. 17).

278

279

280
281

282
283
284
285

286
287

Including: credit card number; credit cards with CVV2; and credit card dumps (information
contained within the magnetic stripe of a card) (Symantec, 2008, pp. 16-17).
Including: bank account numbers; online payment services; online currency accounts; and online
stock accounts (Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
Including: email addresses; email passwords; scams; and mailers (Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
Including cash outs and drops that are used to withdraw money and items from purchases
(Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
Including full identities and Social Security numbers (Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
For file transfers and virtual networks (Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
Including: hacked computers, bot-infected computers, and shells (Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
Including: online accounts for access to specific websites (for example, social networking sites)
(Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
Including web-based attack tools and malicious code (Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
Including gift cards for online stores and online auction accounts (Symantec, 2008, p. 17).
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Table 26 Value of Advertised Goods in Underground Economy Servers as a
Percentage of Total, by Category
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Category
Credit card information
Identity Theft Information
Server accounts
Financial accounts

Percentage
59%
16%
10%
8%

Spam and phishing information
Financial theft tools
Compromised computers
Malicious applications
Website accounts
Online gaming accounts

6%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%

Source: Symantec (2008, p. 17).

The ways consumers can be attacked by offenders range from the most
technologically sophisticated schemes (such as hacking into merchants’ databases) to
low-tech means (such as dumpster diving288 and social engineering289). A
cybercriminal group allegedly led by a former US Secret Service informant, Albert
Gonzales, was uncovered in 2008 and was considered to be the single largest and
most complex identity theft case ever prosecuted in the US, involving the theft of
over 40 million credit card and debit card numbers (Fox News, 2008). The group was
believed to have targeted retailers such as TJX Companies, BJs Wholesale Club,
OfficeMax Market, Barnes and Noble, Sports Authority, Forever 21 and DSW
(Lemos, 2008). According to the US Attorney General, Michael Mukasey, the
offences were committed by means of, among other things, hacking retailers’ systems
via wireless networks and by remote capture of sensitive information (such as card
288

289

An identity theft method where the offenders dig through rubbish bins and other discarded matter
to find useful personal information (Wisconsin Identity Theft Lawyers, 2009).
A method of obtaining sensitive information about a company through the exploitation of human
nature (Solomon, Barrett, & Broom, 2005, p. 17). Also the process of encouraging someone else
to carry out a task (normally requiring more access to a particular resource) on the offender’s
behalf (Solomon, Barrett, & Broom, 2005, p. 272).
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numbers) by using certain programs (Lemos, 2008). Another credit card fraud
scheme in Ireland in 2008 was believed to have been committed by means of, among
other things, social engineering, where offenders managed to steal over 20,000 pieces
of credit card and debit card information by posing as bank service personnel. They
also attached rogue devices to card readers in stores from Northeast Ireland, and then
captured the stolen data using wireless connections over the internet (Constantin,
2008). In relation to the activities of the cybercriminal groups, crime opportunities
thereof should be managed (if not eliminated) by safeguarding the personally
identifiable information as part of a country’s identity management290. In other
words, the cases of data breaches in the US that involve a high number of incidents of
stolen data such as social security numbers291 or credit card account information292
from several organisations may have been contributed to by the weak identity
management practice within the country.
On the consumer side, among the most fundamental factors that may provide crime
opportunity for offenders is consumers’ (lack of) awareness of the issues of fraud and
fraud prevention (Williams D. A., 2007, p. 352). Even the most sophisticated security
measures are less useful (if not totally useless) if consumers are not aware of, or do
not use them. Consumer ignorance about fraud may also contribute to their lack of
care when using their cards, and this could create more burdens for, among others,
credit card issuers trying to prevent the offence (Williams D. A., 2007, p. 352). The
online activities of consumers, such as online payments, online auctions, online
290

See the previous discussion on the trends of identity theft in the US.
See United States General Accounting Office (2002f).
292
See United States Government Accountability Office (2007).
291
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gaming, social networking and even weblogs are also believed to have contributed to
the rising trend of online fraud, because unaware consumers may accidently expose
their personal information, including credit card details, to offenders (Choo & Smith,
2008, pp. 44-54). In 2002 eBay, the largest online auction site, was targeted by credit
card fraud offenders who used a shadow website to capture credit card details from
approximately 55 million customers (Armbruster, 2002). In this scheme, offenders
sent seemingly legitimate emails to customers to ask them to log on to a Floridabased website, ‘ebayupdates.com’, to resubmit their financial details (Armbruster,
2002). This scheme is also known as ‘phishing’, which is an internet scam form, in
which offenders trick consumers into divulging sensitive personal information by
means such as seemingly legitimate (but actually fraudulent) emails and websites
(McAfee Research, 2004, p. 2).
As suggested by the previous discussions in this chapter, despite the available
security measures which can be used to protect their consumers from credit card
fraud, the decision as to whether or not institutions such as banks upgrade to a better
fraud prevention measure is likely to be influenced by financial costs and benefits
considerations. The slow adoption of chip and PIN technology in the US and
Australia, for example, may be influenced by the perception that no business case
exists for the implementation of the technology. A study commissioned by Visa
Europe (conducted by the Centre for Retail Research) in October–November 2005 on
UK retailers’ experiences of chip and PIN concludes, among other things, that the
benefits of using the technology include reduction in fraud, faster transaction speeds,
increase in spending on debit and credit cards and cost reductions in store (through
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using fewer till rolls, easier cashing-up procedures and savings in supervision) (Visa
Europe, 2006, p. 6). Conversely, based on the study, the five main concerns prior to
the implementation of chip and PIN technology were system costs, delays or service
reductions, banks not being ready in time, achieving no apparent benefits at all and
concern that the system might be too slow (Visa Europe, 2006, p. 14). Furthermore,
because the study suggests that none of these concerns were actually borne out by
retailers’ experience, suggested that the negative concerns associated with the use of
the chip and PIN technology were proved to be incorrect (Visa Europe, 2006, p. 14).
Despite this conclusion, the results from the study by Visa Europe may be true only
for the UK, and thus similar studies in other countries such as the US and Australia
may yield different results. For example, the data and information from the APCA
indicates that the fraud rate in Australia is lower than in the UK, and this may
influence the equation of costs and benefits associated with the adoption of chip and
PIN technology, because a lower fraud rate means lower savings from the decrease in
frauds. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, although not part of the focus of this
study, several studies suggest that the costs of credit card frauds and can be more than
just financial — they can be used to support other, more serious crimes, such as
terrorism293. The problem of credit card fraud, as shown by the financial statistics, is
just the tip of an iceberg which, if ignored, may result in more serious damages —
even the loss of safety and in the case of terrorist financing, loss of lives, and this
should influence considerations to upgrade to better security measures (Lormel, 2008,
pp. 3-4).

293

See the discussion on the case study of terrorist financing in Chapter 3.
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A country’s security measure must be fully implemented, or it will be less beneficial
(or even useless) when all the concerned parties do not participate. In the case of
Australia, for example, as discussed previously, although several chip and PIN credit
cards are already in circulation (for example, from ANZ and NAB) the fact that not
all of the EFTPOS terminals comply with the technology suggests that the intended
ideal level of security from chip and PIN technology is yet to be achieved. This also
suggests the need for a mandate from parties in the credit card industry, such as
central banks, industry bodies or credit card associations for, among other things,
setting the deadline of implementation of security measures. In the UK, for example,
card schemes such as Visa and MasterCard have mandated that from 1 January 2005,
the liability for fraudulent transactions at the point of sale is on the non-chip and PINenabled party, if the fraud could have been prevented by the use of PIN (Card Watch,
n.d.(b)). In other words, retailers who have not yet upgraded their equipment to
accept PINs at points of sale are liable for losses after the deadline date (Card Watch,
n.d.(b)).
The above factors that may contribute to the changes in the trends of credit card fraud
are just some of those commonly recognised within the area of payments systems.
Several other factors may also influence the crime opportunities of credit card fraud
offenders, and these may not be directly associated with activities in the payments
system, including areas such as politics, society in general, culture and religion,
which are beyond the scope of this study and thus are discussed in this report.

261

CONCLUSION
The development of non-cash payment instruments has contributed to the change of,
among other things, activities in payment systems. Unfortunately, this also includes
changes in the ways crimes are perpetrated. The US, the UK and Australia are among
countries in the world currently experiencing such changes. After comparing fraud
reports (mainly of the FTC, the APACS and the APCA), this study concludes that
despite the different ways offences are named and categorised, they generally
represent similar problems which the three countries must solve. Among the different
types of credit card fraud, the most common and costly types are currently card-notpresent and counterfeit card fraud, which accounted for the largest portions of the
total losses over the years.
Among the factors believed to have shaped the current trends of credit card fraud, the
introduction of the chip and PIN (smart card) technology in 2003 (in the UK) was
thought to be among the most influential events to set a new standard of credit card
security. Over time this technology is also believed to have change the landscape of,
among other things, the trends in credit card fraud in world. This may be related to
the development of information technologies (such as the internet), which facilitate
online transactions and yet may also be used to support online frauds perpetrated by
organised cybercriminals.
On the other hand, victims’ lack of protection may also stimulate the occurrence as
well as growth of frauds. This may be in the form of individual consumers’ lack of
awareness or the weak identity management practices of organisations, including the
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safeguarding of consumers’ personally identifiable information within their databases
(that is, management of the risks of data breaches). The strictly financially oriented
cost-benefit considerations in determining the most appropriate prevention measures
that should be adopted by an organisation may also create loopholes which can be
exploited by offenders to commit frauds. These problems require each country to
develop and execute sound crime prevention strategies based on the actual problems
(problem-based crime prevention). The next chapter discusses how the US, the UK
and Australia handle the fraud problems discussed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: PATTERNS OF CREDIT CARD
FRAUD PREVENTION PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND AUSTRALIA
INTRODUCTION
This chapter follows from the previous chapter to discuss further the trends of credit
card fraud problems in the benchmark countries. This chapter highlights the patterns
of prevention practices in the US, the UK and Australia that attempt to cope with the
growing threats of payments fraud, particularly credit card fraud. In other words, the
purpose of this chapter is to describe the actions that the US, the UK and Australia
have been taking to handle fraud problems discussed in the previous chapter.
Because fraud prevention itself covers many dimensions, in order to maintain focus
and avoid confusion, the discussions in this chapter focus on the prevention practices
in the payments systems by highlighting major initiatives that highly influence the
entire course of the prevention practices. Although not the main focus of this study,
some overviews are also given on other areas, such as fraud investigation and
prosecution conducted by members of criminal justice systems, in order to highlight
their contributions to the area of payments fraud prevention practices in the payments
systems.
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PATTERNS OF PREVENTION PRACTICES IN THE
PAYMENTS SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE
UNITED KINGDOM, AND AUSTRALIA
Over the years, the US, the UK and Australia, as discussed in the previous chapter,
have struggled with the problems of credit card fraud. However, despite some
differences in the severity of each type of fraud within a country, in general, the
major types of credit card fraud in the three countries (mainly based on the
classifications by the FTC, the APACS and the APCA) are the same. Based on these
findings, the following discussions focus on how the three countries allocate their
resources in their efforts to mitigate the threats of credit card fraud.

PATTERNS OF PREVENTION PRACTICES IN THE US
Because credit card fraud is classified as a type of identity theft, the prevention of
credit card fraud in the US has long been part of the country’s identity theft
prevention practices. Meulen (2006, p. 1) believes that whereas the prevalence of
identity theft in the US is relatively high compared to other countries, the US is
considered as among countries with the most advanced prevention practices, and has
been battling the offence for many years.
The recent development of US identity theft prevention practices has been marked by
the increasing coordination in combating offences. The establishment of the
President’s Identity Theft Task Force in May 2006294, for example, aimed to
coordinate federal agencies in their efforts against identity theft (Finklea, 2009, p. 5).
294

Based on the Executive Order 13402 amended by the Executive Order 13414. See The White
House (2006a; 2006b).
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The task force295 was charged with creating a strategic plan to combat identity theft to
covers aspects of awareness, prevention, detection and prosecution (Finklea, 2009, p.
5). In April 2007 the task force issued Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan296
as a strategic plan to solve the growing problems of identity theft in the US. This
document listed 31 recommendations for actions that should be undertaken by the
federal government to prevent the theft and misuse of consumers’ personal
information, help consumers detect and recover from identity theft and increase the
prosecution and punishment of identity theft offenders (Finklea, 2009, p. 5; Federal
Trade Commission, 2008e). The task force’s recommendations cover four primary
areas: keeping consumer data out of the hands of offenders, making it harder to
misuse consumer data, helping consumers repair their lives and prosecuting and
punishing identity theft offenders297 (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a,
pp. 4-8).
As the result of its oversight on the implementation of the above recommendations,
the task force released its report, Task Force Report 298, on 21 October 2008 on the
implementation of its recommendations. The report indicated that efforts had been
295

The 17 members of the task force are: attorney-general (chairman), chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission (Co-chairman), secretary of the Treasury, secretary of Commerce, secretary of Health
and Human Services, secretary of Veterans Affairs, secretary of Homeland Security, director of the
Office of Management and Budget, commissioner of Social Security Administration, chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, chairperson of the Board of Directors of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, comptroller of the Currency, director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision, chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, postmaster
general, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and director of the Office of
Personnel Management (Idtheft.gov, n.d.(a)).
296
See President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a).
297
Table 47 Summary of the President’s Identity Theft Task Force’s Recommendations (in the
appendices) provides a summary of the full recommendations which cover the areas of: prevention,
victim recovery and law enforcement. This chapter focuses on the prevention aspects of the
recommendations.
298
See President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2008).
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made, particularly by government agencies, to carry out the task force’s
recommendations. As stated by the Federal Trade Commission

(Federal Trade

Commission, 2008e):
Highlights of the report include expansion of the Task Force’s data security and identity
theft business and consumer education campaigns; exploring means of improving
consumer authentication processes to prevent the use of stolen information to commit
identity theft; launching new initiatives to help identity theft victims recover; and
improving law enforcement tools to investigate and prosecute identity thieves.

The government of the US is currently considering the problem of identity theft,
including credit card fraud, as a serious matter which needs to be addressed properly.
The following discussions focus on the pattern of credit card fraud prevention
practices in the US, with a focus on crime data and information collection,
management and distribution as well as other fundamental areas, such as fraud
prevention policy, fraud awareness, personal identification, technological approach
and legal deterrence. As mentioned before, because credit card fraud is classified as a
type of identity theft, the prevention practices mentioned in the following discussions
may not be exclusively for credit card fraud, but are designed to accommodate the
prevention of identity theft in general, by which multiple types of identity theft may
be addressed.
Crime Data and Information Collection, Management and Distribution
Monitoring fraud in the US has been accommodated by the US government by,
among other things, the collection, management and distribution of crime data and
information, as well as establishing networks to share information on crimes among
law enforcers. For example, the Consumer Sentinel was launched in 1997 as an
‘investigative cybertool’ to support law enforcers in their investigations (Federal
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Trade Commission, 2009a). Consumer Sentinel is a unique investigative cybertool
that provides members of the network with access to millions of consumer
complaints, including identity theft, do-not-call registry violations, computer , the
internet and online auctions, telemarketing scams, advance-fee loans and credit
scams, sweepstakes, lotteries and prizes, business opportunities and work-at-home
schemes, health and weight-loss products, debt collection, credit reports and other
financial matters (Consumer Sentinel Network, 2009).
In response to the requirement of the Identity Theft Act
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, in November 1999, the

FTC established the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse (FTC Clearinghouse) as part
of the Consumer Sentinel system, to gather information from any consumer who
wishes to file a complaint or pose an inquiry concerning identity theft (United States
General Accounting Office, 2002c, pp. 3-4). The Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse
is currently considered as among the most comprehensive databases of identity theft
data in the US, which enables law enforcement agencies, through the Consumer
Sentinel Network, to scan and match consumer complaints in the database against
certain criteria to determine, for example, if a larger pattern of criminal activity
emerges (United States General Accounting Office, 2002d, p. 4; Newman &
McNally, 2005). By utilising the Consumer Sentinel Network and the Identity Theft
Data Clearinghouse, the FTC continuously collects, manages and distributes data and
information on the prevalence and costs of identity theft in the US in the form of
publicly available reports. In the calendar year 2007 the Consumer Sentinel received
299

The Act requires the Federal Trade Commission to be able to log and acknowledge the receipt of
complaints by individuals who certify that they have a reasonable belief that one or more of their
means of identification have been assumed, stolen or otherwise unlawfully acquired (United States
Congress, 1998).
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over 800,000 consumer fraud and identity theft complaints. Overall, since its launch
in 1997, the Consumer Sentinel has collected information on consumer fraud and
identity theft from the FTC and over 125 other organisations, and the Sentinel
database now includes over 4.3 million complaints300 (Federal Trade Commission,
2008a, p. 2).
Fraud data and information published by the FTC are generally from two main
sources: those collected ‘actively’ through studies, and others collected ‘passively’,
based on consumers’ complaints. The 2006 Identity Theft Survey Report301 is an
example of a report based on the studies by the FTC; whereas the Consumer Fraud
and Identity Theft Complaint Data (January–December 2007)302 was based on
consumers’ complaints recorded in the Consumer Sentinel system database.
Crime data and information collection, management and distribution are also
essential to the entire course of prevention, investigation and prosecution of identity
theft in the US, particularly to understand and properly respond to the actual
problems, as well as to measure the success of, among other things, the law
enforcement efforts (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 47). Improperly
collected, managed and distributed data and information may result in incorrect
decisions in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of identity theft (Moss &
300

301

302

Some future data transfers from other organisations that have not been received will contain
complaints from 2007, thus the total number of complaints in the report may increase within the
next few months (Federal Trade Commission, 2008a, p. 2).
In collaboration with the Synovate, for details, see Federal Trade Commission (2007a). The study
was conducted by telephone interviews using a random digit dialling (RDD) sampling
methodology designed to obtain a random sample of US adults age 18 and older (Federal Trade
Commission, 2007a, p. 3). Between 27 March and 11 June 2006 a total of 4,917 interviews were
conducted (Federal Trade Commission, 2007a, p. 3).
See Federal Trade Commission (2008a).
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Pease, 2004, pp. 7-12). In terms of measuring the success of the law enforcement
efforts, for example, the need for sound measurement, including the required data and
information, is stated by the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a, p. 70) in
its Strategic Plan:
Specifically, there are few benchmarks that measure the activities of the various
components of the criminal justice system in their response to identity thefts occurring
within their jurisdictions, little data on state and local enforcement, and little information
on how identity theft incidents are being processed in state courts.

The President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2008, p. 47) also believes that, among the
possible future improvements in the area of crime data and information collection,
management and distribution is the expansion of data collection to include sources
such as victims, law enforcement agencies and courts for constructing a more
complete picture of the crime and its impact (Recommendation 31). Federal agencies
have responded to this recommendation by, among other things, improving the
existing data collection initiatives to include more information on identity theft. For
example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) of the Department of Justice (DoJ)
has added an identity theft supplement to its National Crime Victimisation Survey
(NCVS)303 that enables the agency to shed light on the types of victimisation,
estimated financial losses, emotional impact and law enforcement responses
(President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 48).
According to the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a, p. 53), other than the
FTC’s Identity Theft Clearing House as the primary source of direct consumer
complaint data, other sources of data and information on identity theft include: the

303

See Bureau of Justice Statistics (2009).
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FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center, which established the Internet
Crime Complaint Center (IC3); the Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit
(CIRFU), which facilitates the operation of the National Cyber Forensic Training
Alliance (NCFTA); and the US Postal Inspection, which hosts the Financial Crimes
Database. Private sector entities (such as the financial service industry and credit
reporting agencies) are also considered important sources of identity theft data and
information (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 54; United States
General Accounting Office, 2002c, p. 1). Nevertheless, the multiple sources of data
and information on identity theft are a problem in itself, because each is managed
independently, and information sharing, in many cases, is not possible. For example,
agencies do not or cannot share information with other agencies and there is an
absence of standard format for information sharing (President’s Identity Theft Task
Force, 2007a, p. 55). Finklea (2009, p. 12) argues that the absence of uniformity in
the reporting process of identity theft by law enforcement agencies, for example, may
affect analysts’ abilities to evaluate the true extent of identity theft, because, among
other things, the identity theft categories may not be clearly described in the reporting
forms. Further, Newman and McNally (2005, p. vi) argue that:
However, in contrast to the FTC’s extensive database of consumer complaints and
victimization, the criminal justice system lacks any such information. There is no
national database recorded by any criminal justice agency concerning the number of
identity theft cases reported to it, or those disposed of by arrest and subsequently
prosecution. The FBI and the US Secret Service have reported numbers of cases of
identity theft in recent years, but these number in the hundreds and without state, multiagency and local level data, there is at present no way to determine the amount of
identity theft confronted by the criminal justice system.

These problems were believed to have created inefficiencies in the use of the existing
data and information, and may hinder the progress of, among other things, crime
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prevention activities (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 55; Cheney,
2004, p. 11). Newman and McNally (2005, p. 59) assert that the link among
information on identity theft is of importance, and requires, among other things,
information-sharing agreements between relevant agencies and jurisdictions. This
matter has been included in the President’s Identity Theft task Force’s Strategic Plan
and has been responded to by, among others, federal agencies. Examples of the
agencies’ responses are:



The monthly meeting of the President’s Identity Theft Task Force’s Criminal
Law Enforcement Subgroup to discuss the implementation of the Strategic Plan,
whose participants include, among others, prosecutors, investigators and analysts
from various federal agencies (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p.
30). The subgroup consists of representatives from the task force, who are
essential to criminal law enforcement efforts. Their role is to examine and
address operational issues in investigations and prosecutions, as well as make
recommendations to the task force regarding structural elements and agency
policy to further enhance criminal investigations and prosecutions related to
identity theft (United States Department of Justice & United States Federal Trade
Commission, 2006, p. 4).



The development of a standardised identity theft report form by the FTC, in
cooperation with the criminal law enforcers and representatives of financial
institutions, the consumer data industry and consumer advocacy groups. The
result is available on, among others, the FTC’s website, and has also been
promoted at the national conference of the International Association of Chiefs of
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Police (IACP) and the 2007 conference of the International Association of
Financial Crime Investigators (IACFI) (President's Identity Theft Task Force,
2008, p. 32).
The US Postal Inspection continuously participates in the intelligence sharing
initiative (ISI) that facilitates information sharing between the private sector and law
enforcement, as an effort to enhance cooperation with the private sector in combating
identity theft (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 33). The ISI website
was created in 2005 to facilitate the sharing of information regarding mail theft,
identity theft, financial crimes, investigations and prevention methods for the
Inspection Service and fraud investigators representing retail and financial
institutions, as well as major mailers (Tenpas, 2007).
Other Areas of Prevention Practices
As mentioned before, crime data and information collection, management and
distribution are among the first steps toward establishing problem-based crime
prevention practices. Based on the knowledge from the process, as previously
mentioned in this chapter, further steps should be taken by any country, including the
establishment of prevention measures in the areas of fraud prevention policy, fraud
awareness, personal identification, technological approach and legal deterrence.
In terms of fraud prevention policy, the US has for years made efforts to establish
sound fraud prevention policies within the nation to counter the growing threats of
identity theft. An example of this effort was the issuance of the ‘red flags rule’ by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the federal bank regulatory agencies and the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) in 2007. The red flags rule requires
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creditors and financial institutions to implement identity theft prevention programs,
and is implemented pursuant to the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT)
Act 2003 (P.L. 108–159)304 (Finklea, 2009, p. 7). According to the guidelines
published by the FTC, Fighting Fraud with the Red Flags Rule: A How-To Guide for
Business, the programs must include the following four basic elements to construct a
framework to address the threat of identity theft (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b,
p. 4):


Reasonable policies and procedures to identify the ‘red flags’305 of identity theft;



Ability of the Program to detect the previously identified red flags (e.g. if an
organization identified fake IDs as a red flag, it must have procedures in place to
detect possible fake, forged, or altered identification).



The Program must describe appropriate actions to be taken when red flags are
detected; and



Periodical evaluation of the Program to cope with the changing threat of identity
theft.

As stated in its original text, the red flags rule306 applies to ‘financial institutions’ and
‘creditors’ with ‘covered accounts’. As stated in the FTC’s guidelines, the red flag
rule defines a ‘financial institution’ as (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 8):
…a state or national bank, a state or federal savings and loan association, a mutual
savings bank, a state or federal credit union, or any other person that, directly or
indirectly, holds a transaction account belonging to a consumer.

304

305

306

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, an amendment to The Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), emphasises accuracy of information in credit transactions for, among
other things, identity theft prevention (for example, change of address and request for replacement
or additional credit card, credit card number printed on receipts and verification of credit
applicant’s address) (National Consumer Law Center, n.d.). For details, see United States
Congress (2003).
As defined by the FTC (2009b, p. 4), ‘red flags’ are suspicious patterns or practices, or specific
activities that indicate the possibility of identity theft, for example, a customer who provides an
ID that looks like it might be fake to open an account.
See the Department of Treasury et al. (2007, p. 63772).
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The definition of ‘creditor’, on the other hand, is broader, and includes business and
organisations that regularly defer payment for goods or services, or provide goods or
services and bill the customers later (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 9). In
other words, entities that are not traditionally considered financial institutions (such
as utility companies, health care providers and telecommunications companies) must
also adhere to the rule (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 9). In the case of health
care entities, for example, as stated by Saul (2009):
Health care entities are a ripe target for security breaches due to the sensitive nature of
the patient information that they house, such as personal identifying information
(address, date of birth, social security number, etc., of a patient), financial information
(patient’s account numbers, credit card numbers, etc.) and medical records (medications,
HIV status, mental health, etc.).

Finally, the definition of ‘covered accounts’ covers two categories. The first covers
consumer accounts that an entity offers to its customers, which are primarily for
personal, family or household purposes and involve or are designed to permit,
multiple payments or transactions, such as credit cards, mortgage loans, automobile
loans, margin accounts, cellphone accounts, cheque accounts and saving accounts
(Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 10). The second covers other accounts that a
financial institution or creditor offers or maintains, but with a reasonably foreseeable
risk to customers or to the safety and soundness of the financial institution or creditor
from identity theft, including financial, operational, compliance, reputation or
litigation risks (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 11). Examples of this category
include small business accounts, sole proprietorship accounts and single transaction
consumer accounts that may be vulnerable to identity theft (Federal Trade
Commission, 2009b, p. 11). In the case of health care entities, for example, with the
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above two definitions, offering extended payment plans to patients will make them
‘creditors’ which offer ‘covered accounts’ (Saul, 2009). Generally, whereas
consumer accounts that enable multiple payments are always ‘covered accounts’,
other types of accounts are in this category only if the risk of identity theft is
reasonably foreseeable (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 11).
The red flag rule is set to be implemented on 1 November 2009, a year’s
postponement from the initial implementation schedule (1 November 2008), during
which period the schedule was revised three times (1 May 2009, 1 August 2009 and
finally 1 November 2009)307. The delays in the implementation of the red flag rule
were caused largely by the fact that financial institutions and creditors were not yet
fully prepared to implement the rule308. According to the FTC, among the reasons
behind the postponements of the red flags rule, many entities were still uncertain
about whether or not they were legally subject to the rule309. The definition of
‘creditor’, for example, as mentioned above, extends to even doctors and lawyers (for
providing services in advance of payments), who may find that establishing and
maintaining comprehensive identity theft prevention programs create more costs than
they confer benefits310. To address these matters, the FTC published its guideline to

307

However, these changes apply only for the FTC’s jurisdictions, which means that they do not affect
other federal agencies’ enforcement of the original 1 November 2008 compliance deadline for
institutions subject to their oversight. For more details, see Federal Trade Commission (2008b;
2009c; 2009d).
308
Federal Trade Commission (2008b; 2009c; 2009d).
309
Federal Trade Commission (2008b; 2009c; 2009d).
310
Lawyers are strongly rejecting the implementation of the proposed red flags rule because it will
impose undue time and financial burdens on the practice of law, particularly at small firms and
solo proprietorships with fewer resources than the large firms (Lash, 2009). Another reason for this
rejection is that law firms were believed to have very low risk of identity theft, particularly from
their clients (Lash, 2009). The American Bar Association even threatened to sue to lawyers exempt
from the red flags rule (Atkins, 2009).
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the rule on 29 March 2009, in which it states that (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b,
p. 14):
The Program must be designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate identity theft in
connection with the opening of new accounts and the operation of existing ones. Your
Program must be appropriate to the size and complexity of your business or organization
and the nature and scope of its activities. A company with a higher risk of identity theft
or a variety of covered accounts may need a more comprehensive Program.

Further, according to the FTC (2009b, p. 5), whereas some entities may need a
comprehensive program for addressing the high risk of identity theft within, others
with a lower identity theft risk may have more streamlined programs. In other words,
the decision about how comprehensive the identity theft prevention program should
be for an entity is subject to its cost-benefit considerations. To enhance society’s
understanding of the red flags rule, the FTC established, among other things, a
website dedicated to provide comprehensive information regarding the rule311.
The efforts of the US government in advancing fraud awareness on identity theft and
identity theft prevention are evidenced by the inclusion of the matter in the
President’s

Identity

Theft

Task

Force’s

Strategic

Plan.

In

relation

to

Recommendation 6 of the plan, and because access to consumer data is essential for
the occurrence of identity theft, the President’s Identity Theft Task Force states that
(2008, p. 14):

311

See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/redflagsrule/index.shtml, which, as part of the FTC’s
website, provides information such as frequently asked questions regarding the red flags rule and
guidelines for the implementation of the rule.
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…in addition to the government doing more to educate itself, it also do more to educate
the private sector and consumers about the importance of data security. With respect to
the private sector, the Task Force made two specific recommendations: (1) hold regional
seminars for businesses on safeguarding information and (2) distribute improved
guidance for private industry in developing an information security program tailored to
their needs.

In response to this recommendation, as reported in the Task Force Report (September
2008)312, various government agencies have made efforts to implement the
recommendation. The FTC, for example, conducted two workshops on data security
(Protecting Personal Information: Best Practices for Business) on 15 April 2008 in
Chicago313 and on 13 August 2008 in Los Angeles314 (President's Identity Theft Task
Force, 2008, p. 14). In terms of distribution of improved guidance for private
industry, the members of the task force put in place a range of programs to educate
the private sector about the importance of data security and the risk of identity theft
(President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 14). Examples of these initiatives are:



The Business Continuity Planning Handbook315 for financial institutions
technology service providers and examiners, which discusses threats to business
continuity such as fraud, theft, or extortion, issued by the Federal Financial

312

See President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2008).
Co-hosted by the Federal Trade Commission, International Association of Privacy Professionals,
and Northwestern University School of Law, the one-day public workshop featured
businesspeople, attorneys, government officials, privacy officers and other experts who provided
practical guidance for businesses of all sizes on data security, best practices for developing an
appropriate data security program and how to respond to security problems, including data
breaches (Federal Trade Commission, 2008d).
314
The half-day workshop was co-hosted by the Federal Trade Commission and the California Office
of Privacy Protection, and addressed the issue of how business can secure personal information and
protect the privacy of consumers and employees (Federal Trade Commission, 2008c). Presented in
partnership with the International Association of Privacy Professionals and the Los Angeles Area
Chamber of Commerce, the workshop featured businesspeople, attorneys, government officials,
privacy officers and other experts who provided practical guidance for businesses of all sizes on
data security, privacy, best practices for developing an appropriate data security program and
responding to data breaches and other privacy and security problems (Federal Trade Commission,
2008c).
315
See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (2008).
313
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Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in March 2008 (President's Identity
Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 15). Generally, the handbook provides guidance to the
financial services industry on the importance of business continuity planning, as
a basis for financial institutions to recover and resume business processes when
operations

are

disrupted

unexpectedly

(Federal

Financial

Institutions

Examination Council, 2008, p. 1).


Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business316, a guidance brochure
published by the FTC in 2007 that offers business practical tips on securitysensitive data, based on the notion that many breaches can be prevented by
relatively simple commonsense measures (President's Identity Theft Task Force,
2008, p. 15). Within the guide, the FTC formulates ‘five simple phrases’ for
effective means of identifying and responding to security concerns (Federal
Trade Commission, 2007d, p. 3; Nahra, 2007, pp. 11-12):



o

TAKE STOCK. Know what personal information you have in your files and on your
computers.

o

SCALE DOWN. Keep only what you need for business.

o

LOCK IT. Protect the information you keep.

o

PITCH IT. Properly dispose of what you no longer need.

o

PLAN AHEAD. Create a plan to respond to security incidents.

A nationwide campaign by the FTC in December 2007 to remind businesses of
their duty to truncate credit and debit card numbers on customers’ purchase
receipts, pursuant to the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT Act)

316

See Federal Trade Commission (2007d).
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2003317, which includes the distribution of the FTC’s Business Alert: Slip
Showing?318 to 187 national trade associations (President's Identity Theft Task
Force, 2008, p. 16).
The above examples of initiatives generally aim to protect businesses from identity
theft. In addition, the task force also believes that consumer awareness is generally
considered to be among the first lines of defence against identity theft, and thus it
recommends a broad, multi-year national public awareness campaign to educate
consumers about identity theft (Recommendation 8) (President's Identity Theft Task
Force, 2008, p. 17). In response to this recommendation, a range of initiatives were
made by, among others, government agencies, to improve consumer awareness and
knowledge on identity theft and identity theft prevention. Examples of such
initiatives include:



The task force’s extensive public awareness campaign in December 2007 with
the FTC’s Deter, Detect, Defend: AvoID Theft319 campaign, which utilised
means such as websites, articles, brochures, speeches, public service
announcements and interviews to reach a variety of audiences as the
cornerstone320 (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, pp. 17-18). The

317

318
319

320

Under the Act, it is prohibited for businesses to include more than five digits of a card number or
the expiration date on electronically printed credit and debit card receipts (President's Identity
Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 16). For the original text of the Act, see United States Congress
(2003).
See Federal Trade Commission (2007e).
For supporting this campaign, the FTC established the ‘Deter, Detect, Defend: AvoID Theft’
website. For details, see Federal Trade Commission (n.d.).
Based on the task force’s recommendation to increase outreach to communities that are
traditionally underserved, all of the materials distributed by the FTC (for example, booklets,
brochures and posters) were also available in Spanish (President's Identity Theft Task Force,
2008, p. 21).
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campaign’s basic message was that consumers should take simple steps to reduce
their risk of identity theft (for example, securing their personal information and
monitoring their credit reports and accounts) (President's Identity Theft Task
Force, 2008, p. 18). Additionally, the Deter, Detect, Defend: AvoID Theft website
serves as a one-stop national resource for learning about identity theft by, among
other things, providing detailed information on how to deter, detect and defend
against identity theft (Federal Trade Commission, n.d.).


The FTC, in partnership with the technology sector and other federal agencies
sponsors www.OnguardOnline.gov321 a website that provides education for
consumers on online safety in the form of, among other things, practical tips on
internet fraud, computer security and the protection of personal information
(President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 21; OnGuard Online, n.d.(a)).



Law enforcement agencies have been working with private industry to create
www.LooksTooGoodToBeTrue.com322,

a

website

dedicated

to

educate

consumers on how to avoid internet fraud schemes that may lead to identity theft
(President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 21). The US Postal Inspection
Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide funding for the site
(LooksToGoodToBeTrue.com, n.d.). The National White Collar Crime Center,
Monster.com, Target and members of the Merchants Risk Council are among the
key partners (LooksToGoodToBeTrue.com, n.d.).

321
322

See OnGuardOnline (n.d.(b)).
See LooksToGoodToBeTrue.com (n.d.).
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In response to the task force’s recommendation to develop online clearinghouse that
provides educational resources, in 2007, task force members established
www.idtheft.gov323, containing links to 40 educational resources from many federal
agencies, including the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Department of the Treasury, the Social Security Administration and the US Postal
Inspection Service. Its materials include basic identity theft information with
prevention tips for consumers and businesses (President's Identity Theft Task Force,
2008, p. 22).
In terms of identity management324, the past experience with serious crimes (for
example, terrorist attacks)325 has made the US government highly committed to
combating identity theft within the country. In many cases of serious crimes,
difficulties in the country’s law enforcement in preventing and investigating the
offences was caused by, among other factors, the use of identity-related crime (for
example, false identification documents). For example, as Wang (2002, p. 1) puts it:
Clearly, the nation’s current system of documentation failed to impede the September 11
terrorists. Two of the hijackers were on a government watch list of suspects, two had
overstayed their visas, and another violated the terms of his student visa by not showing
up for classes, yet they were able to operate freely while in the United States.

According to Tatelman (2008, p. 1), the events of 11 September 2001 changed the
view on the national standards for so-called ‘breeder documents’326, including

323

See Idtheft.gov (n.d.(b)).
Defined as the combination of technical systems, rules and procedures that define the ownership,
utilisation and safeguarding of personal identity information. The primary goal of the process is to
assign attributes to a digital identity and to connect that identity to an individual (National Science
and Technology Council, 2008, pp. ES-1).
325
See the discussion in Chapter 6 on the trends of credit card fraud in the US.
326
Documents used as original sources of identity to apply for (or breed) other forms of identity
credentials (Smart Card, n.d.).
324
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driver’s licences and personal identification cards. In its final report327, the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission)
recommends, among other things, that (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, 2004, p. 390):
Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal government should
set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as
drivers’ licenses. Fraud in identity documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At
many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources
of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are
and to check whether they are terrorists.

Later, as a response to this recommendation, the US Congress enacted the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)328, which
delegated authority to the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, empowering them to issue regulations on the
minimum standards for federal acceptance of driver’s licences and personal
identification cards (Tatelman, 2008, p. 2). The act contains provisions for robust
travel document screening and authentication, and recommends improved training for
a variety of federal officials who come into contact with fraudulent identification
documents (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2007b, p. 44).
Another example of response to the recommendation was the Real ID Act 2005329,
which created national standards for the issuance of state driver’s licences (DLs) and

327

The 9/11 Commission Report. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (2004).
328
Passed on 17 December 2004. For the original text, see United States Congress (2004b).
329
Passed on 11 May 2005 as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief Act. For the original text, see United States
Congress (2005).
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identification cards (IDs)330, and which must be met by 11 May 2008 should stateissued DLs/IDs be accepted as valid identification by the federal government
(National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, &
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 2006, p. 2). As explained by
the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007b, p. 44):
…the Real ID Act of 2005 supplements the requirements of state drivers’ licenses and
identification cards for use by federal agencies. The law requires a number of
verification measures before such identification is issued, including that the state verify
the validity of supporting documents. The law also mandates that identification cards
used for federal purposes expire every eight years and be produced in secure
environments by personnel with appropriate clearances. It further requires that state
identification cards that do not meet the federal security requirements state soon their
face, and that all states provide electronic access to other states of their motor vehicle
databases.

On 11 January 2008, pursuant to the Real ID Act 2005, the Department of Homeland
Security issued a final rule331 to establish minimum standards for state-issued driver’s
licences and identification cards, which includes (United States Department of
Homeland Security, 2009):


Information and security features that must be incorporated into each card;



Proof of identity and lawful status of an applicant;



Verification of the source documents provided by an applicant; and



Security standards for the offices that issue licenses and identification cards.

330

Although the initial intention behind the Act is to prevent (or at least make it more difficult for) the
crime offenders to use identity-related crimes (for example, false IDs) to support more serious
offences (for example, terrorist attacks), many criticism were raised regarding the possibility that
the seemingly excessive use of personal information for the issuance of driver’s licences and
identification cards will actually increase the threats of identity theft (Center for Democracy &
Technology, 2008, p. 3). For more discussion on the criticisms on the Real ID Act 2005, see
National Council of La Raza (2005).
331
For the original text, see US Department of Homeland Security (2008).
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In relation to the compliance deadline of 11 May 2008, the rule also provides a
mechanism by which states can seek an additional extension of the compliance
deadline to 11 May 2011, if they demonstrate material compliance with the core
requirements of the Act and this rule (United States Department of Homeland
Security, 2009).
As discussed in the previous chapter, among the problems in combating identity theft
in the US is the high level of data breaches, by which offenders steal, among other
things, consumers’ data and information such as social security numbers and credit
card account information332. However, some studies333 suggest that such problems
may have been caused by the extensive use, by both public and private sectors, of
personally identifiable information334 which, if stolen, could be used by offenders to,
among other things, create new accounts (for example, credit card accounts).
A major initiative taken to safeguard identity-related information is minimising the
use of social security numbers (SSNs) by both public and private sectors
(Recommendation 1). This is deemed necessary because SSNs are widely used in
authentication processes, such as matching consumers with their records (for
example, credit files), and they are also available from many sources, including
public records; thus keeping them safe is essential for protecting consumers from
332

333

334

See United States General Accounting Office (2002f) and United States Government
Accountability Office (2007; 2009).
For example, see United States General Accounting Office (2002f) and United States Government
Accountability Office (2007; 2009).
Personally identifiable information refers to information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual’s identity (for example, names, social security numbers, biometric records and so on)
either alone or in combination with other personal or identifying information that is linked or
linkable to a specific individual (for example, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name and
so on) (Office of Management and Budget, 2007, p. 1).
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identity theft (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 44; Federal Trade
Commission, 2008f, p. 1). Such protection should also balance the convenience of
consumers and credit grantors with a reduction of crime opportunities for offenders
(President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 44). In a broader scope, the FTC
(2008f, p. 1) states:
Moreover, there is a danger that reducing the availability of SSNs would have
unintended, adverse consequences. A number of important functions in our economy
depend on access to SSNs. Businesses routinely rely on SSNs to ensure that the
information they use or share with other organizations is matched to the right individual.
Still, we believe it is feasible to reduce the availability of SSNs to identity thieves, such
as by eliminating unnecessary public display, while preserving the legitimate and
beneficial uses and transfers of SSNs.

In response to the task force’s recommendations, federal agencies have taken various
initiatives to minimise the use of SSNs. Some examples of such initiatives are:



The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) inventoried their use of SSNs on
forms and in information systems in spring 2007, and issued reminders from the
OPM’s director to its employees and contractors to reduce unnecessary SSN
usage and take appropriate measures to protect all personally identifiable
information (PII) (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 6).



The issuance of the Guidance on Protecting Federal Employee Social Security
Numbers and Combating Identity Theft335 on 18 June 2007 by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) to the Chief Human Capital Officers of all federal
department agencies, which had two goals: to eliminate the unnecessary use of
SSNs in federal personnel records and strengthen the protection of employees’
sensitive information from theft or loss (President's Identity Theft Task Force,

335

See Office of Personnel Management (2007).

286

2008, p. 7). The purpose of the guidance is to help agencies achieve consistent
and effective policies for safeguarding the social security numbers of their
employees (Chief Human Capital Officers Council, 2007).


The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum
Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable
Information336 in May 2007 to all executive departments and agencies. The
memorandum was based, in part, on its government-wide survey on federal
agency use of SSNs that required agencies to review their use of SSNs and,
among other things, identify instances where collection or use is unnecessary
(President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, pp. 7-8). According to the OMB
(2007, p. 1), safeguarding the personally identifiable information of the society
by, among other things, preventing data breaches, also means retaining their trust
in the agencies that keep and maintain such information.



The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a comprehensive summary,
FTC’s Staff Summary of Comments and Information Received Regarding the
Private Sector’s Use of Social Security Numbers337, on 30 November 2007 of the
comments and information it received from its outreach efforts. These included
the comment invitation from the FTC staff on a series of questions regarding the
role of SSNs in relation to the occurrence of identity theft and their use in the
authentication process by the private sector (President's Identity Theft Task
Force, 2008, p. 23). From this outreach, the FTC received more than 300
comments, and it also met with the representatives from over 40 organisations to

336
337

See Office of Management and Budget (2007).
See Federal Trade Commission (2007c).
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discuss the issue (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 23). Many
commenters and observers assert that the use of SSNs by the private sector
should be restricted in order to prevent fraud and identity theft (Federal Trade
Commission, 2007c, p. 43).
In terms of technology-based protection, over the years, several fundamental fraud
prevention measures have been used by, among others, online merchants, among
which are the simple rule system, risk scoring and neural network (Bhatla, Prabhu, &
Dua, 2003, p. 11). The simple rule system basically involves the creation of ‘if…
then’ criteria (expert rules) for filtering orders or transactions by which high-risk
transactions may be identified (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 10). In other words,
the merchant defines a set of criteria against which transactions are evaluated
(Paintal, 2008, p. 5). Such rules are created based on the knowledge of the
characteristics of fraudulent transactions (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 10). The
risk scoring system is constructed to recognise fraudulent transactions based on
several indicators from the characteristics of transactions by using statistical models.
It then generates a numeric score to indicate the likelihood of a transaction being
fraudulent (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 11). The higher the score, the greater the
potential for a fraudulent transaction (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 11).
The neural network system is a later extension of the risk scoring system, which is
based on the statistical information contained in the extensive databases of historical
transactions (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 11). This fraud prevention measure is
not new to, among others, financial institutions, as various types of this system have
been in use in established fraud prevention practices (Valentine, 2003, p. 42). The
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system has drawn a lot of interest from, among others, the research community for
the development of fraud prevention measures (Vatsa, Sural, & Majumdar, 2007, p.
29). Motivated by how a human brain works (for example, using pattern recognition
and associative memory), with the ability to correlate and weigh various indicators
(such as credit card history and unusual transaction amount), the system can also be
‘trained’ by using examples of previous transactions, both legitimate and fraudulent
(Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 11). By adapting to new information, the neural
network system may provide useful models representing knowledge about a specific
problem (Z Solutions Inc., 2004, p. 1).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, two types of technology are often used in the
prevention of credit card fraud: card protection (for example, chip and PIN cards) and
network protection (for example, Verified by Visa and Mastercard SecureCode)338.
The adoption of such technologies is influenced by, among other things, financial
cost-benefit considerations. Unlike many other countries in the world, particularly
those in the Europe, the US does not show much eagerness to adopt chip and PIN
technology to protect their credit cards339. Instead, the country focuses more on the
network-based prevention measures that may have been caused by the high level of
online transactions within the country340. This is believed to be related to the fact that
the chip and PIN technology only provides protection for offline or card-present
transactions, and will provide less or no protection at all in card-not-present

338

See Chapter 3.
See Chapter 6.
340
See Chapter 6.
339
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transactions such as online credit card transactions341 (Drugs and Crime Prevention
Committee - Parliament of Victoria, 2004, p. 178).
According to the report by CyberSource342, the most common fraud prevention tool
used by merchants for online transactions is the address verification service (AVS),
which compares numeric address data with information on file from the cardholder’s
card-issuing bank (CyberSource, 2008, p. 6). Available for US cardholders and
limited numbers of cardholders in Canada and the UK, AVS may result in high rates
of false positives, which may cause merchants to reject valid orders from, for
example, customers with new addresses or alternative addresses (CyberSource, 2008,
p. 6).
The second-most common prevention measure is the card verification number343
(CVN) (also known as CVV2 for Visa, and CID for American Express and
Discover), whose main purpose in online transactions is to verify that the person
placing the order has the actual card in their possession (CyberSource, 2008, p. 6).
However, according to CyberSource (2008, p. 7), because the numbers are generally
printed on credit cards, they can be fraudulently obtained by offenders, just as credit
card numbers are obtained. To profile how offenders (compared to valid customers)
navigate websites, customer behaviour analysis has been used by merchants by to
analyse website traffic and flow of fraud; whereas IP geolocation information is used
341
342

343

For example, see National Australia Bank (2007).
The CyberSource report was based on a survey of 318 online merchants based in North America.
This study did not find any similar studies that focused only on US merchants. Therefore, this
study assumes that the trends of online fraud prevention depicted in CyberSource’s report represent
similar trends in the US.
Each consisting of a three or four digit numeric code printed on the card (not embossed and not
available in the magnetic stripe) (Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 9).
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to provide geographic location by IP addresses of the computers from which orders
are made, and thus identify locations where the probability of fraud is the highest
(CyberSource, 2008, p. 7; FraudLabs, n.d.). Verified by Visa and MasterCard
SecureCode are also included on CyberSource’s list of fraud detection tools
representing programs that enable two parties (cardholders and card issuers) to
authenticate each other by exchanging electronic passwords before proceeding with
online transactions (Paintal, 2008, p. 5).

Address Verification Services (AVS)
CVN (Card Verification Number)
Fraud Screens – Company Specific
Postal Address Validation Services
IP Geolocation Information
Negative Lists
Order Velocity Monitoring
Automated Decision / Order Screening
Customer Behavior Analysis
Fraud Screen – General Industry Models
Verified by Visa, MasterCard SecureCode
External Passive Verification Sources
Chargeback Management / Representment Tools
Positive Lists
Electronic Case Management System
Out-of-Wallet or In-Wallet Challenge
Customer Device ‘Fingerprinting’
Other

80%
74%
39%
39%
37%
36%
35%
34%
29%
25%
25%
22%
20%
17%
11%
6%
4%
9%
0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Figure 60 Fraud Detection Tool Usage 2007
Source: CyberSource (2008, p. 6).

The list of fraud detection tools in Figure 60 are just part of the stages of the fraud
risk management process, and are complementary to one another because using
multiple layers of fraud protection should improve protection against fraud: each
generally oversees different components of a transaction (Paintal, 2008, p. 5).
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CyberSource has used a risk management pipeline framework to highlight the trends
of online fraud prevention practices, consisting of four stages resembling a pipeline:
automated screenings, manual review, order dispositioning (accept/reject) and fraud
claim management (CyberSource, 2008, p. 5).

Figure 61 Risk Management Pipeline
Source: CyberSource (2008, p. 6).

Based on the framework in Figure 61, ‘profit leaks’ occur in the process of fraud
detection and prevention, and these form part of the overall costs of online frauds
(CyberSource, 2008, p. 6). Such ‘leaks’ are commonly contributed by, among other
things, the costs of staffing and scalability in the manual review stages, lost sales in
the dispositioning stage and fraud loss and administration in the fraud claim
management stage (CyberSource, 2008, p. 6).
The second stage of the pipeline, the manual review, is where analysts review
potentially fraudulent orders (Paintal, 2008, p. 5). In other words, every transaction
that goes through this stage must be reviewed for signs of fraudulent activities
(Bhatla, Prabhu, & Dua, 2003, p. 8). This stage represents a critical area of profit
leakage for its expensiveness, scalability limitation and consumer dissatisfaction
(CyberSource, 2008, p. 10). In addition to reviewing data associated with the orders
themselves, various parties are often contacted to validate certain information as part
of the process that may cause, among other things, inconvenience for the customers
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by making them wait (CyberSource, 2008, p. 11). As stated by Valentine (2003, p.
39):
Not only does manually reviewing orders delay shipment, but the overhead costs of
having employees review orders can take a big bite out of a merchant’s bottom line.
There is also the issue of being draconian and denying good transactions, resulting in
lost sales and unhappy customers.

Despite the existing automatic fraud detection tools and their expense, manual review
by staff is still believed to be highly reliable to see deeper into the spotted red flags
(CyberSource, 2008, p. 11). This is because generally, orders that are not accepted by
the automated screening stage using fraud detection tools will not be rejected
immediately, but must go through further review by the analysts before final
decisions are made (Paintal, 2008, p. 8).
The third stage, order dispositioning, is where the decision whether or not to accept
an order is made. According to CyberSource, the number of rejected orders may
reflect true fraud risk; and yet they may also represent ‘profit leaks’ in terms of,
among other things, valid order rejection and unnecessarily high rates of manual
review (CyberSource, 2008, p. 14). Finally, even after layers of fraud prevention
measures are employed, merchants may still have to deal with fraud costs, such as
chargebacks or billing disputes from victimised customers associated with the
occurred fraud in the fourth stage, fraud claim management (Williams K. , 2009;
CyberSource, 2008, p. 15). In this stage, merchants will attempt to recover, or at least
reduce the losses from online fraud by, among other things, reviewing and contesting
the chargebacks (CyberSource, 2008, p. 15). In practice, card associations such as
Visa and MasterCard each have specific rules on chargebacks, including procedures
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thereof344 (Williams K. , 2009). For the purpose of justification, a chargeback has a
reason code with a specific set of criteria for its justification, and failure to comply
with such criteria may result in the rejection of the chargeback (Williams K. , 2009).
Realising the need for a standard of, among other things, storage and usage of
customers’ credit card data, the major card associations (American Express, Discover
Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide and Visa U.S.A. Inc.)
jointly established the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)
in 2006 to bring consistency to the card security initiatives that would be otherwise
managed differently across the networks (Proviti Inc., 2009, p. 1). The council issues
standards that cover technical and operational requirements to protect cardholders,
and are applied globally for all merchants and organisations that store, process or
transmit cardholder data (Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council, 2008a).
Such security standards are of importance because recent developments in the ways
transactions are performed may also contribute to the emerging vulnerabilities for,
among others, merchants. As stated by the PCI SSC (2008b, p. 4):
Merchant-based vulnerabilities may appear almost anywhere in the card-processing
ecosystem including point-of-sale devices; personal computers or servers; wireless
hotspots or Web shopping applications; in paper-based storage systems; and unsecured
transmission of cardholder data to service providers. Vulnerabilities may even extend to
systems operated by service providers and acquirers, which are the financial institutions
that initiate and maintain the relationships with merchants that accept payment cards

Among the standards established by the PCI SSC is the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard (PCI DSS)345, which applies to all entities that store, process

344

For example, see Visa U.S.A. Inc. Operating Regulations: Volume 2—Dispute Resolution Rules
(Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2008b).
345
PCI DSS version 1.1 was released in September 2006 and version 1.2 was released in October 2008
(Carpenter, 2009, p. 12).
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and/or transmit cardholder data (Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council,
2008b, p. 7). In other words, generally, merchants (as well as processors) as among
the entities that store, process and/or transmit cardholder data, must comply with the
PCI DSS to accept payment cards, and non-compliance can result in fines levied by
credit card companies against them346 (Carpenter, 2009, p. 15). The PCI DSS itself
consists of 12 requirements that aim to achieve six primary goals (Payment Card
Industry Security Standards Council, 2008a).
Table 27 Summary of PCI DSS Version 1.2
Goals

PC DSS Requirements
a ▪ install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect
cardholder data
▪ do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and
other security parameters

Build and Maintain
Secure Network

Protect Cardholder Data

▪ protect stored cardholder data
▪ encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public
networks

Maintain a Vulnerability ▪ use and regularly update antivirus software or programs
Management Program
▪ develop and maintain secure systems and applications
Implement Strong Access ▪ restrict access to cardholder data by businesses that need to
Control Measures
know
▪ assign a unique ID to each person with computer access
▪ restrict physical access to cardholder data
Regularly Monitor
Test Networks

and ▪ track and monitor all access to network resources and
cardholder data
▪ regularly test security systems and processes

Maintain an Information ▪ maintain a policy that addresses information security for
Security Policy
employees and contractors
Source: Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (2008b, p. 8).

346

Other parties involved in credit card networks such as software developers and hardware
manufacturers must also in compliance with the PCI standards. The Payment Application Data
Security Standard (PA DSS) and the Payment Card Industry PIN Entry Device (PCI PED)
security requirements are designed for software developers and hardware manufacturers
respectively (Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council, 2008a).
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The existence of a clear standard is essential in lowering the crime opportunity. In
relation to data breaches, for example, the third requirement (protect stored data) of
the PCI DSS prohibits the retention of sensitive authentication data (including
encrypted ones) after authorisation, and includes: the full contents of any track from
the magnetic stripe, the card-validation code or value (the three- or four-digit number
printed on the front or back of the payment card) used to verify card-not-present
transactions and the personal identification number (PIN) or the encrypted PIN block
(Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council, 2009, pp. 22-23; Peretti, 2009,
p. 405). By complying with the existing security standards, merchants and other
parties in credit card networks in particular, and payment systems in general,
contribute to the overall crime prevention strategies within a country. In May 2007
the US state of Minnesota enacted legislation, the H.F. 1758347 (or Plastic Card
Security Act) which codified Requirement 3 of the PCI DSS, becoming the first state
in the US to do so (Peretti, 2009, p. 406). Contrary to the EMV standard (for smart
cards), the PCI DSS is well accepted in the US. As stated by CyberSource UK (2008,
p. 12):
In the US, Visa has stated that over a third of large merchants did not meet their
September 2007 deadline. The introduction of penalties across the Atlantic has also been
widely reported, with Visa beginning to levy fines of US$25,000 a month on acquirers
for each of their very largest merchants that are not PCI compliant. This, alongside the
fact that merchants are obliged to report data breaches, has encouraged higher adoption
rates in the US.

347

For the original text, see Minnesota House of Representatives (2007). This enactment was believed
to reduce the incentives for Minnesota merchants to accept credit cards because it created a direct
obligation between merchants and consumer banks, by which, in the case of data breach, if
merchants retained certain ‘prohibited’ credit card data (as stipulated by the PCI DSS), then they
had to reimburse the financial institutions that issued the card for the reasonable costs incurred to
avoid damage (Wright B. , 2007). Such direct obligation generally does not exist under normal
credit card network arrangements (Wright B. , 2007).
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According to Visa at the 2009 Security Summit, progress in PCI DSS adoption was
evidenced by the fact that approximately 90 per cent of large US merchants already
comply with the standard (VISA, 2009). In contrast to the adoption of chip and PIN
technology, the US has demonstrated greater eagerness compared to the UK
(Business Wire, 2009). For the status of PCI DSS compliance in the US as of June
2009, see Table 28.
Table 28 US PCI DSS Compliance Status (as of 30 June 30 2009)
Category (Visa
Transactions per
Year)

Estimated
Estimated % of
Population Size Visa Transactions

PCI DSS
Compliance
(%)

Confirmed Not
Storing
Prohibited Data
(%)

Level 1 Merchant*
352
(> 6 million)

50

95

99

Level 2 Merchant*
895
(1–6 million)

13

93

99

Level 3 Merchant
(e-commerce only; 2,482
20,000–1 million)

<5

Moderate

N/A

Level 4 Merchant
~ 5,000,000
(< 1 million)

32

Moderate*

TBD

VisaNet Processor
78
(Direct Connection)

100

97

High

Agent
(Downstream)

N/A

80

High

808

* Excludes new Level 1 and 2 merchants identified in 2008, due to validate by 30 September 2009 and
31 December 2009, respectively
** Level 4 compliance is moderate among stand-alone terminal merchants, but lower among
merchants using integrated payment applications
Source: Visa U.S.A. (2009).

Paintal (2008, p. 12) argues that no ‘silver bullet’ exists as a solution to the problem
of managing and reducing costs of online fraud, and thus multiple measures should
be carefully selected and used to maximise operational efficiency and sales revenue
while minimising fraud risk. For example, a bank needs to find an effective form of
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security that does not sacrifice customers’ convenience (Yelton, 2007, p. 14). In other
words, because the above fraud prevention measures may not yield the same costs or
benefits for different parties due to, among other things, availability, the
implementation of such prevention measures must be evaluated carefully to achieve
the desired results.
Although generally considered part of the criminal justice system, the area of
investigation and prosecution of identity theft thus far also correlates with crime
prevention practices within the payments system. Despite all the efforts to prevent
identity theft in the US, including the prevention of access to sensitive consumer
information (for example, credit card information) through better data security and
increased education, as well as the prevention of the misuse of information that may
be obtained by offenders, risks remain that offenders can still commit fraud
(President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 52). Therefore, strong criminal law
enforcement is required to investigate the offences and prosecute and punish
offenders (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 52).
In the US, investigations of identity theft offences are carried out by, among others,
federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
the US Secret Service, the US Postal Inspection Service, the Social Security
Administration Office of the Inspector General (SSA OIG) and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 52). In
practice, the investigations of identity theft offences can be resource intensive,
requiring extensive use of, among other things, human resources, due to various
factors, including where the offences may involve multiple victims, multiple suspects
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and multiple businesses in and out of law enforcement jurisdictions (2007, p. 6; Hoar,
2001). According to the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a, p. 52),
investigations into identity theft offences require a wide range of techniques, such as
physical surveillance, financial analysis and computer forensics. Further, the task
force (2007a, p. 52) asserts that:
In investigating identity theft, law enforcement agencies use a wide range of techniques,
from physical surveillance to financial analysis to computer forensics. Identity theft
investigations are labor-intensive, and because no single investigator can possess all of
the skill sets needed to handle each of these functions, the investigations often require
multiple detectives, analysts, and agents. In addition, when a suspected identity theft
involves large numbers of potential victims, investigative agencies may need additional
personnel to handle victim-witness coordination and information issues.

The task force’s Strategic Plan states that recently, such processes in the US have
been hindered by several problems in the areas of: coordination and information
sharing, coordination with foreign law enforcement, prosecution approaches and
initiatives, offence criminalisation statutes, skills of law enforcement officers and
prosecutors and measurements for success (President’s Identity Theft Task Force,
2007a, pp. 52-71). As previously mentioned in this chapter, among the purposes of
crime data and information collection, management and distribution is designed to
support the investigation and prosecution of identity theft. As stated by Buck et al.
(2005, p. 3):
Nationwide standardized reporting procedures and the ability to aggregate data would be
advantageous for optimal tracking and sharing of information as well as investigation
and prosecution of identity theft crimes and criminals. Automation of reports and data
sharing between public and private sector investigators will help identify multiple
offenders, organized criminal elements such as gangs, and cross jurisdictional
perpetrators.

Although federal law enforcement agencies have recognised the importance of
coordination and information sharing among themselves, as well as with the private
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sector, the task is still challenging (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, pp.
52-71). As previously discussed in this chapter, among the main reasons for this is
the information sharing among the agencies, which is still considered to be less than
ideal for achieving the intended results (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a,
p. 53). Recently, considerable efforts have been made to address such issues as
evidenced by, for example, the efforts of federal agencies to improve their
coordination in data and information sharing and the development of a universal
identity theft report form (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, pp. 29-31).
The skills of the law enforcement personnel, the prosecution approaches and
initiatives and the existing statutes are also among the main targets of the recent
developments in the criminal justice system of the US (President's Identity Theft
Task Force, 2007b, pp. 52-72). According to Newman and McNally (2005, p. 56),
the lack of skills of law enforcement officers in responding to identity theft cases has
been a shared problem among law enforcement agencies. This is believed to have
contributed to other problems, such as the difficulty of identifying identity theft in
cases where it involves other crimes, as well as the lack of any established
mechanisms to record identity theft-related incidents as separate crimes (Newman &
McNally, 2005, p. vi). The task force’s Strategic Plan emphasises the need to
continuously improve the skills of law enforcement officers and prosecutors through
training and education (Recommendation 30). Recent initiatives, such as increasing
the number of regional identity theft seminars and reviewing the curricula for federal
agencies’ officers training and education to enhance basic and advanced training on
identity theft, are among the responses to the task force’s recommendations
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(President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, pp. 46-47). Efforts to increase the
prosecutions of identity theft offenders have also been suggested by, among other
things, the increasing number of numerous successful prosecutions of identity theft
offenders (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 37). The President’s
Identity Theft Task Force (2008, p. 37) states that:
In fiscal year 2006, 1,946 defendants were charged with violating one of the two main
federal identity theft statutes, and 1,534 defendants were convicted. In fiscal year 2007,
2,470 defendants were charged, and 1,943 were convicted. This was a 26.9% increase in
numbers of defendants charged, and a 26.7% increase in the number of defendants
convicted of identity theft.

In order to successfully investigate and prosecute identity theft offenders, the
existence of relevant laws under which identity theft is recognised is of utmost
importance. For this matter, the US Congress passed two statutes which, among other
things, criminalise identity theft: the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
1998348 (18 USC. §1028(a)(7)) on 30 October 1998 and the Identity Theft Penalty
Enhancement Act 2004349 (Aggravated Identity Theft) (18 USC.§1028A) on 15 July
2004 (Richey, 2007, September 6-8, p. 1).
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act criminalises identity theft at the
federal level (Finklea, 2009, p. 4). This means that before 1998, identity theft was not
a federal crime in the US (Finklea, 2009, p. 3). The Act also provides penalties for
individuals who either commit or attempt to commit identity theft, and provides for
forfeiture of property used or intended to be used in the fraud (Finklea, 2009, p. 3). In
terms of crime data and information collection, management and distribution, as

348
349

See United States Congress (1998).
See United States Congress (2004a).
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previously mentioned in this chapter, the Act directs the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to establish the database of victim complaints and refer such information to the
relevant agencies, and also provide informational materials to victims (Finklea, 2009,
p. 4). The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, as an effort to strengthen the US
federal government’s ability to prosecute identity theft offenders, provides penalties
for aggravated identity theft, in which a convicted perpetrator could receive
additional penalties (two- to five-years’ imprisonment) for identity theft committed in
relation to other federal crimes (Finklea, 2009, p. 4). The Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act and the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act are
nearly identical, except that the Aggravated Identity Theft statute nominally applies
to a narrower range of predicate offences and imposes two-year minimum mandatory
consecutive sentences (Richey, 2007, September 6-8, p. 1).
Recently, several attempts have been made to close the gaps in identity theft-related
statutes (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 27). This is because, as stated
by the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a, p. 65), certain gaps were
identified within the statutes that might hinder the prosecution of identity theft
offenders, and thus underlined the need to review such statutes. The Identity Theft
Assumption and Deterrence Act and the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, for
example, according to the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a, p. 65),
contain two main gaps:
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First, because both statutes are limited to the illegal use of a means of identification of
“a person,” it is unclear whether the government can prosecute an identity thief who
misuses the means of identification of a corporation or organization, such as the name,
logo, trademark, or employer identification number of a legitimate business. This gap
means that federal prosecutors cannot use those statutes to charge identity thieves who,
for example, create and use counterfeit documents or checks in the name of a
corporation, or who engage in phishing schemes that use an organization’s name.
Second, the enumerated felonies in the aggravated identity theft statute do not include
certain crimes that recur in identity theft and fraud cases, such as mail theft, uttering
counterfeit securities, tax fraud, and conspiracy to commit certain offenses.

As discussed in previous chapters, the nature of modern crimes such as identity theft
by which technology may be used to, among other things, remotely perpetrate the
offences has made it necessary for federal law enforcement agencies to cooperate
with their foreign counterparts (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 58).
The cross-jurisdictional character of identity theft, for example, may lead to
jurisdictional confusion as to who is responsible for recording the crime (Newman &
McNally, 2005, p. vi). According to the task force (2007a, p. 59), among the first
steps towards better cooperation with other countries is the ratification of the
Convention on Cybercrime350 as the first multilateral instrument drafted to address
the problems of criminal activities on computer networks, such as the theft of
personal information and the exploitation of such information to commit fraud. The
Convention on Cybercrime provides a framework for substantive and procedural laws
to enhance cooperation among countries in the investigation and prosecution of
cybercrime (United States Department of Justice, 2008). Such an initiative is of
importance because the nature of computer crime has made the traditional law
enforcement no longer effective in combating the problem (Aslan, 2006, p. 129).
However, despite the obvious need for international cooperation, challenges still
exist, such as the absence of laws that directly address identity theft, or general fraud
350

See Council of Europe (2001).
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laws parallel to those in the US that impede coordination between countries when
combating identity theft (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 59). To
address this, the US government continues its outreach to its international law
enforcement partners to heighten awareness of identity theft (President's Identity
Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 34). For example, in 2007, at a European Union
conference in Portugal, the Department of Justice made a presentation on the
experiences of the US in, among other things, handling the problems of identity theft
in the country (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 34).
To evaluate the success of law enforcement efforts to combat identity theft, the
collection, management and distribution of reliable data and information is essential,
because such processes commonly involve the extensive use of resources (for
example, human resources)351. Several efforts have been made by the US government
to address such matters, including the expansion of the scope of data collection and
improvements in the mechanisms for sharing such data and information among law
enforcement agencies352.
In conclusion, a major change in the way the United States addresses the issues of
identity theft is the establishment of the President’s Identity Theft Task Force in 2006
which represents a strong commitment in combining efforts to address the problems
of identity theft in the United States. The Task Force’s 31 recommendations cover
various areas of prevention, law enforcement and victim recovery. The Task Force

351

352

See the previous discussion in this chapter on the crime data collection, management and
distribution in the US.
See the previous discussion in this chapter on the crime data collection, management and
distribution in the US.
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highlights the need for improving the quality of crime data collection, management
and distribution by having more data sources and establishing a sound mechanism for
information sharing among them including the use of standardized format to do so. A
wide range of fraud awareness initiatives have been employed by a number of
government institutions as a response to the Task Force’s recommendations. Past
incidents of terrorist attacks particularly the 9/11 appear to have strong influence over
identity management practices in the US which focuses on the prevention of the use
of personally identifiable information for serious crime such as terrorism. Just as in
other countries, business case is a major factor in technology based protection.
Whereas smartcard technology which is considered to be too expensive is slow in
acceptance, the PCI DSS for online fraud protection is adopted by the US credit card
industry much more rapidly due to the growth and development of ecommerce in the
country which makes the initiative economically more beneficial. The Task Force, in
its recommendation, also emphasizes on the need for advancing the skills of law
enforcement personnel in mitigating the threats of identity theft.

PATTERNS OF PREVENTION PRACTICES IN THE UK
As discussed in the previous chapter, just like the US, the UK has struggled to
mitigate the threats from payments fraud (particularly credit card fraud) by various
initiatives. As discussed in the previous chapter, continuous changes of fraud pattern
require continuous efforts to develop and adjust the existing fraud prevention
initiatives. Among the major factors that determine the success of payments fraud
prevention practices is the coordination of various elements in achieving the desired
objectives, which also becomes a major priority for payments fraud prevention
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practices in the UK (see the following discussions). The following discussions focus
on the major events that shaped the pattern of payments fraud prevention practices in
the UK.
The New Strategy
Coordination improvement figures among the recent major initiatives for combating
identity theft offences in the US. The need for better national coordination in
combating fraud in the UK has been a major issue over the past few years353. To cope
with this problem, several efforts have been made to improve the coordination and
cooperation in combating fraud in the UK, among which was the establishment of the
National Fraud Authority (NFA) (formerly known as the National Fraud Strategic
Authority, or NFSA).
The NFA was established on 1 October 2008 to protect the economy from fraud,
through the creation of a more hostile environment for offenders (NFSA, 2008). As
an executive agency of the Attorney General’s Office, the NFA provides England and
Wales with protection against fraud by taking forward the government’s response to
fraud based on, among other things, the 2006 Fraud Review354 (National Fraud
Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 11). The NFA was established with the strategic
priorities of (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2008):



353
354

tackling the key threats of fraud that pose the greatest harm to the UK

See National School of Government (2009, p. 22) and CyberSource UK (2008, p. 4; 2009, p. 3).
The Attorney General and the Chief Secretary commissioned the fraud review in October 2005 and
made 62 recommendations based on the review (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2007). The
enhancement of anti-fraud co-ordination by means of, among other things, a national fraud
strategy, was proposed by the review (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2007). For the original
text, see Attorney General (2006).

306



acting effectively to pursue fraudsters, hold them to account and improve the
support available to victims



reducing the UK’s exposure to fraud by building the nation’s capacity for
preventing it, by targeting actions against fraud more effectively, including
building, sharing and acting on knowledge



securing the international collaboration necessary to protect the UK from fraud.

Based on the Fraud Review, the NFA then released its National Fraud Strategy on 19
March 2009 (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2007; 2009a). Officially launched
by the Attorney General, Baroness Scotland, QC, it was the first national strategy to
tackle fraud offenders, who cost the UK approximately $US27.4 billion355 per year
(Sims, 2009b). St John’s Chambers barrister, Mr Adrian Maxwell, believes that there
has been a heavy emphasise on fraud data and good practice sharing as well as the
responsibilities of the business community (2009b). As stated by the Attorney
General, Baroness Scotland, QC at the release of the strategy (National Fraud
Strategic Authority, 2009a):
This Strategy represents an emphatic response from the Government — and the wider
economy, to the misconception that fraud is a ‘victimless crime’. Fraud costs every
person in the country £231 per year. I am very aware of the financial and personal
misery frauds, such as e-mail scams, identity theft, mortgage and credit card fraud,
through to Ponzi schemes and share sale frauds, can inflict on consumers and
businesses.

Further, Baroness Scotland, QC states (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009a):

355

See NFSA (2009b, p. 3).
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The National Fraud Strategy represents further Government action to deliver real help
for consumers and businesses by creating a more hostile environment for fraudsters. The
Strategy makes clear that there are fair rules which apply to individuals, communities
and businesses alike and there will be clear consequences for those who break them.

The three-year strategy focuses on four key priorities for shifting the balance of risk
back on to offenders (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009a):



Building and sharing knowledge about fraud (National Fraud Strategic Authority,
2009b, p. 18). In this key priority, the NFA serves as the central player for
brokering agreements that facilitate collaboration and cooperation between
counter-fraud organisations on key fraud issues (Financial Services Authority,
2009, p. 4).



Tackling the most serious and harmful fraud threats (National Fraud Strategic
Authority, 2009b, p. 19). Within this area, the NFA is working on, among other
things, tackling identity crime and mass marketing fraud, as well as examining
the effects of the recent financial recession on fraud and financial crime
(Financial Services Authority, 2009, p. 4).



Disrupting and punishing more offenders while improving support to their
victims (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 20). Within this area of
priority, together with the Attorney General’s Office, the NFA will contribute to
pursuing legal measures for lowering the barriers to successful fraud prosecutions
(Financial Services Authority, 2009, pp. 4-5).



Improving the nation’s long-term capability to prevent fraud (National Fraud
Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 21). Within this area, the NFA will launch a public
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awareness campaign as part of the NFA’s contribution to the fourth key priority
of the National Fraud Strategy (Financial Services Authority, 2009, p. 5).
In terms of building and sharing knowledge about fraud, over the years, various
efforts have been made to share information on fraud in order to understand the
actual problems for decision-making purposes. Examples of such efforts include:



The data sharing initiatives undertaken by several institutions, such as the UK
Payments Association (previously known as the APACS)356, the CIFAS (the
UK’s fraud prevention services) and the Insurance Bureau have been among the
important tools in fraud prevention practices in the UK (National Fraud Strategic
Authority, 2009b, p. 37).



The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the UK printing industry-initiated
Project Genesius, which builds intelligence about the supply of printing
equipment that could be used to create false identity documents (National Fraud
Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 37). It is basically a partnership to reduce
offenders’ access to the required equipment and supplies used to produce false
identity documents (Metropolitan Police, n.d.).

The National Fraud Authority also acknowledged that, despite the existing data and
information on fraud357, many pieces of information are gathered by separate
356
357

Discussed later in this chapter.
Based on the fraud review, major sources of fraud data and information in the UK include:
Association of British Insurers (ABI), British Retail Consortium (BRC), Commercial Insurance
Fraud Syndicate Group (MORI), Telecommunications UK Fraud Forum (TUFF), KPMG,
Mischon de Reya, Norwich Union, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Department for
Work and Pensions (DWP), Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), HM Treasury, Ministry of
Defence (MoD), National Health Service (NHS) and National Economic Research Associates
(NERA) Report (Attorney General, 2006, pp. 325-333).
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organisations or groups of organisations, obviating the need to bring together such
data and information for analysis (National School of Government, 2009, p. 23). This
is based on, among other things, the Fraud Review358, which highlights the need for
further enhancement of data sharing among different institutions of different groups
in the UK for fraud prevention, investigation and prosecution (Attorney General,
2006, pp. 93-114). According to the Fraud Review (Attorney General, 2006, p. 95):
There are a large number of databases which retain information which could be of used
to identify patterns of fraud or known fraudsters. When fraud is identified within one
dataset it is possible to highlight frauds which may not yet have come to light, or to
confirm patterns of fraud against different victims if these results can be shared with
other data sets.

As stated by the National Fraud Authority (2009b, p. 37) in its Strategy, to improve
the fraud prevention practices, enhancement of knowledge about fraud is essential.
For this, the first initiatives to be undertaken over the next few years include
(National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 37):



the establishment of the National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC) and National
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB)359



improvement of the coordination of fraud assessments



elimination of the top data-sharing blockages obstructing progress against fraud



strengthening the ability to identify losses from fraud across the economy.

358

359

In particular, the fraud review highlighted the existence of the Data Protection Act (DPA) which,
despite being an important legislation on data protection, was often not clearly understood and
was used for restricting data sharing (Attorney General, 2006, p. 100).
The NFRC aims to support the public by providing a channel for reporting fraud as well
dissemination of information on fraud (Serious Fraud Office, 2009). The City of London Police
has collaborated with the National Fraud Authority to establish the National Fraud Reporting
Centre (NRFC) as well as the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) (Serious Fraud Office,
2009).
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As stated by the National Fraud Authority (2009b, p. 37), among the reasons for the
need for enhancing knowledge about fraud is that:
Fraudsters thrive on exploiting the difficulties in gathering and sharing information
about their criminal activities. Fraud often involves many offences committed in more
than one place against more than one victim. Victims are often unsure about how and
where to report fraud. For law enforcement, this means reports may not be investigated
because intelligence and responsibility is split across different organizations.

Therefore, the establishment of NFRC and NFIB, which are managed and operated
by the City of London Police (CoLP) in collaboration with the NFA (which became
the police force with lead responsibility for fraud in England and Wales in April
2008) is expected to, among other things, reform the way victims’ reports are
managed and thus investigated (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, pp. 3738; Serious Fraud Office, 2009). Generally, the NFRC supports the public by
providing a channel for reporting fraud as well as disseminating information on fraud
(Serious Fraud Office, 2009).
The National Fraud Authority argues that the problem of the duplication of data and
information on fraud offences, as well as the gaps of knowledge thereof, has hindered
the prevention, investigation and prosecution of fraud in the UK (National Fraud
Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 39). Therefore, the removal of such duplications and
gaps is considered important for mitigating the threats of fraud in the country
(National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 39). For this matter, the NFA plans to
establish a coordinated approach for improving the fraud assessment initiatives in the
UK, including (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 39):



an annual assessment of the largest gaps in the understanding of fraud to shape
knowledge-building activity in the year ahead
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a senior fraud intelligence committee that will commission, manage and
distribute a program of fraud intelligence assessments



a program to enable all organisations that develop criminal intelligence on fraud
to work together more effectively.

As mentioned above, in addition to the available information on fraud offences, the
mechanisms by which such information is exchanged is also important, because, in
practice, exchange of information about fraud often plays a major part in a country’s
ability to prevent fraud. In other words, when such information is not shared or
provided in a timely manner, the detection and further actions related to fraud cannot
be done properly (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 39). To cope with
this problem, the National Fraud Authority (NFA) the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and
the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) sponsor a program to identify and
challenge the critical blockages that obstruct the flow of information between
organisations (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 39).
Among the important elements in understanding fraud in a country is the ability to
identify financial losses thereof. This can be a challenging task because, in practice,
fraud that can limit fraud preventers’ ability to learn about fraud offences and fraud
offenders often goes undetected, and this hinders further actions, such as the
allocation of resources to mitigate fraud threats (National Fraud Strategic Authority,
2009b, p. 39). To overcome this problem, in particular to expand knowledge on fraud
(for example, offences and offenders) at a national level, the NFA has planned to
launch a collaborative program to measure fraud losses across the economy that
could contribute to, among other things, increasing knowledge about the changing
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nature of fraud, measurement of fraud prevention success and also to encourage
organisations to implement internal fraud prevention measures (National Fraud
Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 39).
The entire course of fraud prevention, investigation and prosecution can be very
resource consuming, and thus priorities to the area where resources are allocated
must be determined efficiently (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 52).
This requires decision makers to have a clear understanding of the specific areas
where change is needed most (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 40). The
absence of such an understanding increases the risk of undermining the counter-fraud
response through duplicated or conflicting efforts (National Fraud Strategic
Authority, 2009b, p. 40). According to the NFA (2009b, p. 40), the threats of fraud
can be assessed by measures such as: volumes of crime and financial losses, impact
on victims, damage to public confidence, links to serious crime and systemic effects,
such as disruption to markets. As stated by the NFA in its National Fraud Strategy
(National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 40):
The NFSA will manage a programme across the counter-fraud community to identify
and understand the most harmful fraud threats. In key areas, the NFSA will undertake
intensive strategic reviews that take a fresh, evidence-based look at key areas of
concern. In other areas, the NFSA will co-ordinate action between partners to address
the issues preventing progress.

In combating fraud, particularly in the area of prevention, in addition to the
prevention measures to reduce crime opportunity (situational crime prevention
measures), discouraging offenders from committing offences is also an important
element. Generally, offenders are likely to stop committing fraud if they face a
credible threat of detection or sanction when prevention fails (National Fraud
313

Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 48). This requires, among other things, the existence of
laws that provide sufficient sanctions for offenders. The deterrence effects of criminal
prosecution and punishment can be regarded as the final measures in deterring fraud
(Smith, 1998, p. 5). The UK Fraud Act 2006360, which came into force on 15 January
2007, for example, was believed to have radically streamlined previously diverse
laws in England and Wales, as well as creating new offences which, to some extent,
became a ‘modernisation’ of the statute book itself (National Fraud Strategic
Authority, 2009b, p. 49). Summers (2008, p. 10) contends that the Act represents the
most radical change in the law of criminal fraud since the Theft Act 1968. In relation
to the old law, and prior to the establishment of the Fraud Act 2006, Summers (2008,
p. 10) describes how:
The overriding criticism of the law as it then stood was that there were too many
specific fraud offences, defined with reference to different types of consequences and it
was not always easy to identify which offence to charge, and often, even less easy to
secure a conviction. These in turn led prosecutors, wherever possible, to rely heavily
upon the common law offence of conspiracy defrauds.

Among the changes that the Fraud Act 2006 brought to the UK criminal justice
system, as stated by Johnson and Rogers (2007, p. 1), was that:
It introduces a new general offence of fraud in section 1, with a maximum penalty of 10
years’ imprisonment. This offence can be committed by false representation (section 2),
failure to disclose information (section 3) and by abuse of position (section 4). The
introduction of general offences is intended to provide a substantial scope for ensure that
technologically focused crime can be targeted by this provision. This covers ‘newer’
offences such as inter alia phishing and spoofing.

As stated above, the Fraud Act 2006 defines fraud in three categories: false
representation, failing to disclose information and abuse of position (Hand & Blunt,

360

For the original text, see Parliament of the United Kingdom (2006b).
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2007, p. 22). In terms of false representation, Section 2(1) of the Fraud Act 2006
rules:
A person is in breach of this section if he—
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and
(b) intends, by making the representation—
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.

In terms of fraud by failing to disclose information, Section 3 of the Fraud Act 2006
rules:
A person is in breach of this section if he—
(a) dishonestly fails to disclose to another person information which he is
under a legal duty to disclose, and
(b) intends, by failing to disclose the information—
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.

And regarding fraud by abuse of position, Section 4 the Fraud Act 2006 rules:
(1) A person is in breach of this section if he—
(a) occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act
against, the financial interests of another person,
(b) dishonestly abuses that position, and
(c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position—
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
(2) A person may be regarded as having abused his position even though his conduct
consisted of an omission rather than an act.
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Despite the arguments that some varieties of fraud are still outside such definitions361,
the above three definitions of fraud represent the Act’s attempt to characterise fraud
in the UK (Hand & Blunt, 2007, p. 22). Several specific legislations, such as the
Companies Act 2006362, the Financial Services Act 2000, the Markets Act 2000363
and the Enterprise Act 2002364 which criminalise the exploitation of the business and
financial sector complement the Fraud Act 2006 (National Fraud Strategic Authority,
2009b, p. 49). To optimise fraud-related laws, law enforcement personnel with high
levels of skills are highly needed. England and Wales, for example, have an
established network of specialist anti-fraud prosecutors, which often perform major
roles in fraud investigation and prosecution, including but not limited to: the Fraud
Prosecution Services (FPS), the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Financial Service
Authority (FSA), the Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office (RCPO) and the
Department for Work and Pensions Fraud Investigation Service (National Fraud
Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 50). These are also supported by the ongoing
development of the skills of fraud investigators in the UK, for example, the
establishment of the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit (DCPCU), funded by
the UK’s financial payments. Within this unit, investigators from various institutions
(such as the MPS, the CoLP and civilian investigators) collaborate to mitigate the
threats of payments fraud (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 51).

361

Johnson and Rogers (2007, p. 9) were of the opinion that whereas the broad nature of the Fraud Act
2006 has its advantages (for example, that it also covers offences such as e-crimes), such breadth
could also lead to problems, because minor acts could also be criminalised under the heading of
‘fraud’. See Johnson and Rogers (2007) for further discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of
the Fraud Act 2006 from a legal point of view.
362
For the original text, see United Kingdom Parliament (2006a).
363
For the original text, see United Kingdom Parliament (2000).
364
For the original text, see United Kingdom Parliament (2002).
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Along with the investigation and prosecution of offenders, assisting fraud victims is
believed to be of the same importance. As stated by the National Fraud Authority
(2009b, p. 52):
Anyone can fall victim to fraud. The emotional and financial cost to individuals can be
devastating; recovery can be difficult and lengthy, and support can be hard to find.
Fraudsters can also inflict crippling losses on businesses, which often have a direct
impact on employees’ wages and job security.

For future development, the NFA, based on the progress achieved so far, plans to
launch a new phase of anti-fraud measures that will include victim recovery,
strengthening law enforcers’ capability to investigate and prosecute fraud, holding
more fraud offenders to account and enhancing policing service for business
(National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 52).
Fraud prevention is known as a continuous process that requires long-term capability
in, among other things, minimising fraud opportunities (National Fraud Strategic
Authority, 2009b, p. 56). Improving such capability is a challenging and complex
task, and requires the sustained cooperation of a broad range of parties to establish
solid foundations (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 56). The National
Fraud Authority’ Strategy states that its immediate priorities are: building and
enhancing effective counter-fraud networks, developing, delivering and improving
public awareness and responsibility, assessing joint threats, sharing best practices and
increasing the use of horizon scanning to enhance the nation’s capability to prevent
fraud (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 58).
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Trendsetters in Plastic Card Fraud Prevention Measures in the UK Payments
System
Understanding the real problems in relation to plastic card fraud begins with the
collection of fraud data and information. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
among the major sources of plastic card fraud data and information in the UK,
particularly those of self-reporting by victims, is the Association for Payment
Clearing Services (APACS), currently known as the UK Payments Administration
(the change took place on 6 July 2009). As the provider of a forum for banks,
building societies and card issuers to work together on non-competitive issues, the
APACS also contributes to the fraud prevention efforts in the UK by, for example,
publishing payments industry fraud statistics twice a year as a definitive overview of
payments industry fraud and measures to prevent it (Association for Payment
Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 2). The Fraud Review acknowledges the APACS as
among the major sources of information on fraud losses (Attorney General, 2006, p.
325). According to the Fraud Review, the fraud reporting mechanism of APACS’
members is as follows (Attorney General, 2006, p. 235):
As at the last calendar day of the month, card issuers are required to provide details of
transactions identified as fraudulent during the reporting month irrespective of when the
transaction may have occurred. Each report is divided in to three main sections: 1)
Product details (card type, scheme, turnover); 2) Value and volume of fraud transactions
by circumstance of loss / compromise (how the fraudster was able to obtain card or card
details); 3) Value and volume of fraud transactions by place of misuse (where the
fraudster used the card or card details). Sections 2 & 3 are the same data aggregated
different ways; both cuts of data should be reported on both a gross and net basis. These
data form the basis of APACS monthly analysis and industry reporting. Twice yearly
these data are made available publicly (mid-year and year-end) via media/press/APACS
publications — all published data are gross, net losses are not made available. All fraud
figures are confirmed losses and so real losses will be higher as some will go
undetected.

Over the years, the Fraud The Facts reports, which include various fraud statistics
published by the APACS, have been among the main references in understanding
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payments fraud trends in the UK365. In the Fraud The Facts 2008 report, in addition
to plastic card fraud (debit and credit card), the APACS reviews the trends in cheque
and online banking fraud (for the 2007 period)366. The report also highlights the
trends of fraud prevention measures employed by various industries367.
In July 2009, the APACS ceased to exist, and several new and previously existing
institutions now carry on its previous roles in the UK payments system. As stated by
the UK Payments Association (UK Payments Administration, 2009):
Change is afoot. APACS, the UK payments association, has been the umbrella name for
the cooperative activity of banks, building societies and card issuers on payments and
payment systems since the mid-80s, but from 6th July 2009, we have stopped using the
name APACS in favour of names that better describe the different parts of the industry.
The UK payments industry has a number of different players and separate industry
groups.

Among the new institutions that continue APACS’ previous roles is the UK Cards
Association, formed in April 2009 as the successor body to the APACS Card
Payments Group (UK Cards Association, 2009). The association was established to

365

According to the Home Office (2007, p. 31), the APACS is considered as a better fraud figures
source than the police. The Home Office (2007, p. 30) contends that the statistics from the police
are a poor indication of the real level and trends in fraud. Over the years, the APACS has been a
contributor to many of Home Office’s publication on economic fraud such as (Hoare, Green, &
Murphy, 2010; Home Office, 2007; Home Office, 2010):
 Acquisitive crime and plastic card fraud: Findings from the 2008/09 British Crime Survey
 Mobile Phone Theft, Plastic Card and Identity Fraud: Findings from the 2005/06 British Crime
Survey

 Crime in England and Wales 2009/10 (as well as the previous years’ reports)
Therefore, for plastic card fraud statistics, instead of referring to the Home Office’s reports, this
study chose to refer to the original source, the APCA’s statistics.
The UK Cards Association was launched in April 2009 as a successor to the APACS with the
responsibility of recording information on financial losses from plastic card fraud in the UK
(Home Office, 2009, p. 66). Although the data provided by the UK Cards Association to the Home
Office are not part of the Government Statistical Service and are not National Statistics, they are a
good source of information on the level of plastic card fraud in the UK (Home Office, 2009, p.
66).
366
See Association for Payment Clearing Services (2008b).
367
See Association for Payment Clearing Services (2008b).
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promote cooperation between industry participants on non-competitive matters of
mutual interest and advance the industry for the ultimate benefit of its members’
consumer and retail customers (UK Cards Association, 2009). These include, but are
not limited to activities such as (UK Cards Association, 2009):



representing the card industry’s interests to government, the European
Commission, regulators, the media and other influential stakeholders



promoting best practice across the industry in terms of transparency, responsible
lending and data sharing



rollout of infrastructure (such as chip and PIN) and support for new technologies
(such as contactless card payments)



managing accreditation schemes for card protection agencies, Industry Hot Card
File (IHCF) data recipients and PIN mailers



ensuring that the UK card industry is a model market in terms of card security
and fraud prevention



publishing key industry information and statistics



developing standards that ensure inter-operability



influencing the development of card payments globally.

In terms of financial fraud prevention, one institution specifically created for this
purpose is the Financial Fraud Action UK (FFA), under which the financial services
industry coordinates its activities on fraud and presents a united front against
financial fraud and its effects (UK Payments Administration, 2009). Established on 6
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July 2009, this institution continues the previous roles of the APACS as the leading
voice on fraud within the payments industry (UK Payments Administration, 2009).
Another source of payment card fraud data and information is the Industry Hot Card
File (IHCF), which contains information on more than six million cards reported lost
or stolen, and contributed to the prevention of over 491,991 cases of attempted fraud
in 2008 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2009b, p. 30). The system was
established in 1993 to combat fraud on lost or stolen cards (British Bankers'
Association, 2009). Subscribed to by over 80,000 retailers, it is an industry database
against which retailers can check every card transaction for cards being used
fraudulently (UK Payments Administration, n.d.). In other words, a card is checked
against the database when it is swiped in a transaction, and the retailer is alerted when
its details match those on file (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2009b, p.
30). Currently, in addition to all major banks and card issuers in the UK, card
schemes such as Visa, MasterCard Europe, Maestro, American Express and Diner’s
Club also support the system by providing continuous updates to the IHCF in real or
near-real time, by which the crime opportunity for the ‘same-day fraud’ can be
reduced (Card Watch, n.d.(a)). The IHCF is particularly essential in the prevention of
the card-not-present fraud (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2009b, p. 30).
After possessing the necessary understanding on the actual problems based on the
previously collected data and information, the next step is to use this knowledge in
fraud prevention, as well as investigation and prosecution. This requires, among other
things, cooperation between members of payments systems and the criminal justice
system. As mentioned above, an example of such cooperation is the establishment of
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the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit (DCPCU) in 2002, funded by the
banking industry, within which, members of the UK payments system and criminal
justice system (for example, police officers and banking industry fraud investigators)
collaborate to tackle organised card and cheque fraud across the country (Association
for Payment Clearing Services, 2009b, p. 28). The unit was launched on 29 April
2002 as a two-year pilot, and after proving successful, it was established as a
permanent unit (Sims, 2009a). The areas of coverage of the DCPCU’s investigations
include cash machine fraud, plastic card counterfeiting, mail non-receipt fraud,
identity fraud, card-not-present fraud and cheque fraud (Dedicated Cheque and
Plastic Crime Unit, n.d.). Such cooperation was further enhanced by the
establishment of the Payments Industry and Police Joint Intelligence Unit (PIPJIU) in
March 2008 as an integral part of the DCPCU. It was formed through the
amalgamation of the banking industry’s Fraud Intelligence Bureau (FIB) and the
intelligence section of the DCPCU (Association for Payment Clearing Services,
2009b, p. 28). As an enhanced intelligence unit, the PIPJIU uses a secure and robust
reporting mechanism to gather information on fraud, which is then analysed and
shared among bank officials and police officers throughout the country (Sims,
2009b). The DCPCU’s achievements include achieving more than $US617 million in
savings from reduced fraud activity, recovering over 45,000 counterfeit cards,
recovering just under 290,000 compromised card numbers and securing 240
convictions on fraud-related matters (Sims, 2009a).
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In addition to the existing initiatives, the CIFAS368, established in 1988, is a not-forprofit membership association dedicated to the prevention of financial crime and staff
fraud in the UK by providing fraud prevention services to its members (CIFAS (n.d.).
Initially established as an association under the auspices of the Consumer Trade
Association, CIFAS was later incorporated as an independent company limited by
guarantee on 22 February 1991 (CIFAS, n.d.). Currently it has 270 members across
areas that include banking, credit cards, asset finance, retail credit, mail order,
insurance, telecommunications and factoring and share dealing, and these members
share information on fraud and fraud prevention issues (Association for Payment
Clearing Services, 2009b, p. 31). The CIFAS has also been represented on the
Identity Fraud Communications and Awareness Group (IFCAG) (Association for
Payment Clearing Services, 2009b, p. 31).
In terms of technology-based protection, since its nationwide rollout in 2003 in the
UK, chip and PIN technology369 has been considered as a major fraud prevention
measure in the country (as well as around the world). The UK was seen as the leader
in the implementation of such technology, because it was the first in the world to
complete its chip and PIN technology national rollout (Association for Payment
Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 27). Basically, chip and PIN technology employs twofactor authentication in securing a credit card transaction: something that a customer
has (the chip card) and something that a customer knows (the PIN) (Smart Payment
Association, 2005, p. 6). The chip on the card stores data more securely (compared to
368
369

Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (historical acronym) (DebtWizard, 2009).
The initiative was named the chip and PIN program, and was coordinated by the British Retail
Consortium (BRC) and the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) (Chip and PIN,
2003b).
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magnetic stripe) and the personal identification number (PIN) proves that a customer
is who they say they are (Chip and PIN Programme Management Organisation,
2003, p. 11). The chip and PIN system in the UK complies with the EMV (the
EuroPay, MasterCard and Visa370 protocol suite) standard for its interoperability
(Drimer, Murdoch, & Anderson, 2008, p. 4). Technically, as explained by Drimer et
al. (2008, p. 4):
In EMV, customers authorize a transaction by inserting a bank smartcard and entering a
PIN into a PIN entry device (PED); the PIN is verified by the smartcard, which is in turn
authenticated to the PED by a public-key certificate. Transactions may be further
authenticated online by the card issuer. The move from magnetic strip to chip has
reduced the use of counterfeit cards domestically, but fraud abroad has more than
compensated.

According to the APACS (2008b, p. 27), chip and PIN technology constitutes the
biggest change to the way consumers pay since decimalisation, and is part of a global
program to cope with the increasing levels of plastic card fraud. The APACS (2008b,
p. 27), in its Fraud The Facts 2008 report argues that, statistically speaking,
evidences of the successes of chip and PIN technology include that:


Over the past three years, losses on face-to-face transactions on the UK high street
have reduced by 67% from $ 429 m in 2004 to $ 143 last year.



Fraud on lost and stolen cards$ 110 m ) and mail non-receipt fraud ($ 20 m) are now
at their lowest levels for 10 years.



UK cash machine fraud has decreased by 44%, last year.



Domestic levels of counterfeit card fraud have decreased by 32% in the past year.

The nationwide implementation of chip and PIN technology in the UK started on 19
May 2003 in a trial in Northampton. The city was considered demographically
representative of the UK as a whole, and thus was expected to help to confirm the
best ways to roll out the then new technology and communications program to
370

See EMV (n.d.).
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consumers worldwide (Chip and PIN, 2003b). The trial invited a wide range of
participants, including shops371 and card networks (for example, Visa and
MasterCard (Chip and PIN, 2003b). Based on the report by the Chip and PIN
Program Management Organisation, Checking Out Chip and PIN: The Northampton
Trial Report, published in September 2003, the trial was generally considered a
success (Chip and PIN Programme Management Organisation, 2003, p. 4). For
example, as stated by the Chip and PIN Program Management Organisation (2003, p.
4):
Customers took to the new system extremely well and attitudes towards chip and PIN
were very encouraging. The media also gave heavyweight coverage to the scheme and
highlighted its importance as a key weapon in fighting card fraud in the UK.
Communications, from centrally co-ordinated advertising and public relations to
individual bank and retailer publicity, were also tested in advance of rollout and were
well received by customers.

Following the success of the Northampton trial, the national Chip and PIN rollout
was then initiated in October 2003, and was also backed by the UK banking and
retail industries (Chip and PIN, 2004a). Despite the absence of sanctions by the
government (for example, the central bank) for failure to comply with the chip and
PIN standards, the card networks decided that from 1 January 2005, retailers who
upgrade to chip and PIN technology are entitled to liability shift in cases of fraud on
chip and PIN cards where they are completely protected from the cost of card fraud,
provided all the security standards and procedures are followed (Chip and PIN,
2004b; 2005b). In other words, as stated by Mr Steve Sinclair372 of the chip and PIN

371

372

For examples, ASDA (Corby), Blenders, Braylake Cars, Chanse Leather Goods, Dollond and
Aitchison, Gamestation, Health Quest, Holiday Inn, Montague Jeffery, Phones 4 U, Pitsford
Water Cycles, three Safeway stores, Sanity Entertainment (Our Price), Sisley, Spinadisc,
Supabikes, Tie Rack and Vodafone (Chip and PIN, 2003b).
The communications director of the chip and PIN program of the time.
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program, after 1 January 2005, retailers who have not upgraded to chip and PIN
technology are liable for plastic fraud that takes place in their shops and could have
been prevented by the technology (Chip and PIN, 2003a). Additionally, after 14
February 2006, cardholders must use their PINs instead of signatures for making
transactions, otherwise their cards may be declined with the option of signing no
longer guaranteed (Chip and PIN, 2005a)373.
Just as with its first trial in Northampton, the national rollout of the chip and PIN
program also generally received a good reception by society at large and, by the end
of 2005, 99 per cent of cardholders in the UK (41.5 million cardholders) had at least
one chip and PIN card in their possession. By August 2006 more than 98 per cent of
all chip and PIN card transactions were PIN verified374. The success of the chip and
PIN program was contributed to by, among other things, the extensive and intensive
initiatives to educate retailers and cardholders. For example, the I ♥ PIN campaign,
launched in October 2005, aimed to raise consumer awareness, particularly to remind
those who had not used their PINs to start doing so (Chip and PIN, 2005a). The fourmonth campaign included initiatives such as a PR campaign, online information and
customer leaflets and point-of-sale material for shops and staff to use (Chip and PIN,
2005a). To support the chip and PIN national rollout, the program also released
publicly available materials for educational purpose, for example:

373

The exceptions were made for: cardholders with magnetic stripe cards who were still waiting for
their new cards, cardholders from overseas with magnetic stripe cards and disabled cardholders
with chip and signature cards (Chip and PIN, 2006b).
374
See Chip and PIN (2006a; 2006c).
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Get Ready for Chip and PIN (an implementation guide for businesses)375



Staff Guide to Chip and PIN: Top Chip and PIN Tips for Using Chip and PIN at
Point of Sale376



The Chip and PIN Guide: Remembering Your PIN377



Guide for Retailers after 14th February: Always Follow the Prompts378.

Although the system is statistically (financially) satisfactory, from a technical point
of view, some criticisms were levelled at, among other things, the level of security of
the chip and PIN system. According to Anderson et al. (n.d.), the anti-fraud system of
the EMV can be defeated, at least in theory, by using methods such as ‘shoulder
surfing’ and fraudulent fallback transactions379. Shoulder surfing occurs when an
offender unlawfully obtains a card’s PIN by secretly observing the customer keying
their PIN into the terminal (Anderson, Bond, & Murdoch, n.d.). Because some
customers are from countries (such as the US) where chip and PIN technology is not
prevalent, as well as the fact that some UK customers may also use their credit cards
in such countries, generally, the chip and PIN system in the UK can still accept
magnetic stripe credit card transactions (Anderson, Bond, & Murdoch, n.d.). On the
other hand, generally the UK chip credit cards are also designed to be able be used on
magnetic stripe terminals (Anderson, Bond, & Murdoch, n.d.). Additionally, based on
the existing credit card rules of operation, the magnetic stripe system in a chip and

375

See Chip and PIN (2004c).
See Chip and PIN (2004d).
377
See Chip and PIN (2004e).
378
See Chip and PIN (2005c).
379
For further discussion on the weaknesses of the chip and PIN technology from technical point of
view, see Anderson et al. (n.d.) and Bond (2006).
376
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PIN card is also used as an alternative means of authorising transactions whenever
the chip cannot be used (for example, broken chip), and is known as a fallback
mechanism380. This means that it is possible for fraud offenders to doctor cards (for
example, using a broken chip card and encoded stolen data on the magnetic stripe as
well as a stolen PIN) so that the fallback situation will occur and a fraudulent
transaction can be made (Anderson, Bond, & Murdoch, n.d.).
In February 2008 a group of researchers from the University of Cambridge released a
report381 based on their previous examinations of two widely deployed models of PIN
entry devices (PEDs), whose results suggest that the devices failed to protect
customers’ card details and PINs adequately (Collins, 2008). The researchers claim
that, by using a self-made low-cost interceptor, they managed to record PIN and
account details that were transmitted between the card and the PIN pad (2006;
Collins, 2008). As stated by the researchers in the report (Drimer, Murdoch, &
Anderson, 2008, p. 3):
We have implemented practical low-cost attacks on two certified, widely-deployed
PEDs — the Ingenico i3300 and the Dione Xtreme. By tapping inadequately protected
smartcard communications, an attacker with basic technical skills can expose card
details and PINs, leaving cardholders open to fraud. We analyze the anti-tampering
mechanisms of the two PEDs and show that, while the specific protection measures
mostly work as intended, critical vulnerabilities arise because of the poor integration of
cryptographic, physical and procedural protection.

In response to the findings by the Cambridge University researchers, Ms Sandra
Quinn, spokeswoman of the APACS of the time, argued that their findings were the
results of the removal of terminals out of their natural environments into a laboratory
380

381

See Visa International Operating Regulations: Volume I — General Rules (Visa Inc., 2008a) and
LogicGroup (n.d., p. 8).
Thinking Inside the Box: System-Level Failures of Tamper Proofing (Drimer, Murdoch, &
Anderson, 2008).
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setting, where they were tampered with and had interceptors installed (Vijayan,
2007). Ms Quinn believes that, in practice, such a fraud method is not a realistic
threat to retailers (Vijayan, 2007). Furthermore, Ms Quinn states (Association for
Payment Clearing Services, 2007):
We are aware of the Cambridge University team’s findings. There is absolutely no
evidence at all to suggest that this has actually happened in the UK. However, as with all
potential security threats, we will be looking closely at their findings to assess whether
any action is required. Keeping customers’ cards and accounts as safe as possible is a
primary concern of every bank. Without customer confidence no bank could operate.
Chip and PIN was never going to eradicate fraud, but our cards are certainly much safer
because of it. Decreasing card fraud figures prove this. Most critically, any innocent
customer who is the victim of this or any other type of card fraud, is protected by the
Banking Code, which means that they will not lose out financially.

The University of Cambridge researchers’ findings, and the responses to those
findings, underline that perfect security measures do not exist, and the measures
alone (without additional supports such as customers’ awareness and retailers’ sound
fraud prevention policies) do less or even nothing at all to prevent fraud.
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, one undisputed weakness of the chip
and PIN technology exists: the technology does not protect online transactions. To
complement the inherent weakness of the chip and PIN technology (for example, lack
of protection in online transactions)382, the UK card industry has also developed a
range of online fraud prevention measures, such as the address verification system,
Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode. Based on the study by CyberSource
UK383, in 2007 the two most common fraud management tools employed by online

382

383

See the discussion in the previous chapter on the impacts of the introduction of the chip and PIN
technology.
The study was conducted through online responses and telephone surveys of 165 UK-based
businesses on matters such as business operations and experiences with fraud and fraud
prevention (CyberSource UK, 2008, p. 3).
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merchants in the UK were the card verification number (CVN)384 and address
verification services (AVS)

385

(CyberSource UK, 2008, p. 11). According to

CyberSource UK, while the CVN (90 per cent) and the AVS (84 per cent) remain
more common, the fastest growing fraud prevention tool in that year was payer
authentication (also known as Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode) 386 (71
per cent), possibly due to the June 2007 Maestro mandate (CyberSource UK, 2008, p.
11).
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Figure 62 Trends in Fraud Management Tools in 2007 in the UK (by Percentage
of Merchants)
Source: CyberSource UK (2008, p. 11).
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See the previous discussion on the North American version of the study.
See the previous discussion on the North American version of the study.
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See the previous discussion on the North American version of the study.
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Based on its 2007 study (published in 2008), CyberSource UK concludes, among
other things, that the lack of nationwide coordination in fraud prevention remains a
major problem in the UK. As stated by CyberSource UK (2008, p. 4):
For all the continued growth and optimism in the online retail industry, one message has
come through loud and clear from merchants this year. Efforts to tackle fraud are being
hampered by a lack of coordination. Merchants have complained about the quality of
information from the card schemes and acquirers, and a lack of interest and inconsistent
approach from the police. The suggestion from some is for a single, independent body to
track organized fraud efforts, share information, direct police efforts, liaise with the card
schemes and lobby the government on improving policy.

As discussed above, the establishment of the National Fraud Authority (previously
called the National Fraud Strategic Authority) in October 2008, and Financial Fraud
Action UK in July 2009, can also be regarded as part of the efforts to address such
problems in the UK. Just like the North American version of the study, the
CyberSource UK report used the risk management pipeline to illustrate how UK
online merchants allocate their resources to prevent online fraud387. Based on the risk
management pipeline model, the total cost of fraud goes beyond the direct losses of
the offences, because it also includes the cost of rejecting valid orders, the cost of
manual order review and administration costs (CyberSource UK, 2008, p. 14). Just as
with chip and PIN technology for offline credit card transactions, the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is becoming a standard for online credit
card transaction security388. As discussed previously in this chapter, the PCI DSS was
established to prevent card fraud and was formed out of the collaboration of major
credit card schemes such as Visa, MasterCard, American Express, JCB and
Discovery (Condon, 2008). However, unlike the seemingly easy reception of the PCI
387
388

See the previous discussion on the North American version of the study.
See the previous discussion in this chapter on the PCI DSS specifications and requirements.
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DSS in the US, the UK has been slow in its adoption of the standard (Hummingbird,
2008; Business Wire, 2009). CyberSource UK, in its study, states that (CyberSource
UK, 2008, p. 12):
As forecast in last year’s report, a large number of UK merchants missed the June 2007
deadline for achieving PCI DSS compliance. …In the UK, survey respondents have
highlighted the lack of clear information over the June deadline for compliance and the
fines to be levied. Currently 27% of all merchants — 39% of small merchants — have
no plans to achieve PCI DSS compliance in the next year.

Based on the previous discussions in this chapter, financial costs and benefits
considerations are likely factors behind the slow reception of the PCI DSS in the UK,
because the country seems to prioritise offline credit card transaction security (for
example, by using chip and PIN technology)389. The previous national rollout of chip
and PIN technology, which required significant resources, may have caused the slow
reception, because compliance with the PCI standards390 also requires significant
resources391.
Despite all the newly developed fraud prevention measures, none is a ‘silver bullet’
for solving all the problems in fraud cost minimisation. Thus, selecting the more
effective and efficient combination of measures will always be the better option
(Paintal, 2008, p. 12). The UK, particularly in its payments industry, should continue
its efforts in developing measures to tackle payments fraud in the country. Such
efforts must also be coordinated properly, so as to achieve the intended results,
particularly to ensure that the benefits of the fraud prevention practices exceed the
costs.
389

For example, see Vodat International (2009) and Litan (2008, p. 2).
See the previous discussion in this chapter on the requirements of the PCI standards.
391
See Litan (2008, p. 2).
390
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In terms of identity management, the National Identity Scheme has been a major
issue since the Identity Cards Bill received Royal Assent on 30 March 2006 and
became Identity Cards Act 2006392. The scheme consists of eight important elements
(London School of Economics, 2005, pp. 24-25; Whitley & Hosein, 2008, p. 669):


The National Identity Register, which is a central population register where the
personal details of UK citizens aged 16 years and over will be recorded and is
functioning as the information the system’s information hub.



National Identity Registration Number, which is a unique number assigned to
every individual. The number serves as the access key into information on the
Register.



Biometrics, which is physical identification of such as fingerprinting and may
also include facial recognition, signature and iris recognition used as means of
data matching, identification and verification. Such data will be stored on the
Register as well as on the identity card.



The identity card. A card generated from and contains part of information in the
Register.



Legal obligations. A requirement to produce the card to obtain public services is
contained in the Clause 15 of the Act.



Administrative convergence. Various agencies and organizations will use the
number and the Register for access and disclosure as well as possible

392

For original text, see United Kingdom Parliament (2006c).
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administrative base in the future. All registration numbers of an individual are
allowed to be brought together.


Cross Notification. Should a person’s details change, agencies will notify each
other. However, Secretary of State can disclose details from the registers to other
agencies without the individual’s consent.



New crimes and penalties. A number of new crimes and offences to ensure
citizen’s compliance with the system requirement are established by the Act.

The Home Office argues that the benefits of the Identity Cards Scheme include:
strategic benefits (for example, faster delivery of public and private sector services);
quantifiable benefits (for example, reduction of social and economic costs of crime);
and non-quantifiable benefits (for example, more secure online public and private
sector business) (Home Office, 2005, p. 1). According to the Identity and Passport
Service, overall, the National Identity Scheme (including the Identity Cards Scheme)
will benefit UK citizens as it will (Identity and Passport Service, 2008, p. 3):


Make life easier by providing you with an easy and convenient means of proving
your identity;



Help protect you from identity theft and fraud by providing a simple, universal
means of proving your identity;



Reassure us all that workers in positions of trust, such as people working airside at
airports, are who they say they are;



Help protect the country from illegal immigration and reduce illegal employment;
and,



Make it harder for criminals to use false or multiple identities and thus protect us all
from crime and terrorism.
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Criticism surfaced soon after the Identity Cards Bill was introduced and continued
until after the Identity Cards Act 2006 was passed. Many perceives that the existence
of identity card as a form of surveillance and is a major threat to privacy and civic
freedom (Beynon-Davies, 2009, p. 3). Beynon-Davies (2009, p. 5) also contends that
maintaining a large centralized personal identity database will be very difficult which
will have impact on the accuracy of the data within. The importance of the single ID
card will make it difficult if for some reasons an individual does not have the card
(for example, stolen) and thus he or she will not be able to access, for example, health
services even if it is just temporarily (Beynon-Davies, 2009, p. 3). The threat of
cybercrime also becomes a major concern related to the security of the National
Identity Register. A recent study on information security practices and incidents in
the UK by Infosecurity Europe and PricewaterhouseCoopers (published in 2010)
revealed that (Infosecurity Europe & PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010, pp. 2-3):


92% of large respondents had a security incident in the last year.



83% of small respondents had a security incident in the last year.



62% of large respondents were infected by a virus or malicious software in
the last year.



46% of large respondents had staff lose or leak confidential data.



45% of confidentiality breaches were very serious or extremely serious
(compared with only 15% of other types of breaches).

These have been a major factor behind the resistance to the National Identity Scheme
especially after the case of data breach at the Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) in October 2007 (Beynon-Davies, 2009, p. 8). As stated by the British
government officials, the data breach was caused by the loss of two discs containing
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personal identification of around 25 million people (40% of population) that was
sent from the HMRC office to National Audit Office (NAO) (Fisher, 2007). The
discs were password protected but the data within them including names, addresses,
birth dates, national insurance numbers and banking details were not encrypted
(Fisher, 2007). This led into the resignation of the HMRC Chairman, Paul Gray
(Fisher, 2007). An enquiry by PricewaterhouseCoopers senior partner, Keiran
Poynter resulted in 45 recommendations to address the problem of weak data security
at the HMRC (Poynter, 2008, pp. 65-87).
A study by the London School of Economics on the Identity Cards Bill revealed
many weaknesses within the National Identity Scheme including the use of
biometrics that is considered to be less reliable that what the government claimed.
The scheme was believed to be ‘too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive
and lack a foundation of public trust and confidence’ (London School of Economics,
2005, p. 5). In its report, The Identity Project: An Assessment of the UK Identity
Cards Bill and Its Implications, the London School of Economics concludes that
(London School of Economics, 2005, p. 5):
The technology envisioned for this scheme is, to a large extent, untested and
unreliable. No scheme on this scale has been undertaken anywhere in the world.
Smaller and less ambitious systems have encountered substantial technological
and operational problems that are likely to be amplified in a large-scale, national
system. The use of biometrics gives rise to particular concern because this
technology has never been used at such a scale.
…All identity systems carry consequential dangers as well as potential benefits.
Depending on the model used, identity systems may create a range of new and
unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial
costs, increased security threats and unacceptable imposition on citizens. The
success of a national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and
cooperative approach involving all key stakeholder groups including an
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independent and rolling risk assessment and a regular review of management
practices. We are not confident that these conditions have been satisfied in the
development of the Identity Cards Bill. The risk of failure in the current proposals
is therefore magnified to the point where the scheme should be regarded as a
potential danger to the public interest and to the legal rights of individuals.
Finally, after years of criticisms, the British government decides that it is time to put
an end to the National Identity Scheme. The Home Secretary, Theresa May,
announced on 27 may 2010 that the National Identity Card scheme would be
scrapped within 100 days (Travis, 2010). The first step of doing so is the introduction
of the Identity Documents Bill393 which will invalidate the Identity Card Scheme
(Identity and Passport Service, 2010). The Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg,
argued (Identity and Passport Service, 2010):
"The wasteful, bureaucratic and intrusive ID card scheme represents everything
that has been wrong with government in recent years.
"By taking swift action to scrap it, we are making it clear that this government
won't sacrifice people's liberty for the sake of Ministers' pet projects.
"Cancelling the scheme and abolishing the National Identity Register is a major
step in dismantling the surveillance state - but ID cards are just the tip of the
iceberg. Today marks the start of a series of radical reforms to restore hard-won
British freedoms."
In conclusion, following the US a major change in the fraud prevention practices in
the UK is the more coordinated nature thereof. This is marked by the establishment
of the National Fraud Authority (NFA) (formerly known as the National Fraud
Strategic Authority, or NFSA) in October 2008 which then released the National
Fraud Strategy in 2009. The Strategy outlines the importance of areas such as public
awareness, information and knowledge sharing, legal deterrence and victim support.
The United Kingdom is known as the first country in the world to complete a national
393

For original text, see House of common (2010).
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rollout of the smartcard technology which becomes a major driver behind the
changing landscape of credit card fraud trends in the country. Fraud data and
information are collected, managed and distributed by institutions such as the
APACS, the NFIB and the NFRC to shed light on the actual problems that need to be
solved. Future improvements include assessing gaps in the understanding of fraud to
establish knowledge building activity and collaboration to measure fraud losses
across the economy. In terms of legal deterrence, the Fraud Act 2006 is an example
of a major change in the improvement of legal deterrence for fraud. This is also
supported by the collaboration to tackle fraud by, for example, the establishment of
the DCPCU to tackle organised card and cheque fraud across the country.

PATTERNS OF PREVENTION PRACTICES IN AUSTRALIA
The previous analysis on the credit card fraud prevention practices in the US and the
UK indicate that the growing threats of the crime, at least from a financial point of
view, were major reasons that significant resources were allocated for fraud
prevention, investigation and prosecution in those countries. However, the Australian
case differs because, statistically speaking, over the years, and compared to other
countries such as the US and the UK, the fraud rate in the country has always been
low. Figure 63 shows the fraud rate in Australia in 2006, 2007 and 2008, based on the
statistics of the Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA).
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Figure 63 Payment Fraud in Every $US
Source: Australian Payments Clearing Association (2009d) (2009d).

In relation to the payment card fraud rate for the year 2008, the APCA (2009d)
(2009d) states:
Despite the increase in credit and charge card fraud, Australia’s total payment card fraud
rate remains relatively low when compared to other countries. At 32 cents in every
$AU1,000, Australia’s debit card, credit card and charge card fraud rate is about a
quarter of the UK’s which is the equivalent $AU1.20 in every $AU1,000.

Previously, in the APCA’s media release (30 May 2009), in relation to the payment
card fraud rate in 2007, Mr Chris Hamilton394 of the APCA contends that (Australian
Payments Clearing Association, 2008d):
While Australia’s payment card fraud rate has increased over the last 12 months it still
remains low by global standards. For example, the UK’s payment card fraud rate is the
equivalent of $AU1.18 in every $AU1,000 as against slightly under 28 cents in
Australia.

394

The chief executive officer of the APCA.

339

The APCA (2006) believes that the low level of payments fraud in Australia was due
in part to the industry’s fraud prevention efforts. However, as mentioned above, the
statistically low fraud rate over the years has also kept low the incentives to invest
more on fraud prevention practices. For example, as previously discussed in this
chapter, the UK allocated significant resources to strengthen their payments fraud
prevention practices by implementing chip and PIN technology, which significantly
decreased the crime opportunities for counterfeit card fraud and made the country the
first in the world to complete a national chip and PIN rollout395. Similar nationally
coordinated initiatives396 were started in Australia, marked by the establishment of
the Chip Payments Program for Australia (CPPA)397 in January 2008, supported by
21 organisations, including financial institutions, major retailers and international
card schemes to provide industry-wide coordination and infrastructure to support
Australia’s migration to chip cards (Australian Payments Clearing Association,
2008a, p. 17).
The fraud rate in Australia has always been low, despite the less robust fraud
prevention practices in the country compared to those of the US and the UK. This
395

See the previous discussion on the fraud prevention practices in the UK.
The first chipped credit card in Australia was issued by the ANZ in October 2006 (ANZ, 2009). In
terms of national strategy for fraud prevention, although not yet at the extensive level of those of
the US and the UK, there have been some efforts to move on the same path. For example, the
Police Commissioners’ Conference Australasian Identity Crime Working Party (AICWP), with
representatives from all Australasian jurisdictions and the Australian Crime Commission, is
chaired by the Australasian Centre for Policing Research. The AICWP formulated the Australasian
Identity Crime Policing Strategy 2006–2008 (preceded by the Australasian Identity Crime Policing
Strategy 2003–2005) to complement the E-Crime Policing Strategy in tackling the problems of
identity crime by focusing on areas such as: prevention, victim assistance, partnerships, education
and capability, resource and capacity and regulation and legislation (Lormel, 2008). For the
original text of these strategies, see Police Commissioners' Conference Electronic Crime Steering
Committee (2001; 2003) and Australasian and South West Pacific Region Police Commissioners’
Conference (2005).
397
Discussed further later in this chapter.
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340

suggests the possibility that despite the absence of reference398 as to exactly why
Australia has a low fraud rate, Australia may not face fraud threats as great as those
of the US and the UK, partly due to its geographic distance from countries with
relatively lax fraud controls (Risk Magazine, 2008). From a cost-benefit point of
view, the lesser threats of fraud contribute later to the decreased necessity for
Australia to invest more on payments fraud prevention, because doing so may create
more costs than benefits. By referring to the case of France, where the chip and PIN
technology has been widely adopted, Mr Chris Hamilton399 of the APCA contends
that (Hamilton, 2007a):
…the French payments system had three distinctive features that led to its adoption of
chip technology significantly earlier than many others: relatively high fraud losses,
relatively high telecommunications costs (leading to electronic card payment solutions
that did not rely on online verification) and a relatively centralized, growth-oriented,
national card infrastructure. None of this had much to do with technological capability.
Necessity is the mother of invention, not the other way around.

398

Even the APCA, which is a regulatory body that conducts payment fraud data and information
collection, management and distribution, states that it does not know exactly what caused the fraud
rate to be continuously low over the years (Risk Magazine, 2008).
399
The chief executive officer of the APCA.
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Figure 64 Crime Prevention Wheel Model400
Source: Australian Payments Clearing Association (2008c, p. 3).

According to the APCA, from the crime prevention wheel401 point of view,
Australia’s efforts to tackle fraud are mostly under the prevention quadrant; whereas
overseas financial industries spend greater efforts on the other three quadrants
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2008c, p. 3).
Despite the statistically lower fraud threats in the country, in practice, so far as
offence displacement is concerned, the need for improving Australia’s defence
against fraud is pronounced, because many other countries have already improved
400

401

The fraud types depicted in the figure are: (1) general fraud, (2) ID fraud, (3) e-fraud, (4) card
fraud, (5) cheque fraud, (6) superannuation fraud, (7) internal fraud and (8) lending fraud
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2008c, p. 3). Each * symbol represents an industrywide initiative to counter fraud within the fraud category (Australian Payments Clearing
Association, 2008c, p. 3).
The model classifies initiatives across eight of the most common fraud types and four quadrants:
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution (Australian Payments Clearing Association,
2008c, p. 3).
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their fraud countermeasures. Halliday et al. (2007), referring to the 2007 APCA fraud
statistics, argues that:
Historically, Australian financial institutions have been very good at preventing
payments fraud, especially when compared to other jurisdictions. As an example, at 24
cents in every $AU1000, Australia’s plastic card (debit, credit and charge card) rate of
fraud is less than a third of that in the United Kingdom which remains the equivalent of
about 90 cents for every $AU1000. This does not mean Australia can be complacent. As
other jurisdictions improve their defences there will be an inevitable shift by criminals
as they go forum shopping for weaker defence payment systems. Fraudsters are never
restricted geographically in this age of the internet.

Over the years, the payments fraud prevention practices in Australia have been
depicted as a structure of four layers: user, institution, system and government and
industry (Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007; Australian Payments Clearing
Association, 2009d, p. 3).
Each of the four layers plays its part in the whole fraud prevention process, and all
elements support one another by making different (yet equally important)
contributions to the entire course of payments fraud prevention. In the first level, the
end users (such as customers) can ensure that they protect their cards and PINs at all
times, and merchants can ensure that their staff follow the existing counter-fraud
practices (Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007; Australian Payments Clearing
Association, 2009d, p. 3).
In the second level, institutions (such as banks) can design and implement effective
and efficient fraud prevention measures as part of their fraud risk management
systems (Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007). This level is where the Australian
institutions have already invested significant amount of resources for fraud detection
and risk management systems (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2009d, p.
343

3). In the third level, schemes such as Visa and MasterCard can set security standards
and develop measures (such as those for online fraud prevention) with which member
institutions must comply (Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007; Australian Payments
Clearing Association, 2009d, p. 3).

Figure 65 The Four Layers of Fraud Prevention Practices in Australia
Source: Halliday et al.402 (2007).

Finally, the fourth level is where government and industry bodies work together to
deal with the problems of payments fraud in the country (Halliday, Kendall, &
Pearce, 2007). This level involves cooperation and coordination of most (if not all)
parties in the previous three levels, including financial institutions, government and
law enforcement agencies, merchants, technology providers and customers
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2009d, p. 3). As previously discussed in
this chapter, the US and the UK now allocate more resources for the enhancement of
402

Stephen Halliday is the Head of Industry Policy at the APCA.

344

national coordination in fraud prevention (as well as investigation and prosecution).
Referring to the four layers of payments fraud prevention in Australia, such
coordination should be part of the fourth level of the structure, yet Halliday et al.
(2007) assert that payments fraud prevention activities in Australia are still
concentrated on the first three levels:
To date, payments fraud prevention initiatives in Australia have largely taken place at
the first three levels. There have been fourth level type industry forums such as the
Australian Bankers’ Association’s (ABA) Financial Crimes Steering Group and
APCA’s Fraud Committee, but these have not attracted much attention in recent times.

In other words, Australia should also allocate more resources for developing more
coordinated efforts into fraud prevention practices. As stated by Halliday et al.
(2007):
However, the question is whether more should be done to enhance fraud prevention and
detection in Australia through a more coordinated, industry-wide approach? If the
answer is yes, then how should this be done? An important element of this would be to
improve interaction between the different players in the industry, including financial
institutions, government and law enforcement agencies, merchants, technology
providers and customers, as occurs in many overseas jurisdictions.

In practice, improving fraud prevention practices at the fourth level in Australia is not
an easy task, because at least two challenges must be overcome in the process
(Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007). First, it is easier to establish the business case
for investing in fraud prevention activities when the costs and projected savings can
be estimated easily (Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007). Unfortunately, when it
comes to estimating the net benefits out of the overall industry costs and benefits of
collective industry efforts, such estimations can be very difficult to make (Halliday,
Kendall, & Pearce, 2007). Second, any successful industry efforts in which resources
are allocated to reduce total fraud costs may not translate into competitive advantage
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for any individual institution or group of institutions, and thus persuading business
decision makers to choose such investments can be difficult (Halliday, Kendall, &
Pearce, 2007).
Recently, some efforts have been made to optimise fraud prevention practices at the
fourth level, among which is the education campaign run as a joint initiative between
the Australian Bankers Association (ABA) and the Australian High Tech Crimes
Centre (AHTCC) (Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007). In 2004 the Joint Banking
Finance Sector Investigation Team (JBFSIT) was established to tackle internet
banking fraud by conducting investigations on offences such as banking fraud,
phishing and related criminal matters, including fraudulent job recruiting websites
and identity theft (Sykora, 2009, p. 7). The JBFSIT is a partnership between the
AHTCC and the financial sector403 to coordinate a national response to online
banking frauds that involve unauthorised access to banking service over the internet
(Australian High Tech Crime Centre & Australian Federal Police, 2008). Among the
actions that have been taken by the JBFSIT are those against thousands of
illegitimate websites, including phishing sites targeting Australian financial
institutions, mule recruitment sites and email recruitment addresses (for money
laundering) and malware download sites (Australian High Tech Crime Centre &
Australian Federal Police, 2008). On 13 July 2010, the Criminal Intelligence Fusion
Centre (within the Australian Crime Commission) was launched by Attorney-

403

The JBFSIT’s stakeholders include Australian financial sector institutions, Australian policing
services and international law enforcement agencies (Australian High Tech Crime Centre &
Australian Federal Police, 2008).
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General, Robert McClelland and Minister for Home Affairs, Brendan O’Connor
(Attorney-General, 2010).As stated in the joint media release:
The Fusion Centre will provide in-depth criminal intelligence and analysis and will boost
the capability of law enforcement agencies to identify high risk cash flows, patterns of
crime and the individuals, businesses and corporate structures that may be involved in
criminal enterprises in Australia and overseas.
…The Fusion Centre will co-locate expert investigators and analysts from
Commonwealth agencies including the Australian Federal Police, Department of
Immigration and Citizenship, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre,
the Australian Taxation Office, Centrelink, Customs and Border Protection and State and
Territory law enforcement authorities.

Another example is the role of the APCA404 in collecting, managing and distributing
fraud data and information (Halliday, Kendall, & Pearce, 2007). As discussed in the
previous chapter, the APCA is one of the sources of information regarding the trends
in payments fraud that has become part of Australia’s efforts to understand the actual
problems related to payments fraud in the country. As stated by the APCA (2009d, p.
7):
APCA keeps statistics on this area of fraud and is examining the feasibility of extending
its collection into related areas, such as internet banking fraud. APCA believes that
effective systematic prevention is greatly assisted by reliable statistical information
about levels of fraudulent activity. …In simple terms, what gets measured, gets
managed.

The APCA published its first fraud data covering cheque fraud, debit card fraud and
credit and charge card fraud in November 2006, and makes subsequent publications
every six months to help raise awareness of payments fraud risks (Hield, 2007, p.
20).

404

Other roles of the APCA in fraud prevention include implementing industry initiatives in payment
fraud prevention as well as providing a payment fraud discussion forum (Australian Payments
Clearing Association, 2010, p. 9).
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The APCA administers the data collection of three fraud types: credit and charge card
fraud, debit card fraud and cheque fraud, which are commonly identified through
customers’ direct reporting and financial institutions’ detection (Australian Payments
Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). Unlike the data of cheque fraud and debit card fraud,
which come from two of APCA’s clearing systems405, the Australian Paper Clearing
System (APCS) and the Consumer Electronic Clearing System (CECS) respectively,
credit and charge card fraud data are provided by card schemes such as Visa,
MasterCard, Amex, Diners and JCB406, and cover nearly all credit card activities in
Australia (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). The APCA classifies
credit and charge card fraud data into three categories (Australian Payments Clearing
Association, n.d.(c)):


fraudulent transactions on cards issued in Australia and where the fraud occurred in
Australia



fraudulent transactions on cards issued in Australia and where the fraud occurred
overseas



fraudulent transactions on cards issued overseas and where the fraud occurred in
Australia.

The collected fraud data and information also serve as the basis for decision-making
processes in payments fraud investigation and prosecution. In terms of investigation
and prosecution, Choo et al. (2007, p. x) assert that in coping with the problems of
technology-enabled crime, Australia has a relatively comprehensive legislative

405

406

To ensure the completeness and reliability of the fraud data, all APCA member institutions
automatically become part of fraud data sources and are obligated to provide such data as required
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). Among the users of the APCA fraud data are
the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission (Australian Payments
Clearing Association, n.d.(c)).
The card schemes recognised the benefits of providing fraud data to the APCA and have been
supplying their data since 2005 (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)).
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framework407, yet it is still in need of greater harmonisation of laws and sanctions.
Such harmonisation is also viewed by Choo et al. (2007, pp. x-xxvii) as needed by
countries around the world to reduce the risks of technology-enabled crime from
countries with more lenient sanctions and less robust law enforcement. Such need
comes hand in hand with the need to enhance the skills of criminal justice system
members (such as lawyers, judges, juries and court officials), particularly for dealing
with cases involving technology issues, by initiatives such as training materials
covering legal and technical aspects of technology-enabled crime (Choo, Smith, &
McCusker, 2007, p. xxvii).
In terms of technology, Australia has recently begun its national movement to adopt
chip and PIN technology to strengthen its payments fraud prevention practices. As
mentioned above, the Chip Payments Program for Australia (CPPA) was established
in January 2008 to facilitate and support this movement408 (Australian Payments
Clearing Association, 2008a, p. 17), and was among the results of the exploratory
407

The Australian Government has been working on addressing issues in cybercrime and internet
banking fraud by, among other things, introducing a range of legislation such as: the Criminal
Code Act 1995, the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other
Measures) Act 2004, the Spam Act 2003 and the Spam (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003,
the Cybercrime Act 2001 and the Commonwealth Criminal Code Amendment (Theft, Fraud,
Bribery, and Related Offences) Act 2000 (Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee
Attorney-General's Department, 2006).
408
An industry initiative, the Pen or PIN program was initiated on 4 June 2008 following an industrywide collaboration involving all Australian financial institutions and card schemes (for example,
Visa, MasterCard, Diners Club and American Express) to provide, among other things, cardholders
with a choice between signature or PIN to authorise their transactions (Pen or PIN, 2008a). Despite
the fact that such initiative places a greater emphasis on convenience than security, it can be
considered as a preparation toward future chip and PIN migration in Australia by socialising the
use of PIN to consumers (Winterford, 2008). Experience of the UK’s chip and PIN program
showed that consumers may not be familiar with the use of PIN in transactions, and thus may
encounter problems such as difficulties memorising their PINs (see previous discussion on fraud
prevention practices in the UK). On 2 November 2009 Visa announced that, as part of the wideranging agenda to counter fraud, over the next four years, Australian Visa cards will move to the
chip and PIN technology, and signatures will no longer be accepted at the points of sale from 2013
(Visa, 2009).
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workshop in held in Sydney on 28 October 2004. Over 60 participants were present,
covering the APCA members, CECS Advisory Council members (including
retailers), card schemes (Visa, MasterCard, JCB and American Express), the Reserve
Bank and the Federal Treasury (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2004, p.
3). Among the topics at the workshop was the identification of business drivers that
may promote the implementation of the EMV409 (chip and PIN technology standard)
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2004, p. 3). As mentioned above, the
statistically low fraud rate has created fewer incentives for Australia to invest more
on fraud prevention measures. As stated by the APCA (2004, p. 3):
The prime driver for the introduction of EMV in Europe was fraud reduction. In
Australia, however, the expected reduction in fraud, on its own, does not at this stage, it
was suggested, provide a sufficient driver for EMV implementation. A ‘whole-ofsystem’ perspective (that includes, but is not limited to fraud alone) would need to be
considered.

Australia needs to consider more than just cost reduction (for example, from
decreasing fraud losses) to create sufficient drivers for the adoption of chip and PIN
technology. International trends, as well as liability shifts, are examples of such
additional drivers (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2004, p. 3). In the UK,
for example, under the chip and PIN program, retailers who upgrade to the chip and
PIN technology are entitled to liability shift in cases of fraud on chip and PIN cards
(Chip and PIN, 2004b; 2005b). Participants of the workshop also state that for the
implementation of chip and PIN technology to succeed, a coordinated approach is
needed to bring economies of scale, ensure interoperability between applications and
devices, provide common education to retailers and cardholders and increase the
409

The APCA is currently a representative for Australia on the EMVCo Board of Advisors (BOA)
which positions the institution as a conduit for disseminating information and comment between
EMVCo and its Australian stakeholders (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2009b, p. 3).
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speed of the rollout drivers (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2004, p. 3).
On 22 May 2007 the APCA held a Chip for Australia Implementation Forum410 in
Sydney, attended by local and international guest speakers, to explore the challenges
faced by the industry for the adoption of chip and PIN technology (Australian
Payments Clearing Association, 2007b, p. 1). The forum’s participants agreed that,
based on the overseas experiences, a coordinated industry approach is important to
ensure the success of chip and PIN technology implementation (Australian Payments
Clearing Association, 2007b, p. 1). To support the implementation of the smartcard
technology in Australia, Visa as one of the leading brands in credit card industry has
set a five-year agenda which consists of seven key security initiatives to protect
cardholders, merchants and financial institutions (Australian Payments Clearing
Association, 2010, p. 12). The initiatives are (Australian Payments Clearing
Association, 2010, pp. 12-13; Visa Asia Pacific, 2009):
1. Moving to 100 percent chip card issuance. By 1 January 2010, banks and other
financial institutions must issue all new Visa credit cards on chip; by 1 January 2011
all new Visa debit and reloadable prepaid cards must be on chip; and by 1 April
2013, 100 percent of all Visa cards must be on chip.
2. Ensuring all merchant acceptance terminals must be chip capable and activated by 1
April 2012
3. Ensuring all new Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) commissioned must be chip
capable by 1 January 2011.
4. Introducing a broad rollout of PIN (Personal Identification Number) verification for
all domestic transactions, with signatures no longer accepted from 1 April 2013.
5. Issuers must enrol all Visa cards for Verified by Visa, a free service for cardholders
that provides a password for secure online shopping, by 1 April 2012.

410

The forum was attended by over sixty participants representing Australian financial institutions,
retailers and card schemes that represented major stakeholders that would be directly participating
in chip and PIN technology implementation (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2007b, p.
1).
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6. All merchants who take online, telephone and mail order transactions must check the
threedigit card verification code (known as CVV2) from 1 January 2011.
7. Small and medium sized (Level 4) merchants will be required to implement higher
levels of data security. Acquiring banks will be required to provide Visa with a
program for their merchants to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard (PCI DSS) by 30 April 2010 that includes a strategy for risk
profiling, merchant education and compliance reporting twice per year.

As discussed in the previous chapter, statistical data shows that card-not-present
fraud is among the biggest threats to Australia’s payments industry, just as it is to
other countries. In addition to the adoption of chip and PIN technology, various fraud
prevention measures are employed by the Australian banks and financial institutions
to combat payments frauds in the country, including those to tackle card-not-present
schemes. Such initiatives include the implementation of enhanced security standards
for computer systems and encrypted data links, as well as working with merchants to
implement measures such as Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode as
additional layers of security for online transactions (for example, to establish better
cardholder’s identity verification) (Australian Payments Clearing Association,
2009d) (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2009d). As previously discussed
in this chapter, the major card schemes have also recently developed PCI standards
for securing online credit card transactions. The reception of such standards has
varied around the globe411, depending largely on cost-benefit considerations. In
Australia, the lower incentive for enhancing its payments fraud prevention practices
is among the factors behind the somewhat slower progress (compared to the US and
the UK) in the implementation and development of online fraud prevention measures.

411

As discussed previously, for example, the US credit card industry seems to have accepted the PCI
standards easily and has allocated necessary resources for their implementation; whereas the UK
counterpart appears to move on the same path at slower pace.
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For example, according to a study by Visa (released in September 2006) (Visa,
2006):
One in two merchants in Australia are not aware of their obligations to protect their
customers’ personal financial information, according to new research by Visa
International, released today. The research shows that only 49 per cent of Australian
merchants are aware of the international standard on payment security, known as the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)412. This standard has been
promoted by the payment card schemes for some years

Based on the Australian Business Assessment of Computer User Security
(ABACUS) 2008 study413, Australian businesses’ total expenditure for information
technology security during the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 was
approximately between $US1 billion and $US1.5 billion, with the average figure of
$US1,444 (small businesses: $US783 , medium businesses: $US6,010, large
businesses: $US30,368 ) (Richards, 2009, p. xiii). According to the study, the ten
most common computer security tools used by Australian businesses were: antivirus,
firewall, anti-spam filters, anti-spyware software, password verification, antiphishing software, limiting access to workstations, keeping servers in secure
positions, internet content/image filtering or monitoring and single sign-on
(Australian Institute of Criminology, 2009b).

412

However, one might argue that the slower reception was also due to the overly complicated rules
and procedures (for example, different deadlines for different countries and different types of
merchants) thereof, which raise more questions than answers (Litan, 2008, p. 1). For example, see
Litan and Prescatore (2007) and Rufollo (2007).
413
The study was commissioned by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), and was conducted
by means of a national survey on computer security incidents against businesses to shed light on
issues such as the prevalence of computer security incidents, measures employed by Australian
businesses to prevent such incidents, types of incidents, effects of victimisation (for example,
financial losses) and responses after incidents (Challice, 2009).
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Figure 66 Top 10 Computer Security Tools Used by Australian Businesses414
Source: Australian Institute of Criminology (2009b) based on the Australian Business Assessment of
Computer User Security (ABACUS) 2008 (Richards, 2009).

The implementation of the technology shown in Figure 66 alone is not sufficient to
prevent fraud without the support of other measures, such as consumer education and
fraud prevention policy. During the industry workshop jointly organised by the
Association for Payments Clearing Association (APCA) and the Australian Bankers’
Association (ABA) on 19 February 2008, among the themes to emerge from the
workshop was the need for greater consumer education and awareness campaigns in
tackling the growing threats of fraud in Australia (Australian Payments Clearing
Association, 2008c, p. 3). To achieve these aims, the Australian payments industry
has taken various initiatives to improve, consumers’ awareness of the issues in fraud
and fraud prevention. For example, to support the existing fraud prevention
initiatives, the APCA developed the Protect Your PIN campaign as an effort to
increase consumers’ awareness about the available authentication measures to
414

n = 3,658.
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prevent fraud (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2009a, p. 18). The
Australasian Centre for Policing Research (ACPR) also published the brochure When
Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name415, which contains essential information
regarding identity theft and identity fraud, including preventive actions that can be
undertaken by potential victims (Lormel, 2008). Similarly, over the past few years,
the Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce (ACFT)416 has been running annual
scams education and awareness campaigns to raise awareness of fraud in
Australasia417. The 2010 campaign, for example, carries the theme of ‘Online
Offensive – Fighting Fraud Online’ whose aim is raising awareness of online
consumer fraud in Australasia (SCAMwatch, n.d.(f)). This is conducted through the
activities of member418 and partner419 including distribution of educational materials
(SCAMwatch, n.d.(f)). A Taskforce member, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC), administrate a website, the SCAMwatch which
provides information to consumers and small businesses about how to recognize,
avoid and report scam which will then be analised by the ACCC (SCAMwatch,
415
416

417
418

419

For the original wording of the brochure, see Australasian Centre for Policing Research (2004).
Established in March 2005 to combat consumer fraud and scams, the ACFT comprises all of the
governmental agencies and departments with the responsibility to protect consumer in Australia
and New Zealand (Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, 2009).
For examples, see SCAMwatch (n.d.(c); n.d.(d); n.d.(e)).
Members of the Taskforce from the Australian Government include: Attorney-General's
Department; Australian Bureau of Statistics; Australian Communications and Media Authority;
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission; Australian Federal Police (represented by the
Australian High Tech Crime Centre); Australian Institute of Criminology; Australian Securities &
Investment Commission; and the Department of Communications, Information Technology & the
Arts (Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, 2009). In Australia, the Australian
Government Attorney General’s Department is responsible for the coordination of fraud control
policy (Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, 2010). For this purpose, the
Department collaborates with the Australian Federal Police to address fraud control issues
(Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, 2010).
The Taskforce’s business partners include: leading banks, financial institutions, credit card
providers, insurers, telecommunications groups, community groups and other government
organisations (SCAMwatch, n.d.(b)).
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n.d.(a)). The Australian Bankers Association (ABA) in collaboration with the
AHTCC and the ASIC also administrates a joint site, Protect Your Financial Identity
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2010, p. 8). The site provides
information on a range of fraud and scams and how to prevent them420. Raising fraud
awareness has also been part of fraud prevention efforts by credit card associations
such as MasterCard and Visa by means of, for example, merchant education
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2010, pp. 11-13). The fraud data and
information collection, management and distribution by the APCA that provides a
basis for decision making can also support initiatives to improve consumers’ fraud
awareness. As stated by the APCA (Australian Payments Clearing Association,
2009d, p. 7):
APCA keeps statistics on this area of fraud and is examining the feasibility of extending
its collection into related areas, such as internet banking fraud. APCA believes that
effective systematic prevention is greatly assisted by reliable statistical information
about levels of fraudulent activity. Such information allows the calculation and
allocation of value-at-risk, so as to drive cost-efficient prevention measures; it also
provides important context for consumer education and awareness promotion, which can
minimise opportunities for fraud at its source.

Although technology-based protection (such as chip and PIN and the PCI DSS)
provide a degree of protection against the most prevalent types of fraud (such as
counterfeit card fraud and card-not-present fraud), other types of fraud (such as
fraudulent credit card application) may require effective fraud prevention policies to
prevent. An example of such policies is the 100-point system, by which, for a person
to open an account, they must provide multiple and independent primary sources of
identification, pursuant to the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cwth)421
420
421

See http://www.protectfinancialid.org.au/default.aspx?ArticleID=4#secondary
For the original text, see Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing (2009).
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(Smith, 1998, p. 4). To satisfy the 100 points of documentary evidence for proof of
identity, primary documentation is required (passport, driver’s licence, certificate of
citizenship and birth certificate each worth 70 points) along with secondary
documentation (for example, a utility account) (Smith, 1998, p. 4).
Table 29 Examples of Documentation in the 100-Point Check
Documentation

Points

Current passport (or expired within last two years)

70

Birth certificate (or certified extract)

70

Current Australia passport

70

Australian citizenship certificate (or certified copy)

70

Driver’s licence

40

Public service employee ID card

40

Centrelink card

40

Tertiary education ID card

40

Veteran Affairs Gold Card

40

Mortgage documents

35

Land Titles Office records

35

Proof-of-age card

25

Proof of name change, for example, deed pool, marriage certificate 25
Medicare card, Seniors card

25

Bank statement, council rates

25

Credit, bank and debit cards

25

Electoral enrolment card

25

Insurance renewal

25

Motor vehicle registration

25

Utility accounts, rent records

25

Source: South Australia Police (2008).

The 100-point check has now been widely used by banks and financial institutions
issuing payment cards (such as credit cards) as part of the application process422, and
is also part of efforts to prevent fraud (such as fraudulent credit card application)
422

For example, see ANZ’s 100 Point Check Process and Guidelines Documents (ANZ, 2007), and
HSBC’s Customer Identification 100 Point Check Form (HSBC Australia, n.d.).

357

using false identities. To support the application of the 100-point check in the
Australian payments industry, the APCA developed the Identity Document Reference
Guide, whose purpose is to assist its members in assessing the authenticity of identity
documents in account application process within their institutions (Australian
Payments Clearing Association, 2005, p. 1).
As the last layer of defense, legal framework has been continuously developed in
Australia to cope with the changing nature of crime such credit card fraud. A major
challenge, according to the Model Criminal Law Officer’s Committee (2008, p. 14)
has been that there is no single offence that comprehensively criminalize identity
crime in its own right. Further, the Model Criminal Law Officer’s Committee (2008,
p. 14) argues that:
Offences that can currently be used to prosecute identity crime are scattered through
State, Territory and Commonwealth legislation on a range of subjects. The difficulty
with using most of these offences is that they require the prosecution to prove another
associated criminal act, such as theft, fraud or forgery. With the exception of South
Australia and Queensland, it is not currently an offence in Australia to assume or steal
another person’s identity, except in limited circumstances. It is what is done with the
identity that generally attracts law enforcement attention.

South Australia was the first state that enacted an offence which specifically
criminalises identity theft, Part 5A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935
(SA)423, in 2003 (Model Criminal Law Officers’ Committee, 2008, p. 17). The
offence criminalises conducts such as: the assumption of a false identity (including
falsely pretending to have a particular qualification or have, or be entitled to act in, a
particular capacity); the misuse of personal identification information; the production
and possession of prohibited material; and the possession of equipment for making
423

For original text, see Parliament of South Australia (2003).
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prohibited material (Model Criminal Law Officers’ Committee, 2008, p. 17). In
March 2007, Queensland followed South Australia’s footsteps by enacting a specific
identity theft offence through the Criminal Code and Civil Liability Amendment Act
2007 (QLD)424 (Model Criminal Law Officers’ Committee, 2008, p. 17). The s 408D
of the Criminal Code covers conduct which involves another entity’s identification
information whether the entity: is alive or dead; exists or does not; and consents to
the use of the identification information or does not (Model Criminal Law Officers’
Committee, 2008, pp. 17-18).
In Victoria, the Crimes Amendment (Identity Crime) Act 2009 was passed in March
2009425 (Standing Committee on Communications , 2010, p. 105). The Act
introduces there new offences: making, using or supplying identity information
(Section 192B); possessing identity information (Section 192C); and possessing
equipment for making identity documents (Section 192D), with the intent to commit
an indictable offence. The Act also allows court to issue certificate to victims of
identity crime (Section 89F). This certificate aims to assist identity crime victim to,
for example, restore his or her credit rating which has been damaged by the crime
(Consumer Action Law Centre, 2009). This is particularly important especially when
dealing with creditors and financial institutions (Consumer Action Law Centre,
2009).

424
425

For original text, see Parliament of Queensland (2007).
For original text, see Parliament of Victoria (2009).
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In New South Wales, on 22 February 2010, the Crimes Amendment (Fraud, Identity
and Forgery Offences) Act 2009426 broadly based on Model Criminal Code was
commenced (Steel, 2010, p. 17; Dearne, 2009). This, according to Steel (2010, p. 17),
introduces identity-crime related offences which represents a significant change to
fraud offences in New South Wales. The Attorney-General John Hatzistergos
explained that the changes brought by the Act will enable law enforcers to target
offenders who trade personal data for fraudulent purpose as well as increasing the
serious fraud penalty from five to ten years of imprisonment (Dearne, 2009). Further,
as explained by Mr Hatzistergos, the use of everyday devices such as scanners,
printers and laminators to produce false identity documents is an offence under the
new laws (Dearne, 2009). Similar to that of the state of Victoria, the Act also allows
court to issue certificate to assist the recovery of identity crime victim (Section
309A). Other relevant law for establishing legal deterrence for credit card fraud is the
Cybercrime Act 2001427 which pertains to computer offences as well as law
enforcement powers related to electronic data (Crowley, 2006, p. 2).
In conclusion, as discussed above, the payments fraud prevention practices in

the

Australian payments system consists of four layers each represents a major group in
the system. In this four layered structure, resources have been allocated to address
payments fraud problems including credit card fraud. Fraud data collection,
management and distribution is conducted by institution such as the APCA to
identify the actual problems that need to be solved. Despite years of statistically low
fraud rates, Australia should also prepare for future threats due to the development of
426
427

For original text, see Legislature of New South Wales (2009).
For original text, see Parliament of Australia (2001).
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information technology that narrows (or in many cases, eliminates) the geographical
boundaries for payment fraud (such as credit card fraud) to occur. Because crimes
follow opportunities, this may eventually contribute to offence migration to Australia
from other countries with relatively higher fraud rates, such as the US and the UK.
Following the footsteps of the UK, Australia already begins to introduce the
smartcard technology to the Australian payments system to counter, in particular
counterfeit card fraud. Improving fraud awareness has been conducted by means of,
for example, the ‘Protect Your PIN’ to improve consumers’ awareness about the
available fraud prevention measures. This is also supported by the 100 point check
system as part of identity management in Australia to prevent the use of false
identities for, for example, credit card application. On the other hand, the
establishment of the JBFSIT and enactment of laws concerning identity crime are
examples of efforts to strengthen legal deterrence for payments fraud.

THE ‘FOUR-PILLARED HOUSE’ OF PAYMENTS
FRAUD PREVENTION PRACTICES IN A PAYMENTS
SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE US, THE UK AND
AUSTRALIA
From the above discussions, the US, the UK and Australia are all struggling to
combat credit card fraud as well as other forms of payments frauds in their payments
systems by implementing various fraud prevention measures. To achieve the desired
results, prevention measures must be carefully planned, implemented and evaluated
to ensure that their benefits exceed their costs. From the above review of the recent
patterns of payments fraud prevention practices in the US, the UK and Australia
(particularly those for credit card fraud prevention), this study concludes that the
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basic, ideal structure of fraud prevention practices resembles a house with four pillars
(see Figure 67).
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Figure 67 The Four-Pillared House of Payments Fraud Prevention Practice
Source: Adapted from various sources (see the following discussions).

As shown by Figure 67, the structure of the prevention practices is supported by four
‘pillars’, which represent the four groups of key participants in the payments system
(users, institutions, networks and government and industry) who work together to
promote the safety of the payments industry. In Australia, the framework of
payments fraud prevention practices with these four groups is known as the ‘four
layers of fraud prevention’, with the fourth layer the most challenging to manage and
coordinate, because it encompass the interests of many different parties428. Other than
the central banks (for example, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the
Reserve Bank of Australia), whose responsibilities include promoting the safety and
428

See the previous discussion on the four layers of fraud prevention activities in Australia.
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efficiency in the payments systems, other institutions (such the FTC, the APACS —
now known as the UK Payments Administration — and the Australian Payments
Clearing Association), along with other payments system institutions, play important
roles in payments fraud prevention practices.
Each pillar is important to the entire structure in achieving its purpose. For example,
cardholders can make their best efforts to keep their confidential information such as
PINs protected, and credit card-issuing banks and financial institutions can design
and implement effective and efficient fraud prevention measures to minimise fraud
risk. Additionally, card networks such as Visa and MasterCard can issue rules of
operation that provide incentives for implementing better fraud prevention measures,
such as chip and PIN technology429 for offline transactions, and PCI standards430 for
online transactions.
On top of the four pillars are the six broad groups of initiatives which form the
essentials in the payments fraud prevention practices in a country: understanding the
real problems, fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness, technology-based
protection, identity management and legal deterrence. Among the six groups,
understanding the real problems is the basis for decision-making processes for the
remaining five groups of initiatives, because good prevention practices are based on
the actual problems, and thus building sufficient understanding on the problems
should be achieved before resorting to further actions. Important elements in the
process of understanding the real problems include fraud data collection,

429
430

For example, see the previous discussion on the chip and PIN technology in the UK.
For example, see the previous discussion on the PCI standards in the US.

363

management and distribution, such as those of the FTC, the APACS and the APCA.
Payments system institutions are in a strategic position to shed light on recent issues
(such as recent trends in credit card fraud and credit card fraud prevention practices),
particularly in the form of the collection of victim-side data through self-reporting
mechanisms. For example, as discussed above, the FTC, the APACS431 and the
APCA regularly publish fraud statistics based on the reports of victims. Combined
with the information on offenders from the criminal justice system, such victim data
and information can be used to draw a more complete picture of payments fraud for
further actions regarding prevention, investigation and prosecution.
As mentioned before, based on the understanding of the actual problems, further
actions to tackle payments fraud must be taken properly. In terms of fraud prevention
policy, banks and other financial institutions, card schemes, government bodies and
industry bodies can establish specific policies dedicated to fraud prevention activities.
For example, in the US, the red flags rule was issued in 2007 by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the federal bank regulatory agencies and the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), creating an obligation for creditors and financial
institutions to implement identity theft prevention programs pursuant to the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT) Act 2003 (P.L. 108–159) (Finklea, 2009, p. 7)
432

. As potential victims, consumers should be kept aware of the recent issues in

payments fraud and the available prevention measures thereof. Fraud data and
information from the fraud data and information collection process can also be used

431
432

Now the UK Payments Administration.
For more details, see the previous discussion on the red flags rule in the US.
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for educational purposes to increase consumers’ awareness. In the UK, for example,
during the period of transition from magnetic stripe to chip and PIN technology,
several consumer education initiatives were undertaken to ensure that consumers
were aware of the new security features introduced433. Chip and PIN technology itself
represents

technology-based

protection

against

fraud

to

minimise

crime

opportunities.
Despite the currently available options of technology for use in preventing fraud in
the payments system, not all can be implemented by the industry, because
considerations must be made regarding the costs and benefits of each option. For
example, as previously discussed in this chapter, the level of acceptance of chip and
PIN technology in the UK is higher than in the US; whereas the PCI DSS, which is
well received in the US, is being adopted in the UK at a slower pace. This may have
been caused — at least partly — by the previous significant investment in the UK in
chip and PIN technology, which made industry members reluctant to make additional
investment in the PCI standards (Vodat International , 2009; Litan, 2008, p. 2).
Identity management, as previously discussed in this and the previous chapter, is
related to the combination of technical systems, rules and procedures that define the
ownership, utilisation and safeguarding of personal identity information (National
Science and Technology Council, 2008, pp. ES-1). In other words, the existence of
personal identity information is a major reason this group of prevention practices
exists. Identity management is essential not just for prevention of payments fraud, but

433

For more details, see the previous discussion on the implementation of the chip and PIN technology
in the UK.
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also for the entire course of investigation and prosecution into it. Identity
management can be used to reduce the opportunity for fraud offenders to use forged
or stolen identity document to commit fraud (for example, fraudulent credit card
application). In the US, for example, efforts have been made to minimise the use of
the social security number (SSN) by public and private sectors to reduce, among
other things, the risks of such information being unlawfully obtained by offenders434.
In Australia, to open an account, an applicant must satisfy the requirements of the
100-point check by providing multiple sources of identification, and this can reduce
the opportunity for fraudulent applications to occur435.
Although the focus of this study is on the prevention practices in the payments
system, the researcher also acknowledges the fact that despite all the resources spent
on prevention measures, payments fraud can still occur. To address this shortfall,
cooperation with members of the criminal justice system should be strengthened to
provide sufficient legal deterrence to discourage potential offenders to commit fraud.
Among such cooperation is the sharing of information on fraud cases reported by
victims, based on which, and combined with information on offenders, should form a
more complete picture of the actual fraud problem in a country. For example, as
previously discussed in this chapter, the FTC, the APACS436 and the APCA are
sources of fraud data and information based on victims’ reports, and continue to
supply such information to members of the criminal justice systems in their countries.
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See the previous discussion on the identity management in the United States.
See the previous discussion on the 100-point system in Australia.
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Now UK Payments Administration.
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Members of criminal justice systems can increase legal deterrence by improving their
skills and knowledge about the investigation of fraud cases and prosecution of the
fraud offenders, supported by the improvement of the legal systems by, among other
things, the enactment of laws for the prosecution of payments fraud offenders. In the
US, for example, to cope with growing threats from identity theft, the US Congress
passed two statutes that criminalise identity theft: the Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act437 (18 USC. §1028(a)(7)) on 30 October 1998, and the Identity Theft
Penalty Enhancement Act (Aggravated Identity Theft) (18 USC. §1028A) on 15 July
2004 (Richey, 2007, September 6-8, p. 1).
Although each is different, the six areas of payments fraud prevention practices often
overlap and support one another. For example, as previously discussed in this
chapter, the UK credit card network’s (for example, Visa and MasterCard) policies
for fraud prevention contributed to the adoption of chip and PIN technology in the
country by network members (for example, banks and merchants), as well as several
fraud awareness campaigns to inform consumers about recent issues in fraud and
fraud prevention practices. To optimise the role of the four pillars in the six
categories of fraud prevention practices, coordination is of the essence in ensuring
that objectives are achieved. In the US, for example, the President’s Identity Theft
Task Force issued a strategic plan in April 2007, Combating Identity Theft: A
Strategic Plan438, to tackle growing threats of identity theft in the US439. Later, the
UK National Fraud Authority released the first national strategy on 19 March 2009 to
437

See United States Congress (1998).
See President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a).
439
See the previous discussion on the implementation of the national strategy to combat identity theft
in the US.
438
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mitigate threats of fraud in the country440. Both strategies basically represent the
efforts to coordinate the available resources to combat crimes in the respective
countries to achieve the intended objectives effectively and efficiently.
The four-pillared house of payments fraud prevention practice only sets a minimum
standard for payments fraud prevention practices based on the benchmark countries
(the US, the UK and Australia). This means that, in practice, more parties and efforts
can be added to the ‘house’ to improve the achievability of the objectives.
From theoretical point of view as discussed in Chapter 3, the above structure
addresses at least two key problems in crime prevention, suitable victim and crime
scene with lack of guardianship. From VIVA (Value, Inertia, Visibility and
Accessibility) point of view, fraud awareness, will increase victim’s inertial
resistance and thus decrease his or her suitability as a target. The smartcard
technology makes a stolen credit card valueless since it will be very difficult to, for
example, extract the information from the chip and use it to create a forged credit
card. For online credit card fraud, the use of means such as Verified by Visa and
MasterCard SecureCode by customers and merchants acts as an online guardian
against the attacks from offenders. Identity management makes it more difficult for
offenders to get access to, for example, victim’s account and personal information.
All these efforts to combat fraud are orchestrated through fraud prevention policy to
achieve the desired objectives. Finally, the high ability of the law enforcers to
investigate and track down the offenders (to establish legal deterrence) including

440

See the previous discussion on the UK’s national strategy to tackle fraud.
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those of online credit card fraud means that the chance for the offenders to get away
(the ‘escape’ attribute) from the crime scenes (even in cyberspace) is slim441.

CONCLUSION
Based on the discussions in this chapter, and in response to the trends of payments
fraud (such as credit card fraud in their payments systems), the US, the UK and
Australia have all devoted efforts to prevent these offences. In doing so, several
considerations were undertaken by the benchmark countries in deciding the most
appropriate fraud prevention measures to use, among which are financial cost-benefit
considerations. Generally, the basic structure of payments fraud prevention practices
in the US, the UK and Australia resembles a house with four pillars that support one
another. The pillars consist of users, institutions, networks and government and
industry bodies, and these contribute to the six areas of payments fraud prevention
practices: fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness, technology-based protection,
identity management and legal deterrence. Because the four pillars support one
another, the six areas of fraud prevention often overlap in trying to achieve their
objectives. Recently, at least in the US and the UK, the improvement of coordination
of elements for tackling crimes (such as credit card fraud) has been a major concern
in fraud prevention practices. As discussed in this chapter, such coordination
basically aims to ensure that the available resources are used in ways that will
maximise the benefits not only in crime prevention, but also in other areas, such as
investigation, prosecution and victim recovery.
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See the discussion on the concept of SCAREM in Chapter 3.
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Based on the framework constructed in this chapter, the next chapter discusses how
the lessons from the benchmark countries in this chapter can be applied to the
payments fraud prevention practice in Indonesia.
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CHAPTER 8: TRENDS IN CREDIT CARD
FRAUD AND PREVENTION IN INDONESIA:
BUILDING UP STRONGER DEFENCES
INTRODUCTION
Previous chapters, particularly Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, highlight the lessons from
the credit card fraud prevention practices in the US, the UK and Australia. The
discussions in this chapter focus on the trends of credit card fraud and prevention in
Indonesia, particularly to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the fraud
prevention efforts in the country, as well as to provide recommendations for closing
the existing gaps based on the experiences of the benchmark countries. The
discussions in this chapter include the prevalence and costs of credit card fraud,
pattern-setters in credit card fraud prevention and recommendations for closing the
existing gaps.

PREVALENCE AND COSTS
Indonesian banks bear tens of billions of rupiahs of losses from credit card fraud
every year (Kompas.com, 2008b). According to the Indonesia Credit Card
Association (AKKI), during the period July 2003 to April 2006, 89 cases of credit
card fraud occurred, with losses of $US4.6 million, of which, 82 cases were
committed through a counterfeit card fraud scheme (that is, creating forged cards by
using stolen information), and the rest involved application fraud (Alwie & Anthony,
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2008). According to Mr Dodit Probojakti442 of AKKI, Indonesian banks recorded
$US4.4 – $US5 million of losses from credit card fraud during 2007 (Kompas.com,
2008b).
In 2007, the South Jakarta Sector Police arrested Chen, Tia Hui Halim and Hendri
Wijaya, and they were convicted of counterfeiting 564 credit cards from nine banks
(Suara Merdeka, 2008): the Standard Chartered Bank (163 cards), ANZ Panin Bank
(157), HSBC (154), Bank Commonwealth (24), Bank Niaga (25), Citibank (35),
Bank Lippo (3), Bank Westpac (2) and Bank Permata (1) (Suara Merdeka, 2008). In
2008, another credit card fraud case was uncovered, involving a group of criminals
led by Simon Woon (aka Ciement) which forged 7,000 credit cards from 21 banks,
including Citibank, Bank Niaga, Bank Mandiri, BNI, HSBC and Bank Danamon,
stealing 7.2 million credit card data from 9.2 million credit cards in Indonesia (Suara
Merdeka, 2008). This case is believed to be the largest credit card fraud case in
Indonesia (by an organised syndicate), with total losses of approximately $US3.3
billion (Kompas.com, 2008c). According to Mr Murugesh Khrisman443 of Visa South
Asia and South East Bank, this case had a most complete modus operandi, including
the use of networks for stealing data from banks, multiple buyers of counterfeit cards,
the establishment of a factory for producing counterfeit cards, production of
counterfeit cards and the utilisation of counterfeit cards at merchants (Kompas.com,
2008c).

442
443

A member of the AKKI executive board.
Risk director of Visa South Asia and South East Bank.
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According to Bank Indonesia (2007c, p. 30), application fraud and counterfeit card
are the most common schemes of credit card fraud in the country. In terms of
application fraud, Bank Indonesia believes that careless cardholder selection process
is commonly the primary cause of credit cards falling into the wrong hands
(cardholders with bad track records), which leads into the misuse of the cards (Bank
Indonesia, 2007c, p. 30). As stated by Mr Dodit Probojakti444 of AKKI, the majority
of counterfeit card fraud cases were in the form of credit cards issued by legitimate
issuers being forged by criminal syndicates (Kompas.com, 2008b). This was largely
because most (if not all) credit cards in Indonesia (at least until the issuance of Bank
Indonesia Regulation Number 7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning the Operation of CardBased Payment Instrument Activities) were magnetic stripe based (Bank Indonesia,
2007c, p. 30).
Financial loss from credit card fraud is not the only problem faced by the Indonesian
payments system, because, according to Mr Muhammad Helmi445 of AKKI, credit
card fraud can also damage Indonesia’s image in the e-commerce world (Ridwan,
2005). This is evidenced by the fact that for the last few years, online merchants such
as Amazon.com and eBay have put Indonesia on their list of ‘dangerous’ countries to
make online transactions with. eBay, for example, has had many experiences of
online credit card fraud offenders (carders) from Indonesia who made online
transactions using unlawfully obtained credit card information (Sodikin, 2006b).
Such designations diminish the benefits Indonesia could otherwise enjoy from the

444
445

A member of the AKKI executive board.
Chairman of the AKKI of the time.
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development of world e-commerce. Referring to the experience of Malaysia446,
Police Brigadier General Indradi Thanos of the Indonesian National Police at the
seminar on credit card fraud in Bogor (15 April 2008) contends that should
Indonesian be considered a credit card warning country, all credit card users are
warned not to make transactions in the country that will impact negatively on banks
and the industries within (Suara Karya Online, 2008).
Table 30 Types of Credit Card Fraud in Indonesia447
fraudulent application
using real card

non-received card
lost/stolen card

Using Credit Card

altered card (re-embossed/re-encoded)
using forged card totally counterfeit
white plastic card

Using Sales Drafts

record of charge (ROC) pumping
altered amount
skimming

Using Stolen Data

wire tapping
inline tapping
mail, telepone and internet order
edc modification

Other Methods

fictitious merchant
common purchase points (CPP)
credit card generator (CCG)
Ghost Phantom Terminal

Source: Indonesian National Police (1998, p. 14).
446

447

Malaysia had previously been known as among the worst countries in the world for counterfeit
card fraud. However, since the implementation of smart card technology, it has since been
considered a very hostile environment for credit card fraud offenders. For example, aaccording to
the Visa Asia-Pacific’s Head of Payment Security Services, Mr Ingo Noka, at a conference on IT
governance in Singapore (May 2006), Visa’s loss from counterfeit card fraud was approximately
$US400,000 in November 2004. As at September 2005, there were no significant indications of
counterfeit card fraud in Malaysia, and the country had already replaced its magnetic striped
credit cards with chip-based cards in 2005 (Yeo, 2006).
For descriptions, see Table 48 Types of Credit Card Fraud in Indonesia in the appendices.
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In practice, categorising credit card fraud is often difficult, because of the complexity
and the dynamics of the offence (for example, one offence may involve multiple
schemes). This creates challenges for law enforcers in investigating and prosecuting
offences and offenders. This prompted the Indonesian Police, in cooperation with
Bank Indonesia and other Indonesian banks and financial institutions to issue The
Field Manual for the Investigation of Credit Card Crime (translated title)448. Based
on this manual, four major classifications of credit card fraud in Indonesia exist using
these modus operandi: using credit cards, using sales drafts, using stolen data and
other methods (see Table 30) (Indonesian National Police, 1998, p. 14).

PATTERN-SETTERS IN PREVENTION PRACTICES
As discussed in the previous chapter, the basic structure of a good payments fraud
prevention practice resembles a house with four pillars that support six key areas449.
The fieldwork conducted in Indonesia in 2008 for this study found that generally the
same pattern applies to Indonesia, but with somewhat lesser robustness (see the
following discussions). The first key area is ‘understanding the real problems’, in
which fraud data collection, management and distribution is a major part. A
discussion with Mr Dodit Probojakti of the Indonesia Credit Card Association
(AKKI)450 suggests that day-to-day monitoring has been carried out by credit card
issuers in Indonesia by various means (such as neural-based technology, for example,
448
449

450

See Indonesian National Police (1998, p. 14).
This is also supported by Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI in a discussion with the researcher
(Probojakti, 2008a). Mr Probjakti was of the opinion that generally, there are four pillars (three
main pillars and one supporting pillar) within the credit card fraud prevention practices in
Indonesia: customers, issuers, schemes and other stakeholders (for example, regulators, consumer
protection bodies and so on) (Probojakti, 2008a).
A member of the AKKI executive board.
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the Falcon system) to spot unusual transactions, as well as other procedures (such as
‘know your customer’451) that should provide cardholders and financial institutions
with a degree of protection against fraud (Probojakti, 2008a).
Over the years, efforts to administer fraud data collection have been demonstrated by
Bank Indonesia’s publishing of such data as part of its payments system annual
reports452. Additionally, the issuance of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number
7/52/PBI/2005453 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument
Activities (for example, Article 61) created an obligation for bank and non-bank
financial institutions that operate card-based payment instruments to provide monthly
fraud reports to Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2005b, p. 43). However, the
researcher behind this study believes that the lack of technical explanation (for
example, how to categorise offences and calculate losses) may have affected the
reliability of the data, because it may lead to different interpretations by different
institutions. This was confirmed by Ms Ida Nuryanti454 of Bank Indonesia during a
discussion with the researcher (Nuryanti, 2008). Ms Nuryanti believes that reliable
fraud data is of great importance for Bank Indonesia in formulating policies to

451

As part of the efforts to circumvent the problems of money laundering, ‘know your customer’
(KYC) represents the obligation of financial institutions (for example, banks and insurance
companies) to record information about their customers, including ensuring the reliability of that
information (Innovations Software Technology, 2009, p. 4).
452
For examples, see Bank Indonesia (2007b, p. 142; 2007c, p. 30; 2008b, p. 30).
453
For the original text, see Bank Indonesia (2005b). The regulation was later on amended by Bank
Indonesia Regulation Number 10/8/PBI/2008 on the Amendment on Bank Indonesia Regulation
Number 7/52/PBI/2005 on Card-Based Payment Instrument Operation. In April 2009 Bank
Indonesia issued Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 concerning Operation of Card-Based
Payment Instrument Activities as the new regulation on card-based payment instruments (Bank
Indonesia, 2009b). Due to the time setting of this study, the enquiries made to Bank Indonesia on
existing regulation for supporting this study in 2008 was limited to Bank Indonesia Regulation
Number 7/52/PBI/2005 and Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 10/8/PBI/2008.
454
A senior legal analyst of Bank Indonesia.
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regulate the credit card industry (Nuryanti, 2008). To date, Bank Indonesia, since the
issuance of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning the
Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities, and recently, Bank
Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of CardBased Payment Instrument Activities, has published its card fraud statistics as part of
its payments system annual reports455. For examples of card fraud statistics, see Table
31, Table 32 and Table 33.
Table 31 Card Fraud 2006
Types of Fraud

Number of
Incidents

Losses ($US)

5,267

2,783,440

48,797

211,310

Counterfeiting
Lost/Stolen
Card Not Received

369

124,630

Identity Theft

748

483,120

Mail/Phone Order

643

45,540

Internet Transaction

451

6,930

Cash Advance

25

880

Application

252

173,910

Deception

161

90,860

44

8,250

143

66,440

Account Takeover
Other
Total

56,900

3,995,310

Source: Bank Indonesia (2007c, p. 30).

Table 32 Card Fraud 2007
Fraud

Percentage of
Incidents (%)

Losses
(%)

95.18

19.00

Card-Not-Received

2.71

1.25

Counterfeit Card

0.96

61.00

Identity Theft

455

Some publications exist of fraud data based on the data submitted by banks and other financial
institutions to Bank Indonesia. Nevertheless, the researcher of this study believes that the absence
of regulations that create obligations to report fraud that can result in incompleteness of the
submitted data would affect the reliability of the data in question.
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Fraud

Percentage of
Incidents (%)

Losses
(%)

Deception

0.14

8.15

Application Fraud

0.06

9.07

Internet Fraud

0.03

0.01

Other

0.48

1.21

Total

100

100

Source: Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 30).

Table 33 Card Fraud 2008 (Number of Identified Cases)
Fraud Type

2007 2008

Counterfeit

33

11

Fraud Applications 6

7

Lost/Stolen

2

1

Other

1

7

Total

42

26

Source: AKKI, cited in Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 52).

The examples of card fraud statistics in Table 31, Table 32 and Table 33 were
published as part of Bank Indonesia’s payments system annual reports for 2006, 2007
and 2008456. The data are inconsistently arranged and presented in the reports, and
essential information, such as descriptions of the categories of offences is lacking;
therefore, the fraud data collection mechanisms still need to be improved, despite the
currently existing regulations that obligates financial institutions to report any fraud
incidents. Furthermore, although the 2009 card fraud statistics are yet to be
published, the latest regulation, Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/ 11/PBI/2009

456

There are other alternative sources of data in the form of premium reports from international
research companies such as Euromonitor. However, they are very costly, approximately
AU$10,000 for 5 annual reports. The University of Wollongong and the AusAID (scholarship and
research sponsor) were unable to support the researcher for this matter. Furthermore, industry
practitioners whom the researcher had discussions with during fieldwork advised that the raw
fraud data from credit card associations such as Visa and MasterCard can be accessed only by
authorized financial institution personnel on a strict and confidential way. Therefore, the
researcher chose to cite only the publicly available data from the Bank Indonesia.
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Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities, has not
made significant improvements to the mechanism of fraud data collection,
management and distribution, as evidenced by, for example, the lack of clear
guidance about how to calculate and categorise card fraud.

In comparison, the fraud data from the FTC, the APACS and the APCA are always
presented in consistent and systematic ways that include descriptions about how and
from whom the data were gathered, as well as the calculation methods (at least in
general) and offence categorisations, so explanations exist, should inconsistencies
ever occur. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (2007a, p. 9), regarding its
2006 Identity Theft Survey Report explains how:
…the 2006 report adopted a new way to account for instances where more than one
individual may have been victimized by a single theft of personal information because
the misuse involved accounts that were jointly held by two people. In the 2003 report,
the total amount obtained by the thief was attributed to each of the victims, whereas in
the 2006 report, the total was divided amongst the victims (e.g., attributing half of the
loss to each of two joint victims).
Although we believe that these methodological changes improve the reliability of the
estimated values, they tend to cause lower estimates as compared to the 2003 survey.
Thus, the differences in the estimates between 2003 and 2006 may, at least in part, be
due to the changes in methodology as opposed to changes in consumers’ actual
experiences. We cannot, therefore, be confident that the difference between the 2003
and 2006 estimates represents an actual drop in the average amount obtained by identity
thieves.

As mentioned above, the obligation to report fraud incidents to Bank Indonesia came
into existence after the issuance of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number
7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument
Activities, and were later re-established under Bank Indonesia Regulation Number
11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument
Activities. In Australia, for example, such an obligation is important in maintaining
379

the completeness — and thus the reliability — of data and information on fraud. In
the APCA’s fraud data collection mechanism, for example, all APCA member
institutions automatically become fraud data sources, and are obligated to provide
such data as required (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)).
Regardless, the existence of the obligation to report fraud incidents does not in itself
solve the problems of the lack of reliable data, because further technical guidance on
how to perform such tasks is also of a high level of importance. The analysis of the
relevant Bank Indonesia regulations and a discussion with Ms Ida Nuryanti457 of
Bank Indonesia during the fieldwork both suggest that such technical guidance is yet
to be developed to avoid misinterpretations in the data collection process in Indonesia
(for example, which offence goes into which category).
The difficulty in finding reliable data on at least the losses from credit card fraud in
Indonesia similar to those of the FTC, the APACS (now the UK Payments
Administration) and the APCA458, led the researcher to conduct an inquiry into the
Indonesian payments system by means of fieldwork in 2008 (April–December)459.
During the fieldwork, the researcher made several enquiries to the Indonesia Credit
Association (AKKI) as the industry body of credit card issuers in Indonesia that
includes visits to its headquarters in Jakarta, the head office of GE Money (Jakarta),
the head office of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Jakarta) and the head office of Bank

457

A senior legal analyst of Bank Indonesia.
See Chapter 6.
459
See Chapter 4 for more discussion on the methodological framework of this study.
458
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Mandiri (Jakarta)460. For supplemental information for this study, inquiries were also
made to the office of the Yogyakarta Provincial Police (Polda DIY) (Yogyakarta), the
office of the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (Jakarta)
and the office of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
(Jakarta). However, despite these visits and inquiries, the researcher was unable to
obtain payments fraud statistics comparable to those of the FTC, the APACS and the
APCA. The researcher’s meetings with members of the management of the AKKI (in
particular, Mr Dodit Probojakti461 and Mr Ferry Tupanno462) led him to conclude that
such statistics do not exist. This was somewhat unexpected because, among other
things, during the researcher’s visit to the Bank Indonesia office as well as at the
office of the Yogyakarta Provincial Police, experts from these institutions
recommended the researcher make further inquiries to the AKKI office to obtain the
required fraud statistics463.
Despite the existence of the central bank, an industry body such as the AKKI should
support the ‘four-pillared house’ as part the fourth pillar, particularly by providing (or
460

Another justification to the visit to the AKKI office was the fact that whenever a credit card fraud
case was uncovered and was published in the mass media, the institution often gave its statements
through its representatives regarding the modus operandi and the financial losses from the incident.
For examples, see Alwie and Anthony (2008), Kompas.com (2008b) and Beritabali.com (2008).
The visits to other institutions were conducted because experts from the AKKI were generally also
members of the management of commercial banks and other financial institutions and spent most
of their working time at their home institutions. For example, at the time of fieldwork, Mr Dodit
Probojakti (a member of the AKKI executive board) was the Chief Operation Officer (COO) of GE
Money, Mr Ferry Tupanno (the Risk Management coordinator of the AKKI) was the Section Head
of the Quality Assurance Department, Consumer Collection Group of the Bank Mandiri and Mr
Harrold Abraham Gaspersz (a member of the AKKI Risk Management Forum) was the Manager
of the Risk Management Department of Bank Rakyat Indonesia. For full descriptions on the
interviewed experts, see the appendices.
461
A member of the AKKI executive board.
462
Risk management coordinator of the AKKI.
463
A preliminary study in 2007 where the researcher met the former chairman of the AKKI, Mr
Mohamad Helmi, to assess the possibility of conducting fieldwork in 2008, gave the researcher an
impression that the institution had the required fraud data and information for this study.
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at least supporting) fraud data collection, management and distribution. As evidenced
by the roles of the APCA in Australia, an industry body is in a strategic position to
perform such a function, due to its relationship to the sources of fraud data and
information (for example, banks and non-bank financial institutions)464.
Further inquiries were subsequently made by the researcher regarding the absence of
such data and information by focusing on the AKKI’s roles. Further inquiries into the
performance of the AKKI suggest that, despite the fact that the institution has been in
operation for years465 and has made major contributions to solving multiple credit
card fraud cases, it could have performed better, had several internal problems been
solved in the first place. A noticeable problem during the researcher’s visit to the
AKKI office was that of the available human resources: only a handful of full-time
staff, in addition to part-time managerial members, were in charge of running the
institution. This was confirmed by Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI in a discussion
with the researcher (Probojakti, 2008b). Furthermore, as shown on its website
(accessed on 24 April 2009), there were only two-full time staff in the AKKI’s
organisational structure, and several unfilled positions (see 0
Organisational Structure of the AKKI (September 2007 to September 2009)
(Indonesia Credit Card Association, 2007b). Furthermore, as stated by Mr Probojakti,
the fact that the part-time AKKI management spent most of their time in their home
institutions has made it difficult even to conduct meetings to discuss, among other
464

The fact that fraud victims are very likely to contact their credit card issuers (for example, to block
their cards so that the offenders are unable to use them) immediately after incidents also adds to the
importance of an industry body’s position in understanding the prevalence and cost of payments
fraud, such as credit card fraud, in a country.
465
The AKKI was established in 1988 (Indonesia Credit Card Association, 2007a).
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things, current fraud cases, let alone conducting larger tasks (Probojakti, 2008a).
According to Mr Probojakti, the limited financial resources is among the major
problems in developing human resources at the AKKI, because the institution is
generally funded by its members466 (Probojakti, 2008b). As for the AKKI’s
statements in the mass media, particularly in relation to financial losses figures from
credit card fraud incidents, Mr Probojakti states that such information were requested
on a strictly confidential basis from credit card schemes (such as Visa and
MasterCard), and were generally given in the forms of total figures only, thus
limiting the researcher’s ability to conduct trend analyses on the data (Probojakti,
2008b).
Referring to the APCA’s Payment Fraud Methodology Paper, a payments system
institution that conducts fraud data collection, management and distribution should
consider certain important matters in performing this task, including data items and
definition, scope and coverage, data reporting and timing, data processing and release
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). In terms of data items and
definition, the APCA categories credit card fraud statistics into lost/stolen card, card
never received, fraudulent application, counterfeit/skimming, card not present (CNP)
and other (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). These categories have
been defined and used consistently over the years. The scope and coverage of fraud
data collection must be clearly defined regarding from whom the data are collected as
466

In November 2007 members of the AKKI were: ANZ Panin Bank, Bank Central Asia (BCA), Bank
International Indonesia (BII), Citibank, Bank Lippo, Bank Danamon, Bank Niaga, Bank Permata,
Bank Mandiri, Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), Bank Bukopin, Bank
Buana Indonesia, Bank Mega, HSBC, GE Finance Indonesia, Diners Club, Standard Chartered
Bank, Bank Bumiputera Indonesia, ABN AMRO Bank and PANIN Bank (Indonesia Credit Card
Association, 2007a).
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well as the coverage thereof. For example, the APCA, in its Payment Fraud
Methodology Paper, states that although it does not maintain the clearing system for
credit and charge cards, the card schemes had already agreed to be part of the fraud
data collection mechanism that improved the reliability of the data and information
generated by the APCA (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)).
Data reporting and timing refers to the procedures regarding how data are reported
and how timing issues impact on output from the collections (Australian Payments
Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). For example, APCA’s member institutions report
credit and charge card fraud data as gross actual losses, and a three-month period
after the end of reporting period is required for fraud to be discovered and all relevant
details thereof acquired (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). This is
because fraudulent transactions may have occurred for some time (for example, days
or weeks) before being realised by victims (Australian Payments Clearing
Association, n.d.(c)). For data processing, to maintain consistency and to avoid
missing values and other faults that may impair the reliability of the data and
information, each individual submission is checked by the APCA and, when
necessary, respondents are contacted to verify and/or correct their data and
information (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). Even after the data
are aggregated (after they are received and checked) to produce final totals, the data
series is still be checked for consistency (Australian Payments Clearing Association,
n.d.(c)). After the above matters are sorted out, the release of the statistics should also
be arranged in a way that avoids (or at least minimises) the lead and lag effects from
timing differences in discovering, reporting and/or resolving fraud events (Australian
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Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). For this purpose, the APCA, for example,
presents its fraud statistics in annualised terms, where the data are aggregated on the
basis of 12-month periods (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.(c)). The
APCA’s statistics are also provided to institutions such as the Australian Federal
Police and the Australian Crime Commission Australian Payments Clearing
Association (n.d.(c)).
In the US, to record and manage identity theft data, a special database, the Identity
Theft Data Clearinghouse, as part of the Consumer Sentinel system, is used to gather
data from identity theft complaints filed by customers (United States General
Accounting Office, 2002c, pp. 3-4). The clearinghouse is considered to be one of the
most comprehensive identity theft databases in the US, by which law enforcement
agencies may identify pattern of criminal activities (United States General
Accounting Office, 2002d, p. 4; Newman & McNally, 2005). According to the
President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2008, p. 47), to improve existing identity theft
data collection, management and distribution, the planned future improvements
should include expanding data sources to include not only victims, but also other
parties, such as law enforcement agencies and courts (Recommendation 31).
In terms of fraud prevention policy, several efforts have been made in Indonesa,
particularly by Bank Indonesia as the central bank, to set a standard for fraud risk
management in the Indonesian payments system, especially regarding card-based
payment instruments. This was achieved by the issuance of several regulations, such
as Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning the Operation of
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (no longer in effect), Bank Indonesia
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Regulation Number 10/8/PBI/2008 Concerning the Amendment to Bank Indonesia
Regulation Number 7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning Card-Based Payment Instrument
Operation (no longer in effect) and Bank Indonesia Regulation Number
11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument
Activities (currently in effect). Other central bank regulations that directly or
indirectly contribute to the mitigation of fraud risks in the payments system include,
but are not limited to:



Bank

Indonesia

Regulation

Number

3/10/PBI/2001

Concerning

the

Implementation of Know-Your-Customer Principles (Bank Indonesia, 2001a)


Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 3/23/PBI/2001 Concerning the Amendment
to Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 3/10/PBI/2001 Concerning the
Application of Know-Your-Customer Principles (Bank Indonesia, 2001b)



Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 5/21/PBI/2003 Concerning the Second
Amendment to Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 3/10/PBI/2001 Concerning
the Application of Know-Your-Customer Principles467 (Bank Indonesia, 2003)



Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 9/15/PBI/2007 on Risk Management in the
Use of Information Technology by Commercial Banks468 (Bank Indonesia,
2007d).

467

468

Although initially set up to tackle money laundering, the KYC procedures are also useful for
spotting red flags, particularly the application fraud schemes. Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI,
in a discussion with the researcher, mentioned the KYC principles as a common means used for
preventing credit card fraud (Probojakti, 2008a).
The regulation established that a bank has the obligation to report any critical events, abuses,
and/or offences in the management of information technology that may or had already caused
significant financial losses and/or disturbances on the operation of the bank (Bank Indonesia,
2007d).
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Such regulations, when implemented properly, should establish minimum standards
for card fraud prevention activities, and may help to reduce offence displacement
problems (for example, target displacement), because all the supposedly potential
victims are on the same level of difficulties to be victimised469. According to Bank
Indonesia Circular Letter Number 11/10/DASP Concerning Card Based-Payment
Instrument Operations470, in terms of card-based payment instrument security, an
issuer has the obligation to prevent and minimise card fraud to preserve public trust
(Bank Indonesia, 2009d, p. 34). Such an obligation covers the entire related
technology infrastructures, including the security of the card security and the security
of the entire system of card data processing (Bank Indonesia, 2009d, pp. 34-35).
For card security, Bank Indonesia has mandated the implementation of chip
technology with the ability to store and/or to process data, so that various additional
applications can be added for the sake of the security of transaction data processing
(Bank Indonesia, 2009d, p. 34). The due date for the conversion to chip technology
was 31 January 2009471 (Bank Indonesia, 2009d, pp. 35-36). In terms of data
processing, this includes improvements on the security electronic data capture (EDC)
devices as well as the supporting transaction processing system of the issuers,
acquirers and/other third-party processors by providing hardware and systems that
can process chip cards (Bank Indonesia, 2009d, pp. 34-35).
469
470

471

For more discussion on the concept of crime displacement, see Chapter 3.
A circular letter is generally issued to provide further explanations and guidance to the
corresponding Bank Indonesia regulation.
The initial due date was the 31 December 2008 as stipulated by Bank Indonesia Regulation
Number 7/52/PBI/2005 concerning Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities
(Bank Indonesia, 2005a, p. 11). However, later, due to the difficulties experienced by the industry
participants in preparing themselves for the migration, the date was changed to 31 December 2009
(Bank Indonesia, 2008a, pp. 41-42).
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Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (article 27.(3).a), as further explained by
Bank Indonesia Circular Letter Number 11/10/DASP Concerning Card BasedPayment Instrument Operations, establishes that, despite all efforts to prevent card
fraud, should fraud incidents occur, financial institutions are required to submit their
reports to Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2009b, p. 19; 2009d, pp. 50-60). As
stipulated by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the
Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (elucidation, Article 15.(1)),
issuers and acquirers (for example, banks and non-bank financial institutions) must
also be financially prepared to fulfil any future payment obligations arising from
credit card fraud incidents (Bank Indonesia, 2009b, p. 9).
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities set the standard for fraud risk
management in credit card industry in Indonesia, among which is the use of the chip
technology472. However, as discussed later in this chapter, the experience of the credit
card industry in the UK suggests that the Indonesian payments system should prepare
for the possibility of offence displacements, where credit card fraud offenders no
longer commit counterfeit card fraud but instead focus on other schemes such as

472

As explained by the Circular Letter No. 11/10/DASP concerning Card-Based Payment Instrument
Operation (Bank Indonesia, 2009d, p. 34).
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card-not-present fraud and application fraud, or may even target other card-based
payment instruments, such as the ATM card473.
These issues highlight the need for more regulations on the fraud risk management,
which in turn covers more areas, such as online credit card fraud transactions and
ATM card fraud. In other words, future Bank Indonesia regulations on fraud risk
management should cover more (if not all) areas of payments instruments to
minimise crime opportunity in the payments system. Regulations on ‘what’ should be
achieved in terms of fraud prevention should also be accompanied by clear guidelines
on ‘how’ to achieve this. For example, as discussed above, Bank Indonesia should
provide more explanations on how financial institutions should arrange their credit
card fraud data before submitting them to the central bank to avoid confusion and
misunderstanding. In Australia, for example, the APCA, in its Payment Fraud
Statistics Methodology Paper474, describes the procedures used consistently
throughout the years and by which the periodic fraud statistics are constructed.
In terms of fraud awareness, several events (such as seminars and training events)
have been held often as collaborations among institutions such as Bank Indonesia, the
Indonesian National Police, the Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI) and
commercial banks to enhance knowledge and understanding on the modus operandi,
prevention measures and investigation techniques of credit card fraud in Indonesia.
473

474

The researcher’s review on Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 did not find any
part of the regulation that creates an obligation for ATM card issuers to switch to smartcard (chip)
technology. According to the acting Governor of Bank Indonesia, Mr Darmin Nasution, Bank
Indonesia has not yet mandated the use of chips on ATM cards (Khoiriyah, 2010). Therefore, the
magnetic stripe technology is still in use for this type of payments card that exposes cardholders to
the higher risk of payments fraud.
See Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(c)).
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For example, a seminar on credit card fraud in the payments system was held on 16
December 2009 at the Postgraduate Study Program of STIE Perbanas Surabaya,
whose speakers included Mr Mahmud (Head of Bank Indonesia, Surabaya Office),
Mr Dodit Probojakti (a member of the AKKI executive board) and Mr Winang
Budoyo (an economist from Bank CIMB Niaga) (STIE Perbanas Surabaya, 2009).
The seminar was attended by banking practitioners, academics, students, police and
credit card users, and aimed to enhance the knowledge of practitioners, students and
credit card users on the modus operandi and prevention of credit card fraud (STIE
Perbanas Surabaya, 2009).
Another example is the information event, The Socialisation of the Modus Operandi
of Credit Card Fraud (January 2008), attended by Mr Paulus Purwoko of the
Indonesian Police, Mr I Gusti Firaguna Bagus Oka of Bank Indonesia475, Mr Elvin
Schew of MasterCard Singapore, Mr Daniel Tan Peng Huat of American Express and
130 participants from various offices of the Indonesian Police in Bali
(Beritabali.com, 2008). The event, according to Mr Dodit Probojakti476 of AKKI
aimed to update, in particular, law enforcers’ knowledge of the latest credit card
fraud modus operandi (Beritabali.com, 2008).
The Work Group on Public Education on Banking477 (2007) states that many
problems exist between the banking industry and society in banking operations.
Among the causes of such problems is the lack of society’s knowledge about banking

475
476
477

A director of Bank Indonesia of the time.
A member of the AKKI executive board of the time.
The work group members consist of Bank Indonesia, 14 commercial banks, one rural credit bank,
four associations and one non-bank credit card issuer (Sari, 2007).
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matters (Work Group on Public Education on Banking, 2007). Bank Indonesia has
expressed its commitment to educating society on banking matters by launching the
Blueprint of Public Education on Banking in 2007 (Sari, 2007). Among the matters
covered by the Blueprint was the need to educate society about crimes related to
banking products to prevent losses (Work Group on Public Education on Banking,
2007). In early 2008 Bank Indonesia initiated the Let’s Go to the Bank campaign to
educate society on banking matters (Nopiansyah, 2008). 2008 was also named the
Year of Banking Education (PerbanasNews, 2008, p. 2).
As evidenced by the various training events and seminars held for enhancing
knowledge on the issues of credit card fraud and prevention, it appears that some
understanding exists of the importance of fraud awareness in tackling credit card
fraud in Indonesia. However, because many credit card fraud cases are technologybased crimes that evolve rapidly over time, such initiatives should be continuously
carried out and improved frequently, particularly for cardholders, because many
offences were successfully perpetrated by offenders because of customers’ ignorance
and negligence. The recent massive ATM fraud in Indonesia is an example. The
offences were perpetrated in different areas in different provinces in Indonesia (for
example, Jakarta, Bali, East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and Yogyakarta) in
January 2010, and were believed to be perpetrated by organised criminals with
estimated total losses of over $US2 million (Gatra, 2010). Although not specifically
targeting credit cardholders478, the fact that such offences were perpetrated by means

478

Because credit cards can also be used to withdraw funds from ATM machines (cash advances),
credit cardholders who use magnetic stripe cards also bear the risk of being victimised by this
scheme.
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of ‘classic’ modus operandi (such as attaching a skimming device and fake customer
call centre number to an ATM machine and unlawfully installing a hidden camera)
suggest the lack of customer awareness about the issues of payments fraud (Gatra,
2010; Prasetyo, 2010; Kompas.com, 2010).
In the US, improving society’s fraud awareness has been a major agenda, as
determined by the countries’ national strategies, including Combating Identity Theft:
A Strategic Plan (US)479. The US FTC, for example, has undertaken various
initiatives to implement the Strategic Plan, such as a public awareness campaign in
December 2007 named Deter, Detect, Defend: AvoID Theft, as well as by means of
websites, articles, brochures, speeches, public service announcements and interviews
to reach a variety of audiences with a basic message that consumers should take
simple steps to reduce the risk of identity theft (President's Identity Theft Task Force,
2008, pp. 17-18). In the UK, during the country’s migration to smartcard technology,
the chip and PIN program released publicly available materials for educational
purposes, such as Get Ready for Chip and PIN (an implementation guide for
businesses) (Chip and PIN, 2004c) and The Chip and PIN Guide: Remembering Your
PIN (Chip and PIN, 2004e). Additionally, after the migration, to educate consumers
about how to remember and use their Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) the ‘I ♥
PIN’ campaign was launched in October 2005 (Chip and PIN, 2005a).
In terms of technology-based protection, as stated by Mr Dodit Probojakti480 of the
AKKI, in a discussion with the researcher, every bank and non-bank financial

479
480

Recommendation 8 (Initiate a Multi-Year Public Awareness Campaign).
A member of the AKKI executive board.
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institution that operates credit card system in Indonesia generally already has its own
protection against fraud (Probojakti, 2008a). Recently, because chip technology is
recognised worldwide as the best standard of card security, the Indonesian credit card
industry has begun to embrace such technology to tackle credit card fraud, as
stipulated by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the
Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities, with a chip conversion due
date of 31 December 2009 (Bank Indonesia, 2009d, pp. 35-36). In other words, from
1 January 2010, all credit cards in Indonesia will have been converted into chip
cards481. In December 2008 Bank Indonesia’s statistics indicated that 4.7 million
credit cards were already chip–based, which accounted for 42 per cent of the total
cards in circulation in Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2009a, p. 49). Additionally, the
number of electronic data capture (EDC) machines in compliance with the EMV
(Europay MasterCard Visa) standard in December 2008 was 106,360, representing a
14 per cent increase from the 2007 figure (Bank Indonesia, 2009a, p. 50).
Table 34 Chip Card Implementation (December 2008)
Issuer Groups

Number of Cards Number of Chip Cards % of Chip Cards

Foreign Banks

2,839,382

1,556,357

55

Joint Venture Banks

412,224

145,978

35

Private National Banks 4,200,747

2,434,972

58

Government Banks

2,781,607

253,092

9

Non-banks

1,051,370

299,084

28

Total

11,285,330

4,689,483

42

Source: Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 49).

481

According to the Deputy Director of the Directorate of Accounting and Payment System of Bank
Indonesia, Mrs Yohana Fransiska Sri Suparni, The time needed for the delivery of the cards to the
cardholders caused a few cardholders had not received their cards by 1 January 2010 and thus
made the actual percentage of completion in the country’s migration to chip technology slightly
less than 100 percent on that date (Warta Kota.co.id, 2010).

393

Table 35 EMV Compliant EDC482
Acquirer Groups

Total Number of
EDC

Total EMV
Compliant EDC

% of EMV
Compliant EDC

Foreign Banks

5,230

3,000

57

Private National Banks

110,058

87,530

80

Government Banks

58,683

15,830

27

Total

173,971

106,360

61

Source: Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 50).

According to Mr Wawan Salum483, of ABN Amro, the migration from magnetic
stripe-based card to chip-based card requires significant additional investment
(Wibowo, 2006). Bank BNI for example, plans to spend $US120 million on card
replacement from magnetic stripe-based to chip-based technology (Berita Sore,
2008). Bank Mandiri, as the largest state-owned bank in Indonesia, according to its
Director of Consumers at the time, Mr Omar S. Anwar, would have to spend $US2.5
million for the conversion (Channel Magazine, 2008(b), p. 6). Bank Danamon has
allocated approximately $US1 million for upgrading their cards to chip-based
technology (Channel Magazine, 2008(b), p. 6).
However, the statistics in Table 34 and Table 35 suggest that industry participants in
Indonesia believe that, despite the significant costs of establishing the chip system for
fraud prevention, the cost savings from the reduction of fraud losses and other
benefits will exceed them, at least in the long run. This was confirmed by Mr
Probojakti484, of AKKI, in a discussion with the researcher (Probojakti, 2008a). He
believes that generally, credit card issuers already perceive the benefits of migration

482

Electronic data capture.
Head of consumer finance of ABN Amro of the time.
484
A member of the AKKI executive board.
483
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to chip-based cards as exceeding its costs, at least in the long run (Probojakti, 2008a).
Further, according to Mr Probojakti, with chip-based cards, the issuers can have more
benefits than just the decrease in their fraud losses (Probojakti, 2008a). Such benefits,
according to Mr Probojakti, can be financial, such as the loyalty programs which can
only be enjoyed by chip-based cardholders (Probojakti, 2008a).
Despite the seemingly easier reception of the smartcard technology in Indonesia
compared to, for example, the US and Australia, referring to the experience of the
UK, Indonesia may need to prepare itself against the possible adverse consequences
thereof. As discussed in Chapter 6, the APACS fraud statistics indicate that soon after
the conversion of credit cards in the UK into chip-based cards was completed, total
losses from card fraud (debit and credit card) increased from $US823.6 million in
2003 to $US989 million in 2004 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b,
p. 6). According to the APACS, in its press release of 8 March 2005, the increase was
partly caused by offenders trying to seek and maximise new crime opportunities by
focusing on card-not-present fraud schemes (Association for Payment Clearing
Services, 2005). Therefore, the Indonesian payments system must prepare itself by
strengthening other vulnerable areas485 that may be targeted by credit card fraud
offenders after the implementation of the smart card technology in the country, for
example, by strengthening online security in the country to anticipate the growth of
card-not-present schemes. Additionally, and based on the UK’s experience, chip485

Even though the investigation process is still ongoing, the author of this study believes that the
recent massive ATM fraud in Indonesia (see above discussion) may also indicate that offenders
had already begun their migration to other more vulnerable areas after the full implementation of
the smart card technology in Indonesia on 1 January 2010 on all credit cards. This is because, as
previously discussed, Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 did not mandate that
ATM card issuers must use chip technology.
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based credit cards commonly still use magnetic stripes to anticipate the needs of
cardholders travelling to other countries without (or with a slower pace of adoption
of) smartcard technology (Everett, n.d.). On the other hand, to accommodate the need
of overseas cardholders who still use magnetic stripe cards, magnetic electronic data
captures (EDC) are still in use in Indonesia (Surya Online, 2009). Therefore, the risk
remains of credit card fraud offenders stealing card data from magnetic stripes and
using them to commit fraud in other countries that still accept magnetic stripe
cards486 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008a).
The lack of effective identity management in Indonesia has always been a major
problem in crime prevention, investigation and prosecution in the country. The ease
of acquiring false or multiple identity documents for criminal purposes, for example,
is evidenced by the many cases of serious crime in Indonesia, such as money
laundering and corruption487. Mr Dodit Probojakti, of AKKI488, in a discussion with
the researcher, stated that, in practice, credit card issuers have been using various
means in their customer identification process, including the use of software, the

486

According to the Deputy Director of the Directorate of Accounting and Payment System of Bank
Indonesia, Mrs Yohana Fransiska Sri Suparni, as of 1 January 2010, the magnetic stripes on
Indonesian credit cards can no longer be used to make transactions. However, the EDCs can still
recognise magnetic stripes from overseas cards and accept them (Surya Online, 2009).
487
The Head of the Directorate of Compliance and Supervisor of the Indonesian Financial Transaction
Reports and Analysis Center (INTRAC), Mr Eddy Manindo Harahap, in a discussion with the
researcher, suggested that false personal documents such as identity cards, are major obstacles in
the investigations of many crimes in Indonesia (Harahap, 2008). According to Mr Harahap,
whenever false identity was involved in a crime, it was generally very difficult to track down, let
alone to prosecute, the offender (Harahap, 2008). This was also confirmed by the Supervisor of
Asset Declaration Examiners of the Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia, Mr Najib
Wahito, in a discussion with the researcher. Mr Wahito was of the opinion that, in many corruption
cases, a common way to conceal illegitimate wealth is by having more than one identity with the
same name, but different addresses (Wahito, 2008). In many cases of terrorism, it is also common
for a terrorist to have more than one false identity card to distance themselves from the authorities
(Adi, 2009).
488
A member of the AKKI executive board.
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implementation of the KYC principle, ID checking, audit trails, ‘matching and crosscheck’ and field surveys (Probojakti, 2008a). Furthermore, as explained by Mr
Probojakti, cooperation among issuers on fraud data and information sharing for
background checking has also strengthened existing fraud prevention practices,
particularly to ensure that credit cards are issued only to trusted people (Probojakti,
2008a). Finally, as stated by Mr Probojakti, even after an application is approved,
issuers still monitor the use of the cards to look for any unusual transaction patterns
that may indicate fraudulent activities (Probojakti, 2008a). However, Mr Probojakti
also believes that despite these efforts, schemes such as credit card application fraud
remains a serious threat, due to the lack of effectiveness in identity management in
Indonesia, which allows credit card fraud offenders to obtain multiple identity
documents easily (Koran Jakarta, 2010). According to Mr Probojakti, on average, a
credit card fraud offender has four ID cards (Koran Jakarta, 2010).
Several initiatives have been prepared to circumvent the problems of identity
management in crime prevention, investigation and prosecution, among which is the
development of the Single Identification Number (SIN) system in Indonesia. As
stated by the National Coordinating Committee on the Prevention and Eradication of
the Crime of Money Laundering (Komite TPPU) (2007, p. 15):
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In order to overcome the immense number of false identities, including the misuse of
such identity, a Single Identity Number489 for every citizen is needed. Thus, there will be
no individual having multiple personal identities. From KTP (Identity Card), SIM
(Driving License), health insurance, and others, all require only one single identity
number490.

The population administration by means of the SIN system is not a new concept. The
US has been using this system in its social security numbers (SSNs) since 1935
(Lusmiarwan & Supangkat, 2005, p. 9). Originally created for tracking workers’
earnings, the SSN is now considered an important means of identification in the US
(President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p. 23). President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, through his staff member, Mr Denny Indrayana, expressed his support
for this plan, which is believed will benefit Indonesia in many ways, including crime
prevention (Khumaini, 2009). Other areas of use of the SIN include police record,
taxation, land administration and banking, which all require information on a
person’s identity (Henricus & Siringoringo, 2009).
Explained by Lusmiarwan and Supangkat (2005, p. 11), the SIN is a unique identity
integrated with a set of multiple data from different government and private
institutions so it can be used by different institutions. It has the characteristics of
being unique (no duplications exist), standardised (the same identity structure is used
nationwide), complete (it has nationwide coverage), permanent (no changes of data
occur) and integrated (Lusmiarwan & Supangkat, 2005, p. 11; Suharno, Leksono, &
489

Many identity management literatures uses the term ‘Single Identification Number’ instead of
‘Single Identity Number’. For simplicity, this study considers the two terms as synonymous and
chooses to use the former.
490
As stipulated by the Law No. 23 Year 2006 concerning Population Administration System (Article
28, paragraphs 1 and 2), the population administration information management shall be handled
by the Minister of Home Affairs, and shall be implemented through the Population Administration
Information System (National Coordinating Commitee on the Prevention and Eradication of the
Crime of Money Laundering, 2007, p. 15). For the original wording of the law, see Republic of
Indonesia (2006).
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Kurniawan, 2004, p. 6). This means that ideally every citizen will have and use only
one ‘single identity’ for a different range of needs, organisations and areas
(Lusmiarwan & Supangkat, 2005, p. 12). The information heterogeneity and
incompleteness in the identity management in Indonesia with lack of communication
among organizations contributes to: inefficiency in data collection due to redundancy
in the process; spatial nature of the information due to the lack of communication
among organizations in maintaining and developing their data; and misunderstanding
in interpreting data and information from the same object (Suharno, Leksono, &
Kurniawan, 2004, p. 6).
The complexity of current identity management systems in Indonesia491 would make
the centralisation process a very difficult and expensive task. The government plans
to spend approximately $US737 million on this project, which will be supervised by
the Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia (KPK) to avoid violations such
as misuse of funds (Wardany, 2009). As stated by the KPK Deputy Chairman for
Prevention, Mr M. Jasin, in accordance with the Law No. 23/2006 Concerning the
Population Administration System, the Minister of Home Affairs has only five years
after the law was enacted to bring the program into realisation (Wardany, 2009). In
other words, despite slow progress to date, the SIN program must be finished by
2011 (Wardany, 2009). Despite the technical issues, Swastika (2009) argues that the
private interests492 of institutions is a major cause why the SIN has not existed in
491

492

For example,there are approximately 32 institutions that issue different identity numbers for
documents such as ID cards, family cards, passports, driver’s licences, proof of vehicle ownership
books (BPKB), birth certificates and electric bills, to name a few, and this often creates confusion
(Swastika, 2009).
This is often dubbed as the ‘sectoral ego’, where institutions are resistant to system centralisation
with one another, and everyone wants to be the leader in such a process (eBizzAsia, 2004).
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Indonesia until now. This is because to establish the SIN system in Indonesia,
process–based activities are needed that requires intensive and responsive crosssectoral cooperation (Swastika, 2009). The trial of the system is planned to be
conducted in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Denpasar and Padang in 2010 (Ferdina, 2009).
SIN simplifies registration process in a country (Small and Medium Enterprise
Department of World Bank Group, 2006, pp. 35-36). A business, for example, may
use the same number in dealing with different government agencies within a country
which means database management simplification as well as better business
information sharing for public authorities

(Small and Medium Enterprise

Department of World Bank Group, 2006, pp. 35-36). An essential element in SIN
system is the establishment of an integrated database of subjects (for example, people
and organization) and objects (for example, land) (Suharno, Leksono, & Kurniawan,
2004, p. 9). With this database, data and information can be easily accessed, shared,
and integrated with other systems. Other benefits include: cross-sectoral information
exchange; more accurate information aspects such as social, economics, and
environment of a country; ability for assessing income potential for taxation purpose;
and removing unnecessary redundancy of information; to name a few (Suharno,
Leksono, & Kurniawan, 2004, pp. 9-10).
The integrated database of the SIN system will make it very difficult for fraud
offenders to obtain and use multiple and/or false identification documents to commit
offences (for example, for making fraudulent credit card applications). Additionally,
should an offence be committed, the authorities may more easily track down and find
offenders because all personally identifiable data will be centralised. However, in
400

terms of crime opportunity, centralised identity management may reduce it in some
areas, but increase it in others. This is so because the accumulated data within the
database will be an attractive target for fraud attacks (London School of Economics,
2005, p. 187; Myhr, 2005, p. 22). Based on a study by the London School of
Economics (LSE) on the UK’s national identity program, common factors that
increase the security risk of a centralized identity management system include
(London School of Economics, 2005, p. 188):
1. The scale and the complexity of the system
2. The number of users
3. The security sensitivity of data held on the system
4. Whether it has connections to other computer systems, especially untrusted ones
5. Whether it is connected to the Internet
6. Whether it is likely to be an attractive target for attack

Therefore, the system has to be very secure to prevent data theft and unauthorized
modification and at the same time to protect citizens whose data are stored in the
database (London School of Economics, 2005, p. 187). An identity management
system should have mechanism to regulate matters such as: processing of personal
data; rights of the data subject; data sharing between administrations; and allowed use
of the SIN (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 7). In terms of processing of
personal data, it should be clear as to whether or not and how the authority needs to
be notified when personal data is to be processed (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz,
2006, p. 5). Rights of data subject include: information and notification right; an
access right; and a right to object (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 6). Data
sharing between administrations concerns transfer, sharing, interconnection and
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exchange of personal data between public agencies or administrative authorities by
means of identifier (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 6). In terms of allowed
use of the SIN, a major concern has been its use by private institutions especially for
internal needs (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 6).
Another challenge in establishing SIN system is the possible resistance mainly from
society as it may be considered similar to a form of surveillance which also means
the invasion of privacy493.This may cause data subjects reluctant in providing reliable
data and information which can impair the accuracy of the database. Other factors
include the lack of human resource to maintain the authenticity of the inputted data as
well as system error (for example, due to technical attack) during enrollment process
(London School of Economics, 2005, pp. 190-191). Therefore, to anticipate these
problems in the future, the Indonesian government may need to conduct socialization
program of SIN system to inform public about the mechanism and benefits of the
system so as to eliminate fear of, for example, privacy invasion. The Indonesian
government must also provide sufficient human resources to ensure that the
management of database is well performed.
One way to maintain the reliability of the SIN system is through the use of biometric
(for example, fingerprint). Biometric refers to a range of identification techniques
based on physical characteristics and behaviour unique to the individual which
provides greater confidence that the identification is accurate (Myhr, 2005, p. 27).
Examples of the most common biometrics are fingerprints, iris scans, hand geometry,
DNA and signatures (London School of Economics, 2005, p. 160; Ryan, 2006, p.
493

See Martin et al. (2009) for further discussion.
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18). Myhr (2005, p. 27) argues that biometric is a better means (than, for example,
PIN) to verify that an ID user is also its owner. To support the development of the
SIN system, on 30 January 2009, the Indonesian Automatic Fingerprint Identification
System (INAFIS) was created by the Indonesian National Police and inaugurated by
President Yudhoyono (Portal Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2009). The system will
record data from every Indonesian citizen including newborn children

(Portal

Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2009). Every citizen will be given a card with chip in it
which records the holder’s personal data (Portal Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2009).
In supporting the national ID scheme, the fingerprint database will prevent
redundancy in enrollment and thus prevent the ownership of multiple national IDs by
a single person (Kristanti & Afrianti, 2009).
Biometrics has been considered as the gold-standard for identity verification due to
the difficulty in altering or counterfeiting physical characteristics of a subject494.
However, using biometrics on a national scale is a very complex and difficult task,
not to mention costly. Major issues in the implementation of biometrics in identity
management include (London School of Economics, 2005, pp. 174-176):


Usability. Ensuring that all citizens are able to use biometric based devices. Some
people may find using biometric based devices very difficult and thus increasing
the usage time which will slow down the verification process.

494

See, for example, Whitley & Hosein (Whitley & Hosein, 2008, p. 672) and London School of
Economics (2005, p. 45).
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Accessibility. Ensuring that all citizens are able to enroll their biometric data into
the system. Some people are unable to enroll their biometric due to certain
physical limitations (for example, visually impaired).



Acceptance. Eliminating citizen’s fear of using biometric devices. Many people
are afraid of using biometric devices for reasons such as hygiene and safety. Iris
scan, for example, are believed by some people to cause eye damage in long term
use.

Finally, one must realize that there is no such thing as perfect technology and
biometric is not an exception. A number of literatures have discussed the weaknesses
of biometric system. For example, Matsumoto et al. (2002) in their article, Impact of
Artificial "Gummy" Fingers on Fingerprint Systems, establishes that:
… that gummy fingers, namely artificial fingers that are easily made of cheap and readily
available gelatin, were accepted by extremely high rates by particular fingerprint devices
with optical or capacitive sensors. We have used the molds, which we made by pressing
our live fingers against them or by processing fingerprint images from prints on glass
surfaces, etc. We describe how to make the molds, and then show that the gummy
fingers, which are made with these molds, can fool the fingerprint devices.

A report from the US GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border
Security, states that (United States General Accounting Office, 2002):
… that certain ethnic and demographic groups (elderly populations, manual laborers, and
some Asian populations) have fingerprints that are more difficult to capture than others’.
Optical and silicon scanning technologies have unique performance issues. Scanning
fingerprints optically can be prone to error if the platen has a buildup of dirt, grime, or
oil—producing leftover fingerprints from previous users, known as latent prints.

Cultural differences may also become a factor behind the difficult acceptance of
biometric technology. For example, Riley et al. (2009, p. 295) in their study of
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attitude toward biometric technology in India, South Africa, and United Kingdom
conclude that the way biometric systems are used can be influenced by cultural
differences and thus they should be taken into consideration when designing and
implementing such systems. According their study, Riley at al. (2009, p. 305)
contend that:
In general, Indians were more receptive to the idea of biometric authentication and were
less worried about the implications of using the technology than the British or South
Africans who took part in this study. Biometrics could be an appropriate technology in
the Indian context given the positive opinion many expressed. The results from this
survey also suggest that South Africans may be accepting of biometric technology.
Respondents from the United Kingdom, however, did not rate the technology in a
positive way and large-scale consumer facing implementations in the context would
likely face significant resistance.

Once the SIN system is fully up and running, it is important for the Indonesian
government, despite the substantial resources devoted into establishing the system,
not to overuse the SIN in administration matters. As discussed in Chapter 7, the US
had firsthand experience in overusing the SSN which resulted in more fraud
offenders are targeting the identification number. For example, the report of the
General Accountability Office (GAO) (2009, p. 8) suggests that excessive use of the
social security numbers (SSNs) that leads to data security breaches is among the
major vulnerabilities of the country in relation to identity theft. This was believed to
be largely caused by the widespread use of SSNs as identifiers by government and
private institutions, and where such numbers commonly become parts of information
to authenticate consumers’ identities (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007a, p.
23). As discussed in Chapter 7, the first two recommendations in the President’s
Identity Theft Task Force’s Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan are:
‘Decrease the unnecessary use of social security numbers in the public sector’
405

(Recommendation 1) and ‘Develop comprehensive record on private sector use of
SSNs’ (Recommendation 2) (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 6). These
indicate the efforts of the US Government to circumvent the identity theft problems
within the country by minimising the use of SSNs in its systems.
In terms of legal deterrence in payments fraud prevention practice in Indonesia, prior
to the issuance of the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic
Transactions495, the prosecution of credit card fraud offenders is generally conducted
using the Indonesian penal code, which the country inherited from the Dutch colonial
period, and which is considered insufficient for tackling, in particular, technologybased offences (GLG Expert Contributor , 2008). For example, according to Mr
Dodit Probojakti496 of the AKKI, the case of counterfeit card fraud perpetrated by
Beny Wong, who received a five-year, eight-month jail sentence, was known at the
time as the highest sentence ever for a credit card fraud case in Indonesia
(Hukumonline.com, 2007). Previously, perpetrators of credit card fraud (such as
Herry Komet in Bandung, Tan Wo Siang and Ripin Kasim in Jakarta and Chandra
Halim in Surabaya) were sentenced to a maximum of four years in prison
(Hukumonline.com, 2007). As stated by the Police Brigadier General Indradi Tanos
of the Indonesian Police at the seminar on the law enforcement of credit card in
Indonesia (15 April 2006), the weak legal sanctions, as found in the penal code, has
made credit card fraud syndicates keep repeating their offences (Sebayang, 2008). Mr
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For the original text, see the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the
Republic of Indonesia (2008).
AKKI risk management coordinator at the time; currently a member of the executive board of
AKKI.
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Mohamad Helmi of AKKI497 contends that the perpetrators of credit card fraud in
Indonesia who were prosecuted by using the penal code would receive the maximum
sanction of only five to six years of imprisonment; whereas in other countries (such
as Malaysia, Singapore and Australia), the sanctions for the same offence are more
severe (Ridwan, 2005).
According to the Police Great Commissioner Adjutant Dharma Pongrekun of the
Indonesian National Police, regardless of the efforts made by the Indonesian National
Police to counter credit card fraud, the relatively light sanctions for offenders has
made Indonesia a safe haven for credit card fraud offenders (Hukumonline.com,
2004). Furthermore, as stated by Mr Pongrekun, indications exist that migrations of
credit card offenders from Malaysia and Thailand to Indonesia have occurred due to
this situation (Hukumonline.com, 2004).
The use of technology to support crime in Indonesia has created new challenges for
the law enforcement institutions to conduct investigations into offences and prosecute
offenders. A major city in Indonesia, Yogyakarta, for example, was known a few
years ago as a haven for online credit card fraud offenders, as well being as among
the worst places in the world for online credit card fraud. This was confirmed by the
Police Commissioner Adjutant Tri Wiratmo of the Yogyakarta Provincial Police
(Polda DIY), who had years of experience in the investigation of credit card fraud in
Yogyakarta, in a discussion with the researcher (Wiratmo, 2008). According to Mr
Wiratmo, among the major difficulties of the investigation and prosecution of online
credit card fraud offences and online credit card fraud offenders are (Wiratmo, 2008):
497

Chairman of AKKI at the time.
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victims are often from different jurisdictions (that is, overseas)



offenders are very difficult to track down and apprehend, due to their use of
technology



the law at the time had not yet regulated matters such as cybercrime and
electronic evidences



the complexity of the technology enabled crimes that required law enforcers to
possess high level of skills and knowledge to conduct the investigations, which
often created human resource problems498.

Efforts have been made to circumvent such problems by, for example, establishing
networks of cooperation with the international law enforcement agencies such as
Interpol. According to Mr Wiratmo, even with such cooperation, inter-jurisdictional
cases will still take a long time to solve (Wiratmo, 2008).
As mentioned above, a major effort made by the Indonesian government in
mitigating the threats from technology supported crimes was the passing of the Law
No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic Transactions in April 2008499.
According to Mr Mohammad Nuh500, the law generally covers various aspects of the
use of information and communication technology, including crimes within (Ministry
of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008,
p. v). Among the important matters regulated by this law is the use of electronic
498

This matter has been addressed by, for example, The Field Manual Book of the Investigation of
Credit Card Crime and the training events conducted by institutions such as the AKKI and Bank
Indonesia (see the above discussion).
499
See Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia (2008,
p. 30).
500
Minister of communication and information technology at the time.
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information and/or electronic documents as legitimate legal evidences as the
expansion of legitimate legal evidence pursuant to the Law of Procedure (Article 5)
(Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of
Indonesia, 2008, p. 7). With such matters already regulated within, the law has been
fully supported by the Indonesian National Police, because previously, it was very
difficult (if not impossible) to use electronic documents as evidence (Yanuarti, 2008).
According to the Head of the IT and Cybercrime Unit of the Criminal Investigation
Bureau (Bareskrim) of the Indonesian National Police, Police Grand Commissioner
Petrus Reinhard Golose, the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and
Electronic Transactions is the first ‘legal umbrella’ for law enforcers to tackle
electronic crime in cyberspace, and is considered as an outstanding accomplishment
(Yanuarti, 2008).
Mr Iwan Setiawan501 of Bank Indonesia, in a discussion with the researcher,
explained that the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic
Transactions has adopted several international regulations, guidance and practices,
such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996, the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Signatures 2001 and the European Union’s Convention on
Cyber Crime (ETS no. 185, 2001)502 (Setiawan, 2008). In relation to this new law,
the Police Commissioner Adjutant Tri Wiratmo of the Yogyakarta Provincial Police
(Polda DIY), in a discussion with the researcher, argued that it has a potential to

501
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IT senior system analyst of Bank Indonesia.
See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (1999; 2002) and Council of Europe
(2001).
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mitigate the problem of the use of technology to facilitate crime such as in credit card
fraud (Wiratmo, 2008).
In terms of legal deterrence, the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and
Electronic Transactions imposes higher sanctions, particularly for credit card fraud
offenders in terms of jail sentences and fines, which can strengthen the area of legal
deterrence. This was confirmed by Mr Dodit Probojakti503 and Mr Ferry Tupanno504,
both of AKKI, in a discussion with the researcher (Probojakti, 2008a; Tupanno,
2008a). According to Mr Probojakti, before 2004, the average jail sentence for credit
card fraud offender was approximately one year, and later on became 2.5 years after
2004, with the case of Beny Wong in Bali receiving the highest sentence (five years,
eight months) (Probojakti, 2008a). With the maximum of 12 years of imprisonment,
the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic Transactions is
expected to have a better deterrence effect than previous laws. For example, as stated
in Article 35 (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the
Republic of Indonesia, 2008, p. 21):
Any person, on purpose and without right or violating the law, manipulates, creates,
deletes, damages electronic information and/or electronic documents with the aim to
make the electronic information and/or the electronic documents to be regarded as an
authentic data.

Additionally, Article 51(1) rules that (Ministry of Communication and Information
Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008, p. 28):
Any person who fulfils the provisions as referred to in Article 35 shall be liable to
imprisonment to the maximum period of 12 (twelve) years and/or fine to the maximum
amount of Rp12,000,000,000 (twelve billion rupiah).
503
504

A member of the executive board of the AKKI.
Risk management coordinator of the AKKI.
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Several criticisms arose after the law was passed on 25 March 2008505 by the
People’s Representative Council of Indonesia indicating, among other things,
unaccommodated interests of some parties. Mr Irwan Effendi506, of the Indonesia
Internet Association, for example, believes that there were major six weaknesses
within the law: lack of socialisation during the formulation process, the use of
misleading definitions, inconsistencies, the use of unclear standards, restrictions to
the upholding of the law and the development of information technology and
ignorance of jurisdiction issues (Effendi, n.d.). Another criticism came from Mr
Rusdi Rudiah, a member of the working group on the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic
Information and Electronic Transactions, who complained that the sanction of the law
is too severe compared to other laws governing similar matters (for example,
humiliation and/or defamation) (Kompas.com, 2009). Despite the numerous
criticisms of the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic
Transactions, all focus on its substance, but do not criticise its existence. Basically,
the law itself represents the state’s efforts to fulfil its responsibility to provide
maximum protection for information and communication technology utilisation in the
Indonesia (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic
of Indonesia, 2008, p. v).
The existence of cyberlaw in Indonesia to provide sufficient legal deterrence will not
be a significant contribution for the payments fraud prevention practice, should law
enforcers not be equipped with sufficient skills and experience to conduct
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See Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia (2008,
p. ix).
506
Secretary of the Indonesia Internet Association.

411

investigations and bring offenders to the courts (Elly, 2008). As previously
mentioned, the limited human resources for tackling technology-based crimes has
always been a major problem for the Indonesian National Police. This is because
offenders often possess extensive knowledge os information and communication
technology, surpassing those of law enforcers (Elly, 2008). An Indonesian
telecommunication and informatics expert, Mr Roy Suryo, states that during 2008, in
32 Provincial Police (Polda) offices, only approximately 12 had cybercrime units,
and that this suggests the need for more personnel with sufficient knowledge on
technology-related crimes (Lobo, 2008; Suara Pembaruan Daily , 2008). According
to the Head of Unit V IT and Cybercrime of the Criminal Investigation Bureau
(Bareskrim) of the Indonesian National Police, Police Grand Commissioner Petrus
Reinhard Golose, despite the enormity of the problem, the Indonesian National Police
as law enforcer is not yet prepared to handle cybercrime cases (Kompas.com, 2008a).
Further, Mr Golose states that handling cybercrime cases depends heavily on
improving human resources within the police institution itself (Kompas.com, 2008a).
According to Mr Golose, this matter not only concerns having police officers who
know about using computer, but is also about how to ‘create’ police officers who are
capable of investigating computer-related crimes (Kompas.com, 2008a). For this, Mr
Golose recommends having special education on cyberspace and the use of computer
hardware and software in cybercrime investigations in the Indonesian Police
Academy, police school and the Police Science University (Kompas.com, 2008a).
Referring to the experience of the US, such problems are common and will always be
encountered by law enforcers in investigating technology-enabled crimes. One of the
412

President’s Identity Theft Task Force’s recommendations in its Strategic Plan is to
‘Enhance training for law enforcement officers and prosecutors’ (Recommendation
30) (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 46)

507

. The increase in the

number of regional identity theft seminars as well as the review on the curricula for
the education and training of federal agencies’ officers are examples of responses to
this recommendation (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, pp. 46-47).
Referring to the experience of the UK, establishing special units, task forces, or
networks to mitigate the threats of payments fraud should also strengthen the area of
legal deterrence in payments fraud prevention practices. For example, the Dedicated
Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit (DCPCU) was established in 2002 to tackle organised
criminal networks that commit cheque and plastic card fraud in the UK, and is
supported by investigators from various institutions such as the Metropolitan Police
Service (MPS), the City of London Police (CoLP) and civilian investigators
(National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 51; Dedicated Cheque and Plastic
Crime Unit, n.d.).
Success in the above key areas requires the roles of users, institutions, networks and
government and industry as the four ‘pillars’ of the payments fraud prevention.
Customers, as part of the user group, can participate in training events and seminars
held to improve their awareness on the current fraud issues, which should encourage
cautious behaviour when using credit cards and thus provide fewer crime
opportunities for offenders. By reporting fraud incidents to their financial institutions
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See Chapter 7 for more discussion.
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as soon as they occur, customers can also support fraud data collection, management
and distribution as part of the efforts to understand the real problems.
Financial institutions, as part of the institution group in the four pillars, can contribute
to the above recommendations by allocating resources to acquire the latest credit card
fraud prevention technology, conducting customer education programs and becoming
part of the fraud data collection, management and distribution process in the country.
Credit card associations, as part of the network group, can establish rules of
operation508 for the network participants, including security standards within (for
example, EMV for smart cards and PCI DSS for online transactions), as well as
contribute to the fraud data collection, management and distribution process.
In the fourth group, government and industry, Bank Indonesia, as the central bank, in
fulfilling its responsibility to promote safety and efficiency in the payments system,
can formulate regulations on fraud risk management for the Indonesian credit card
industry. Institutions such as the Indonesian National Police are in a position to
support credit card fraud prevention in Indonesia by creating deterrences to
discourage offenders or potential offenders from committing offences.
Based on previous analyses of the credit card fraud prevention practices in the
benchmark countries, as well as the results of the researcher’s fieldwork in the
Indonesian payments system, this study believes that the ‘four pillars’ can be
strengthened further by advancing the roles of the credit card industry body, the
508

For examples, see Rules for Visa Merchants: Card Acceptance and Chargeback Management
Guidelines (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2007); Visa U.S.A. Inc. Operating Regulations: Volume I — General
Rules (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2008a); and Visa U.S.A. Inc. Operating Regulations: Volume 2 — Dispute
Resolution Rules (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2008b).
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Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI)509. In Australia, for example, the
Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) has been part of that country’s
efforts to mitigate the threats of payments fraud by, for example, continuous
monitoring of the trends thereof (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 2009d,
p. 3). As discussed in the previous chapter, as the Australia’s payments industry selfregulatory organisation, the APCA has been a major source of payments fraud data
and information in Australia, which supports payments fraud prevention in the
country. As stated by the APCA (2009d, p. 7):
APCA believes that effective systematic prevention is greatly assisted by reliable
statistical information about levels of fraudulent activity. …In simple terms, what gets
measured, gets managed.

Over the years, discussions have emerged about establishing similar self-regulatory
organisation in Indonesia to represent the adoption of self-regulatory system in the
country510. Such a plan has been mentioned by Bank Indonesia in its payments

509

In the Indonesian payment system, the Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI) has been known
as the country’s premier credit card industry body, whose primary objectives include (Indonesia
Credit Card Association, 2007c):
▪ bridging banks and financial institutions that issue credit cards with other parties that are
committed to the development of healthy credit card industry

510

▪ supporting the investigation of credit card fraud by providing expert witnesses from the industry
practitioners, as well as from the representations of international credit card schemes such as
MasterCard and Visa International.
Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI, in a discussion with the researcher, was of the opinion that
among the first priorities in developing the Indonesian credit card industry in particular, and the
Indonesian payments system in general, is the adoption of the self-regulatory system by
establishing a self-regulatory organisation (SRO) (Probojakti, 2008a). Further, Mr Probojakti
believed that the AKKI is a good candidate to be upgraded into a self-regulatory organisation that
will grant the institution several powers to regulate itself (for example, deciding rules for the credit
card industry, such as those related to minimum payment, non-performing loan (NPL) calculation
and merchant certification) (Probojakti, 2008a). This was also confirmed by Mr Ferry Tupanno, in
a discussion with the researcher (Tupanno, 2008a). Mr Tupanno stated that in its current state, the
AKKI generally has no binding rules, and this causes difficulties, particularly for decision-making
process as well as collecting fraud data from its members — despite the available database tools
(Tupanno, 2008a). Additionally, Mr Harrold Abraham Gaspersz of the AKKI, in a discussion with
the researcher, suggested that not all credit card fraud cases are addressed by the AKKI, only those
of significant value (Gaspersz, 2008b).
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system annual reports (2007 and 2008) (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, pp. 39-66; 2009a,
pp. 24-42). Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 39) contends that the primary objective of the
establishment of a credit card industry self-regulatory organisation (SRO) is to allow
the industry to decide on its own rules and standards for small and technical matters,
on its own. Further, according to Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 66), the commitment to
establish a payments system SRO forms part of the efforts to improve the roles of the
stakeholders in the development of payments systems based on market need.
According to Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 66), by implementing a self-regulatory
system, a central bank can focus on macro regulation; whereas the area of micro and
technical regulation is covered by the SRO. For example, because Bank Indonesia
Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based
Payment Instrument Activities does not provide clear technical guidance on the
mechanism of fraud data collection, management and distribution, an SRO can fill
this gap by setting up such a mechanism to promote the reliability of the generated
information. Alternatively, and just as with the case of the APCA511, a future SRO
could coordinate the collection of fraud data from its members to be submitted later
on to the central bank, as well as to other relevant law enforcement institutions. For
this purpose, a future SRO may need to consider establishing an equivalent of the
APCA’s fraud committee512 to administer the process. Therefore, the formulated
rules and standards could promote and maintain the security of the credit card

511
512

See Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(c)).
The APCA’ s fraud committee holds a meeting every calendar quarter to monitor the trends in
payments fraud in Australia, as well as developing the most appropriate countermeasures based on,
among other things, the collected fraud data and information (Australian Payments Clearing
Association, n.d.(c)).
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instrument as well as maintaining healthy and efficient competition in the market
(Bank Indonesia, 2008b, p. 39). In December 2007 the agreement between the card
issuers who were also AKKI members to form an SRO was signed513 (Bank
Indonesia, 2008b, p. 39).
In terms of payments fraud prevention in Indonesia, theoretically, with greater
understanding of the actual problems, a self-regulatory organisation should be able to
allocate the existing resources more effectively to design and implement the most
appropriate fraud prevention strategy514. In an SRO, the parties who make the
decisions would also be those who would bear the consequences (for example,
financial costs) thereof515. Therefore, their decisions related to payments fraud
prevention should be effective as well as efficient. However, in practice, the nature of
a self-regulatory organisation may also create some challenges in achieving its
objectives, including those of fraud prevention.
The strengths and weaknesses of a self-regulation system has been the subject of
many studies in various disciplines516. Whereas the system itself is considered to be a
means to improve performance at lower costs more quickly than traditional
command-and-control regulation, evidence such as the collapse of Enron and
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Confirmed by Mr Ferry Tupanno, in a discussion with the researcher (Tupanno, 2008b). However,
as implied in the researcher’s discussion with Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI, the conflicts of
interests occur because many of the AKKI’s professional staff are also employed by other
institutions as members of their institutions’ top management level, has made the SRO
establishment process progress somewhat slower than expected (Probojakti, 2008a).
514
See the discussion on the principles of self-regulation in Chapter 2.
515
See the opinion of the Head of Industry Policy of the APCA, Dr Brad Pragnell, in Table 49
Interviews and Interviewees in the appendices.
516
For examples, see Sullivan (2002); Hilary and Lennox (2005); Cunningham and Harris (2006);
Lenox (2006); Lenox and Nash (2003); and King and Lenox (2000).
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WorldCom517, suggest the need for greater government intervention (Sullivan R. ,
2002, p. 91). The major challenges in operating a self-regulatory organisation (SRO)
are often related to how to manage various interests within so as to avoid (or at least
minimise) the conflicts thereof518.
Principally, self-regulation is a common process that most individuals deal with in
their daily life as part of their human decision-making processes. Baumeister and
Heatherton (1996, p. 2) assert that three essential ingredients exist in self-regulation:
standards, monitoring and operation519. Standards refer to ideals, goals or other
concepts of possible states without which self-regulation is stagnant (Baumeister &
Heatherton, 1996, p. 2). Monitoring basically compares the actual state to the
standards, without which self-regulation will lose control (Baumeister & Heatherton,
1996, p. 2). In the operation phase, should the monitoring phase indicate that the
current state is below the standards, then some actions will be taken to change it
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996, p. 2). The importance of the above three elements
suggests that if they are not properly managed, they will become the most likely
causes of failure in self-regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996, p. 2).
Regarding fraud prevention, this study believes that a major role of a self-regulatory
organisation (SRO) is to set the standards of security for its members, for example,
517

The issues of self-regulation in the Enron case centre on the roles of external auditors (Arthur
Andersen, LLP) who was unlawfully supporting the misleading accounting practices within the
company. Many believed this failur highlighted the need for reforming the accounting industry’s
self-regulation — at least in the US. See Vinten (2002); Sullivan (2002); and Hilary and Lennox
(2005).
518
For example, see the opinion of the Head of Industry Policy of the APACA), Dr Brad Pragnell, in
Table 49 Interviews and Interviewees in the appendices.
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Also dubbed as the ‘feedback loop’ model. For more discussion, see Carver and Scheier (1982) and
Carver (1979).
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by policies or regulations to mandate the use of a certain fraud prevention measure
for credit card transaction. However, this would present the SRO with the challenge
of ensuring the compliance of its members to the standards. Lenox and Nash (2003,
p. 353), referring to the experiences of four US trade associations520, contends that
the failure of an SRO in ensuring the compliance of its members will contribute to
the failure of the institution in achieving its objectives. Members’ compliance can be
achieved by a variety of means, among which are explicit sanctions (Lenox & Nash,
2003, p. 343; King & Lenox, 2000, p. 713). However, sanctions are better
administered by independent parties so as to avoid conflicts of interest, because an
SRO can be limited in some ways, such as simply because it is ultimately governed
by its members (King & Lenox, 2000, p. 713). These also suggest the need to have in
place a sound mechanism for monitoring compliance (Lenox & Nash, 2003, p. 354).
In principle, Lenox and Nash (2003, p. 354) believe that the prospects of an industry
self-regulatory organisations to administer industry self-regulation well depend on
the quality of the monitoring and compliance mechanisms, particularly for noncompliant members.
Despite several advantages of adopting self-regulation system, at some point,
particularly when things are out of control, government may need to step in and
assume control, or at least part of it. For example, in the case of the US accounting
industry after the collapse of Enron, following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and due
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The American Chemistry Council (ACCC), the National Association of Chemical Distributors
(NACD), the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) and the American Forest and
Paper Association (AFPA).
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to the perceived lack of credibility, self-regulated peer reviews521 in accounting firms
were replaced by independent inspections conducted by the Public Company
Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAOB)522 in 2004 (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p.
211). Basically, as argued by Sullivan (2002, p. 97):
…self regulatory approaches are considered to lack dependability and therefore such
approaches are likely to be more effective when used in combination with other
instruments. Self-regulation can be combined with command-and-control legislation, as
self-regulation can encourage companies to move beyond the minimum performance
benchmarks established in legislation, but non-participating firms (or free-riders) must
still comply with the baseline. That is, the combination provides some dependability
whereas, on their own, voluntary approaches would not guarantee that companies would
meet minimum performance standards.

Furthermore, should interventions by government be needed, for example by policy
instruments, the sequence thereof should be carefully planned to achieve the desired
objectives. As Sullivan (2002, pp. 97-98) put:
…the sequence in which policy instruments are introduced may have an effect on the
overall effectiveness of policy. Sequencing could refer to the introduction of a
completely new instrument where another instrument had failed or could refer to the
enforcement components of a specific piece of legislation. It has been suggested that
such sequencing should follow a progression of increasing levels of intervention. For
example, one way of bolstering the credibility of a self-regulatory regime could be to
underpin the regime with the threat of introducing command-and-control legislation if
self-regulatory regime fails to meet its objectives.

This is approach is known as ‘responsive regulation’ which, as a dynamic model,
does not focus on specifying in advance which area constitutes the types of matters
that should be handled with less intervention and which demand more (Braithwaite,
2006, p. 886). This means that government needs to be aware of the current
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The inspections were administered by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p. 212).
The Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 to conduct independent inspections of public company audit firms, due
to the concerns regarding the failure of the self-regulation of the accounting profession that failed
to protect investors from poor quality audits (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p. 212).
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effectiveness in the existing self-regulation practice before deciding whether or not to
escalate the intervention (see Figure 68) (Braithwaite, 2006, p. 886).

Figure 68 Regulatory Compliance Pyramid
Source: Braithwaite (2006, p. 887).

In relation to intervention, some believe that it is better to start with the least amount
before escalating further, as the situation demands (Sullivan R. , 2002, p. 98).
According to Sullivan (2002, p. 98), a voluntary approach is preferable, because it is
the most efficient from a cost point of view (for example, for taxpayers and regulated
industry), particularly when the government negotiates with the industry concerning
the targeted goals to be achieved (the ‘what’ aspect) and lets the industry decide the
best way to achieve them (the ‘how’ aspect) (Sullivan R. , 2002, p. 98). As
Braithwaite (2006, p. 887) puts it:
…means that however serious the lawbreaking, our normal response is to try to have a
dialogue first for dealing with it, to only override this presumption if there are
compelling reasons for doing do. As we move up the pyramid in response to a failure to
elicit reform and repair, we often reach the point where finally reform and repair are
forthcoming. At that point responsive regulation means that we put escalation up the
pyramid into reverse and de-escalate down the pyramid. The pyramid is firm yet
forgiving in its demands for compliance. Reform must be rewarded just as recalcitrant
refusal to reform will ultimately be punished.

421

Despite the high cost of government intervention, particularly at the top of the
pyramid, responsive regulation is a good strategy for developing countries (with
presumably less regulatory capacity than developed ones) to mobilise less costly
forms of social control than a government’s command-and-control approach
(Braithwaite, 2006, p. 884). Therefore, this study believes that the responsive
regulation approach is suitable for developing countries (such as Indonesia), which
have fewer government regulatory resources compared to other, more developed
nations. Understanding the landscape of the existing regulation and policies is also
important in designing a self-regulatory system (Sullivan R. , 2002, p. 98). This is
because, in practice, the extent to which self-regulation can function can be limited
by factors such as crowded regulatory space (that is, insufficient room left for a new
policy instrument) and regulatory inertia (for example, opposition from public or
industry to the establishment of a self-regulation system, which may suggest the need
for more gradual but steady changes) (Sullivan R. , 2002, p. 98).

RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, from the above discussions about the ‘four-pillared house’ framework
perspective, various efforts have been made, particularly in the Indonesian payments
system, involving four key groups (user, institution, network and government and
industry) to support the six key areas of payments fraud prevention: understanding
the real problems, fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness, technology-based
protection, identity management and legal deterrence. In each of these key areas, this
study has identified at least one event or measure as a trendsetter, and this has formed
the focus of discussions. The following sections examine proposed future
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improvements for the six key areas, based on the above discussions and the practices
in the benchmark countries.
Understanding the Real Problems
Although some efforts have been made, particularly by Bank Indonesia, to gather,
manage and disseminate payments fraud data from the victim side (for example, from
consumers’ complaints) by, for example, creating obligations for financial
institutions to report any fraud incidents to the central bank, more should be done to
improve the reliability of the information generated from such a mechanism. This
includes creating clear guidelines on how to record, calculate and report fraud
incidents to the central bank. Such guidelines must address matters such as data items
and definition, scope and coverage, data reporting and timing, data processing and
release (see the above discussions).
To support these procedures, the establishment of a special database such as that of
the FTC’s Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse is worthy of consideration, at least in
the future, Expanding data sources to include more than just victims (for example,
offender data) should also to add to the reliability of the information. Parties from the
Indonesian criminal justice system (for example, Indonesian police and prosecutors)
who handle the investigation of offenders might effectively collaborate with, for
example, parties from the payment system (for example, Bank Indonesia and the
commercial banks) which handle the complaints from victims to synchronise their
data from both sides (victim and offender) to construct a more complete picture on
the actual fraud problems that need to be solved. Just as in the US, the UK and
Australia, where various institutions use the fraud data from the FTC, the APACS
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and the APCA to support their crime prevention, investigation and prosecution
efforts, institutions in Indonesia may also gain benefit from using reliable fraud data,
at least from the victim side, as a basis for their decision-making processes. However,
due to the sensitive nature of the data, the mechanism of fraud data collection,
management and distribution must be arranged in a way that balances promoting
transparency and maintaining confidentiality523.
Fraud Prevention Policy
Due to their national coverage and enforceability, the regulations from Bank
Indonesia, as the country’s central bank, are considered by this study as the
trendsetters in the area of fraud prevention policy. Bank Indonesia Regulation
Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment
Instrument Activities524 mandates participants in credit card networks (for example,
issuers, acquirers and associations) to promote safety in their systems (Bank
Indonesia, 2009b, pp. 6-21). Among the matters governed by the regulation is the use
of chip technology on credit cards, which is understandably important, considering
the fact that counterfeit card fraud is one of the most common types of credit card
fraud in Indonesia, because the country was previously still relying on magnetic
stripe technology.
However, because counterfeit card fraud is not the only types of credit card fraud and
that offenders will tend to shift their offences to other vulnerable areas (for example,
other targets or by using other methods, such as what occurred in the UK), this study
523

See the opinion of Ms Caroline Pearce (Head of Fraud, Risk and Compliance of the APCA) in
Table 49 Interviews and Interviewees in the appendices.
524
Accompanied by the Circular Letter No. 11/10/DASP concerning Card-Based Payment Instrument
Operation that provides explanatory information.
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believes that Bank Indonesia needs to seriously consider advancing its regulations to
cover more areas, so that the benefits of the implementation of the chip technology
will not be offset by the increase of losses from other fraud schemes (for example,
card-not-present and application fraud). Despite the high investment required,
mandating financial institutions to comply with the online security standards of the
Payment Card Industry Security Standard Council (PCI SSC), at least in the future,
may help to reduce offenders’ crime opportunities by limiting the options for
displacements. Alternatively, Bank Indonesia may require the industry to use and
develop online fraud measures such as Verified by Visa, MasterCard SecureCode,
address verification services (AVS) and card verification numbers (CVNs), to name a
few525.
To anticipate the possibility that offenders will also shift their offences to application
fraud, Bank Indonesia may also take advantage of the future Single Identification
Number (SIN) system in Indonesia, which should limit offenders’ ability to obtain
multiple and/or false identity documents for credit card applications. Therefore, this
study suggests that when the SIN system is up and running, Bank Indonesia (or any
other relevant institution) should consider formulating a specific regulation on the
credit card application process to ensure that the applicants are really who they say
they are. In Australia, for example, such a procedure is part of the 100-point
identification system, which requires any individual who wishes to open an account
to provide multiple independent sources of identification (Smith, 1998, p. 4). Such
procedures will make the Indonesian payments system a particularly hostile
525

For examples, see CyberSource (2008, p. 6) and CyberSource UK (2008, p. 11).
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environment for credit card fraud application offenders. Finally, to support fraud data
collection, management and distribution, Bank Indonesia, in its regulations, may
provide clear technical explanations about how to comply with the fraud reporting
requirements.
Fraud Awareness
Despite a range of initiatives, such as training events and seminars on credit card
fraud and other current issues, more should be done to enhance society’s awareness
on the issues of credit card fraud and credit card fraud prevention in Indonesia. From
the experience of the benchmark countries, and despite the previous Let’s Go to the
Bank campaign and other initiatives, due to the rapidly evolving nature of
technology-enabled crime, more intensive and extensive education on credit card
fraud prevention is needed in Indonesia to educate society. For example, due to the
recent chip conversion (1 January 2010) in the country, some members of society
may still need to be educated on the strengths and weaknesses of the new system,
because, for example, although the chip technology can tackle counterfeit card fraud,
it provides less (if not no) protection against card-not-present fraud such as online
credit card fraud526. Therefore, consumers need to be made aware of the other
security options, such as 3D secure technology (for example, Verified by Visa and
MasterCard SecureCode) when making transactions online. As practised in the
benchmark countries, a range of means of education, such as seminars, training
events, workshops, educational websites with online materials, advertisements,
brochures and pamphlets, to name a few, can be employed to educate the society. An

526

For example, see the case study of the UK in Chapters 6 and 7.
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aware society will ‘unwillingly’ provide less crime opportunity for credit card fraud
offenders.
Technology-Based Protection
As previously discussed in this chapter, in terms of technology-based protection,
smartcard technology is the recent trendsetter in Indonesia. As previously mentioned
in this chapter, as of 1 January 2010, all credit cards in Indonesia have been equipped
with chips (Bank Indonesia, 2009d, pp. 35-36). However, as suggested by the above
recommendation on the area of fraud prevention policy employing a particular
technology to reduce crime opportunity in a particular area may contribute to
offenders shifting their offences to other, more vulnerable areas. To prevent this, the
Indonesian credit card industry should also work on strengthening its defence against
other credit card fraud schemes, such as card-not-present and application fraud. For
card-not-present fraud, referring to the experience of the US and the UK as depicted
by CyberSource’s annual studies527, various online security measures such as address
verification services (AVS), card verification numbers (CVNs), IP geolocation
information, Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode have been employed to
tackle online credit card fraud. In the US, the PCI Data Security Standard for online
transaction security has gained favourable reception. For example, approximately 95
per cent of large Visa merchants already comply with the standard (Visa U.S.A.,
2009). For application fraud, as mentioned above, in relation to the future
establishment of the Single Identification Number (SIN) in Indonesia, the Indonesian
credit card industry might establish and develop systems or applications that can be
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For examples, see CyberSource (2008, p. 6) and CyberSource UK (2008, p. 11).
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used in conjunction with the SIN system to verify applicants’ identity to protect itself
from identity-related fraud. In principle, in terms of technology, what the credit card
industry must do to protect its customers is to plug as many loopholes as possible to
minimise (if not eliminate) credit card offenders’ opportunities to commit their
offences in Indonesia.
Identity Management
As previously discussed in this chapter, as stipulated by the Law No. 23/2006
Concerning the Population Administration System, by 2011, the Single Identification
Number (SIN) system is scheduled for operation in Indonesia (Wardany, 2009).
Although the technical application of the system is yet to be seen, basically, should
this system be already up and running, identity management in Indonesia will be
more centralised than before. This will bring benefits, among which is the difficulty
for credit card fraud offenders to obtain multiple and/or false documents for
fraudulent purposes. However, based on the experience of the UK’s National Identity
Scheme (discussed in Chapter 7), being too excessive in implementing centralized
identity management within a country will result in more problems than benefits for
the society. Among the major drawbacks of an excessively centralized identity
management system is the fact damages from data breaches will be more severe
compared to those of a less centralized system. Furthermore, society may perceive
the system as a form of surveillance and is a threat to their privacy which in turn will
result in the resistance to the system itself. It is of outmost importance that the
Indonesian government considers establishing a sound mechanism (for example, by
policy or technology) to control the use of the SINs by institutions to avoid
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unnecessary use that may increase the risk of identity theft. Above all, Indonesian
government should carefully assess how far the centralization will go so as to avoid
having too many problems in the future.
Legal Deterrence
The first Indonesian cyberlaw, the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and
Electronic Transactions, has strengthened the area of legal deterrence in Indonesia,
particularly that related to credit card fraud in the form of higher sanctions for
offenders. In other words, the law now supports Indonesian law enforcers in
investigating credit card fraud offences as well as prosecuting offenders. Therefore,
the next important step is to enhance the knowledge and skills of law enforcers to be
able to enforce the law effectively. To achieve this, proactive efforts to educate law
enforcers should be undertaken, including reviewing the curricula of the law
enforcement education institutions as well as conducting training and seminars for
law enforcers. Cooperation with industry practitioners may also support such efforts.
For example, industry experts may share their fraud data to be used to educate the
law enforcers. The existence of both effective law on technology-related crimes and
effective law enforcers with extensive knowledge and skills in the investigation and
prosecution of such crimes will discourage offenders from committing their offences
in Indonesia.
Strengthening the Pillars
As discussed above, among the future plans to promote the safety and efficiency in
the Indonesian payments system is the establishment of a credit card industry selfregulatory organisation (SRO). A future SRO can support the Indonesian payments
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system by deciding on the most effective and efficient ways to achieve the objectives
set by the government. Nevertheless, the establishment of a self-regulatory
organisation (SRO) for the credit card industry in Indonesia must be carefully
planned, including the targeted objectives to be achieved as well as means (for
example, regulations and policies) to achieve them. To ensure the achievement of the
objectives, mechanisms to ensure the compliance of members must also exist, which
may include explicit sanctions as well as sound monitoring processes. Additionally,
the Indonesian government must always monitor the progress of the self-regulation
system so as to decide properly the time when intervention is needed and how far the
intervention should go.
To further strengthen the four ‘pillars’ of payments fraud prevention in Indonesia,
referring to the experience of the US and the UK, where payments fraud level is
relatively high compared to Australia, the establishment of a special task force to
coordinate the available resources in circumventing fraud problems is worthy of
consideration. For example, the President’s Identity Theft Task Force was established
in May 2006 to coordinate federal agencies in the US in combating identity theft and
was charged with creating a strategic plan for such a purpose (Finklea, 2009, p. 5).
Similarly, in the UK, the National Fraud Strategic Authority (NFSA) was established
in October 2008 as an executive agency of the Attorney General’s Office to protect
the economy from fraud through the creation of a more hostile environment for
offenders (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2008). Establishing a special task
force for tackling a serious crime is not a new matter in Indonesia, because
previously, the country had already established the Corruption Eradication
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Commission of Indonesia (KPK) for combating corruption, and the Indonesian
Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) for circumventing
money laundering.

CONCLUSION
Over the years, Indonesia has allocated resources to counter the growing problem of
credit card fraud. This includes the six key areas of payments fraud prevention:
understanding the real problems, fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness,
technology-based protection, identity management and legal deterrence. Due to the
growing threat of credit card fraud, particularly that caused by offenders shifting
offences to Indonesia from other countries that have already strengthened their
defences, recent efforts to protect consumers from fraud have been intensified,
particularly in the six key areas: understanding the real problems, fraud prevention
policy, fraud awareness, technology – based protection, identity management and
legal deterrence. These key areas are similar to those developed by this study’s
benchmark countries (discussed in Chapter 7).
Major prevention measures in these areas include: publication of fraud data by Bank
Indonesia, formulation of fraud risk management policy by Bank Indonesia, seminars
and training events about credit card fraud and prevention, implementation of the
chip technology, development of the Single Identification Number (SIN) and the
enactment of Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic
Transactions. Additionally, as part of the efforts to strengthen in particular the fourth
pillar (government and industry) of the payments fraud prevention, a credit card
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industry SRO is planned to be established in the near future. All these efforts will at
least reduce crime opportunity for credit card fraud offenders such as by increasing
consumer awareness and thus improving their resistance to fraud attacks.
Additionally, technology-based protection such as smartcard makes it more difficult
for offenders in committing offences such as counterfeit card fraud. Consumers’
higher resistance means that they will be less suitable as fraud targets. Additionally,
measures such as smartcard technology will make stolen credit cards valueless as it
will be very difficult to use them for fraudulent purposes due to the encryption
technology within. Similarly, with more robust identity management system,
application fraud becomes very difficult to commit.
From the discussions in this chapter, each measure has its strengths as well as
weaknesses in protecting Indonesia from credit card fraud in particular, and payments
fraud in general. Generally, future improvements for credit card fraud prevention in
Indonesia include: improving the reliability of fraud data collection and
dissemination, designing better fraud prevention policy which can establish a
standard of sound credit card fraud prevention practice, implementing additional
technology which can increase the difficulty of offenders in committing their
offences online and offline, developing a balanced identity management system and
improving the skills of law enforcement personnel to uphold the new law on
information and communication technology. Continuous improvements must always
be kept in motion to cope with the rapidly changing environment that may include
the introduction of new prevention measures or improvements on existing ones.
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Nevertheless, in implementing the above initiatives, considerations need to be made
on the costs and benefits thereof. The Single Identification Number (SIN), for
example, as discussed in this chapter, when applied excessively will result in more
disadvantages than benefits to the society. The same applies to other measures such
as the smartcard technology which requires substantial investments by banks and
financial institutions to make it up and running. In principle, as discussed in Chapter
3, the desired end results from credit card fraud prevention practices in the payments
system is that the benefits thereof must exceed the costs. This is also related to the
efficiency in using the available resources to achieve the objective of crime
prevention practices. This also signifies the need for reliable fraud data collection,
management and distribution which represents efforts to understand what the actual
problems are and how resources can be properly allocated to address them.
The next chapter summarises the answers to the benchmark questions formulated in
Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 9: ANSWERS TO THE
BENCHMARK QUESTIONS
INTRODUCTION
This study has been guided by the principles and concepts of good crime prevention
practice from commerce and criminology to find strategic solutions to the growing
problems of credit card fraud in the Indonesian payments system. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the entire course of crime prevention can be regarded as a function of
decision-making processes (even for crime offenders), in which each participant
seeks to maximise the excess of benefits over costs. As the discussions in Chapter 3
suggest, because of its nature, the most effective and efficient way to prevent
technology-enabled crimes such as credit card fraud is generally to minimise
offenders’ opportunities to perpetrate offences based on the actual fraud problems
(problem-based crime prevention).
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 discuss the various issues surrounding the payments fraud
prevention practices, especially those for credit card fraud in the US, the UK,
Australia and Indonesia. As explained in Chapter 4, a main foundation of such
discussions is the concept of ‘learning from the best performers’, otherwise known as
‘benchmarking’. This study considers the US, the UK and Australia as countries from
which Indonesia may learn about how to establish a sound payments fraud prevention
practice for tackling credit card fraud. As the last part of this report, this chapter
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summarises the answers to the remaining benchmark questions528 set in Chapter 4,
based on the discussion in previous chapters.

SUMMARY OF THE ANSWERS TO THE BENCHMARK
QUESTIONS
The discussions in the previous chapters are dedicated to provide answers to this
study’s benchmark questions regarding credit card fraud prevention in the US, the
UK, Australia and Indonesia. The following discussions summarise the results of this
study, including the recommendations for Indonesia.
Are the US, the UK and Australia Better than Indonesia in Terms of Credit Card
Fraud Prevention Practices? Why Are They Better? What Credit Card Fraud
Prevention Practices do the Three Countries Have to Minimize Offenders’
Opportunity?
Ideally, precise or quantifiable measures are needed to answer the question related to
the performance of the credit card fraud prevention practices in the benchmark
countries compared to those in Indonesia. Because every country is different,
common measures are very difficult to find or construct. For example, as shown in
the discussion in Chapter 6, credit card fraud is categorised in different ways by the
selected institutions from the benchmark countries. This created a challenge for this
study, especially in identifying comparable elements within the prevention practices
in the benchmark countries529.

528
529

Some of the benchmark questions are answered in Chapter 4.
As implied in the discussion in Chapter 4, it is difficult (if not impossible) to benchmark things that
are not comparable (the ‘analogy principle’). Watson (1993, p. 47) believes that such comparison
is like going to a ‘vegetarian barbecue’. For further discussion, see Chapter 4.
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From the selected payments fraud statistics used in this study, although the losses
from certain types of payments fraud are quantified in financial terms, they alone
cannot be used to determine the quality of the fraud prevention practice in the
corresponding countries, because other factors should also be considered, such as the
level of fraud risk therein. For example, although the fraud prevention efforts in
Australia appear to be less robust than those of the US and the UK, the country’s
inherently lower level of fraud may justify the lesser resource allocation for fraud
prevention for the sake of efficiency. A major change in the payments fraud
prevention efforts in the US, the UK and Australia over the past few years has been
the improvement of coordination and cooperation among institutions that are
committed to tackling fraud. The establishment of the President’s Identity Theft Task
Force in the US and the National Fraud Authority in the UK are examples of
initiatives to enhance coordination and cooperation in combating fraud. Similarly, the
Chip Payments Program for Australia (CPPA) was established in Australia to
coordinate the implementation of smartcard technology in the country. As discussed
in Chapters 6 and 7, in the past few years, the benchmark countries have intensified
their efforts to prevent payments fraud, particularly credit card fraud, by allocating
significant amount of resources especially to the areas of: understanding the real
problems, fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness, technology-based protection,
identity management and legal deterrence. The development of fraud prevention in
these areas is conducted using various means and is supported primarily by four
major groups in the payments system: users, institutions, networks and government
and industry.
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On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 8, Indonesia, despite the high level of
threats, particularly from credit card fraud, appears not yet to have optimised its
resources to address the problems experienced. The discussion in Chapter 8 suggests
that Indonesia has just begun to seriously strengthen its defence against credit card
fraud by, for example, fully adopting the smartcard technology in January 2010,
developing the Single Identification Number scheme (scheduled for completion in
2011), enacting the nation’s first cyberlaw in 2008 and developing an industry selfregulatory organisation (SRO). Simply put, referring to the experience of the
benchmark countries, Indonesia still has a long road ahead in mitigating the threats
from credit card fraud.
This study identifies several persistent major gaps in the current credit card fraud
prevention practices in Indonesia, such as: the need for a reliable mechanism to
collect, manage and disseminate fraud data; the need for more fraud prevention
policies with more extensive coverage; the need for more consumer education; the
need for effective and efficient identity management system; and the need to enhance
the skills and knowledge of law enforcers.
How can the Benchmark Countries’ Payment Fraud Prevention Practices be
Incorporated or Adapted for Implementation in Indonesia?
Due to the differences between the four countries, simply copying the prevention
measures from the benchmark countries is not the appropriate solution to credit card
fraud problems in Indonesia. Therefore, this study analyses the patterns of credit card
fraud prevention practices in the benchmark countries to identify the lessons that are
applicable to Indonesia. Based on this analysis, the Indonesian payments system can
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strengthen its defence against fraud by continuously developing the six primary areas
(understanding the real problems, fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness,
technology-based protection, identity management and legal deterrence), supported
by four pillars in the payments system (users, institutions, networks and government
and industry). In summary, based on the experiences of the benchmark countries, the
major improvements that Indonesia needs to consider to be implemented in the near
future to address credit card fraud problems in the country are530:



improving the mechanism for collecting, managing and distributing fraud data
for decision-making purposes



improving fraud prevention policies to cover more vulnerable areas to prevent
offence displacements



providing sufficient technical details and data to avoid misinterpretations



intensifying and extending the education campaigns for improving, in particular,
consumers’ awareness on the current issues of credit card fraud and prevention in
Indonesia



enhancing technology-based protection by continuously advancing the currently
adopted technology



anticipating the future offence displacements by, for example, adopting new
technology

530

For more discussion on this study’s recommendations, see Chapter 8.
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developing an identity management system that balances effectiveness and
efficiency with a high level of security over the personally identifiable
information within



continuously improving the skills and knowledge of the law enforcer, to optimise
the existence of the existing Indonesian cyberlaw to provide sufficient legal
deterrence that will discourage credit card fraud offenders from perpetrating their
offences in Indonesia



accelerating the establishment process of a credit card industry self-regulatory
organisation (SRO) to help to promote efficiency and safety in the Indonesian
payments system.



continuous monitoring by the Indonesian government (for example, Bank
Indonesia) of the progress of the SRO to determine the level of intervention
needed to maintain control.

FINAL NOTES
Combating fraud is a continual journey that can be seen as similar in many ways to
the game of chess, where ‘players’ (for example, fraud preventers and fraud
offenders) generally seek to optimise their benefits, and their decision-making
processes are related to each other. For example, fraud preventers’ acts are often
based, at least in part, on the previous actions of fraud offenders and vice versa. In
the end, the player with the better strategy will emerge victorious. In preparing or
refining a strategy, a player needs to understand the resources that they have at their
disposal, as well as the best way to use them to achieve the desired objectives.
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Gaining sufficient understanding of the ‘enemy’ is also an important element in
achieving the best results with the least amount of resources. In combating fraud,
every country has its own set of resources (for example, financial resources), but the
desired results are in many ways similar (for example, reducing fraud losses). The
most important thing is not how many resources a country has but whether they are
used effectively and efficiently. Finally, as the focus of this study, fraud prevention is
just as important (some would say more important) as other areas (for example,
investigation and prosecution) in combating fraud. Preparation against possible future
threat should be of the same level of importance with combating existing fraud
threats. As the great master of strategy, Sun Tzu, once said (Giles, 1910, pp. 2-18):
Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle
is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus
do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no
calculations at all!
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a
small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals…
…to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to
receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have
made our position unassailable.
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APPENDICES
Table 36 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision532
No. Principles

Descriptions

1

Objectives,
independence,
powers, transparency
and cooperation

An effective system of banking supervision will have clear
responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in
the supervision of banks. Each such authority should possess
operational independence, transparent processes, sound
governance and adequate resources and be accountable for the
discharge of its duties. A suitable legal framework for banking
supervision is also necessary, including provisions relating to
authorisation of banking establishments and their ongoing
supervision, powers to address compliance with laws as well as
safety and soundness concerns and legal protection for
supervisors. Arrangements for sharing information between
supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such
information should be in place.

2

Permissible activities

The permissible activities of institutions that are licenced and
subject to supervision as banks must be clearly defined and the
use of the word ‘bank’ in names should be controlled as far as
possible.

3

Licensing criteria

The licensing authority must have the power to set criteria and
reject applications for establishments that do not meet the
standards set. The licensing process, at a minimum, should
consist of an assessment of the ownership structure and
governance of the bank and its wider group, including the
fitness and propriety of Board members and senior
management, its strategic and operating plan, internal controls
and risk management and its projected financial condition,
including its capital base. Where the proposed owner or parent
organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home
country supervisor should be obtained.

4

Transfer
significant
ownership

5

Major acquisitions

532

of The supervisor has the power to review and reject any
proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling
interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other
parties.
The supervisor has the power to review major acquisitions or
investments by a bank, against prescribed criteria, including the
establishment of cross-border operations and confirming that
corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to
undue risks or hinder effective supervision.

This study uses the 2006 version of the Core Principles.
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Descriptions

6

Capital adequacy

Supervisors must set prudent and appropriate minimum capital
adequacy requirements for banks that reflect the risks that the
bank undertakes and must define the components of capital,
bearing in mind its ability to absorb losses. At least for
internationally active banks, these requirements must not be
less than those established in the applicable Basel requirement.

7

Risk
management Supervisors must be satisfied that banks and banking groups
have in place a comprehensive risk management process
process
(including Board and senior management oversight) to identify,
evaluate, monitor and control or mitigate all material risks and
to assess their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk
profile. These processes should be commensurate with the size
and complexity of the institution.

8

Credit risk

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a credit risk
management process that takes into account the risk profile of
the institution, with prudent policies and processes to identify,
measure, monitor and control credit risk (including
counterparty risk). This would include the granting of loans
and making of investments, the evaluation of the quality of
such loans and investments and the ongoing management of
the loan and investment portfolios.

9

Problem
provisions
reserves

assets, Supervisors must be satisfied that banks establish and adhere to
and adequate policies and processes for managing problem assets
and evaluating the adequacy of provisions and reserves.

10

Large
limits

11

Exposures to related In order to prevent abuses arising from exposures (both on
balance sheet and off balance sheet) to related parties and to
parties
address conflict of interest, supervisors must have in place
requirements that banks extend exposures to related companies
and individuals on an arm’s length basis, these exposures are
effectively monitored, appropriate steps are taken to control or
mitigate the risks and write-offs of such exposures are made
according to standard policies and processes.

12

Country and transfer Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies
risks
and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring and
controlling country risk and transfer risk in their international
lending and investment activities and for maintaining adequate
provisions and reserves against such risks.

exposure Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have policies and
processes that enable management to identify and manage
concentrations within the portfolio and supervisors must set
prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single
counterparties or groups of connected counterparties.
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13

Market risks

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place policies
and processes that accurately identify, measure, monitor and
control market risks, supervisors should have powers to impose
specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on market risk
exposures, if warranted.

14

Liquidity risk

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a liquidity
management strategy that takes into account the risk profile of
the institution, with prudent policies and processes to identify,
measure, monitor and control liquidity risk and to manage
liquidity on a day-to-day basis. Supervisors require banks to
have contingency plans for handling liquidity problems.

15

Operational risk

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk
management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor
and control/mitigate operational risk. These policies and
processes should be commensurate with the size and
complexity of the bank.

16

Interest rate risk in Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have effective systems
in place to identify, measure, monitor and control interest rate
the banking book
risk in the banking book, including a well defined strategy that
has been approved by the Board and implemented by senior
management, these should be appropriate to the size and
complexity of such risk.

17

Internal control and Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place internal
controls that are adequate for the size and complexity of their
audit
business. These should include clear arrangements for
delegating authority and responsibility, separation of the
functions that involve committing the bank, paying away its
funds and accounting for its assets and liabilities, reconciliation
of these processes, safeguarding the bank’s assets and
appropriate independent internal audit and compliance
functions to test adherence to these controls as well as
applicable laws and regulations.

18

Abuse of financial Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies
and processes in place, including strict ‘know-your-customer’
services
rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards in
the financial sector and prevent the bank from being used,
intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities.

19

Supervisory
approach

An effective banking supervisory system requires that
supervisors develop and maintain a thorough understanding of
the operations of individual banks and banking groups and also
of the banking system as a whole, focusing on safety and
soundness and the stability of the banking system.

20

Supervisory
techniques

An effective banking supervisory system should consist of onsite and off-site supervision and regular contacts with bank
management.
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21

Supervisory
reporting

Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and
analysing prudential reports and statistical returns from banks
on both a solo and a consolidated basis and a means of
independent verification of these reports, through either on-site
examinations or use of external experts.

22

Accounting
disclosure

and Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains
adequate records drawn up in accordance with accounting
policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally
and publishes, on a regular basis, information that fairly
reflects its financial condition and profitability.

23

Corrective
and Supervisors must have at their disposal an adequate range of
remedial powers of supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective actions. This
includes the ability, where appropriate, to revoke the banking
supervisors
licence or to recommend its revocation.

24

Consolidated
supervision

An essential element of banking supervision is that supervisors
supervise the banking group on a consolidated basis,
adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential
norms to all aspects of the business conducted by the group
worldwide.

25

Home–host
relationships

Cross-border consolidated supervision requires cooperation
and information exchange between home supervisors and the
various other supervisors involved, primarily host banking
supervisors. Banking supervisors must require the local
operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same
standards as those required of domestic institutions.

Source: Adapted from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006a, pp. 2-5).

Table 37 Essential Criteria of Principle 18 (Abuse of Financial Services)533
No. Criteria
1

Laws or regulations clarify the duties, responsibilities and powers of the banking
supervisor and other competent authorities, if any, related to the supervision of banks’
internal controls and enforcement of the relevant laws and regulations regarding
criminal activities.

2

The supervisor must be satisfied that banks have in place adequate policies and
processes that promote high ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank
from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities. This includes
the prevention and detection of criminal activity and reporting of such suspected
activities to the appropriate authorities.

3

In addition to reporting to the financial intelligence unit or other designated authorities,
banks report to the banking supervisor suspicious activities and incidents of fraud when
they are material to the safety, soundness or reputation of the bank.

533

For more details, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006b, pp. 29-31).
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No. Criteria
4

The supervisor is satisfied that banks establish ‘know-your-customer’ (KYC) policies
and processes which are well documented and communicated to all relevant staff. Such
policies and processes must also be integrated into the bank’s overall risk management.

5

The supervisor is satisfied that banks have enhanced due diligence policies and
processes regarding correspondent banking.

6

The supervisor periodically confirms that banks have sufficient controls and systems in
place for preventing, identifying and reporting potential abuses of financial services,
including money laundering.

7

The supervisor has adequate enforcement powers (regulatory and/or criminal
prosecution) to take action against a bank that does not comply with its obligations
related to criminal activities.

8

The supervisor must be satisfied that banks have:
▪ requirements for internal audit and/or external experts to independently evaluate the
relevant risk management policies, processes and controls, and the supervisor must
have access to their reports
▪ established policies and processes to designate compliance officers at the
management level and appointed a relevant dedicated officer to whom potential
abuses of the bank’s financial services (including suspicious transactions) shall be
reported
▪ adequate screening policies and processes to ensure high ethical and professional
standards when hiring staff
▪ ongoing training programs for their staff on KYC and methods to detect criminal and
suspicious activities.

9

The supervisor determines that banks have clear policies and processes for staff to
report any problems related to the abuse of the banks’ financial services to either local
management or the relevant dedicated officer or to both. The supervisor also confirms
that banks have adequate management information systems to provide managers and
the dedicated officers with timely information on such activities.

10

Laws and regulations ensure that a member of a bank’s staff who reports suspicious
activity in good faith either internally or directly to the relevant authority cannot be
held liable.

11

The supervisor can inform the financial intelligence unit and, if applicable, other
designated authority of any suspicious transactions. In addition, it is able, directly or
indirectly, to share with relevant judicial authorities information related to suspected or
actual criminal activities.

12

The supervisor is able, directly or indirectly, to cooperate with the relevant domestic
and foreign financial sector supervisory authorities or share with them information
related to suspected or actual criminal activities where this information is for
supervisory purposes.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006b, pp. 29-31).
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Table 38 Principles of Sound Self-Governance
Principles

Brief Description

Rationale

Certainty

There must be absolute clarity of:
▪ objectives (policy goals) of the
self-governance framework
▪ the details and scope of any selfgovernance
processes
or
structural arrangements adopted
by the industry
▪ powers and responsibilities of
industry participants, any selfregulatory organisations (SROs)
and the government regulatory
agency and the scope of their
respective application
▪ rules and actions taken at an
industry level.

All stakeholders must share a common
understanding of the self-governance
framework, so they can participate in
an informed and efficient manner that
promotes industry stability and
maintains investment incentives.

Legitimacy

The self-governance framework
must be:
▪ agreed and adhered to by all
relevant stakeholders, including
all industry participants whose
cooperation is necessary for the
fulfilment of the framework’s
objectives
▪ endorsed by government, through
the facilitation of the regulatory
authority
▪ substantively and procedurally
fair
▪ backed by effective enforcement
measures
▪ accountable not only to the
industry but to the government,
whilst consulting with other
external stakeholders
▪ able to sustain the above over
time.

Legitimacy is required if the selfgovernance framework is to be
sufficiently stable and sustainable to
command
respect
among
its
stakeholders and be effective in
executing its governance functions.

Transparency The objectives and processes must
be publicly visible and accessible,
as must the governance instruments
and actions which emanate from
those processes — subject to the
commercial confidentiality required
to maintain the integrity of the
framework.

Transparency is a cornerstone of good
governance and is needed to sustain
both legitimacy and certainty, subject
to
genuine
confidentiality
requirements.
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Principles

Brief Description

Rationale

Flexibility

The governance framework must
respond promptly to changes in the
relevant markets as they evolve if it
is to remain efficient and optimal
over time.

Best practice regulation should be
proportionate to the market failure it
addresses, hence it must be flexible as
markets evolve. This in turn can
facilitate dynamic efficiency in
markets, including enabling efficient
innovation to occur.

Efficiency

The governance framework should
represent the least burdensome
means of achieving the governance
objectives by minimising cost and
risk.

Regulators, like markets, should be
productively efficient. The process of
regulation incurs substantial costs and
these should be minimised for the
regulator and the industry (for
example, compliance costs), without
compromising the objectives, while
facilitating efficiency in relevant
markets.

Source: Adapted from ICPACE (2007, p. 2).

Table 39 Examples of Fraud Management Measures Employed by Visa
Services and
Applications

Description

Address
Verification
Service (AVS)

Allows card-not-present merchants to confirm a cardholder’s billing
address when requesting an authorisation for a transaction534.

Advanced
Authorisation

Captures real-time risk mitigation information from Visa’s existing
fraud-detection systems535. It then transmits the information in-flight
within the authorisation message to the Issuer in the form of risk
scores, reason codes and condition codes536. Issuers can use this
enhanced data in their real-time authorisation strategies and/or in
decisioning-risk management systems537.

Authorisation Risk Assists Issuers in making efficient and cost-effective use of the
VisaNet BASE 1 authorisation services538.
Model
(ARM)
Enables issuers to assess their authorisation strategy and system
Authorisation
parameter settings as well as their performance and operating
Strategy
Assessment Model practices539.
(ASAM)

534

Visa Inc. (n.d.).
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
536
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
537
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
538
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
535
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Services and
Applications

Description

Automatic
Cardholder
Database Update
(Auto-CDB)

Automatically updates information on the Visa Exception File540. This
online system monitors Issuers’ authorisation responses541. If an
account designated by an Issuer for pick-ups is not on the Exception
File, Auto-CDB immediately adds it to the file542.

Card Verification
Value
(CVV)

A unique three digit code on the magnetic stripe of all valid Visa
cards543. The CVV is electronically checked during the authorisation
for card-present sales to ensure that a card is legitimate544.

Card Verification
Value 2
(CVV2)

A unique three-digit code that appears on the signature panel of all
Visa bankcards and is used to confirm the validity of the card during
card-not-present sales545.

Code 10
Authorisation

The telephone call merchants make to their authorisation centres when
they believe that a card or transaction is not valid, but do not wish to
alert the customer of their suspicions546. In most cases, the call is
referred to the card Issuer for special handling547.

Verified by Visa

A global authentication program providing an added level of security
for online transactions548. It verifies cardholder identity in real-time
through the use of a password so customers can shop more confidently
and merchants can accept Visa cards with peace of mind549.

Zero Liability

A policy to guarantee that cardholders will not be held responsible for
fraudulent charges made with their Visa payment card550. Visa’s
cardholder protection policy requires all Visa product issuers to extend
provisional credit for losses from unauthorised card use within five
business days of notification of the loss551.

Source: Adapted from Visa U.S.A. Inc. (n.d.) and Visa Australia (2008).

539

Visa Inc. (n.d.).
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
541
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
542
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
543
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
544
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
545
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
546
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
547
Visa Inc. (n.d.).
548
Visa Australia (2008, p. 5).
549
Visa Australia (2008, p. 5).
550
Visa Australia (2008, p. 5).
551
Visa Australia (2008, p. 5).
540
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Table 40 Examples of Fraud Management Measures Employed by MasterCard
Services and
Applications

Description

Address
Verification
System

Permits merchants who accept card-not-present transactions to verify
that the cardholder billing address provided by the person making the
purchase matches the address on the issuer’s database.

Combined
Warning Bulletin

Maintains a database of credit card account numbers that are blocked
from use. The accounts are restricted because they were reported as lost,
stolen, counterfeit, or otherwise compromised. Any authorisation
request for a restricted account automatically receives a ‘pick up card’
response.

Common Points
of Compromise

Analyses merchant use histories for account numbers reported in fraud
incidents, to identify any common merchants at which the accounts were
used prior to the frauds occurring. A high incidence of accounts for a
common merchant indicates a probability that the merchant has a
collusive employee who is stealing account numbers.

Fraud Velocity
Monitor

Analyses velocity (numbers of uses and accumulated spending) by
account and flags accounts with patterns of rapid growth in activity.
Flagged accounts are reported to issuers for their further investigation.

Issuers
Clearinghouse
Service

Screens credit applications against a database of recent applications to
detect unusual patterns in increased credit applications. Key applicant
data are matched against information like names, addresses, social
security numbers and phone numbers. Known fraudulent and nonexistent addresses are also checked.

MasterCard
Alerts

Distributes high-priority information about new fraud schemes and
alerts about
specific accounts and merchants to member institutions.

MasterCard
Internet Gateway
Services

Provides a payment gateway which e-commerce merchants may
integrate into their catalog shop-and-buy websites, to facilitate credit
card payments without actually handling credit card account details.

MasterCard
SecureCode

Defines a set of rules and underlying technology that permits a
cardholder to define a ‘password’ that must be successfully entered on a
participating website, before a sale can be completed.

Merchant Alerts
to Control High
Risk

Identifies merchants who have accumulated fraudulent activity that
exceeds MasterCard’s rules for percentage of fraudulent transactions to
total sales.

Merchant Online
Status Tracking

Tracks merchants that MasterCard has terminated from the system
because of excessive fraudulent activity. Screens merchant registrations
against the database of terminated merchants to keep bad merchants out
of the system. Key registration data are matched against information like
owner’s name, address, social security number, employer ID number
and Dunn & Bradstreet number.
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Services and
Applications

Description

NameProtect
Partnership

A contracted service that monitors the worldwide web, searching for
websites which are promoting and exchanging information for purposes
of credit card and identity theft fraud.

RiskFinder

Screens approved authorisation transactions against a neural network
designed to detect data anomalies that are predictors of fraudulent
activity and produces a score that indicates the likelihood of fraud. An
alert message is sent to the card issuer for any transaction for which the
fraud score exceeds the issuer’s pre-established threshold.

Site Data
Protection

A service provided to evaluate a merchant’s website against best
practices for eCommerce security and to make recommendations which
the merchant should consider to strengthen its site against attacks.

System to Avoid
Fraud Effectively

Collects and summarises member reported fraudulent transaction
information, to aid the Security and Risk Management team and the
member institutions in tracking fraud trends.

Source: Adapted from Cornish et al. (n.d., p. 11).

Table 41 Major Institutions in the US Payments System
No. Institutions

Descriptions

1

The Federal
Reserve (Fed)

The central banking authority of the US which provides the nation
with a safer, more flexible, and more stable monetary and financial
system (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2005, p.
1). Currently, the Federal Reserve’s duties include four general areas:
conducting the nation’s monetary policy; supervising and regulating
banking institutions; maintaining the stability of the financial system
as well as containing systemic risk in the financial markets; and
providing financial services to depository institutions552.

2

Commercial
Banks

Their roles in the US payments system include accepting demand and
time deposits, making commercial loans and providing other banking
services553. The supervision of the commercial banks is conducted by
the state or the federal supervisor and in some occasions, both554.

3

Thrift
Institutions

In the US payments system, they include saving and loan
associations, credit unions and other saving institutions (for example,
federal mutual savings bank) services555.

4

Other
Institutions

In the US payments system, they include ‘non-bank’ banks556, banks
card companies and the US Postal Services which provide payment
services557.

552

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005, p. 1).
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 436).
554
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 436).
555
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 437).
553
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Source: Various sources (see footnotes).

Table 42 Major Payment Instruments in the US Payments System
No Instruments

Descriptions

1

Cash

Cash is issued in the forms of notes and coins. Notes are issued by
the Federal Reserve in denominations of $US 1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and
100 whereas coins are issued by the US Treasury and the Federal
Reserve in denominations of 1, 5, 10, 25 and 50 cents and $US1558.

1

Cheque

It is a payment instrument in which the Federal Reserve Banks
provide collection services to depository institutions559. Cheque is
currently a dominant means of payment in The U.S (see Figure 16
Distribution of the Number of Non-Cash Payments (2003–2006) and
Figure 17 Distribution of the Number of Non-Cash Payments
(2000–2003)).

2

ACH
(Automated
Clearing House)

ACH transactions are a form of electronic funds transfer used to
make both recurring and non-recurring payments560. The common
forms of the ACH transactions are: payrolls, government benefit
payments, corporate payment to contractors and vendors and federal
tax obligation-related payment or reimbursement561.

3

Fedwire
CHIPS

4

Payment Cards

and Used by financial institutions and non-financial organisations and
individuals and are generally considered large value payments
system562. The Fedwire is the wire transfer system of the Federal
Reserve Bank563. The Clearing House Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS) is an electronic payments system that transfers funds and
settles transactions in US dollars which enables banks to transfer and
settle international payments more quickly by replacing official bank
cheques with electronic bookkeeping entries564.
They represent a complex network of financial institutions providing
payment services and are available in the forms of credit card, debit
or ATM card and proprietary card (CPSS, 2003b, p. 440).

556

‘Non-bank’ banks (or limited-service banks) can make loans or accept deposits, but cannot do both
(Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2003b, p. 437).
557
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 437).
558
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 438).
559
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009).
560
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 439).
561
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 439).
562
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b, p. 440).
563
As a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system for the US and the US dollar, the Fedwire’s role in
the implementation of US monetary policy through the settlement of domestic money market
transactions is crucial (Federal Reserve System, 2009, p. 5).
564
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (n.d.).
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No Instruments

Descriptions

5

The system allows authorised recipients to receive cash and food
assistance benefits (Florida Departments of Children and Families,
n.d.). After the benefits are deposited into the recipients’ accounts,
they can be accessed by using EBT participating ATM machines and
Point of Sale (POS) terminals (Hansell, n.d.).

Electronic
Benefits
Transfer
(EBT)565

Source: Various sources (see footnotes).

Table 43 Major Institutions in the UK Payments System
No. Institutions

Descriptions

1

Bank of England

The central bank of the UK with two core purposes: monetary
stability and financial stability566. It is the banker of the
government as well as the banker to the banking system which
provides banking services to the customers and manages the UK
foreign exchange and gold reserves567. The Bank of England also
holds the monopoly right on the issue of banknotes in England
and Wales568. It is of Bank of England’s responsibility that the
monetary policy is directed to achieve the objective of
safeguarding the value of currency particularly in relation to
inflation569. The policy generally operates in the nation through
influencing the interest rate570.

2

Financial Service
Authority (FSA)

An independent body that regulates the financial services industry
in the UK571. It has the role of banking supervision after
previously held by the Bank of England until 1997572. Generally,
it has three Strategic Aims573:
▪ Promoting efficient, orderly and fair markets,
▪ Helping retail consumers achieve a fair deal
▪ Improving our business capability and effectiveness

565

See, for example, United States General Accounting Office (2002a).
Bank of England (n.d.).
567
Bank of England (n.d.).
568
Bank of England (n.d.).
569
Bank of England (n.d.).
570
Bank of England (n.d.).
571
Financial Services Authority (n.d.(b)).
572
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003a, p. 397).
573
Financial Services Authority (n.d.(b)).
566
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No. Institutions

Descriptions

3

Payment Council

Created in March 2007 to lead the future development of
cooperative payment services in the UK to ensure that payment
systems and services meet the needs of users, payment service
providers and the wider economy574. It has three core
objectives575:
▪ to lead the future development of cooperative payment services
in the UK in order to ensure that the payments system as a
whole meets the needs of payments service user provides, users
and the wider economy
▪ to ensure that the payments system is open, accountable and
transparent
▪ to ensure the operational efficiency, effectiveness and integrity
of payment services in the UK.

4

Association for
Payment Clearing
Services
(APACS)

Set up in 1985, it is the UK trade association for payments and for
those institutions that deliver payment services to customers that
provides a forum for the major banks and building societies to
discuss non-competitive issues relating to money transmission576.
Coordinating payment fraud prevention practices577 is one of its
key responsibilities578.

5

Financial
Ombudsman
Service (FOS)

Under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, it is
a financial ombudsman scheme which provides free independent
service for resolving disputes between consumers and small
businesses and financial firms579.

Source: Various sources (see footnotes).

Table 44 Major Payment Instruments in the UK Payments System
No Payment Instruments

Descriptions

1

Cash

In the payment system of the UK, it is issued in four
denominations: GBP 5, 10, 20 and 50580. The coins are
issued by a government agency, the Royal Mint, in
eight denominations: 1 penny, 2, 5, 10, 20 and 50
pence and GBP 1 and 2581.

2

Clearing House Automated

It is the UK’s high-value payment system that provides

574

Payments Council (2008b, p. 13; 2009, p. 1).
Payments Council (2009, p. 1).
576
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003a, p. 397) and Association for Payment
Clearing Services (n.d.(a)).
577
For example, the introduction of chip and PIN, which has been achieved hand-in-hand with the
retail industry Association for Payment Clearing Services (n.d.(a)).
578
Association for Payment Clearing Services (n.d.(a)).
579
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003a, p. 402).
580
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003a, p. 403).
581
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003a, p. 403).
575
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Payment System (CHAPS)

Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) of credit transfers
and is consisting of two systems: CHAPS Sterling and
CHAPS Euro (providing settlement for sterling and
euro respectively)582.

3

Trans-European Automated
Real-time Gross settlement
Express Transfer system
(TARGET)

A payment system comprising several national realtime gross settlement (RTGS) systems and the ECB583
payment mechanism (EPM) that are interconnected by
common procedures (interlinking) to provide a
mechanism for the processing of euro payments
throughout the euro area and some non-euro area EU
Member States584.

4

CREST

The UK’s securities settlement system that provides a
delivery versus payment (DvP) settlement service for
gilts, equities and money market instruments585.

5

LCH.Clearnet Ltd

The main central counterparty (CCP) in the UK that is
incorporated in the UK as a private limited company
and is regulated by the FSA as a Recognised Clearing
House under the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000586.

6

Continuous Linked
Settlement (CLS)

A system designed to eliminate principal risk in the
settlement of foreign exchange transactions587. The
CLS service is provided by the CLS Bank International
(CLS Bank) 588.The system’s establishment was
authorised by the U.S. Federal reserve that also acts as
the primary supervisor and lead overseer of the CLS
Bank589.

7

Bankers Automated
Clearing Service (BACS)

An automated payment method whose payments are
usually processed as batches using dedicated software
linked in with the bank’s system590. In other words, it is
an electronic-banking system that, among other
business-to-business transactions, allows automated
settlement of accounts between firms591.

8

The Cheque and Credit
Clearings (C&CC)

Enable instructions given in paper form (cheques and
paper credits) to be processed, exchanged and settled

582

Bank of England (2008, p. 9).
European Central.Bank (n.d.).
584
European Central Bank (n.d.).
585
Bank of England (2008, p. 12).
586
Bank of England (2008, p. 15).
587
Bank of England (2008, p. 17).
588
Bank of England (2008, p. 17).
589
Bank of England (2008, p. 17).
590
Improvement and Development Agency for Local Government (n.d.).
591
BusinessDictionary.com (n.d.(a)).
583
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between banks that are managed by the Cheque and
Credit Clearing Company (C&CCC)592.
9

LINK

The largest automated teller machine (ATM) network
in The UK that enables its members’ customers to
withdraw cash from almost all of the United
Kingdom’s ATMs (irrespective of the bank at which
they hold their account)593.

10

Debit and Credit Card

The majority of debit and credit card systems in the UK
are operated by Visa and MasterCard Europe594. Since
2004, MasterCard Europe has been responsible for the
authorisation, clearing and processing of S2 Card
Services’ transactions under which are the Switch (later
rebranded to MasterCard’s Maestro debit brand) and
Solo branded debit cards595.

11

Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial
Telecommunication
(SWIFT)

Although it is not a payment or settlement system
itself, it provides secure messaging services to financial
institutions and market infrastructures and is used by
CHAPS, CREST, LCH.Clearnet Ltd and CLS and thus
its services are of systemic importance to the UK596.

Source: Various sources (see footnotes).

592

Bank of England (2008, p. 23).
Bank of England (2008, p. 24).
594
Bank of England (2008, p. 25).
595
Bank of England (2008, p. 25).
596
Bank of England (2008, p. 26).
593
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Table 45 Major Institutions in the Australian Payments System
No Institutions

Descriptions

1

Reserve Bank of
Australia (RBA)

Established in 1960, it is the central bank of Australia597. The
roles of the RBA in the Australian payments system are598:
▪ Determining the payments system policy (exercised by the
Payment System Board),
▪ Printing and issuing Australian currency notes as well as their
distribution,
▪ Conducting the Exchange Settlement (ES) Accounts used for
final settlement of payments,
▪ Playing the role as the main banker to the Commonwealth
Government, some state governments and several government
institutions,
▪ Operating the Reserve Bank Information and Transfer (RITS),
the central platform for the RTGS system and settlement system
for Commonwealth Government securities
▪ Conducting accounts for other central banks and some financial
organisations.

2

Payments System
Board (PSB)

Has the responsibility for determining the Reserve Bank’s
payments system policy599. This responsibility must be exercised
in a way that best contributes to:
▪ Controlling risk in the financial system,
▪ Promoting the efficiency of the payments system
▪ Promoting competition in the market for payment services,
consistent with the overall stability of the financial system.
The powers of the Payments System Board includes600:
▪ Designating a particular payments system as being subject to
Reserve Bank direction,
▪ Determining rules for participation in the system, including to
ensure access to new participants,
▪ Setting standards for the system on matters relating to safety
and efficiency
▪ Arbitrating on disputes concerning the system over matters
relating to access, financial safety, competitiveness and
systemic risks.

597

Reserve Bank of Australia (n.d.(d)).
Reserve Bank of Australia and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1999, pp. 7-8).
599
Reserve Bank of Australia (Reserve Bank of Australia, n.d.(e)).
600
Reserve Bank of Australia and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1999, p. 7).
598
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No Institutions

Descriptions

3

Australian
Prudential
Regulation
Authority (APRA)

Established in 1998 and funded by the industries under its
supervision, it has the responsibility for the supervision of banks,
credit unions, building societies, general insurance and
reinsurance companies, life insurance, friendly societies and most
members of the superannuation industry601.

4

Australian
Competition and
Consumer
Commission
(ACCC)

An independent Commonwealth statutory authority formed in
1995 whose primary responsibility is ensuring that individuals
and businesses comply with the Commonwealth competition, fair
trading and consumer protection laws to promote competition and
fair trade in the market place to benefit consumers, business and
the community as well as regulating national infrastructure
services602.

5

Australian
Payments Clearing
Association
Limited (APCA)

Established in February 1992, it is a public company owned by
the banks, building societies and credit unions with specific
accountability for key parts of the Australian payments system,
particularly payments clearing operations603. This is performed
by coordinating, managing and ensuring the implementation and
operation of effective payments clearing and settlements systems,
policies and procedures604.

6

Australian
Securities and
Investment
Commission
(ASIC)

The regulator of Australia’s corporate, markets and financial
services that ensures that Australia’s financial markets are fair
and transparent, supported by confident and informed investors
and consumers605. Its roles include606:
▪ Maintaining, facilitating and improving the performance of the
financial system and entities in it,
▪ Promoting confident and informed participation by investors
and consumers in the financial system,
▪ Administering the law effectively and with minimal procedural
requirements,
▪ Enforcing and giving effect to the law,
▪ Receiving, processing and storing, efficiently and quickly,
information that is given to us
▪ Making information about companies and other bodies
available to the public as soon as practicable.

601

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n.d.).
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (n.d.).
603
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(a)).
604
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(a)).
605
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (n.d.(b)).
606
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (n.d.(b)).
602
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No Institutions

Descriptions

7

Council of
Financial
Regulators

The coordinating body for Australia’s main financial regulatory
agencies607. Its responsibility is to contribute to the efficiency and
effectiveness of financial regulation by providing a high-level
forum for cooperation and collaboration among its members608.

8

The Financial
Sector Advisory
Council (FSAC)

Established in 1998, brings together a broad range of expert
views from the financial sector to provide advice to the
Government on policies to facilitate the growth of a strong and
competitive financial system609.
Its mission is to provide advice to the Treasurer on policies that
will maintain an efficient, competitive and dynamic financial
sector, consistent with the objectives of fairness, financial
stability and prudence and to promote dialogue between the
private sector and the Government in support of the development
and growth of Australia’s financial sector610.

9

The Banking
Ombudsman

Its role in the Australian payments system is helping to increase
public awareness and access to external dispute resolution
processes for consumers by providing a single national service
for banking, insurance and investment disputes in Australia611. Its
membership is open to any financial services provider carrying
on business in Australia612.

Source: Various sources (see footnotes).

Table 46 Major Payment Instruments in the Australian Payments System
No. Payment
Instruments

Descriptions

1

Cash are issued in the form of notes and coins. The notes are in
denominations of $AU5, $AU20, $AU50 and $AU100 and the
coins are in denominations of 5c, 10c, 20c, $AU1 and $AU2. The
Reserve Bank Act 1959 confers on the Reserve Bank of Australia
(RBA) the responsibility for the production and issue, reissue and
cancellation of Australia’s notes613.The Royal Australian Mint is
the sole supplier of Australia’s circulating coinage614.

Cash

607

Reserve Bank of Australia (n.d.(a)).
Reserve Bank of Australia (n.d.(a)).
609
Commonwealth Treasury (n.d.(a)).
610
Commonwealth Treasury (n.d.(b)).
611
Financial Ombudsman Service (n.d.).
612
Financial Ombudsman Service (n.d.).
613
Reserve Bank of Australia (n.d.(g)).
614
Royal Australian Mint (n.d.).
608
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No. Payment
Instruments

Descriptions

2

Cheque

A written instruction to a financial institution made by its
customer to pay a third party615. Cheques in Australia are issued
by banks, building societies and credit unions with eight banks
are direct clearers (they process cheques and then exchange them
with other direct clearers at regional exchange centres) whereas
other banks, building societies and credit unions use a direct
clearer to process and exchange cheques for them616.

3

Direct Entry (DE)

Used to handle transactions in large number617. The system is
available to businesses or organisations for making payments to,
or receiving payments from, large numbers of their employees or
clients618. Among the major participants of this system is the
Reserve Bank of Australia (in processing social security and
other government payments)619.

4

Payment Cards

A variety of payment cards are issued by financial institutions in
Australia including proprietary debit cards (for use in ATMs and
EFTPOS devices) as well as Visa and/or MasterCard and
Bankcard credit cards which, in some instances, can also be used
as ATM cards620. Other cards include stored value cards
(‘rechargeable stored value’, ‘smart cards’ or ‘electronic purses’)
that store value (and other information) in a computer chip and
are of various characteristics and degrees of sophistication621.

5

Automated teller
machines (ATMs)

Automated teller machines (ATMs) which generally operate 24
hours a day and are located at various places provide financial
services such as cash withdrawals, balance enquiries, transfers,
cheque book orders and statement orders by using Personal
Identification Number (PIN) to authorise the transactions622.
Several financial institutions have proprietary ATM networks as
does Cashcard, CUSCAL and other third party ATM service
providers623.

6

Electronic Fund
Transfer at Point
of Sale (EFTPOS)

These payment instruments are generally available at the
majority of merchants in Australia and it provides customers with
a payment mechanism for the supply of goods and services at the
point of sale624. Similar to an ATM transaction, an EFTPOS
transaction uses a plastic card with a magnetic stripe and PIN625.

615

Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(e)).
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(e)).
617
Reserve Bank of Australia and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1999, p. 10).
618
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(g)).
619
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(g)).
620
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(f)).
621
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(i)).
622
Reserve Bank of Australia and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1999, p. 11).
623
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(d)).
624
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(h)).
616
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No. Payment
Instruments

Descriptions

7

Third-Party Bill
Payments

Services provided by the participating financial institutions in
which the institutions arrange the payment of customers’ bill by
means of transfers from bank accounts626. An example of the
provider of this service is BPAY627.

8

Austraclear

A proprietary system operated by Austraclear Limited whose
members are the major participants in the money market: banks,
government and semi-government bodies, insurance and
superannuation companies, trustee companies, non-bank
financial institutions and larger corporations628.
The system provides an electronic central depository (private
sector, commonwealth government securities and semigovernment securities) and an electronic system for transferring
ownership of securities in paperless way629.

9

Reserve Bank
Information and
Transfer System
(RITS)

Australia’s Real-Time Gross Settlement that plays a central role
in the payments system and is operated by the Reserve Bank of
Australia630.

10

Clearing House
Electronic Subregister System
(CHESS)

The Clearing House Electronic Subregister System of the
Australian Stock Exchange631. In other words, it serves as a
settlement system for Australian equities operated by ASX
Settlement and Transfer Corporation632.

Source: Various sources (see footnotes).

Table 47 Summary
Recommendations
No. Primary Areas

of

the

President’s

Identity

Theft

Task

Force’s

Proposed Initiatives

625

Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(h)).
Reserve Bank of Australia and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1999, p. 12).
627
Payments System Board (2007, p. 9).
628
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(k)).
629
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(k)).
630
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(j)) and Reserve Bank of Australia (n.d.(f)).
631
Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.(b)).
632
Reserve Bank of Australia (n.d.(b)).
626
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No. Primary Areas

Proposed Initiatives

1

Keeping consumer data out
of the hands of offenders
(prevention)

▪ decrease the unnecessary use of social security
numbers in the public sector by developing
alternative strategies for identity management
▪ educate federal agencies on how to protect data,
monitor their compliance with existing guidance
▪ ensure effective, risk-based responses to data
breaches suffered by federal agencies
▪ establish national standards for private sector data
protection requirements and breach notice
requirements
▪ develop comprehensive record on private sector use
of social security numbers
▪ better educate the private sector on safeguarding data
▪ initiate investigations of data security violations
▪ initiate a multi-year public awareness campaign
▪ develop online clearinghouse for current educational
resources

2

Making it harder to misuse
consumer data (prevention)

▪ hold workshops on authentication
▪ develop a comprehensive record on private sector
use of SSNs

3

Helping consumers to repair
their lives (victim recovery)

▪ provide specialised training about victim recovery to
first responders and others offering direct assistance
to identity theft victims
▪ develop avenues for individualised assistance to
identity theft victims
▪ amend criminal restitution statutes to ensure that
victims recover the value of time spent in trying to
remediate the harms suffered
▪ assess whether to implement a national system that
allows victims to obtain an identification document
for authentication purposes
▪ assess efficacy of tools available to victims
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No. Primary Areas

Proposed Initiatives

4

▪ establish a national identity theft law enforcement
centre
▪ develop and promote the use of a universal identity
theft report form
▪ enhance information sharing between law
enforcement and the private sector
▪ encourage other countries to enact suitable domestic
legislation criminalising identity theft
▪ facilitate investigation and prosecution of
international identity theft by encouraging other
nations to accede to the convention on cybercrime
▪ identify the nations that provide safe havens for
identity thieves and use all measures available to
encourage those countries to change their policies
▪ enhance the us government’s ability to respond to
appropriate foreign requests for evidence in criminal
cases involving identity theft
▪ assist, train and support foreign law enforcement
▪ increase prosecutions of identity theft
▪ conduct targeted enforcement initiatives
▪ review civil monetary penalty programs
▪ close the gaps in federal criminal statutes used to
prosecute identity theft-related offenses to ensure
increased federal prosecution of these crimes
▪ ensure that an identity thief’s sentence can be
enhanced when the criminal conduct affects more
than one victim
▪ enhance training for law enforcement officers and
prosecutors
▪ enhance the gathering of statistical data impacting
the criminal justice system’s response to identity
theft

Prosecuting and punishing
identity theft offenders (law
enforcement)

Source: Adapted from The President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007a, pp. 4-9).

Table 48 Types of Credit Card Fraud in Indonesia
Schemes

Descriptions

Fraudulent Application

The offender forges their personal documents
such as ID, passport, bank statement, salary
statement and reference letter before applying
for credit card. After receiving their credit card,
the offender will make as many transactions as
possible with the card before disappearing
without paying their debts to the bank.
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Schemes

Descriptions

Non-Received Card

This scheme is generally an act of interception
of credit card delivery to the legitimate holder.
Generally the offender will sign the intercepted
card and use it for making transactions as if it
was their own.

Lost/Stolen Card

This scheme is perpetrated by stealing or
‘buying’ credit card and then uses it to make
separate small transactions (generally under the
floor limits) to avoid authorisation process.
Making only small transactions is necessary,
because a large transaction goes through an
authorisation process where the stolen card is
blocked and the offender is arrested.

This scheme is perpetrated by modifying real
credit cards (can be obtained by means of other
schemes such as ‘non-received card’ or
‘lost/stolen card’) by first ‘cleaning’ the cards
from their identities such as card numbers and
Altered Card (Re-Embossed/Re-Encoded) names by means of pressing them under certain
means. Afterward, the cards will undergo ‘reembossing’ (reprinted with new details) and ‘re–
encoding’ (inserting new data to the magnetic
stripes) processes to produce new cards by
which transactions are made.

Totally Counterfeit

Generally this scheme is similar to ‘altered card’
without real credit cards which makes this
scheme somewhat more sophisticated. The
offender produces their own forged card
complete with its logo and valid card details
through the process of embossing and encoding.
The forged cards were generally of high quality
that makes it easier to make transactions with.

White Plastic Card

This scheme is similar to ‘totally counterfeit’
scheme without the addition of physical features
which normally appear on real cards such as
logos. The data from real credit cards are
recorded and then printed (embossed) on credit
card-sized white cards and then the some data
are inserted (encoded) into the white cards’
magnetic stripes. With the forged cards are just
plain white cards, the success of this scheme
depends on the cooperation with corrupt
merchants who accept the transactions and then
charge the banks for the payments.
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Schemes

Descriptions

Record of Charge (ROC) Pumping

In this scheme, a corrupt merchant printed their
sales drafts more than once, the additional sales
draft is then handed in to other corrupt
merchants to be inserted with fictitious
transaction data complete with the forged
signature of the legitimate cardholder. The draft
is then charged to the acquirer as if it was from
legitimate transactions.

Altered Amount

This is a scheme where a corrupt merchant
changes the nominal value of the sales drafts of
the credit cards used in the transactions at their
stores. For example, a Rp100,000 transaction are
changed into a Rp1,000,000 transaction and then
the modified sales draft is charged to the
acquirer.

Skimming

This scheme is generally the theft of credit card
data from the magnetic stripe electronically
using a device called ‘skimmer’. The stolen data
can then be used to create a forged card or a
white card. Additionally the offender can simply
use credit card data for online transaction in
called card-not-present fraud or CNP scheme.

Wire Tapping

This scheme is in the form of theft of data
through the lines of telecommunication between
the Electronic Data Capture (EDC) terminal and
the existing system in the acquiring bank to
intercept credit card data from the magnetic
stripes.

Inline Tapping

This scheme is in the form of theft of data by
means of telephone cable connected to EDC or
PC-based Point of Sale (POS) to intercept credit
card data from magnetic stripes.

Mail, Telepone and Internet Order

This scheme is often mentioned as ‘card-notpresent’ fraud or CNP as only credit card data is
used in the fraudulent transaction without the
card’s presence. The scheme is commonly
perpetrated by ordering goods through mail or
telephone by providing credit card details. The
offender who managed to steal credit card
details act as if they were the legitimate
cardholders when making ‘card-not-present’
transactions the merchant.
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Schemes

Descriptions

EDC Modification

In this scheme, corrupt the merchant alter their
electronic data capture (EDC) that belongs to the
acquirer so that transaction authorisation can be
done without the presence of the cards. This
gives the impression that the transaction has
occurred and the acquirer will be billed for it.

Fictitious Merchant

This scheme is commonly in the form of an
offender posing as a legitimate merchant who
accepts credit card in their store. The offender
first applies for credit card-based payment rights
and facilities in the fictitious stores with false
documents to the banks, and after their
applications are approved, several fictitious
transactions are made and the acquirers are
billed for them. As soon as payments are
received, offenders vanish and leaving their
fictitious stores behind.

Common Purchase Points (CPP)

Unlike the ‘Fictitious Merchant’ scheme, in this
scheme, the merchant is real but corrupt. The
scheme is perpetrated by a merchant by means
of copying customers’ credit card data during
transactions at their store to be used later on in
making forged credit cards.

Credit Card Generator (CCG)

This scheme is very popular among ‘carders’ or
online credit card offenders to generate credit
card numbers. This scheme generally uses some
kind of softwares to generate credit card
numbers based on the existing valid numbers
(extrapolation). The software can generate even
hundreds of valid credit card numbers at once
for offenders to use.

Ghost Phantom Terminal

This scheme is commonly used to support other
schemes such as ‘Credit Card Generator’. This
scheme is a means to test whether the credit card
data acquired by offenders can be used for
making transactions or not. The name ‘Ghost’
came from the fact that the device used for this
scheme is generally Point of Sales (POS)
terminal which has been abandoned by the
merchant and is unknown as to its location.

Source: Adapted from the Indonesian National Police (1998, pp. 16-19).
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Table 49 Interviews and Interviewees633
Date

Experts

Institutions and Positions

7 April 2008

Mr Eddy
Manindo
Harahap



Head of the Directorate of Compliance and
Supervisor of the Indonesian Financial Transaction
Reports and Analysis Center (INTRAC)

8 April 2008

Mr Harrold
Abraham
Gaspersz




A member of the AKKI Risk manager Forum
Manager of the Risk Management Department of the
Bank Rakyat Indonesia

8 May 2008

Mr Iwan
Setiawan



IT Senior System Analyst of Bank Indonesia

9 May 2008

Mr Harrold
Abraham
Gaspersz




A member of the AKKI Risk manager Forum
Manager of the Risk Management Department of the
Bank Rakyat Indonesia

29 May
2008

Mr Ferry
Tupanno




Risk Management Coordinator of the AKKI
Section Head of the Quality Assurance Department,
Consumer Collection Group of the Bank Mandiri

19 June
2008

Mr Ferry
Tupanno




Risk Management coordinator of the AKKI
Section Head of the Quality Assurance Department,
Consumer Collection Group of the Bank Mandiri

24 July
2008

Mr Dodit
Probojakti




A member of the AKKI Executive Board
Chief Operation Officer (COO) of the GE Money

28 August
2008

Mr Najib Wahito



Supervisor of Asset Declaration Examiners of the
Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia
(KPK)
(KPK)



633

On 28 January 2010 the researcher visited the APCA office in Sydney to have a discussion with Dr
Brad Pragnell (Head of Industry Policy) and Ms Caroline Pearce (Head of Fraud, Risk and
Compliance) on issues in payments fraud prevention. This visit was not part of this study’s
fieldwork; however, the researcher believed that the opportunity offered by both experts to have a
face-to-face discussion would provide valuable inputs for this study. In the discussion, Dr Brad
Pragnell was of the opinion that one benefit of an SRO would be that the people who make
decisions are the same as those who would bear the consequences (for example, costs) of such
decisions in the future, and thus problem-oriented decisions could be achieved and resources
allocated more effectively and efficiently. Nevertheless, referring to the experience of the APCA,
Dr Pragnell believed that because of the existing private interests of its members, such a state of
collaboration would not be achieved quickly, because generally, an SRO must go through a long
journey of learning and experience. In terms of fraud prevention, Ms Caroline Pearce argued that,
as part of the APCA contributions in promoting safety in the Australian payments system, fraud
data are essential, because they are of assistance particularly in putting things on perspective to
find solutions for fraud problems. Additionally, according to Ms Pearce, in setting the mechanism
for fraud data collection, due to the sensitive nature of such data, the APCA has its own privacy
arrangement in which confidentiality is preserved while promoting transparency in informing its
members in particular, and the society in general, about, among other things, the current trends in
payments fraud.
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Date

Experts

Institutions and Positions

13 August
2008

Mr Tri Wiratmo



Police Commissioner Adjutant at the Yogyakarta
Provincial Police (Polda DIY) office

27 October
2008

Ms Ida
Nuryanti (via
phone)



Senior Legal Analyst of Bank Indonesia

3 December
2008

Mr Dodit
Probojakti




A member of the AKKI Executive Board
Chief Operation Officer (COO) of the GE Money

Figure 69 Organisational Structure of the AKKI (September 2007 to September
2009)
Source: Indonesia Credit Card Association (2007b).
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Value ($US)
Fraud
Transactions

Total No.
of
All
Transactions
(Thousands)

Total Value ($US)
of All
Transactions
($ Millions)

Fraud as % of
Total
No.
of
Transactions

In Basis Points

Fraud as % of
Total Value ($US)
of Transactions

In Basis Points

1,400

11,339,800

374,254

1,286,960

0.0004

0.04

0.0009

0.09

37,793

11,521,208

2,204,309

174,635

0.0017

0.17

0.0066

0.66

Credit
and
Charge
Card

407,520

114,233,439

1,871,850

214,710

0.0218

2.18

0.0532

5.32

Total

446,713

137,094,448

4,450,413

1,676,305

0.01

1.0

0.0082

0.82

Instruments

of
No. of Fraud
Transactions

Table 50 Fraud Perpetrated on Australian issued Payment Instruments 1 January
2008 – 31 December 2008

Cheque
Debit
Card

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Card Schemes and Australian Payments Clearing Association,
cited in Australian Payments Clearing Association (2009c).

Value ($US)
Fraud
Transactions

Total No.
of
All
Transactions
(Thousands)

Total Value ($US)
of All
Transactions
($ Millions)

Fraud as % of
Total
No.
of
Transactions

In Basis Points

Fraud as % of
Total Value ($US)
of Transactions

In Basis POints

1,488

14,715,073

333,006

1,184,128

0.0004

0.04

0.0012

0.12

63,894

19,315,235

2,509,411

204,839

0.0025

0.25

0.0094

0.94

Credit
and
Charge
Card

593,819

115,122,726

1.845,183

201,457

0.0322

3.22

0.0571

5.71

Total

659,201

149,153,034

4,687,600

1,590,424

0.0141

1.41

0.0094

0.94

Instruments

of
No. of Fraud
Transactions

Table 51 Fraud Perpetrated on Australian issued Payment Instruments 1 January
2009 – 31 December 2009

Cheque
Debit
Card

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Card Schemes and Australian Payments Clearing Association,
cited in Australian Payments Clearing Association (2010b).
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Figure 70 Fraud Perpetrated on Australian issued Payment Instruments 1 January
2006 – 31 December 2009 (in Basis Points)634
Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b; 2009c; Fraud
Perpetrated on Australian Issued Payment Instruments 1 January 2009 - 31 December 2009, 2010b).

Table 52 Credit Card and Charge Card Fraud Perpetrated in Australia and
Overseas on Australian-issued Cards 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2009
Category

2006

2007

2008

2009

Number Value ($US)

Number Value ($US)

Number Value ($US)

Number Value ($US)

Lost/Stolen
Never
Received

55,623
11,397

11,444,592
3,277,535

60,094
10,436

13,718,945
2,454,878

57,471
12,340

12,154,479
2,706,978

62,698
11,505

10,324,112
2,393,062

Fraudulent
Application

9,170

3,896,113

5,612

2,440,932

3,756

1,314,527

3,719

1,333,511

Counterfeit/ 49,673
Skimming
112,958
Card Not
Present
(CNP)
Other
2,242
Total
241,063

22,632,866

50,428

25,909,469

76,039

39,292,487

73,058

29,618,565

56,497,232 437,578

70,027,858

25,092,252 190,239

42,459,680 252,308

917,327
9,377
67,260,685 326,186

1,530,679
5,606
2,267,736
5,261
1,425,618
88,514,584 407,520 114,233,439 593,819 115,122,726

Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b; 2009c; Fraud
Perpetrated on Australian Issued Payment Instruments 1 January 2009 - 31 December 2009, 2010b).

634

Refers to the percentage expressed as 1/100th of a percent.
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Figure 71 Losses ($US) from Credit Card and Charge Card Fraud Perpetrated in
Australia and Overseas on Australian-issued Cards 1 January 2006 – 31 December
2009
Source: Adapted from Australian Payments Clearing Association (2007c; 2008b; 2009c; Fraud
Perpetrated on Australian Issued Payment Instruments 1 January 2009 - 31 December 2009, 2010b).

The basis point calculation in Figure 70 indicates that fraud as percentage of total
number and total value of transactions is on a rising trend in the period of 2006 –
2009. As shown by Table 50 and Table 51, after 2007, credit and charge card fraud
continue to grow in Australia in 2008 and 2009 with total losses of $AU145 million
and $AU146 million respectively. Card Not Present is the main contributor to the
rising credit card and charge card fraud losses in Australia followed by
counterfeit/skimming (see Figure 71). This implies that, just like many other
countries in the world, Australia has to cope with the growing problem of Card Not
Present fraud. For this, in addition to the existing counterfeit/skimming prevention
measures such as the chip and PIN technology, the country should also consider
investing in measures such as PCI DSS for online security.
538

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Issuing bank logo
EMV chip on "smart cards"
Hologram
Credit card number
Card brand logo
Expiration Date
Card Holder Name
Contactless chip

1. Magnetic stripe.
2. Signature strip
3. CVC2 code
Figure 72 Structure of a Credit Card
Source: CreditCard.gen.in (n.d.).
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A credit card’s physical features follow the international standard ISO/IEC 7810 :
2003635 under which the card’s dimension should be of 85.60 millimeter by 53.98
millimeter or 3.370 inches by 2.2125 inches (Dimensions Guide, n.d.). Before the
emergence of smartcard technology, a credit card was in the form of a magnetic
stripe card with the capability to store digital data by recording a magnetic pattern
within a black stripe on the back of the card (Masters & Turner, 2007, p. 16).
According to the standards636, each magnetic stripe has three tracks often referred to
as Track 1, Track 2, and Track 3 (Aurora Bar Code Technologies, n.d., p. 1; Masters
& Turner, 2007, p. 16). A credit card typically uses only Track 1 and Track 2 (Track
3 is not usually used for financial transaction cards) (Masters & Turner, 2007, pp. 1617). Track 1 normally encodes information about cardholder’s name, card number,
and expiry date (Aurora Bar Code Technologies, n.d., p. 2). Track 2 only holds
information about card number and expiry date (Aurora Bar Code Technologies,
n.d., p. 2).
To capture the data within the magnetic stripes during transactions, magnetic stripe
readers of various types are used to swipe the credit cards with at the Point of Sale
(POS) (Aurora Bar Code Technologies, n.d., p. 2). Among the common types of card
readers are stand alone (portable) reader and online reader (attached to a PC or cash
635
636

For the original text, see International Organization for Standarization (2003).
Common Standards covering cards and readers are (Masters & Turner, 2007, p. 17; JCS Computer
Resources , n.d.):


ISO 7810 – physical characteristics of credit cards (ISO/IEC7810, 2003).



ISO 7811 (1–6) – embossing, track location, Lo/Hi coercivity (ISO/IEC 7811).



ISO 7813 – financial transaction cards (ISO 7813).



ISO 4909 – card data format – Track 3 (ISO 4909, 2000).
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register) (Masters & Turner, 2007, p. 17; Aurora Bar Code Technologies, n.d., p. 2).
The reader interprets data encoded on a card’s magnetic stripe (JCS Computer
Resources , n.d.). It reads credit card information directly into a POS program (JCS
Computer Resources , n.d.).
After the introduction of the chip and PIN technology (with the EMV standard)637,
the way a credit card used in a transaction changes. A cardholder, during a
transaction, inserts his or her card and then enters a PIN into a PIN entry device
(PED) (Drimer, Murdoch, & Anderson, 2008, p. 4). The PIN will be verified by the
card and then authenticated to the PED by a public key certificate (Drimer, Murdoch,
& Anderson, 2008, p. 4). Card issuers may further authenticate the transaction online
(Drimer, Murdoch, & Anderson, 2008, p. 4).

Figure 73 Credit Card Transaction
Source: Gerts (2007, p. 3).

The EMV standard itself was formulated with the following goals (Ingenico, 2001, p.
2):


637

The card and acceptance device must communicate together and indicate what
applications the card and acceptance device have in common.

See Chapter 7 for discussions.
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The acceptance device can run common applications and ensure that minimum
standards for risk control and security are applied for debit/credit applications.



The microprocessor-based payment card provides worldwide acceptance and
interoperability.

From information technology point of view, the entire credit card network is a highly
complex structure of information flow from one point to another. Below is a sample
of transaction flow of EMV credit card.
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Figure 74 Sample Transaction Flow of Credit Card
Source: Gerts (2007, p. 14).
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Figure 75 Data Breach Threats in the US (2004-2009)
Source: Verizon RISK Team & United States Secret Service (2010, p. 20).

Malware is software (or programming code) created to compromise or harm
information assets without the consent of the owner (Verizon RISK Team & United
States Secret Service, 2010, p. 20). Among the most well known forms of malware
are viruses and worms (Beaver, 2004, p. 237). The report by the Information
Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) classifies malware into: virus,
network worm, Trojan horse, spyware, blended attacks, embedded malicious code,
crimeware, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
malware constructors and other hacker tool and programmed exploits (Information
Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2009, pp. 7-16). The descriptions of these
malwares are as follows:
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Virus is a program that often has the ability to self-replicate and then attaches
to ‘host’ program or document deleting information and crashing computers
when it is activated by user or other process (Information Assurance
Technology Analysis Center, 2009, p. 7).



Network worm is a self-propagating program which spreads over the internet
by locating other vulnerable potential hosts on the network (Information
Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2009, p. 9).Worms usually load up in
memory, exploiting software vulnerabilities and crashing the system (Beaver,
2004, p. 240).



Trojan horse is a malicious program which is often transmitted through email as a legitimate program (Beaver, 2004, p. 239). Once installed in the
system, hackers can control it for malicious purposes such as stealing money,
passwords, or other valuable information (Information Assurance Technology
Analysis Center, 2009, p. 10).The program can also be used to create a
‘zombie’ to distribute spam, phishing emails, Trojans, or other malware to
other computers on the network (Information Assurance Technology Analysis
Center, 2009, p. 10).



Spyware (non-Trojan) is a program similar to a Trojan which spies on
someone’s computer and can capture and transmit confidential information
(Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2009, p. 14; Beaver,
2004, p. 241). Spyware is often installed as cookies, Window Registry entries,
and executable files (Beaver, 2004, p. 241).
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Blended attack is a combination of multiple malwares most often viruses,
worms and Trojans and recently, bots and adware (Information Assurance
Technology Analysis Center, 2009, p. 14).



Embedded malicious code is malicious logic (for examples, logic bombs, time
bombs, or Trojan) embedded by its developer, integrator, distributor, or
installer in a valid program (Information Assurance Technology Analysis
Center, 2009, p. 14).



Crimeware is a malware type created and used predominantly or exclusively
to support criminal activities (Information Assurance Technology Analysis
Center, 2009, p. 15).



DoS and DDoS tools are used to automate DoS (locally) or DDoS (over the
network) attacks (Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2009,
p. 15). In a DoS or DDoS attack, a hacker initiates a large number of invalid
requests to a network host so that it will stop responding to legitimate request
(Beaver, 2004, p. 144).



Malware Constructors are software tools for developing new malware
(Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2009, p. 15).



Other malwares include tools and programmed exploits used by hackers to
penetrate remote computers such as Dialers which uses modem connections
to dial back to the attacker and may also cause the victim to use primary-rate
billing

numbers

when

making

connections

Technology Analysis Center, 2009, p. 16).
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Hacking refers to all attempts to access or harm information without or in excess of
authorization by challenging and defeating the security mechanisms (Verizon RISK
Team & United States Secret Service, 2010, p. 27). Social tactics refers to the use of
means such as deception, manipulation and intimidation to exploit human element
(for example, users) of information assets in data breach (Verizon RISK Team &
United States Secret Service, 2010, p. 31). This technique is often used in
combination with other technical and or non-technical data breach means (for
example, a malware which is designed to look like an antivirus) (Verizon RISK Team
& United States Secret Service, 2010, p. 31).This technique is often referred to as
‘social engineering’ which focuses on ‘people hacking’ by exploiting the trusting
nature of human beings for obtaining information assets (Beaver, 2004, p. 55).
Misuse is defined as utilising organisational resources (or privileges) for unlawful
purpose whether or not it is malicious in nature (Verizon RISK Team & United
States Secret Service, 2010, p. 33). This is usually committed by offenders (for
example, insiders and partners) who enjoy a degree of trust from their organizations
(Verizon RISK Team & United States Secret Service, 2010, p. 33). In physical
actions category, the data breach is perpetrated by involving human driven threats
such as physical attacks (Verizon RISK Team & United States Secret Service, 2010,
p. 35). Finally, data breach or data leakage may occur from anything done or undone
incorrectly or inadvertently (error) (Verizon RISK Team & United States Secret
Service, 2010, p. 36). Examples of this are poor decisions, omissions,
misconfigurations and process breakdowns (Verizon RISK Team & United States
Secret Service, 2010, p. 36).
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